Ultra Tune Australia Pty Ltd v Mackenzie Auto Repairs Pty

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:  Ultra Tune Australia Pty Ltd v Mackenzie Auto Repairs Pty
Ltd [2021] QCA 3
PARTIES:  ULTRA TUNE AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
ACN 065 214 708
(appellant)
v
MACKENZIE AUTO REPAIRS PTY LTD
ACN 123 938 698
(respondent)
FILE NO/S:  Appeal No 7679 of 2020
SC No 10805 of 2017
DIVISION:  Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:  General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING  Supreme Court at Brisbane – Unreported, 19 June 2020
COURT:  (Wilson J)
DELIVERED ON:  22 January 2021
DELIVERED AT:  Brisbane
HEARING DATE:  18 November 2020
JUDGES:  Fraser and McMurdo JJA and Williams J
ORDERS: 
1.  The appeal is dismissed.
2.  The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal

on the indemnity basis.

CATCHWORDS: 

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – COSTS – OFFERS OF

COMPROMISE, PAYMENTS INTO COURT AND
SETTLEMENTS – PARTICULAR CASES – where

proceedings between the appellant and respondent were settled pursuant to a deed of settlement, which provided that the

respondent be paid its costs on an indemnity basis – where a costs statement was served on the appellant – where the appellant did not serve a notice of objection within time –

where a default costs assessment was made, which was given

effect by the order of the Registrar – where no application under r 740 UCPR was made by the appellant – where the

appellant made an application to have the default costs

assessment and order of the Registrar set aside – where the application was refused – whether the learned primary judge erred in refusing the application – whether the default costs

assessment and order of the Registrar should be set aside Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld), s 63, s 64 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 706, r 708, r 709, r 740

Amos v Wiltshire [2014] QCA 218, considered
Fleming v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 250; [1998] HCA 68,
cited
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40,
considered
Wainohu v New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181; [2011]
HCA 24, cited
COUNSEL:  L Stephens with N Hiscox for the appellant
L Jurth for the respondent

SOLICITORS: 

T Troung, in-house solicitor for the appellant Saunders Downing Legal for the respondent

  1. FRASER JA: I agree with the reasons for judgment of Williams J and the orders proposed by her Honour.

  2. McMURDO JA: I agree with Williams J.

  3. WILLIAMS J: This is an appeal from an order dated 19 June 2020 dismissing an

    application to set aside a default costs assessment and the Registrar’s order dated

    10 February 2020 giving effect to the assessment.

  4. The appellant seeks orders that the order dismissing the application dated 19 June 2020 be set aside, the decision and certificate of the costs assessor dated 5 February 2020 be set aside and the order for costs of the Registrar dated 10 February 2020 be set aside. Further, the appellant seeks an order that the appointed costs assessor

    reassess the respondent’s…

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Details
Case
[2021] QCA 3
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Supreme Court of Queensland, Ultra Tune Australia Pty Ltd (the appellant) brought an appeal against an order of the Registrar that the respondent, Mackenzie Auto Repairs Pty Ltd, be paid costs on an indemnity basis. The appellant sought to have the order set aside on the basis that the respondent failed to give reasons for the decision and the learned primary judge acted without jurisdiction. The appeal also challenged the substantive merits of the order for costs. The appellant submitted that the failure to provide reasons was an error of law and a jurisdictional error, warranting the setting aside of the orders. The respondent argued that the failure to provide reasons did not amount to an error in law, particularly given the extensive interaction between the learned primary judge and Counsel for both parties, and the confirmation by both parties that reasons were not required. The court considered whether the failure to provide reasons amounted to an error in law justifying the setting aside of the orders. It found that the duty to provide reasons was not absolute and was subject to some qualification, particularly in minor interlocutory matters. The particular circumstances of the case, including the extensive interaction between the learned primary judge and Counsel, and the confirmation by both parties that reasons were not required, were factors in support of the position that the failure to give reasons did not amount to an error in law. The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the respondent's costs of the appeal on an indemnity basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The appeal is dismissed.

2.

The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant seeks orders that the order dismissing the application dated 19 June 2020 be set aside, the decision and certificate of the costs assessor dated 5 February 2020 be set aside and the order for costs of the Registrar dated 10 February 2020 be set aside. Further, the appellant seeks an order that the appointed costs assessor reassess the respondent’s costs statement taking the notice of objection into account. Background The respondent was one of the appellant’s franchisees between 2007 and 2017. The respondent commenced proceedings against the appellant alleging breaches of the franchise agreement, provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct and the Australian Consumer Law. The matter was set down for trial in 2019 and, ultimately, the appellant agreed to compromise the proceedings on the terms set out in a deed of settlement dated 22 March 2019.[1] [1] Exhibit “GAD1” to the affidavit of G Downing sworn 13 January 2020. AB page 52. By the terms of the deed of settlement, the appellant agreed to pay the respondent’s costs on a full indemnity basis consisting of costs of the proceedings, the assessment of costs, preparation of the deed of settlement and the costs of enforcing the deed of settlement. Following the appellant breaching the deed of settlement by failing to pay the settlement sum on 21 May 2019, an application was made to the Supreme Court of Queensland to enforce the deed of settlement by obtaining judgment.[2] [2] See affidavit of G Downing sworn 10 June 2020 at [5]-[6]. AB page 360. On 3 June 2019, Applegarth J ordered by consent: The deed of settlement and the order of Applegarth J dated 3 June 2019 provide the basis for the obligation of the appellant to pay the respondent’s costs on an indemnity basis. The parties were unable to agree in relation to the amount of indemnity costs. The respondent’s solicitor served a costs statement on the appellant on 17 December 2019. Pursuant to r 706 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR), any notice of objection to any item in the costs statement was to be served within 21 days after service of the costs statement: being 7 January 2020. No notice of objection was served on or before 7 January 2020. On 14 January 2020, the respondent filed an application to appoint a costs assessor pursuant to r 708 of the UCPR. The costs assessor’s certificate dated 5 February 2020 assessed the costs in the amount of $260,203.23. The respondent filed the costs certificate on 6 February 2020 and, on 10 February 2020, the Deputy Registrar made the Registrar’s order that the costs be assessed in that amount. On 12 February 2020, the Registrar’s order was served on the appellant. The Registrar’s order refers to r 740 of the UCPR in the footer. The effect of r 740 is that the order is not enforceable until at least 14 days after it is made and the Court may stay enforcement pending review of the assessment on terms the Court considers just. No application was made by the appellant pursuant to r 740 of the UCPR.

