Ugur v Australian Human Rights Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ugur v Australian Human Rights Commission [2011] FCA 144

Citation: Ugur v Australian Human Rights Commission [2011] FCA 144
Appeal from: Ugur v Australian Human Rights Commission [2010] AATA 144
Parties: H E O UGUR v AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
File number: NSD 886 of 2010
Judge: BUCHANAN J
Date of judgment: 24 February 2011
Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44, 33, 39
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 11
Cases cited: Bahonko v Sterjov (2008) 166 FCR 415
Ugur v Australian Human Rights Commission [2010] AATA 144
Ugur v New South Wales Police Service [2005] FCA 48 Ugur v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2008] FCA 1461
Ugur v Police Service of New South Wales [2004] FCA 1032
Date of hearing: 17 February 2011
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 31
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person.
Solicitor for the Respondent: Ms M Lindley of Australian Human Rights Commission

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 886 of 2010

BETWEEN:

H E O UGUR
Applicant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
Respondent

JUDGE:

BUCHANAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

24 FEBRUARY 2011

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is dismissed.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 886 of 2010

BETWEEN:

H E O UGUR
Applicant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
Respondent

JUDGE:

BUCHANAN J

DATE:

24 FEBRUARY 2011

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 19 July 2010 Mr Ugur commenced proceedings in this Court seeking an extension of time in which to challenge a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the AAT”) constituted under the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (“the AAT Act”), given on 26 February 2010. The decision of the AAT responded to an application for review of a decision made by the Australian Human Rights Commission (“the AHRC”) not to provide particular documents to Mr Ugur under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth). The AAT identified the nature of the application with which it was required to deal in the following way:

    1.Mr Haci Ugur applies under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) (the Act) for review of a decision made by the Australian Human Rights Commission (the HRC), in relation to his request for a copy of his “personal files”.

    2.In March 2009, the HRC released a number of documents in answer to Mr Ugur’s request.  Twenty-one had parts deleted.  The HRC contends that those deletions were made because the documents were exempt from disclosure, because they contained personal information about HRC employees or third parties and/or information irrelevant to Mr Ugur’s FOI request.

    3.Mr Ugur contends that the HRC failed to release all documents…

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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 144
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Ugur v Australian Human Rights Commission, the applicant, Mr Ugur, sought an extension of time to lodge an appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) and to bring an application for judicial review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). The AAT had affirmed a decision of the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) that it had taken all reasonable steps to locate documents that Mr Ugur had requested under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth). Mr Ugur had not appealed from the AAT decision within the 28-day period allowed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) and did not apply for judicial review within the 28-day period allowed by the ADJR Act. His application for an extension of time was made over three months after the relevant deadlines had expired.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether Mr Ugur had provided a sufficient explanation for his delay in lodging his application for an extension of time. The court considered the affidavit filed by Mr Ugur in support of his application and noted that he had not provided a cogent explanation for the delay. The court also noted that Mr Ugur had made a number of allegations concerning the conduct of the AHRC and the AAT, which were not relevant to the question of whether he had a legitimate basis for appeal or review. The court concluded that Mr Ugur had not provided a sufficient explanation for his delay and dismissed his application for an extension of time.

In reaching its decision, the court emphasised the importance of timeliness in bringing appeals and applications for judicial review. The court noted that the deadlines for lodging such applications were strict and that extensions of time would only be granted in exceptional circumstances. The court also noted that the applicant had the burden of demonstrating that there was a legitimate basis for appeal or review, and that this burden had not been discharged in this case.

The final order of the court was that the application for an extension of time was dismissed. The court did not make any orders regarding the merits of Mr Ugur's appeal or application for judicial review, as it did not have jurisdiction to do so.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Nevertheless, as the AAT made plain, its rejection of this part of Mr Ugur’s arguments did not depend simply upon rejection of his allegations concerning the conduct of the AHRC. Rather, the AAT was satisfied that the steps set out in the decision under review (and in an earlier decision which was itself being reviewed by the decision-maker) disclosed that adequate searches had been conducted. Accordingly, the AAT expressed the following conclusion:89.Conclusion Having reviewed the documents released and the steps undertaken by Mr Hely and Ms O’Brien to locate them, I am satisfied that all reasonable steps have been taken to find the requested documents. In doing so, I have taken into account a number of factors, including:The significant number of documents releasedThe diverse and different types of documents locatedThe range of sources from which the documents have been obtainedThe fact that both electronic and physical records were undertakenThe fact that two searches were undertaken and by different peopleThe fact that the search was conducted across all sections within the HRC90.For these reasons I am satisfied that all reasonable steps were undertaken to locate the documents the subject of Mr Ugur’s request. Immediately thereafter the AAT recorded that the decision under review was affirmed. Subject to a further difficulty facing Mr Ugur, which is considered hereunder, if he wished to challenge the decision of the AAT he was required either to institute an appeal under s 44 of the AAT Act within 28 days of being given the decision of the AAT or make an application in accordance with s 11 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act1977 (Cth) (“the ADJR Act”) within 28 days of the decision. In an affidavit filed on 19 July 2010 in support of his application for an extension of time, Mr Ugur asserted that he did not receive the decision of the AAT (which was dated 26 February 2010) until 11 March 2010. It is apparent that, even making allowance for this in his favour, his application for an extension of time is still well outside the period allowed to him, in the absence of an extension of time being granted by the Court. Mr Ugur’s explanation was that he attempted to file his application on 9 April 2010 but was informed that he would need to apply for an extension of time. He said that he went to the registry of the Court on 3 May 2010 and was again advised to make an application for an extension of time. In the circumstances described by Mr Ugur, and accepting his statements about those matters, it was incumbent upon him, at least, to give a cogent explanation for the delay from 9 April 2010 until 19 July 2010. Mr Ugur provided to the registry a draft notice of appeal under the AAT Act dated 19 July 2010 together with a draft application under the ADJR Act which bore the date of 7 April 2010. Each of those documents referred to a nine page attachment containing a series of complaints about the conduct of the proceedings in the AAT including the accusations that Mr Ugur had been denied natural justice and procedural fairness, that the decision of the AAT was induced or affected by fraud, that both the AAT and the AHRC intended to prejudice his rights, that the AAT was biased against him and that the AAT had acted in bad faith. There were also accusations in this document to the effect that Mr Ugur is being “monitored” by the Government and that he has been subjected to “cruel and inhuman treatment without being formally charged and without being granted a fair trial”. The character of those accusations inevitably diverts attention from the question of whether, nevertheless, there might somewhere appear some legitimate foundation for an appeal under the AAT Act on a question of law, or for an application for review under the ADJR Act on one of the grounds permitted by that Act. That is a matter which I must attempt to assess by reference to the other material filed by Mr Ugur in support of his application for an extension of time and the contribution which he made at the hearing of that application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.