United Voice v Ambulance Victoria

[2014] FWC 7464

[2014] FWC 7464

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.739—Dispute resolution

United Voice
v
Ambulance Victoria
(C2013/1321)

Health and welfare services
COMMISSIONER CRIBB	MELBOURNE, 3 DECEMBER 2014

Alleged dispute concerning annual leave accrual.

[1] United Voice (the union) has made an application for the Fair Work Commission to deal with a dispute between the union and Ambulance Victoria (AV, the employer). The dispute concerns whether an employee accrues annual leave during a period in which the employee is away from work due to illness or injury and is receiving payments pursuant to the Accident Compensation Act 1985 (ACA). The employees concerned are covered by the Ambulance Victoria Enterprise Agreement 2009 1 (the Agreement).

[2] The application was the subject of a jurisdictional objection by Ambulance Victoria. The objection was determined by Commissioner Johns. Although conciliation has taken place, the matter has not been settled.

[3] The hearing of the substantive application occurred on Wednesday 15 October 2014. By the time of the hearing, the only matter to be determined was whether or not the Agreement, at clause 47, provides for the accrual of annual leave whilst an employee is absent from work due to illness or injury and is in receipt of workers compensation payments. 2

[4] This decision, therefore, deals solely with this question.

1. AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS

[5] Prior to the hearing, the parties agreed a Statement of Facts. 3 The Statement set out the chronology of events. The pertinent agreed facts for the purposes of this decision are:

“I. In June 2010 Ambulance Victoria (“AV”) stopped the accrual of leave for employees absent from work die to personal illness or injury for which they received compensation pursuant to the Accident Compensation Act (“ACA”).

II. During the course of negotiations of the 2009 Enterprise Agreement there was no specific discussion around whether or not annual leave would accrue during periods of absence covered by the ACA.” 4

2. WITNESS EVIDENCE

[6] Both parties called a number of witnesses. For the union, Mr S. McGhie, Secretary of the Ambulance Employees’ Association, Mr A. Davis, Paramedic and Mr A. Briggs, Ambulance Paramedic Clinical Instructor, gave oral and written evidence.

(a) The union

[7] Mr McGhie’s evidence went to being alerted by Mr Davis that he had not accrued annual whilst on workers compensation. 5 He stated that this was contrary to his understanding of AV’s custom and practice as a result of being an AV employee and a union official.6 This was said to be that employees did accrue annual leave whilst off work on workers compensation.7 It was Mr McGhie’s understanding that the practice was right across the whole of the public sector of the ambulance service including the previous rural ambulance services and the metropolitan service.8 It was explained that, from subsequent discussions and correspondence, he came to understand that AV had unilaterally altered its interpretation of the Agreement provisions, so that there was no longer annual accrual in these circumstances.9

[8] It was confirmed by Mr McGhie that he was part of the union’s negotiating team for the 2009 Enterprise Agreement. He agreed that, at the time of the negotiations, employees on workers compensation were accruing annual leave. Mr McGhie could not recall the issue ever been discussed during the negotiations. 10 Mr McGhie stated that, up until AV ceased the accruals, the Agreement (which had not changed greatly) had always been interpreted and understood to mean that employers who were off work due to injury, and in receipt of workers compensation, were entitled to accrue leave.11 It was his presumption that there was an entitlement to accrued leave as it had been the custom and practice for about 30 years.12

[9] Both Mr Davis and Mr Briggs gave evidence that they had had periods of time off work on workers compensation and that they had not accrued annual leave during all of those periods. 13 In addition, Mr Briggs recounted that he had accrued annual leave when he was on workers compensation between October 2009 and February 2010 and he believed that to be the normal practice. He indicated that it had never occurred to him to question the basis for the accrual.14

[10] Mr Davis stated that it was custom and practice for employees to accrue annual leave whilst on workers compensation. It was recounted that over the past 30 years, he had accrued annual leave regardless of whether or not he was on workers compensation. He recalled that, as a union delegate, he had advised people of this when asked the question. Mr Briggs stated that he had assumed it was in the award and that, although there were different awards over the 30 years, his understanding was that annual leave accrued in these circumstances. 15

