United Voice v Geo Group Australia Pty Ltd
[2014] FCA 928
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
United Voice v GEO Group Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 928
Citation: United Voice v GEO Group Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 928 Parties: UNITED VOICE v THE GEO GROUP AUSTRALIA PTY LTD File number: QUD 466 of 2014 Judge: COLLIER J Date of judgment: 26 August 2014 Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – interlocutory application seeking reinstatement of suspended employee pending determination or further order – employee union delegate employed at correctional facility – Code of Conduct of employer prohibited employees making media comments concerning workplace – employee made media comments in capacity as union delegate – whether workplace rights and/or lawful industrial activity under Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – principles relevant to grant of interlocutory relief – whether serious question to be tried – whether balance of convenience favours grant of interlocutory relief Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 340, 341, 346, 347, 361(1), 361(2), 545
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 23Cases cited: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57 cited
Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500 cited
Cuevas v Freeman Motors Pty Ltd (1975) 25 FLR 67 cited
Finance Sector Union of Australia v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group (2002) 120 FCR 107 distinguishedDate of hearing: 25 August 2014 Place: Melbourne (via Video Link to Brisbane and Sydney) Division: FAIR WORK DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 42 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr WL Friend QC Solicitor for the Applicant: Hall Payne Counsel for the Respondent: Mr GJ Hatcher SC with Ms S Moody Solicitor for the Respondent: Hall & Wilcox
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
FAIR WORK DIVISION
QUD 466 of 2014
BETWEEN: UNITED VOICE
ApplicantAND: THE GEO GROUP AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Respondent
JUDGE:
COLLIER J
DATE OF ORDER:
26 AUGUST 2014
WHERE MADE:
BRISBANE
SUBJECT TO UNDERTAKINGS BY THE RESPONDENT THAT, PENDING THE HEARING AND DETERMINATION OF THE PROCEEDING OR FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT:
(a)The Respondent, by itself its servants or agents, will not terminate the employment of Ms Kylie Muscat because of the reason, or because of reasons including the reason, that Ms Muscat engaged in the conduct referred to in the Respondent’s show cause letter to Ms Muscat dated 18 August 2014;
(b)The Respondent will continue to pay Ms Muscat pursuant to her contract of employment, such pay for the purposes of the proceeding being calculated on Ms Muscat’s average weekly earnings in the six month period up to and including 12 August 2014 (being the date on which her suspension commenced); and
(c)The Respondent will not give effect to the show cause letter provided to Ms Muscat dated 18 August 2014.
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The interlocutory relief sought by the applicant in its originating application filed 25 August 2014 be refused.
2.The parties provide submissions as to an appropriate form of orders to take the matter to trial.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
FAIR WORK DIVISION
QUD 466 of 2014
BETWEEN: UNITED VOICE
ApplicantAND: THE GEO GROUP AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Respondent
JUDGE:
COLLIER J
DATE:
26 AUGUST 2014
PLACE:
BRISBANE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Yesterday the applicant union filed an urgent application seeking both final and interlocutory relief against the respondent. The final relief sought by the applicant included declarations, injunctions, compensation and penalties concerning the suspension and threat of termination of the employment of one of its members, Ms Kylie Muscat. The interlocutory relief sought is as follows:
1.An order that until the hearing and determination of this application, or further order, the respondent treat the suspension of Ms Kylie Muscat from her employment as invalid and of no force or effect.
2.An order that until the hearing and determination of this application, or further order, the respondent be prohibited from threatening to terminate or terminating the employment of Ms Kylie Muscat on the grounds set out in its letter of 12 August 2014 and 18 August 2014 which are exhibits KM8 and KM13 respectively, to the affidavit of Kylie Muscat affirmed 22 August 2014 or on other grounds related to an alleged contravention of clause 4.3.8 of the respondent’s Code of Conduct and Ethical Behaviour Policy.
3. Such further or other orders as the Court deems appropriate.
In my view interlocutory relief in the terms sought by the applicant ought be refused. I consider that different interlocutory orders should be made, for reasons I explain below. Before turning to those reasons however it is helpful to set out the background to the proceeding currently before me.
