United States Tobacco Company v Minister for Consumer Affairs

[1989] FCA 868

B

JUDGMENT NO. .&Q

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA	)
)

NEW SOUTH W U S DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. G 158 of 1988

)

GENERAL DIVISION 1

Between:  UNITED STATES TOBACCO COMPANY

Applicant

And:  THE MINISTER FOR C0NSUMF.R AFFAIRS

First Respondent

THE TRADE PRACTICES COMMISSION

Second Respondent

THE AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION OF CONSUMER

ORGANIZATIONS INC

Third Respondent

CORAM: Einfeld J.
DATE : 14 March 1989

PLACE: Sydney

MINUTES OF ORDERS

The application for leave is dismissed.

The applicant is to pay the first respondent's costs

NOTE:	Settlement and entry of orders are dealt with in accordance with
order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA	)
1
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY	No. G 158 of 1988

1

GENERAL DIVISION )

Between:  UNITED STATES TOBACCO COMPANY

Applicant

And:  THE MINISTER FOR CONSUMER AFFAIRS

First Respondent

TEE TRADE PRACTICES COMMISSION

Second Respondent

THE AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION OF CONSUMER

ORGANIZATIONS INC

Third Respondent

C O W : Einfeld J.
DATE : 14 March 1989

PLACE: Sydney

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

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In this notice of motion, application is made under Order 16 Rule 1 of

respondent (the respondent) a notice to answer certain interrogatories.	the Federal Court Rules for leave to file and serve on the first
The respondent refuses to answer the interrogatories, claiming that they are oppressive, unreasonable and amount to a "fishing expedition".
TEE FACTS This litigation is not new. I have previously given two substantive judgments on other aspects. One matter has been to a Full Court and the High Court. There is therefore only need now to summarise the relevant facts. On 13 January 1988 the Federal Minister for Consumer Affairs gave notification in the Gazette, pursuant to section 65J(1) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (TPA) that he was proposing to use his powers under section 65C(5) of the Act to declare certain smokeless tobacco products and snuffs to be unsafe goods on the grounds that they cause oral cancers, throat tumours and other medical or pathological consequences for their users. On l6 March 1988 a statement of reasons under section 13 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act

b (ADJR Act) was supplied to the applicant by the respondent. On 5 May

1988 the applicant filed an amended statement of claim.

On 2 June 1988 the respondent requested further and better particulars

of the applicant's amended statement of claim. In its reply the applicant answered some questions but in most cases stated that it was unable to answer until discovery had occurred or referred the respondent to the amended statement of claim. On 6 July 1988 the respondent informed the applicant that he considered its reply inadequate. On 15 August 1988 further information was provided by the applicant. On 7 September 1988 the respondent again informed the applicant that he considered the particulars supplied were inadequate. Discovery was

given on 24 August 1988.

The interrogatories which form the subject of this application are annexed to these reasons as a Schedule.

THE ISSUES

In addition to raising some particular objections to the interrogatories, the respondent argues that as a section 13 statement

has been provided, the Court should use its discretion to refuse to

allow interrogatories.

(1) Fishing Expedition

In relation to what constitutes such an exercise, the respondent quoted

i, W A Pines Pty Ltd v Bannerman [l9801 30 ALR 559, a decision of a Full

Court of this Court. Brennan J stated at 567:

Though the power to require discovery be acknowledged, how should it be exercised? It depends upon the nature of the case and the stage of the proceedings at which the discovery is sought. In the present case, discovery is sought before there is a tittle of evidence to suggest that the Chairman did not have the requisite cause to believe which para 6 of the statement of claim would put in issue. Some assistance was sought to be derived from cases where discovery had been given to a party before he was required to give particulars of his claim: cases such as Ross v Blake's Motors [l9511 2 All ER 689, but in cases of that kind there is either an anterior relationship between the parties which entitles one to obtain information from the other, or sufficient is shown to ground a suspicion that the party applying for discovery has a good case proof of which is likely to be aided by discovery. This is not such a case. This is a case where a bare allegation is made by para 6 of the statement of claim

and, the paragraph being denied, the applicant seeks to	interroaate the Chairman and ransack his documents in the ~~~ ~ - - - - - -.. ...-
hope of-making a case. That is mere fishing. As Nthers J
said in Melbourne Home of Ford Pty Ltd v Trade Practices
Comnission, 5 TPC at 35; [l9791 ATPR at 18,087: "In the absence of such evidence the ~roceedina is essentiallv speculative in nature. In such circumstances for the court to assist the applicants by making available to them the processes of interrogatories and discovery would be to assist them in an essentially fishing exercise and from this the Court on established principles should refrain." His Honour's refusal of discovery was right and it ought not to be disturbed.

Lockhart J also examined the authorities on this point, and then stated

There are four objects of interrogatories:-

(1) to obtain admissions as to facts which will support the

case of the interrogating party;

(2) to obtain admsslons which will destroy or damage the

case of the party interrogated;

(3) interrogatories which are in the nature of a request for

further and better particulars; and

(4) interrogatories which seek to obtain accounts from a
party occupying a fiduciary position.

However, among the well established limitations upon the power to interrogate and to discovery of documents is the rule that this power cannot be used for the purpose of

"fishing" .

In Hennessy v Wright (NO 2) 118821 24 QBD 445 (reported as a note to Parnell v Walter 118901 24 QBD 441) Lord Esher MR said at (p 448):

"In other words, the plaintiff wishes to maintain his questions, and to insist upon answers to them, in order that he may find out something of which he knows nothing now, which might enable him to make a case of which he has no knowledge at present. If that is the effect of the interrogatories, it seems to me that they come within the description of 'fishing' interrogatories, and on that ground cannot be allowed. The moment it appears that questions are asked and answers Insisted upon In order to enable the party to see if he can find a case,

he knows nothing, and which will be a different case either of complaint or defence, of which at present from that which he now makes, the rule against
'fishing' interrogatories applies."

In Lane v Gray 118731 LR 16 Eq Cas 552, Sir Richard Malins

VC held that the court's power to make an order for

discovery was a discretionary power to order production when it shall appear to the court to be right to do so. His Lordship refused the application until the case had proceeded further and the plaintiff made out a prima facie case in support of her claim. The plaintiff had brought a suit claiming to be entitled to a share in the estate of an intestate as an alleged next of kin. It appears that discovery was refused, because all that the plaintiff had done at that stage of the case was to allege that she was next of kin of the intestate and there was no evidence to support her assertion. The estate of intestates was frequently claimed by persons of whom many had no foundation for their claims; but by obtaining on discovery production of documents belonging to the intestate they obtained information by means of which fresh fictitious cases were in many instances manufactured.

In Associated Dominion Assurance Society Pty Ltd v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd L19521 72 W (NSW) 250, Owen J said (at p 254):

"A 'fishing expedition', in the sense in which the phrase has been used in the law, means, as I understand it, that a person who has no evidence that fish of a particular kind are in a pool desires to be at liberty to drag it for the purpose of finding out whether there are any there or not":

see also Bray on Discovery [l8851 pp 13, 16, 98 and 461.

In the present case the appellant seeks discovery and leave to interrogate before there is any evidence that the respondent did not have the belief required by S 155(1). There are the barest allegations in paras 5 and 6 of the statement of claim. They are denied by the respondent in his defence who, in addition, swore an affidavit that he held the relevant belief required by the section. Brochures which were published obviously by, or with the concurrence of, the appellant, contain statements which at the very least are not inconsistent with the respondent's statement of belief. Together with the form of the notice under the section that is all the material on which this court is asked to act and to permit discovery and administration of interrogatories.

"This is not merely clutching at a non-existent straw, but
expecting to be carried by it": per Menzies J in Mulley v
Manifold E19591 103 CLR 341 at 345.

I have no doubt that the appellant is seeking to use the weapons of discovery and interrogatories to find out if it

has a case of which it presently Knows nothing. It is a	fishing expedition to which this court will not lend its
aid.

In support of his argument that these interrogatories are in this category, the respondent referred to the inadequate particulars, to the fact there has been discovery and a section 13 statement, and to the content of the interrogatories. The respondent submitted that the statement of claim does not particularise the facts which form the basis of the claim; rather it regurgitates the language from section 5 of the

ADJR Act. The failure to provide any or any relevant particulars leads

to the view that the applicant does not know what its case is and is seeking to prove a case by obtaining admissions through interrogatories.