(b) Ambulance Victoria

[11] For the respondent’s part, Ms A Peters, Employee Relations Manager and Mr D Ryan, Project Manager gave oral and written evidence. 16

[12] Ms Peters commenced with Ambulance Victoria in May 2011 and she indicated that it was her understanding that the custom and practice was that employees on workers compensation accrued annual leave. 17 Having made a range of enquiries, Ms Peters believed that the custom and practice was based on legislative requirement. It was said to be her understanding that once the statutory requirement ceased, the entitlement was removed.18

[13] It was explained by Ms Peters that she was unable to say whether the decision to cease the accrual was communicated to employees as she was not employed by AV at that time. Ms Peters stated that she had communicated with the union in 2011 and 2013. 19

[14] With respect to the reason for the delay in ceasing the custom and practice following the commencement of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act), it was Ms Peters’ evidence that she had been advised by Mr Ryan that AV was busy in negotiations at the time and that it took some months to organise the changes. 20

[15] In her written statement, Ms Peters differentiated between the entitlement to paid annual leave and the entitlement to accrue annual leave. It was contended that accrual of annual leave in the Agreement is based on ordinary hours of work and not length of service or continuity of service. When absent on workers compensation, it was argued that employees do not work and are not required to work. When on accident compensation leave, there is no need for an employee to take annual leave as they are already off work. Long service leave was said to be different as the Agreement specifically includes absence on accident compensation leave. 21

[16] It was Mr Ryan’s evidence that there was discussion, prior to the introduction of the Fair Work Act, about whether annual leave would or would not accrue. AV was recalled to have decided that the current practice would not be changed at that stage. However, when the Act did come in, it became clear that the entitlement no longer existed. AV made a decision that it did not wish to maintain the accrual on a voluntary basis. It was Mr Ryan’s understanding that such accruals were stopped in late June or early July 2010. 22 He indicated that he was not involved in the implementation of the change and so could not comment on any discussion with employees or the union at the time.23

[17] In Mr Ryan’s witness statement, it was stated that AV managed accident compensation leave in accordance with the relevant legislation. It was his understanding that, prior to the Fair Work Act 2009, it was uncertain whether there was an entitlement to accrue annual leave when absent on workers compensation but that AV chose to an allow accruals to occur. After the introduction of the Fair Work Act, it was clear that annual leave would not accrue in such circumstances. 24

4. SUBMISSIONS

(a) The union

[18] It was submitted, on behalf of the union by Mr Kemppi, that the question to be determined is whether or not the enterprise agreement gives rise to the entitlement whereby employees absent on workers compensation accrue annual leave. 25 It was argued that it is well settled that an object of reading of the words of the agreement should be taken. The interpretation of an agreement should also be performed with respect to the underlying purpose of the agreement. This was said to be to provide certainty in relation to the entitlements that the respondent is obliged to pay. Reference was made to the oft quoted passage in Kucks v CSR Limited26 (Kucks).27

[19] In addition, the negotiations that led to the agreement were said to be relevant in relation to what a reasonable person in the room would have thought was being agreed to. A number of authorities in support of this proposition were highlighted. 28

[20] In relation to clause 47.2 of the Agreement, the union contended that this particular clause provides that an employee is entitled to 4 weeks annual leave for each 12 months of service. Annual leave accrual is on a pro rata basis, cumulative and based on an employee's ordinary hours of work. The union submitted that this clause means that annual leave accrues on the hours that a person works but also when an employee has ordinary hours but is unable to perform them due to injury and when in receipt of workers compensation. 29

[21] On the basis of Kucks, the union contended that, during the Agreement negotiations, neither side may have known the exact source of the accrual entitlement or may not have discussed or have pinpointed it. However, it was argued that the parties all knew, when they were bargaining, that there was a particular set of circumstances (including leave accrual) and that the parties believed that when they bargained for that Agreement, they were just locking in what was happening at the present time. This was said to be the intention of the Agreement and that any reasonable person in the room at the time would have known that the accrual entitlement, which had been provided since day dot, was going to continue under the wording of the Agreement. 30

[22] The Commission was also referred to the decision in Amcor Limited v CFMEU 31 (Amcor) which was argued to be authority for the proposition that the situation, that was going on at the time the 2009 Agreement was reached, should be taken into account. Further, it was contended that the Amcor decision meant that the only sensible outcome is that the Agreement should be read taking into account the entitlement, which was never quite discussed. The union argued that the entitlement was so taken for granted that the respondent did not think to flag the change in the legislative environment. Therefore, it was submitted that, objectively, both parties took the entitlement for granted until about mid 2010 when the respondent unilaterally withdrew the entitlement.32

[23] The union also referred to Short v FW Hercus Pty Ltd 33 as supporting the contention that it is legitimate to look at the history of a provision when interpreting it. It was stated that there has been little change to the clause in question.34 Mr Kemppi also referred to the Full Bench decision in Australian Licensed Aircraft Engineers Association v Qantas Airways Limited35 (Licensed Engineers case) in this regard.36

[24] Taking into account all of the authorities referred to, it was submitted by the union that consideration should be had of the purpose of the Agreement and the history of the clause including the history of its interpretation. It was argued that the entitlement clearly arises and one that had been provided for so long that it was taken for granted by all parties and was assumed to be operating in the background during the 2009 enterprise agreement bargaining. Further, the union argued that, as Ambulance Victoria did not raise the entitlement during the 2009 negotiations, it is impossible for them to say that they did not think it was incorporated into the Agreement, even if it was not explicit. Therefore, the union contended that the entitlement should be read into the relevant clause of the enterprise agreement such that the Agreement gives rise to that entitlement. 37

[25] In their closing submissions in reply, the union referred the Commission to the definition of ordinary hours in section 20 of the Act. Although the employees concerned are not award or agreement free, it was stated that the ordinary hours of work should be looked at as the agreed hours of work. It was contended that an employee actually fulfils those agreed hours by working them or by taking them as annual leave or by being on workers compensation. By whichever method, the union argued that “ordinary hours” in the Agreement should include the different methods and therefore annual leave should accrue whilst on workers compensation. 38

[26] Finally, the union submitted that this was an entitlement that was so obvious that it went without saying and that is why neither party said anything. The only objective reading of the conduct of the parties negotiating the 2009 Agreement, in light of the entitlement being provided, was said to be that both parties knew and understood that the entitlement would be included in the agreement. 39

(b) Ambulance Victoria

[27] On behalf of AV, Mr Broadbent refuted the union’s contention that, because the employer knew of the impending legislative change and chose to not mention it, this should be taken that AV intended the accrual to form part of the Agreement without saying so. It was stated that it was not the respondent’s obligation to raise the impending changes. Further, AV contended that, not having raised them did not result in the current custom and practice automatically becoming part of the terms of the Agreement. The union was said to have been, or should have been, aware of the impending changes due to a great deal of discussion at the time. It was recounted that section 97 of the Accident Compensation Act was amended as a result of it. 40

[28] The evidence, on behalf of Ambulance Victoria, was said to be that Mr Ryan’s understanding was that the accrual of annual leave whilst on workers compensation was based on legislation and not the enterprise agreement. Therefore, there was argued to be no compulsion for Mr Ryan to raise it at the 2009 negotiations. Further, the evidence was described as being that this was one of those inadvertent situations where AV, in the past, had allowed the accrual for various reasons. When the legislation no longer obligated the accrual, AV was stated to have made a commercial and business decision to cease the accrual. This was said to have been effected separate to the enterprise agreement. 41 In this regard, Mr Broadbent highlighted various aspects of Ms Peters’ and Mr Ryan’s evidence, in particular, the written correspondence between the parties.42

[29] A distinction was also drawn between the relevant provisions of the 2005 Agreement (MX Award) and the 2009 enterprise agreement in relation to the accrual of annual leave. It was argued that the 2009 Agreement provides for pro rata accrual based on an employee’s ordinary hours of work which was described as a very different accrual method compared with the MX Award provisions. The clause was said to not take account of a situation where an employee is absent on workers compensation. As well, there was a new provision (clause 54 - Accident Compensation Leave) which applies to employees when they are absent on workers compensation. This clause was argued to create a situation where an employee on accident compensation leave is not performing any work and is not required to perform any work and is therefore not accruing any leave. 43