Decision

Reasons for decision

However, given the matters discussed below it is not necessary to conclusively decide whether s 64 applies in these circumstances and whether leave was required for the appeal to be properly constituted. No reasons for decision In the light of the exchange with Counsel on behalf of the parties, her Honour did not provide reasons. There is no ground of appeal which raises the lack of reasons. However, in the appellant’s reply submissions dated 7 October 2020, reference is made to the learned primary judge’s failure to give reasons for her decision. In its reply submissions the appellant refers to several authorities and a submission is made that a failure to provide reasons where they are required is an error of law and is also a jurisdictional error. Reference is made to the decisions in Fleming v The Queen[10] and Wainohu v New South Wales[11] in support of this proposition. [10] (1998) 197 CLR 250. [11] (2011) 243 CLR 181. The appellant ultimately submits as follows: “As Her Honour has not given any reasons for her decision, the Court of Appeal cannot tell what consideration was given by the Judge in the matter. The Court of Appeal should allow the appeal, set aside the orders and remit the matter to the Chambers or Trial division of the Supreme Court.” In these circumstances, it is necessary to consider, at least to some degree, the issue of whether the failure to give reasons results in the need to set aside the orders. The duty of judges to give reasons is well-established.[12] It requires that judges provide reasons for final decisions and important interlocutory proceedings.[13] However, the duty is subject to some qualification and, as such, does not extend to every decision of the court, such as minor interlocutory matters.[14] [12] AK v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 438, 470 (Heydon J). [13] Wainohu v New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181, 213 (French CJ and Kiefel J). [14] Wainohu v New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181, 215 (French CJ and Kiefel J). The duty is not subject to qualification merely by the fact that parties have not specifically requested reasons from the court.[15] However, where a judge has asked the parties whether reasons for a decision are required and the parties decline the offer, it has been suggested that such a context would be a factor in favour of qualifying the judge’s duty to give reasons.[16] [15] R v Kay; Ex parte Attorney-General [2017] 2 Qd R 522. [16] Crystal Dawn P/L & Anor v Redruth P/L [1998] QCA 373, [17] (Muir J); R v Kay; Ex parte Attorney- General [2017] 2 Qd R 522, 534 (McMurdo JA). The particular subject matter of the decision here, the extensive interaction between the learned primary judge and Counsel for both parties on the issues and the fact that both parties confirmed that reasons were not required in response to her Honour’s question, are all factors in support of the position that the failure to give reasons in the current circumstances does not amount to an error in law justifying the setting aside of the orders. Grounds of Appeal

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Overall, the respondent submits that there was no error in the resolution of the application by the learned primary judge: there remains no satisfactory explanation for the appellant’s failures and delays. Consideration In respect of appeals concerning an exercise of judicial discretion, the principles in House v The King can be summarised as follows: It was plainly open to the learned primary judge to dismiss the application on the basis that: There were several periods of delay that needed to be addressed by the appellant: The affidavit material failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delays, including for example that: Mr Hiscox of Counsel appeared for the appellants at the hearing on 19 June 2020. Mr Hiscox is experienced in respect of legal costs and is an Approved Costs Assessor under the UCPR. Mr Hiscox made a number of concessions in respect of the substantive issues identified in the cost statement and the notice of objection before the learned primary judge. Her Honour acted reasonably in acting on the basis of the concessions made. As evidenced by the transcript of the hearing on 15 and 19 June 2020, the learned primary judge’s exercise of discretion in making the orders was not unreasonable. Further, no error of law or fact in her Honour’s approach has been established by the appellant. Nor has the appellant established any failure to take into account a relevant consideration or taking into account an irrelevant consideration. No miscarriage of the exercise of judicial discretion has been established. In these circumstances, it is not necessary to further consider whether leave is required under sections 63 or 64 of the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld) as the substantive appeal must fail. The appeal should be dismissed. Submissions were made at the hearing of the appeal in relation to costs. The respondent relies on clause 3.2 of the deed of settlement as the basis upon which costs should be awarded on an indemnity basis. Given the express terms of the deed of settlement and the fact that the respondent has had to incur costs as a result of the delays and failures by the appellant to comply with processes under the UCPR, an order that the appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal on an indemnity basis is appropriate in the circumstances. Orders I would therefore make the following orders: