Unilever Australia Ltd v Petrevska

In *Unilever Australia Ltd v Petrevska*, the appellant, Unilever Australia Ltd, sought to appeal a decision concerning a workers' compensation claim. The dispute centred on the interpretation of the six-month time limit for commencing a claim for compensation under the *Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998* (NSW), specifically when an injury is "taken to have been received". The respondent, Ms. Petrevska, had suffered a gradual onset of hearing loss allegedly due to noisy working conditions at the appellant's factory.

The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether Ms. Petrevska's injury, a gradual hearing loss, was to be considered "received" at the point she formed a belief that her hearing loss was causally related to her employment, or only when she received appropriate medical advice confirming this causal link. This question was crucial for determining whether her claim was lodged within the statutory six-month time limit prescribed by section 261(6) of the Act. The court had to consider the meaning of "awareness" in the context of a gradual injury where the precise cause is a matter for expert determination.

The Court of Appeal reasoned that for the purposes of the Act, awareness of an injury means knowledge of the injury itself and its causal connection to employment. It held that a worker's subjective belief or opinion that their hearing loss is causally related to their employment does not equate to the requisite "awareness" if the determination of that causal link is a matter for expert opinion. Therefore, awareness is generally established when the worker receives appropriate medical advice confirming the injury and its connection to their work. The court found that Ms. Petrevska had not been aware of the causal connection between her hearing loss and her employment until she received medical advice.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, directed the appellant to file a notice of appeal, but ultimately dismissed the appeal. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal itself.