[30] In relation to long service leave, AV contended that clause 51.5 specifically provides for continuity of service whilst on accident compensation. This was said to demonstrate that workers compensation was in the mind of the parties when the 2009 Agreement was negotiated. The specific provision in respect of long service leave was contrasted with the situation of there being no corresponding specific provision regarding annual leave.

[31] With regard to the Licensed Engineers Case raised by the union, AV argued that it was a very different case to this one as it dealt with the nature of the terminology used in the agreement. The present case was distinguished from the Licensed Engineers Case on the basis that the latter concerned an existing clause in an agreement where the wording was ambiguous. In this case, AV argued that there is no clause which points to an entitlement and that the words in clause 47.2 are plain. The words were said to necessitate work to be undertaken. 44

[32] In terms of the Shop Distributive and Allied Employees Association v Woolworths Limited Case 45 (Woolworths), the present matter was distinguished from this case on the basis that there is no common understanding of the meaning of the provision. This was due to the union’s best case being that there was a presumption or assumption that the arrangement would continue. However, this was stated to be based on the conduct of the parties rather than anything in the Agreement.46 The case being put by the union, at its highest, was described as being that Mr McGhie had presumed that the arrangement would continue. However, there was said to be no evidence that the presumption/assumption about the arrangement was based on the terms of the Agreement. Rather, the evidence was stated to be that the parties were operating under two entirely different understandings. There was also inadvertence on both sides in terms of the parties not having turned their minds to the issue as far as negotiation an agreement provision is concerned.47

[33] Ambulance Victoria argued further that Woolworths also stood for the proposition that the union needed to establish a breach of a term of the Agreement. 48 In addition, reference was made to the decision where it was stated that the respondent’s change of practice appears mean spirited. It was conceded that the decision by Ambulance Victoria in 2010 might be seen as mean spirited. However, it was stated that, under the previous legislation, there was a requirement that the accrual be applied. Once the legislation changed, AV applied this change as there was nothing in the Agreement which prevents AV from applying legislative changes during the life of an agreement. Therefore, it was stated that, with the Fair Work Act2009 and the changes to the Accident Compensation Act, AV decided to continue its approach of complying with legislative provisions in a situation where the Agreement does not provide a specific obligation.49

[34] Finally, Ambulance Victoria submitted that there was no commonality or meeting of minds by the parties which resulted in a common understanding of the intention of the clause. Rather, it was stated that the opposite applies. The situation was described as AV having acted in accordance with legislation rather than the Agreement with the union not needing to raise the issue as accruals were being granted. Further, other areas of the Agreement were said to deal specifically with the Accident Compensation Act, however, not the annual leave provisions. 50

5. CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

[35] I have given careful consideration to the evidence before me and the submissions of the parties. On the one hand, the union argued that it was necessary for the Agreement to be read objectively, in light of the industrial context of the accrual having been long standing custom and practice and that both parties knew and understood that the entitlement would be included in the 2009 Agreement. The entitlement was described as having been so obvious that it went without saying, which was the reason why neither party raised it during the 2009 enterprise bargaining negotiations.

[36] On the other hand, Ambulance Victoria contended that the entitlement was the result of a legislative requirement which ceased with the commencement of the Fair Work Act 2009. There was said to have been a lot of discussion at the time of the legislative change. As well, AV argued that the relevant clauses in the 2005 Agreement and 2009 Agreement are very different and that a plain reading of clause 47.2 does not point to an entitlement as it is necessary for work to be undertaken.

[37] It was common ground that, prior to the change in June 2010, there was longstanding custom and practice (30 years or so) that employees, whilst on workers compensation, accrued annual leave. It was also common ground that neither party raised the issue during the enterprise bargaining negotiations for the 2009 Agreement. There seemed to be a lack of clarity, particularly by the union, as to the source of the entitlement. The evidence from the union and its members was to the effect that they were unclear as to the origin of the entitlement. Mr Ryan’s evidence was that the entitlement was the result of a legislative requirement but there was no clear history provided of the basis of the entitlement. AV argued that, with the commencement of the Fair Work Act 2009, there was no longer a statutory basis for the entitlement. Further, it is apparent that the annual leave provisions in the 2009 Agreement are different to those in the 2005 Agreement. However, both Agreements have similar, if not the same, provisions in relation to long service leave and accident compensation leave.

[38] Essentially, the union argued that, during the 2009 negotiations, the long standing entitlement was in existence at the time, with the result that the parties, in agreeing to the terms of clause 47.1, were incorporating into it, the existing custom and practice.

[39] There are very few decisions which deal directly with the role of custom and practice in the interpretation of agreements. VP Lawler in Hospira Australia Pty Ltd v NUW and AMWU 51 (Hospira) considered the proper construction of the hours of work, RDO accrual and leave clauses of two agreements.52 In this case, the higher accrual of RDO’s had been the custom and practice for about 20 years and the current agreements replicated the provisions in the previous agreements under which the employees had higher RDO accruals.53 VP Lawler found that, applying the accepted principles of the construction of agreements, the parties to the current agreement did not intend the provisions to have the effect of lessening of RDO accruals.54

[40] A second relevant decision is that of Gray J in Health Services Union v Ballarat Health Services 55 (Ballarat Health Services). In this decision, Justice Gray, amongst other things, dealt with the issue of whether the parties had a common understanding of the meaning of the terms of the 1998 Agreement. It was found that:

“Care is needed in approaching any suggestion of a common understanding as to terms used. In the first place, there must be positive evidence of a common understanding.” 56

[41] In relation to VP Lawler’s decision in Hospira, the provisions in question in the new agreements were the same provisions as in the previous agreements. As there was no change to the particular provisions in the new agreement, VP Lawler could not find an objective intention for the parties to change the way these had been interpreted in the past (custom and practice). This matter is different to the Hospira case as in this matter, the annual leave provisions of the 2009 Agreement are quite different to those of the 2005 Agreement. Therefore, it is not a situation, as it was in Hospira, of the new agreement provisions being the same as the previous ones and one party seeking to change the customary way in which the particular provisions are implemented. This matter is more to do with whether, in agreeing to clause 47.1 of the 2009 Agreement, the parties “automatically” included the existing custom and practice relating to annual leave accruals whilst on workers compensation, even though neither party raised this issue during the negotiations.

[42] Justice Gray’s decision in Ballarat Health Services dealt with the authorities in relation to “common understanding” and he went on to find that, in relation to common understanding:

“Ordinarily, a failure to advance an argument as to the effect of a particular provision will not constitute such evidence. A failure to advance an argument is consistent with inadvertence, and common inadvertence is not common understanding.” 57

[43] In the matter before me, the evidence is that neither party raised the issue, during the negotiations, of the accrual of annual leave whilst on workers compensation. As per Gray J, this does not constitute a common understanding. Further, it appears that the union did not know the basis of the custom and practice and AV believed that it was legislation based. Therefore, it may well have been common knowledge that there was a practice whereby an employee, absent on workers compensation, continued to accrue annual leave. However, there was not a common understanding that it was a result of legislation or that it was to be found in the enterprise agreement. Accordingly, I have not been persuaded that this was a situation where there was a common understanding between the parties, at the time of the negotiations, that this particular custom and practice was incorporated into the terms of section 47.1 of the 2009 Agreement.

[44] In relation to an objective reading of the 2009 Agreement, there are a number of relevant clauses.

[45] The first ones are clauses 47.1 and 47.2, which are as follows:

“47.1 Definitions in this clause

(a) Week means an employee’s ordinary working week.

(b) Ordinary pay for an employee who is not entitled to the rolled-in rate of pay, means remuneration for the employee's normal weekly number of hours of work calculated at ordinary time rates of pay and in addition, includes:

(i) over award payments for ordinary hours of work;

(ii) shift penalties, according to roster or projected roster;

(iii) Saturday and Sunday penalties, according to roster or projected roster; and

(iv) allowances which would have been received by the employee for ordinary hours of work, had the employee not proceeded on leave.