At the conclusion of the argument in Court, the applicant was ordered to supply to the Court and the respondent the documents and other material on which it seeks to rely to counter the argument that its interrogatories very largely constitute a fishing expedition. Of the documents produced, the respondent points out that all but two were not in the applicant's possession when it first alleged a miscarriage of the

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Minister's exercise of power in its amended statement of claim. This, he claims, supports the allegation of fishing, and is a more glaring instance than was the case in W A Pines, especially given that the applicant has already had the benefit of a section 13 statement and of discovery.

The case which the applicant wishes to prove can be summarised as a claim that the respondent has been motivated by the widespread anti- smoking lobby in the community rather than by factors which it is

L alleged he should have taken into account under the consumer protection

provisions of the Trade Practices Act. The applicant disputes the

respondent's assertion that it has no basis for its case, and says that	the documents supplied clearly xeveal that the case has a substantial
basis. In any event, the applicant says, an application for interrogatories is judged on the relevance of the questions to the issues raised in the pleadings and particulars, and has nothing to do
with the strength or weight of the evidence.
The applicant asserts that the function of interrogatories is precisely to permit the formal assembly of evidence by way of admission which can be tendered at trial. The tool of interrogatories exists, it submits, because there will necessarily be matters peculiarly within the knowledge of one party about which the other party is entitled with appropriate safeguards to ask. It argues that the respondent's
arguments quite misconceive the notion of "fishing" interrogatories, which are for the purpose of finding a basis for a case where no such case has been made out on the pleadings and particulars. Here, there is no question of trawling for a new case.

ji THE SECTION 13 STATEMENT

In March 1988 a comprehensive Statement of Reasons under section 13 of the ADJR Act was supplied to the applicant. The respondent concedes that interrogatories are prima facie available in addition to this statement but submits that the court has a residual discretion to and should disallow interrogatories in certain cases where a section 13 statement has been provided. In this regard the respondent referred to the decision of Burchett J in Atochem SA v John Norman Button, Minister

of State for Industry and Commerce unreported 7 March 1986. His Honour

stated at pp 6-7:

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The broader answer to the ao~licant's suhission is that its

Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, is not one in which it is application, being broGht under the Administrative

entitled to ask the Court to review the Minister's findinqs

of fact. The case is limited to the questions of law which arise within the framework of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act. Furthemore, that Act provides its own machinery for ascertaining conclusions which formed part of the reasons for the determination in question. Sub-secs. (4A) and (7) of s.13 should not be overlooked. Under sub-S. (7), further and better particulars can be obtained of a s.13 statement, if it is deficient (cf. Conde v 2KY Broadcasters Pty Ltd [l9821 2 NSWIR 221). This is not, of course, to say that interrogatories are automatically excluded, but the scope for their proper use may well be limited in such a case. This was pointed out by the Full Court in Lloyd v Costigan L19831 62 AIR 284 at 293, where it was stated in the joint judgment:

"A person aggrieved by a decision of a Comnissioner has the rights given by the Act, s 5. He m y request reasons under s 13. We are satisfied that, if the request is refused or not complied with, the court has power to order reasons to be given, certainly once there are proceedings comnenced to review a decision. Such a construction plainly accords with the intent of the legislation. A person aggrieved may apply for an order of review on any of the grounds specified in the Act. If he does so, the onus of proving his case rests upon the applicant. He m y have his statement under s 13, but the procedures of discovery and interrogatories will often be inappropriate. Generally, at least, the information to which a person is entitled under that Act is intended to be obtained in the manner which the Act prescribes."

See also the comnents of King CJ, speaking for the Full
Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia in Barbarian
Motor Cycle Club Incorporated v Koithan [l9841 35 SASR 481
at 484-5.

Having regard to the form of the interrogatory, the burdensome detail it would require the respondent to fossick out, and the availability of the provisions of s.13 as the remedy specifically provided by the legislature to meet such a case, I do not think the respondent should be required to answer this interrogatory.

In addition, French J in Majed Mahmoud Raoucher v The Minister of State

L/ for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (unreported 4 November 1987) stated

It was contended for the respondent at one point in the

argument that the provisions~ of S. 13 of the Administrative

Decisions (Judicial Review) Act spell out the llmit of the entitlement of an applicant to infonnation relatinq to the making of the decision in question and somehow preclude resort to the facilities of discovery, interrogatories and subpoena in review proceedings.

That contention is answered by the decision of the Full Court in Federal Conmissioner of Taxation v Nestle Australia -Ltd L19861 69 AIR 445 at 453 where the Court (Bowen CJ, Loclchart and Sheppard JJ) said:

"A s 13 statement and the court's powers in relation to discovery and inspection are of a basically different nature. and different time scales apply to them. Courts m y take into account in the exercise of discretion, on an application for discovery and inspection, whether a s 13 statement has been sought or provided, whether it is sufficient and whether it is appropriate to leave the parties to then rights under s 13, including the right to obtain further and better particulars under s 13(7). But to the extent that those matters are relevant they lie solely within the discretion of the court. There is no necessary relation between the two quite separate processes of statements of reasons under s 13 of the Judicial Review Act and the court's powers of discovery and inspection which are procedural machinery of courts to assist in the resolution of conflicts between litigants."

The question in this case is one of discretion, not power.

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The case itself concerned draft questions which it was intended to put to the respondent in examination-in-chief. French J noted that the questions were in substantially the form of the interrogatories which were the subject of a previous unsuccessful application. His Honour stated at pp 8-9:

There is already available under the Administrative
Decisions (Judicial Review) Act a facility for the provision

of further particulars where reasons supplied under 9.13 are

inadequate .- Sub-section 13 (7) provides--

"If the Court, upon application for an order under this sub-section made to it by a person to whom a statement has been furnished in pursuance of a request under sub-section (l), considers that the

findings on material questions of fact, an adequate statement does not contain adequate particulars of

reference to the evidence or other material on which

those findings were based or adequate particulars of the reasons for the decision, the Court may order the person who furnished the statement to furnish to the person who made the request for the statement, within such time as is specified in the order, an additional statement or additional statements containing further and better particulars in relation to matters specified in the order with respect to those findings, that evidence or other material or those reasons."

Given the existence of that facility the Court will need compelling justification to issue a subpoena to a decision- maker merely for the purpose of expanding upon his or her reasons.

The Court is, in its judicial review jurisdiction, engaged in a function which is essentially supervisory in character, to ensure that administrative decisions affecting individuals are made lawfully, fairly and rationally.

The decisionnaker's reasons will bind him or her for the purpose of such review.

That is not to say that there may not be occasion when the decisionnaker's evidence is required.

For example, if a decision was said to have been taken in bad faith or to have been induced or affected by fraud or to have involved some procedural irregularity the existence of which is disputed, one can conceive of a need to hear evidence from the decision-maker. There may be other circumstances in relation to other grounds of review where

U such evidence may be necessary.

The only one of the situations outlined by French J possibly relevant in the present context is bad faith, which the respondent alleges in respect of paragraph 10(d) of the Amended Statement of Claim. It is submitted that no proper particulars have been given by the applicant in support of this allegation and that the applicant has therefore not put anything before the Court capable of amounting to "a compelling justification" for the granting of leave to administer any of the proposed interrogatories. In this regard, the respondent refers in

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particular to interrogatories 16 to 27 and 29. These interrogatories essentially seek admissions about the Minister's state of mind; what he

took into account; what he considered; and what views he formed.

The comments of French 3 concerning the essentially supervisory nature of judicial review jurisdiction are also in point. The ambit of these interrogatories is claimed to go far wider than the type of interrogatory which might be permissible even if the special circumstances claimed in Aaoucher were to exist. This, it is submitted, underscores the interrogatories' real purpose as fishing. The respondent submitted that if the administration of interrogatories such as those here were to become commonplace in judicial review proceedings, such proceedings would cease to be expeditious and effective resolutions to challenges against administrative decisions.

The applicant argued that statutory decision-makers such as Ministers of the Crown should not be permitted to put forward section 13 statements as a substitute for answers to interrogatories. It is conceded that it would be otiose and abusive to ask questions in interrogatories which

ii are plainly designed to elicit only the possibility of answers contradictory of those contained in the section 13 statement; but the

applicant denies that any o f the interrogatories fall into this

category. The applicant further argued that the facility in the ADJR

Act for requesting further and better particulars of a section 13

statement does not mean that it is not equally appropriate on occasion

for interrogatories to be directed to particular matters raised by or

referred to in a section 13 statement. It is said that this section 13

statement is not a straightforward statement of reasons, but really an

exposition of administrative history. The applicant says that it is

necessary to read between the lines and draw what may or may not be

obvious inferences as to what the Minister did in relation to this

history. There is something in this contention, but I do not think that it justifies these interrogatories.

OPPRESSIVENESS/UNREASONABLENESS

The respondent further argues that many of the proposed interrogatories are either oppressive or unreasonable or both. It claims that interrogatories 1 to 15 for example do not seek admissions with respect to any particular issue, but merely seek information in respect of the various steps taken prior to the making of the decision. These both duplicate the role of the section 13 statement and would seem, insofar as they are enquiring about rejections by departmental officers, to have very little relevance. It is submitted that the answers would of necessity lack accuracy and that the burden of answering such questions is out of proportion to the benefit to be gained from the answers. Interrogatory 11 further pursues irrelevant issues in that it enquires about interpretations given to certain expressions in section 65C(5) of the TPA. In this connection the applicant submitted that the nature of its case is in part based on an interpretation of the critical words in the TPA which may differ from the interpretation of the Minister. The

ii

applicant says that it is not at all oppressive to ask him to reread what he has already read and considered prior to making a serious decision. That could be so in a given case, but in my view, it depends on circumstances which do not exist here.

IRRELEVANCE
In this connection, the respondent identified particularly to
interrogatories 2, 3, 4, 6 and 28. I agree that these matters have

little to do with this case.

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THE AMENDED INTERROGATORIES

At the conclusion of argument, the applicant was ordered to supply to	the Court and the respondent some amended interrogatories to try to meet
the valid objections raised in argument. The main changes are that the second sentence of the preamble has been deleted; the reference to "First Respondent" in interrogatories 7 to 28 has been altered to 'the then Minister for Consumer Affairs"; interrogatories 11 to 13 inclusive
have been extended to include the views or discussions of departmental officers as well as the relevant Ministers; a new interrogatory (No.29) has been added; the words "in favour of making that decision" have been inserted after the words "took into account' in interrogatories 16, 17 and 21; and certain other even moze minor alterations have been made. These alterations do not materially redress the inadequacies debated in argument - they are still so wide as to preclude any meaningful answer. In my opinion the principles involved in this matter have not been assisted by the amended interrogatories. Indeed, if anything, they re- affirm the tentative view I formed during the hearing that the interrogatories are irrelevant and oppressive and cannot support the case made out in the amended statement of claim. In my view, the interrogatories are intended to embarrass and obstruct this litigation,

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not to prove by admission or inference a case for judicial review.

I dismiss the application for leave with costs

i certify that this and the iweiue (\2]

preceding pages are a true copy of the

Reasons for Judgment herein of his Honour I -

Mr. Justice Elnfeld

I Asscciate I

SCHEDULE

Interrosatories

1.

What was the documentary material obtained by the Federal Bureau of Consumer Affairs among the material referred to in sub-paragraph l(b) of the First Respondent's statement under s.13 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (hereinafter called "the s.13 statement) as that which was considered by officers of the Bureau in the preparation of the Report presented.to the first respondent as referred to in sub-paragraph l(b) of the s.13 statement? (Identification of documents by reference to their

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respective numbers in the First Respondent's list of documents will suffice, and in respect of documents not discovered identification is requested by means of author, date and title as applicable).

2. From whom, if anyone, did officers of the Federal Bureau of Consumer Affairs obtain material, as referred to in sub-paragraph l(b) of the s.13 statement, which was imparted to such officers by speech rather than writing?

3.      In respect to each item of material specified in the answer to interrogatory 2, when was it obtained by officers of the Federal Bureau of Consumer Affairs?

i.

4.      In respect to each item of material specified in the

what was said by whomever imparted it to officers of the answer to interrogatory 2, what was the substance of

Federal Bureau of Consumer Affairs?

1. Which items or parts of the material specified in the answer to interrogatories 1 and 2 was, after the consideration of it by ocficers of the Federal Bureau of Consumer Affairs as referl-ed to in sub-paragraph l(b) of the s.13 statement, rejected by those officers as erroneous, unreliable or irrelevant?

6 . What were the reasons for the rejection of each item or
part of the material specified in the answer to
Interrogatory 5?
Did the First Respondent accept the conclusion contained

in the Report referred to in sub-paragraph l(b) of the

s.13 statement?

In forminb his decision to publish the notice pursuant
to sub-section 65J(1) of the Trade Practices Act 1974
which appeared' in the Commonwealth Gazette of January
13, 1988 (hereinafter called "the 65J notice"), did the
First Respondent reject or differ from in any degree any
of the suggestions, recommendations, statements or
conclusions set out or contained in the Report referred
to in sub-paragraph l(b) of the s.13 statement?

If interrogatory 8 was answefed in the affirmative to
any extent, what were the suggestions, recommendations,
statements or conclusions which the First Respondent
rejected or from which he differed in the Report
referred to in sub-paragraph l(b) of the s.13 statement?

What were the reasons for the First Respondent rejecting
or differing from each suggestion, recommendation,
statement or conclusion specified in the answer to
interrogatory 9?

In coming to his decision to publish the 6 5 5 notice what interpretation or meaning did the First Respondent.give to the expressions "goods", "injury" and "will or may

cause" in sub-section 6 5 C ( 5 ) of the Trade Practices Act
1974?

In coming to his decision to publish the 655 notice did

the First Respondent take into account any discussion
with the Minister for Health, and, if so, identify the
occasion of each such discussion, and state the content
of it?

In coming to his decision to publish the 6 5 5 notice did the First Respondent take into account any discussions with the Attorney General, and if so, identify each such discussion and state the content of it?

In coming to his decision to publish the 655 Notice did the First Respondent take into account any discussions with anyone other than those persons specified in Interrogatories 12 and 13, and if so, identify each such person and discussion and state the content of the discussion?

In coming to his decision to publish the 655 notice did the First Respondent take into account any oral briefing, and if so, identifiy the occasion of each such briefing, the participants, and the content of it?

In coming to his decision to publish the 655 notice did the First Respondent take into account the existence of a group of persons and bodies actively and publicly

campaigning for the eradication of the smoking of
tobacco in Australia?

In coming to his decision to publish the 6 5 J notice did the First Respondent take the view that publication of the notice would assist in the ultimate eradication of the smoking of tobacco in Australia?

In coming to his decision to publish the 655 notice did the First Respondent consid@r whether it would be a proper use of his statutory power to publish a notice and yet not take any statutory steps relating to the smoking of tobacco, and if so, what was his view?

Is it a fact that the First Respondent in coming to his

decision to publish the 655 notice considered that the

small number of people who would be affected compared
with the number of tobacco smokers in Australia made it
unlikely that there would be any serious political
reaction?

Is it a fact that the First Respondent in coming to his decision to publish the 655 notice considered that it

was politically impossible to take any step towards
banning the smoking of tobacco in Australia?

Is it a fact that the Minister in coming to his decision to publish the 655 notice took into account the fact that the goods in question were not manufactured in Australia and the fact that smoking tobacco was manufactured in Australia?

What were the reasons for the First Respondent deciding to publish the 655 notice but not to publish a similar notice in relation to smoking tobacco?

What were the reasons of the First Respondent in deciding to publish the 653 notice rather than to propose some form of regulation of sale of the product?

In coming to his decisign to publish the section 655 notice rather than to propose some form of regulation of sale did the First Respondent take the view that a proposal for regulation of sale which fully informed the public of risks was unacceptable if it did not have the effect of actually deterring people from using the product?

Is it a fact that the First Respondent in. coming to his decision to publish the 65J notice was concerned only with whether there was*lawful power to do so, rather than considering whether to do so was a proper exercise of the statutory power if it existed?

1,s it a fact that in com;ng to his decision to publish

the 655 notice the First Respondent was acting solely

upon the advice of each of the Minister for Health and

the Attorney General?

Was the sole matter considered by the First Respondent in coming to his decision to publish the 655 notice the

question whether smokeless tobacco will or may cause
injury?

28.     Look at document no G referred to in the Applicant's list of documents and answer the following questions:

(a)	Did the First Respondent on 5 January 1988 have an interview with Ruth Elks of Radio Station 6PR?
(b)	If so, does the document accurately reflect the substance of what was said by the First Respondent at the interview?
(C)	If the answer to (b) is wholly or partly in the negative, specify thohe parts which do not accurately reflect the substance of what was said and the manner in which it is said to be inaccurate.