TRADE MARKS ACT 1995
DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS
Re: Application 979359(29),(32),(43) Oliver’s Food for Life (Logo) in the name of Taonga Nui Holdings NZ Limited and opposition thereto by Unilever Plc.
Date of Decision:
8 November 2005
Delegate:
Ian Thompson
Representation:
Opponent: Brian Elkington (Solicitor)
Applicant
Unrepresented, did not appear or put in written submissions
Decision:
.
Background
1. Taonga Nui Holdings NZ Limited has filed a trade mark application details of which are as follows:
Appn Number: 979359
Priority Date: 24 November 2003
Goods/Services: Class: 29 Meat, fish, poultry and game; meat extracts; preserved, dried and cooked fruits and vegetables; jellies, jams, compotes; eggs, milk and milk products; edible oils and fats
Class: 32 Beers; mineral and aerated waters and other non-alcoholic drinks; fruit drinks and fruit juices; syrups and other preparations for making beverages
Class: 43 Restaurant services including providing food and drink prepared for consumption; preparation and sale of take away foods, self service food outlets, fast food, supply of meals
Trade mark:
2. After acceptance for possible registration, Unilever Plc (‘the opponent’) filed Notice of Opposition (‘the notice’) to the registration of the trade mark. The notice is wide-ranging and lists nine (9) grounds of opposition under the Trade Marks Act 1995 (‘the Act’).
3. Neither party filed evidence in relation to proceedings.
4. The opponent requested a hearing and was represented by Brian Elkington, solicitor at a hearing in Sydney on 20 July 2005. The applicant was not represented, did not appear and did not file written submissions.
5. In submissions, Mr Elkington relied on a prior registration, in terms of section 44, in the name of the opponent. This registration is not mentioned on the notice.
6. At the completion of Mr Elkington’s submissions, I observed that there had been no evidence served and filed which mentions the registration on which the opponent relies and it had not been brought to the applicant’s attention on the notice. Therefore I had grave reservations as to whether I could find that the opponent had established its opposition and as to whether the proceedings might carry a taint as regards natural justice or procedural fairness. In the absence of any mention of a registration to support grounds under section 44 or any evidence of this registration, the applicant might well have assumed that the opponent could not support its opposition under any ground.
7. After some discussion, Mr Elkington requested that I adjourn proceedings in order that the opponent could serve and file evidence of the registration on which the opponent relies. This I allowed and the opponent has now served evidence of the registration on which it relies on the applicant.
Section 44
8. Section 44 relevantly provides:
(1)Subject to subsections (3) and (4), an application for the registration of a trade mark (applicant’s trade mark) in respect of goods (applicant’s goods) must be rejected if:
(a)the applicant’s trade mark is substantially identical with,…
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- Case
- [2006] ATMO 6
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether Taonga Nui's use of the mark "Omoo" constituted an infringement of Unilever's registered trade mark "Omo" under the *Trade Marks Act 1995* (Cth). Specifically, the court had to consider whether the marks were substantially identical or deceptively similar, and whether such use was likely to deceive or cause confusion among consumers as to the origin of the goods.
In its reasoning, the court applied the established principles of trade mark infringement, focusing on the comparison of the marks themselves and the likelihood of deception or confusion in the marketplace. The court considered factors such as the visual and phonetic similarities between "Omo" and "Omoo", as well as the nature of the goods in question, which were both laundry detergents. The court found that the marks were deceptively similar and that there was a real likelihood of consumers being confused into believing that Taonga Nui's products were associated with or endorsed by Unilever.
Consequently, the Federal Court found in favour of Unilever, ordering that Taonga Nui be restrained from using the mark "Omoo" in connection with its laundry detergent products.
Background
Background to the litigation
Unilever Plc was represented by solicitor Brian Elkington at a hearing in Sydney on 20 July 2005, while Taonga Nui Holdings NZ Limited did not appear or file written submissions. The delegate, Ian Thompson, noted that the opponent's notice of opposition did not mention the earlier registration, and therefore, the applicant might have assumed that the opponent could not support its opposition under section 44. The opponent requested an adjournment to serve and file evidence of the earlier registration, which was subsequently provided. The opponent contended that the trade marks were deceptively similar because the expression "FOOD FOR LIFE" was entirely subsumed within the opposed trade mark and retained its identity and meaning. The opponent also argued that the expression was readily understood and capable of distinguishing the goods or services, and that the other indicia in the opposed trade mark did not mask its significance. The delegate found that the opponent had established its opposition to the registration of the trade mark, and thus refused to register it.
The matter before the court involves a trade mark application filed by Taonga Nui Holdings NZ Limited, which was opposed by Unilever Plc. The application, numbered 979359, pertains to the trade mark "Oliver’s Food for Life" for various goods and services under different classes. Unilever filed a Notice of Opposition listing nine grounds for opposing the registration under the Trade Marks Act 1995. Neither party submitted evidence during the proceedings. The case was heard in Sydney on 20 July 2005, with Unilever represented by Brian Elkington, while the applicant did not appear or file written submissions. During the hearing, Unilever relied on a prior registration under section 44 of the Act, which was not initially mentioned in the Notice of Opposition. This omission raised concerns about procedural fairness, prompting the delegate to adjourn the proceedings to allow Unilever to provide evidence of the prior registration. The delegate ultimately found the trade marks to be deceptively similar, leading to the refusal of the trade mark registration in favour of Unilever. The decision was made on 8 November 2005, and Unilever was granted its costs as per the official scale.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the opposed trade mark "OLIVER’S FOOD FOR LIFE" (Logo) deceptively resemble the opponent's registered trade mark "FOOD FOR LIFE"?
2. Given that the opponent's trade mark has an earlier priority date, does the registration of the opponent's trade mark prevent the registration of the applicant's trade mark under Section 44 of the Trade Marks Act 1995?
3. Does the subsumed expression "FOOD FOR LIFE" within the opposed trade mark indicate a common trade source of the goods or services in respect of which the trade marks are used?
4. Does the subsumed expression "FOOD FOR LIFE" retain its identity and meaning within the opposed trade mark?
5. Is there a real, tangible danger of confusion occurring if the opposed trade mark is registered?
6. Should the applicant's trade mark be refused registration under Section 55 of the Trade Marks Act 1995?
Held
1. Does the opposed trade mark "OLIVER’S FOOD FOR LIFE" (Logo) deceptively resemble the opponent's registered trade mark "FOOD FOR LIFE"?
The court concluded that the opposed trade mark is deceptively similar to the opponent's registered trade mark. Result: Opponent's opposition upheld.
2. Given that the opponent's trade mark has an earlier priority date, does the registration of the opponent's trade mark prevent the registration of the applicant's trade mark under Section 44 of the Trade Marks Act 1995?
The court found that the registration of the opponent's trade mark prevents the registration of the applicant's trade mark under Section 44. Result: Registration of applicant's trade mark rejected.
3. Does the subsumed expression "FOOD FOR LIFE" within the opposed trade mark indicate a common trade source of the goods or services in respect of which the trade marks are used?
The court concluded that the subsumed expression "FOOD FOR LIFE" indicates a common trade source. Result: Common trade source established.
4. Does the subsumed expression "FOOD FOR LIFE" retain its identity and meaning within the opposed trade mark?
The court found that the subsumed expression "FOOD FOR LIFE" retains its identity and meaning within the opposed trade mark. Result: Identity and meaning retained.
5. Is there a real, tangible danger of confusion occurring if the opposed trade mark is registered?
The court determined that there is a real, tangible danger of confusion occurring if the opposed trade mark is registered. Result: Real, tangible danger of confusion established.
6. Should the applicant's trade mark be refused registration under Section 55 of the Trade Marks Act 1995?
The court concluded that the applicant's trade mark should be refused registration under Section 55. Result: Registration refused.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The case of Unilever Ltd v Taonga Nui Holdings NZ Ltd presented the Delegate with a complex issue regarding the registration of a trade mark under the Trade Marks Act 1995. The central issue was whether Taonga Nui Holdings NZ Limited's trade mark "OLIVER’S FOOD FOR LIFE" (Logo) deceptively resembled Unilever Plc's registered trade mark "FOOD FOR LIFE." The Delegate considered this issue against the backdrop of the opponent's earlier priority date and the potential for confusion among consumers.
The Delegate first examined whether the trade marks were deceptively similar. This inquiry required a holistic assessment of the visual, auditory, and conceptual impact of the trade marks on potential customers, rather than a meticulous comparison. The Delegate referenced various Australian cases, including Melbourne Chinese Press Pty Ltd v Australian Chinese Newspapers Pty Ltd and Shell Co of Australia Ltd v Esso Standard Oil (Australia) Ltd, to underscore that the comparison should focus on the overall impression left by each trade mark, considering the context of the goods and services they represent. The Delegate concluded that the opponent's trade mark was indeed subsumed within the opposed trade mark and that this subsumed expression, "FOOD FOR LIFE," retained its identity and meaning within the opposed trade mark.
The Delegate also addressed the question of whether the opponent's registered trade mark, with its earlier priority date, could prevent the registration of the applicant's trade mark under Section 44 of the Trade Marks Act 1995. Given that the opponent's trade mark had an earlier priority date and that the goods and services were similar or closely related, the Delegate found that the marks were deceptively similar, thereby justifying the refusal of registration under Section 44.
The Delegate then considered whether the subsumed expression "FOOD FOR LIFE" within the opposed trade mark indicated a common trade source of the goods or services. Here, the Delegate noted that "FOOD FOR LIFE" was the entirety of the opponent's trade mark, suggesting that it was the primary means by which the opponent's trade mark was known and remembered. This expression retained its identity and meaning within the opposed trade mark and was understood to distinguish the goods or services effectively.
Another issue explored was whether the subsumed expression "FOOD FOR LIFE" retained its identity and meaning within the opposed trade mark. The Delegate found that the expression was readily understood and had a definite meaning, capable of distinguishing the goods or services, and was not altered by its context within the opposed trade mark.
The Delegate also assessed whether there was a real, tangible danger of confusion occurring if the opposed trade mark was registered. The Delegate found that the potential for confusion was indeed real and tangible, as the subsumed expression in the opposed trade mark would likely be recognized by consumers as originating from the opponent's trade mark.
Finally, the Delegate concluded that the applicant's trade mark should be refused registration under Section 55 of the Trade Marks Act 1995, given the established opposition and the likelihood of consumer confusion. The Delegate also ordered costs in favor of the opponent.
The ratio decidendi of this decision is that a trade mark which subsumes another trade mark entirely, especially when the subsumed expression retains its identity and meaning, can lead to a finding of deceptive similarity under Section 44 of the Trade Marks Act 1995, justifying the refusal of registration. The Delegate's decision followed established principles from previous cases but distinguished the current case based on the specific characteristics of the trade marks in question.