For an operational employee who is entitled to the rolled-in rate of pay in accordance with this Agreement, ordinary pay means the rolled-in rate of pay.

If no ordinary time rate of pay, or no normal weekly number of hours, is fixed for an employee, these will be deemed to be the average weekly rate earned, or average weekly number of hours worked, during the period in respect of which the right to annual leave accrues.

(c) Seven day shift employee means an employee rostered to work regularly on Sundays and public holidays. Employees who are seven day shift workers under this Agreement are shiftworkers for the purposes of annual leave in accordance with Division 6 of Part 2-2 of the Act.

47.2 Entitlement/period of leave

An employee is entitled to four weeks annual leave on ordinary pay for each twelve months of service. Annual leave accrues on a pro rata basis based on an employee's ordinary hours of work, and is cumulative.”

[46] It can be seen from clause 47.2 that an employee is entitled to four weeks annual leave for each twelve months of service.

[47] Further, clause 47.10 of the Agreement provides for continuity of service in the following terms:

“47.10 Continuity of service

(a) For the purposes of calculating an employee’s annual leave entitlement, a year of service is a period during which an employee is employed by AV, but does not include any period of:

(i) unauthorised absence; or

(ii) any period of unpaid leave or unpaid absence that is not otherwise stated to count as service in accordance with the Act.”

[48] This clause states that, in calculating an employee’s annual leave entitlement, any period of unpaid leave or unpaid absence, that is not otherwise stated to count as service under the Fair Work Act, is not included (clause 47.10(a)(ii)).

[49] Section 22 of the Act sets out the meaning of “service”:

“22 Meanings of service and continuous service

General meaning

(1) A period of service by a national system employee with his or her national system employer is a period during which the employee is employed by the employer, but does not include any period (an excluded period) that does not count as service because of subsection (2).

(2) The following periods do not count as service:

(a) any period of unauthorised absence;

(b) any period of unpaid leave or unpaid authorised absence, other than:

(i) a period of absence under Division 8 of Part 2-2 (which deals with community service leave); or

(ii) a period of stand down underPart 3-5, under an enterprise agreement that applies to the employee, or under the employee’s contract of employment; or

(iii) a period of leave or absence of a kind prescribed by the regulations;

(c) any other period of a kind prescribed by the regulations.

(3) An excluded period does not break a national system employee’s continuous service with his or her national system employer, but does not count towards the length of the employee’s continuous service.”

[50] Section 22(2) sets out the periods that do not count as service. They include any period of unpaid leave or unpaid authorised absence (section 22(2)(b)).

[51] In addition, the 2009 Agreement also contains a clause entitled “Accident Compensation Leave” as follows:

“54. ACCIDENT COMPENSATION LEAVE

An employee is entitled to accident compensation leave during any period of absence from work covered by weekly payments of compensation or WorkCover certificates issued in accordance with the Accident Compensation Act 1985.”

[52] Therefore, section 22(2) of the Act would appear to include accident compensation leave as a period that does not count as service. This is on the basis that it falls within the category of unpaid authorised absence, as contained in section 22(2)(b).

[53] As an employee is entitled to four weeks annual leave for each twelve months service (clause 47.2 of the Agreement) and absence on workers compensation (accident compensation leave) is excluded from being counted as service (clause 47.10(a)(ii)), under the terms of the 2009 Agreement, an employee absent on workers compensation does not accrue annual leave as this period is not counted as service. On the basis of clause 47.2 of the Agreement, an employee is not able to accrue annual leave unless they have service.

[54] By way of contrast, the long service leave provisions of the 2009 Agreement expressly provide for accident compensation leave to be counted as continuity of service for the purposes of calculating long service leave (clause 51.5).