Background
As Mr Hatcher SC for the respondent submitted, the background facts are not contentious.
The Centre
The respondent conducts a privately managed remand centre at Wacol in south-east Queensland known as the Arthur Gorrie Correctional Centre (“the Centre”). The Centre has approximately 1000 male inmates, and no female inmates. All inmates are high security inmates on remand. They are supervised and serviced by approximately 58 prison officers at any one time.
Approximately 130 members of the applicant union, including union delegate Ms Kylie Muscat, are employed by the respondent at the Centre.
Ms Muscat
Ms Muscat has been employed by the respondent since September 2006. She has been an elected delegate for United Voice since February 2014. There are four other United Voice delegates at the Centre. As union delegate Ms Muscat’s duties include:
·providing industrial advice to members;
·raising issues that affect her colleagues with supervisors and managers;
·attending disciplinary meetings on behalf of members as their representative;
·identifying and seeking to resolve industrial and/or occupational health and safety issues that affect union members.
Safety issues at the Centre
The applicant contends that since May 2014 a number of serious safety issues have arisen at the Centre, namely:
·issues relating to proper control of inmates arising from a reduction in the number of staff rostered on at any given time; and
·issues arising due to a smoking ban imposed at the prison which has distressed inmates and made them aggressive towards staff.
During this time two prison officers have been assaulted by inmates. In her affidavit affirmed 22 August 2014 Ms Muscat deposed that she reported these matters to the applicant. Ms Muscat also deposed that she raised her concerns with the respondent on numerous occasions including monthly consultative committee meetings and various other meetings. She stated further however that:
… we were being ignored by the respondent. I therefore sought advice and assistance from the applicant to address the issues as it saw fit.
Media release and subsequent events
Importantly, Ms Muscat continues:
25.On 12 August 2014 I authorised the applicant to issue a press release about the safety issues including quotes from me in my capacity as a delegate for the applicant. Annexed and marked KM4 is that document (the Press Release).
26.The content of the press release, including the quotes, was drawn from a lengthy meeting which I had with the applicant at the office of the applicant on 7 August 2014 regarding the safety issues. During that meeting the applicant encouraged me to publicise the safety issues in an attempt to have them resolved and I agreed to do so because, as set out above, that is one of my responsibilities as a delegate.
27.Later on 12 August 2014, an article was run by the Brisbane Times regarding the matters the subject of the Press Release. Annexed and marked KM5 is that document. The article contained quotes from me which were lifted from the Press Release. I did not participate in any interview with that publication.
28.On 13 August 2014, an article was run by the Sydney Morning Herald regarding the matters the subject of the Press Release. Annexed and marked KM6 is that document. That article contained quotes from me which were lifted from the Press Release. I did not participate in any interview with that publication.
29.On 12 August 2014 ABC Radio contacted United Voice regarding the Press Release and sought to interview me. I discussed this request with Edwina from United Voice and agreed to give an interview in my capacity as a delegate for the applicant. Annexed and marked KM7 is the transcript of that interview.
By letter dated 12 August 2014 the respondent suspended Ms Muscat from her employment on full pay. Subsequently by letter dated 18 August 2014 the respondent required Ms Muscat to show cause why her employment should not be terminated.
On 20 August 2014 the respondent notified the Fair Work Commission of a dispute with the applicant regarding, inter alia, the Enterprise Agreement. The applicant contends that the relevant dispute was outside the jurisdiction of the Fair Work Commission.
Enterprise Agreement and Code of Conduct
Corrective Services Officers and Supervisors at the Centre are employed under the Arthur Gorrie Correctional Officers Enterprise Agreement 2014 (“Enterprise Agreement”), which was made in accordance with the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (“the Act”). It is not in dispute that the applicant is also covered by this Agreement in respect of its members employed at the Centre.
Clause 6.5.4 of the Enterprise Agreement provides:
Employees shall adhere to the Employer’s policies including the Code of Conduct, as amended from time to time.
Annexed to the unsworn affidavit of Mr Troy Ittensohn, the General Manager of the Centre, is a copy of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Behaviour (“Code of Conduct”) of the respondent, approved 23 May 2014. It is not in dispute that the terms of the Code of Conduct are applicable in this case. In particular clause 4.3.8 of the Code of Conduct provides:
Staff members are not to deal with the media on Company related matters under any circumstances. Staff will not identify themselves as GEO employees in any media comment (on non-Company related matters) without the prior authorisation of the Managing Director.
I note that Mr Ittensohn is currently in the United States of America. The respondent has undertaken to file a sworn affidavit of Mr Ittensohn as soon as possible.
In his affidavit Mr Ittensohn referred to the article in the Brisbane Times of 12 August 2014 quoting Ms Muscat (and to which Ms Muscat also referred in her affidavit). That article read as follows:
The assault of a female prison officer at one of Queensland’s toughest jails has her union complaining of poor resources and inmate anger over a prisoner smoking ban.
A United Voice spokeswoman said the woman was assaulted on Friday morning during a “routine check” of an inmate’s cell at the Arthur Gorrie Correctional Centre at Wacol, west of Brisbane.
She said the officer was struck across the face and needed medical treatment.
United Voice delegate Kylie Muscat said a smoking ban introduced on May 5 had escalated tensions at the prison.
“The smoking ban really set a match to what was already a volatile situation and we’ve seen several staff attacked by inmates since,” she said.
“On top of the resourcing issues we already had, conditions at the prison have become a perfect storm and it’s workers who are suffering.”
Ms Muscat said the prisoner population had increased from about 880 in May to 979 now. On Tuesday, the Corrective Services website listed the prison’s capacity as 890.
“The Workload has increased significantly and staff are facing increased aggression from prisoners frustrated by food shortages, a lack of chairs and general overcrowding,” she said.
“Unless something changes soon, we suspect we’re going to see increasingly violent assaults on workers at Arthur Gorrie and that’s completely unacceptable.”
Ms Muscat said Arthur Gorrie management needed to better resource the prison to cope with the increased prisoner population.
Comment was sought from Attorney-General Jarrod Bleijie, whose office directed queries to the Department of Justice and Attorney-General.
The questions sent to the department await response.
It is not in dispute that the article in the Brisbane Times accurately reflected comments of Ms Muscat in the press release issued by the applicant on 12 August 2014.
In his affidavit, Mr Ittensohn relevantly states:
23.When I read the Brisbane Times article of 12 August 2014 quoting Ms Muscat, it appeared to me that (if the quotes were genuine in having been made by her) there had been a serious breach of the Code by Ms Muscat.
24.I satisfied myself that Ms Muscat was aware of the Code. I came to this conclusion as I accessed a signed acknowledgement of awareness of the Code by Ms Kylie Muscat of 30 November 2013…
25.As stated above, I was aware that Ms Muscat was an employee union delegate. However, I was satisfied that, on the balance of probabilities, Ms Muscat had knowingly breached the Code.
…
27.I made the decision to suspend Ms Muscat as it appeared to me she had breached the Code of Conduct and that the breach was a serious breach.
28.I regarded the breach as serious as I understand the purpose of the restrictions on media contact to be related to the safety and security of the facility and that the concerns were common to GEO and its principal, QCS.
29.Prisoners read newspapers, as do gang members and even terrorist groups with interest about the activities of the Centre. All of these groups are looking for vulnerability of either staff or operational processes.
30.Staff by identifying themselves can make themselves targets of such groups. Further, the operation of the facility can be made much more vulnerable where prisoners are alert to a sense of vulnerability of a particular staff member, or staff generally.
…
34.I am aware generally of the workplace rights identified in s 341 of the Fair Work Act and I was aware at the relevant time that Ms Muscat enjoyed many of these rights. I have already stated that I was aware Ms Muscat was a delegate. However, these workplace rights and Ms Muscat’s union membership and role as a delegate, were entirely immaterial to my decision to suspend her. If it did not appear to me that Ms Muscat had breached the Code I would not have taken any action against her. If any other employee who did not enjoy the rights tht Ms Muscat enjoyed, or who was not a union member and/or delegate, had engaged in the same conduct as Ms Muscat appeared to have engaged in, I would have suspended their reemployment pending investigation.
Relevant legislation
The starting point for consideration of the applicant’s claim is s 340 of the Act which provides as follows:
Protection
(1) A person must not take adverse action against another person:
(a) because the other person:
(i) has a workplace right; or
(ii) has, or has not, exercised a workplace right; or
(iii)proposes or proposes not to, or has at any time proposed or proposed not to, exercise a workplace right; or
(b) to prevent the exercise of a workplace right by the other person.
Note: This subsection is a civil remedy provision (see Part 4-1).
(2)A person must not take adverse action against another person (the second person) because a third person has exercised, or proposes or has at any time proposed to exercise, a workplace right for the second person’s benefit, or for the benefit of a class of persons to which the second person belongs.
Note: This subsection is a civil remedy provision (see Part 4-1).
“Workplace right” is defined by s 341 to mean circumstances where a person:
(a)is entitled to the benefit of, or has a role or responsibility under, a workplace law, workplace instrument or order made by an industrial body; or
(b)is able to initiate, or participate in, a process or proceedings under a workplace law or workplace instrument; or
(c) is able to make a complaint or inquiry:
(i)to a person or body having the capacity under a workplace law to seek compliance with that law or a workplace instrument; or
(ii) if the person is an employee--in relation to his or her employment.
The applicant also relies on s 346 and s 347 of the Act. Materially these sections provide:
346 Protection
A person must not take adverse action against another person because the other person:
(a)is or is not, or was or was not, an officer or member of an industrial association; or
(b)engages, or has at any time engaged or proposed to engage, in industrial activity within the meaning of paragraph 347(a) or (b); or
(c)does not engage, or has at any time not engaged or proposed to not engage, in industrial activity within the meaning of paragraphs 347(c) to (g).
Note: This section is a civil remedy provision (see Part 4-1).
347 Meaning of engages in industrial activity
A person engages in industrial activity if the person:
(a) …
(b) does, or does not:(i) …
(ii)organise or promote a lawful activity for, or on behalf of, an industrial association; or
…
(v)represent or advance the views, claims or interests of an industrial association; or
…
Principles relevant to grant of interlocutory relief
Principles relevant to the grant of the interlocutory relief sought by the applicant in this case are not in dispute. The High Court in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57 found, inter alia, that an applicant for an interlocutory injunction must show that:
·there is a serious question to be tried as to the applicant’s entitlement to relief;
·the applicant is likely to suffer injury for which damages will not be an adequate remedy; and
·the balance of convenience favours the granting of the interlocutory injunction.
That the Federal Court has power to make the interlocutory orders sought pursuant to s 545 of the Act and s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) is not in dispute.
Mr Friend QC for the applicant also submitted that, in considering the strength of the serious question to be tried, the Court is entitled to have regard to the existence of the provisions of s 361(1) of the Act, which (in summary) reverses the onus of proof to require the employer to establish that it did not take action for proscribed reasons once certain facts are established. This presents a curious conundrum because s 361(2) specifically provides that s 361(1) does not apply in relation to orders for an interim injunction. Nonetheless, I accept the submission of Mr Friend QC that the provisions of s 361(1) and the general position in respect of the onus borne by an employer in circumstances of adverse action claims are relevant considerations in determining whether interlocutory relief should be granted.
Case of the applicant
The position of the applicant is, in summary, as follows:
·The respondent has suspended and threatened to dismiss Ms Muscat, apparently because she exercised workplace rights within the meaning of s 341 of the Act, and/or engaged in industrial activity within the meaning of s 347 of the Act.
·The conduct of the respondent constituted adverse action within the meaning of the Act, in contravention of s 340 and s 346 of the Act.
·Ms Muscat was entitled to both complain to the applicant and the respondent, and speak to the media, in her capacity as a delegate of the applicant. These were workplace rights within the meaning of s 341 of the Act, irrespective of the terms of the Enterprise Agreement and the Code of Conduct.
·While Mr Ittersohn has stated that his reason for deciding that disciplinary action should be taken against Ms Muscat was because she had contravened the Code of Conduct, the Court is required to determine the real reason for the employer’s action based on the material before the Court: Gummow and Hayne JJ in Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500 at [79].
·Speaking to the press as a delegate has been held to have the relevant character of a protected attribute: Finance Sector Union of Australia v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group (2002) 120 FCR 107 and Cuevas v Freeman Motors Pty Ltd (1975) 25 FLR 67.
·There is a very strong issue to be tried.
·It is self-evident that the terminations will cause financial and other detriment to Ms Muscat. In her affidavit Ms Muscat deposes as to the financial difficulty she will experience if she is suspended and/or terminated.
·Damages are an inadequate remedy.
·The failure to return Ms Muscat to duty at the workplace will also deprive the applicant and its members of her services as delegate.
·Irrespective of any offer by the respondent to pay Ms Muscat her salary pending resolution of this matter, Ms Muscat should be permitted to return to the workplace.
The applicant also relies on the affidavit of Michael Clifford, a union official employed by the applicant as a co-ordinator. In his affidavit affirmed 25 August 2014 Mr Clifford deposes, inter alia, that Ms Muscat is the sole delegate for the applicant in respect of her work group, and in her absence it could be very difficult for the applicant to adequately represent members of the applicant employed at the Centre.
Case of the respondent
In summary the respondent contends:
·It is prepared to give an undertaking that, pending hearing and determination of the proceeding or further order of the Court, the respondent will not terminate the employment of Ms Muscat for reasons associated with this proceeding or give effect to the show cause letter of 18 August 2014.
·The matter should be referred to mediation prior to returning to Court for further orders.
·Pending determination of the proceeding or further order the respondent will pay Ms Muscat her salary but she should not be required to attend the Centre or make any public comment.
·The applicant and the respondent had agreed in the Enterprise Agreement (by reference to the Code of Conduct) that employees – including members of the applicant union – should not make media comment.
·Workplace rights and industrial activities contemplate lawful conduct only. Issues of security are clearly of high importance in the operation of a correctional facility. “Workplace rights” and “industrial activities” should not extend to public media comment by union delegates in light of potential security risks which could arise from such comment. The Court ought not find there is a serious question to be tried.
·The respondent is prepared to pay Ms Muscat her salary and suspend the investigation related to the show cause letter pending further orders of this Court.
Consideration
The applicant argued strongly that the relevant conduct of Ms Muscat in her capacity as a union delegate – including making media statements – was protected under the Act, irrespective whether the respondent disapproved of that conduct.
First, the applicant submits that its position in this respect is supported by the decision of this Court in Finance Sector Union. However I consider that the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable from the facts before me. In Finance Sector Union:
·the relevant union official made general comments concerning problems of job security in the banking industry;
·she was the national President of the applicant union;
·she was not identified as an employee of the respondent bank;
·there was no agreement between the applicant union and the respondent bank in relation to media comments.
In this case before me however:
·in light of the respondent’s Code of Conduct and the Enterprise Agreement, the applicant and the respondent had agreed that employees would not deal with the media on company related matters under any circumstances, or identify themselves as employees of the respondent; and
·in clear contravention of the Enterprise Agreement and the Code of Conduct, Ms Muscat commented on matters internal to the workplace in a press release and gave an interview to a media outlet in respect of those matters.
Second, there are clear issues of security and public safety associated with comments in the media by members of staff of a correctional facility concerning the behaviour of prisoners, management responses, adequate staffing and other operational matters. This is explained in his evidence by Mr Ittersohn. The prospect that, for example, prisoners at the Centre could take advantage of security gaps identified in unguarded media commentary by members of staff at the Centre, is a real risk. Similarly, as also identified by Mr Ittersohn, there is a risk, from publication of such comments, of prisoners being encouraged to engage in conduct which puts further pressure on the Centre’s resources. The Code of Conduct appears to recognise these risks in that it proscribes media commentary by staff members, as does the Enterprise Agreement in giving effect to the Code of Conduct.
Third, in this case Ms Muscat is an employee of the respondent making comments to the media in respect of internal operational matters – including matters associated with security – at the Centre. She clearly did so in her capacity as a union delegate, because she is not identified in either the press release or media reports as an employee at the Centre.
While the applicant claims that its members have a workplace right to comment in the media or that the members can engage in lawful industrial activity to provide media commentary, and that these rights supersede the agreement between the applicant and the respondent in this respect, in my view this is questionable. I am not persuaded at this stage that there is a “workplace right” to comment to the media, for the purpose of s 341 of the Act. Further, at this stage of the proceedings it can be forcibly argued that the agreement between the applicant and the respondent in respect of media commentary shapes the nature of what is “lawful” industrial activity for the purposes of s 347 of the Act, such that media commentary by employees like Ms Muscat is not lawful. This agreement resulted from negotiation between the union and the employer. There is no reason for me to consider that the parties did not turn their minds to the effect of this position concerning media comment, or that it was in any way controversial.
Notwithstanding these issues, on balance I am persuaded that there is a serious question to be tried as to whether, by making a media statement, Ms Muscat was engaging in lawful industrial activity within the meaning of s 347 of the Act. This is because notwithstanding the powerful arguments which can be put by the respondent – some of which I have outlined – it cannot be said that the applicants do not have a “sufficient likelihood of success” such that the status quo should not be preserved pending trial. As a general proposition, the making of media statements by union delegates can be considered to be legitimate conduct advancing union interests. The contentions of the applicant have substance, and raise issues which warrant further consideration in substantive trial.
In relation to the issue whether damages would be an adequate remedy, there is evidence before the Court that Ms Muscat has personal financial obligations which require a steady income to service, and to that extent she would suffer loss and inconvenience not compensable by damages should that steady income from employment cease. I note, however, that the respondent is prepared to pay Ms Muscat her salary pending resolution of these proceedings, and to that extent Ms Muscat is likely to suffer no financial consequences should interlocutory relief be refused.
Ms Muscat has said that she would miss the camaraderie associated with working for the respondent. There is some authority that this is a relevant factor for the Court to take into consideration. Further, the applicant submitted that there are intangible benefits it enjoys from having Ms Muscat as a union delegate at the Centre. In my view, however, in the circumstances of this case these are minor points.
The final question is whether the balance of convenience supports the interlocutory relief sought by the applicant. Taking into consideration all material before the Court, I am not satisfied that it does not. I have formed this view for the following reasons.
First, while I am satisfied on balance that there is a serious question to be tried, I do not accept that the applicant’s case is “very strong” as it contends. In particular, I note the powerful contentions of the respondent concerning the critical need for security and confidentiality in respect of internal processes at the Centre, which explains the embargo on staff members providing media commentary.
Second, and following from this point, I note that from the perspective of the respondent, there are important disciplinary issues at stake in respect of the conduct of Ms Muscat apparently flouting the Code of Conduct in such a public fashion. While the interaction of the Code of Conduct and the protections under the Act is in dispute, as a general proposition I consider that the need for the respondent to give effect to its Code of Conduct in the workplace weighs in its favour so far as concerns the application by the union for the Court to set aside Ms Muscat’s suspension pending trial. As I have already noted, the actions of Ms Muscat in contravention of this particular aspect of the Code of Conduct were not trivial, and could potentially have serious consequences. No compelling reason has been put forward by the applicant for the Court to disturb the respondent’s workplace response.
Third, the proposed undertaking by the respondent to not only pay the salary of Ms Muscat but also to take no further action in respect of the show cause letter and associated investigation pending determination of the substantive proceedings or further order, are factors I consider relevant in assessing where the balance of convenience lies in respect of the interlocutory relief sought.
Fourth, while Ms Muscat deposes that she is the only union delegate on her roster at the Centre, I am not persuaded that an order that she remain suspended pending final determination of the substantive proceedings would prejudice the interests of the applicant such that interlocutory relief is warranted. The evidence before the Court is that there are four other delegates of the applicant at the Centre. Other than a bare statement by Mr Clifford, there is no reason to suppose that they cannot adequately represent the applicant’s interests at the Centre.
Conclusion
In the circumstances I consider the appropriate order is to dismiss the interlocutory application. The respondent has proffered undertakings which have influenced my decision, and to that extent should be incorporated in an order. I will now seek submissions by the parties in respect of an appropriate form of order.
I certify that the preceding forty-two (42) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Collier. Associate:
Dated: 26 August 2014
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