[55] Therefore, on the basis of an objective reading of the relevant clauses of the 2009 Agreement, together with the relevant authorities in relation to agreement construction, I find that the 2009 Agreement does not provide for employees, who are away from work due to illness or injury and who are in receipt of workers compensation payments, to accrue annual leave during this period. It has not been found that the parties had a common understanding when negotiating the 2009 Agreement that clause 47.1 of the Agreement incorporated the long standing custom and practice regarding the accrual of annual leave in this situation. Further, it has been found that a plain reading of the relevant clauses of the 2009 Agreement do not provide such an entitlement.

[56] Having formed the view that there is no basis in the 2009 Agreement for an employee to accrue annual leave whilst on workers compensation, I do need to indicate that, in relation to this matter, I concur with the comments of Justice Gray in the Woolworths case 58 where he described the respondent’s change of practice as appearing mean spirited.59 There may have been no longer any legal basis to the entitlement but to make that decision, without advance warning of the intention to do so, does appear mean spirited. In addition, there is no evidence before me that, once the decision was made, employees or the union were advised of the change to the practice. AV may well, technically, have been within its rights to make this decision with the commencement of the Fair Work Act 2009. However, the manner in which this change in custom and practice was implemented, would seem to fall well short of best practice workplace relations.

Appearances:

Mr S Kemppi for United Voice

Mr C Broadbent of Marsh & Maher for Ambulance Victoria

Hearing details:

2014.

Melbourne:

October 15.

 1   AE872116

 2   Exhibit A1 at paragraphs 13 - 15 and Transcript PN519 - 521

 3   Exhibit A1

 4   Ibid

 5   Exhibit A2 at paragraph 5

 6   Ibid at paragraph 6 and Transcript PN 352 - 353

 7   Ibid at paragraph 6

 8   Transcript PN 354

 9   Exhibit A2 at paragraph 7

 10   Transcript PN 355 - 358 and 361

 11   Exhibit A2 at paragraph 8

 12   Transcript PN 368 - 369

 13   Exhibit A4 at paragraph 8 and Exhibit A3 at paragraph 6

 14   Exhibit A3 at paragraph 4 and Transcript PN 390 - 392 and 402 - 403

 15   Ibid PN 422 and 425 - 427

 16   Exhibits R1 and R2

 17   Exhibit R1 at paragraph 15 and Transcript PN 461 - 462 and 464

 18   Ibid at paragraphs 14 and 19 and ibid PN 463, 465 - 466 and 470

 19   Ibid at paragraphs 9 and 11 - 12 and ibid PN 466 - 467

 20   Ibid PN 473

 21   Exhibit R1 at paragraphs 21 - 26

 22   Exhibit R2 at paragraphs 8 and 11 - 12 and Transcript PN 497 - 500

 23   Ibid PN 506

 24   Exhibit R2 at paragraphs 6 - 8

 25   Transcript PN 517 - 521

 26 [1996] 66 IR 182

 27   Transcript PN 523 - 525

 28   Ibid PN 523

 29   Ibid PN 526

 30   Ibid PN 527 - 528

 31 [2005] 22 CLR 241

 32   Transcript PN 529 - 533

 33 [1993] FCA 51

 34   Transcript PN 534

 35   [2008] AIRCFB 603

 36   Transcript PN 535

 37   Ibid PN 535 - 538 and Exhibit A5 at paragraph 20

 38   Ibid PN 633 - 635

 39   Ibid PN 636

 40   Ibid PN 546 - 547

 41   Ibid PN 548 - 549

 42   Ibid PN 551 - 565 and Exhibits R1 and R2

 43   Ibid PN 571 - 589

 44   Ibid PN 591 - 594

 45 [2006] FCA 616

 46   Transcript PN 594 - 603

 47   Ibid PN 594 - 605

 48   Ibid PN 605 - 607

 49   Ibid PN 594 - 610

 50   Ibid PN 619 - 621

 51   [2010] FWA 1199

 52   Ibid at [7]

 53   Ibid at [29]

 54   Ibid at [30]

 55 [2011] FCA 1256

 56   Ibid at [77]

 57   Ibid

 58 [2006] FCA 616

 59   Ibid at [34]

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<Price code C, AE872116  PR556860>