Uddin v Minister for Immigration - [2005] FMCA 841

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

UDDIN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION

[2005] FMCA 841

MIGRATION – Visa – student visa.

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s.39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.137J
Education Services for Overseas Students Act 2000 (Cth), s.20

Applicant:

MOHAMMAD AHSAN UDDIN

Respondent:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

File Number:

SYG 1313 of 2004

Judgment of:

Scarlett FM

Hearing date:

3 June 2005

Date of Last Submission:

3 June 2005

Delivered at:

Sydney

Delivered on:

7 June 2005

REPRESENTATION

Solicitor for the Applicant:

Mr McNally

Solicitors for the Applicant:

Parish Patience Immigration Lawyers

Counsel for the Respondent:

Mr Kennett

Solicitors for the Respondent:

Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

DECLARATIONS

That the Applicant’s student visa was not cancelled by operation of law under section 137J of the Migration Act 1958.
That the Applicant was not an unlawful non-citizen at any stage.

ORDERS

That a writ of prohibition is to issue restraining the Respondent and her servants or agents from acting upon or giving effect to the purported automatic cancellation of the Applicant’s visa on 6 March 2005.
That a writ of certiorari is to issue removing the purported decision of the delegate of the Respondent on 6 April 2005 rejecting the Applicant’s application for a visa into this Court to be quashed.
That a writ of prohibition is to issue restraining the Respondent and her servants or agents from acting upon or giving effect to the decision of

6 April 2005 rejecting the Applicant’s application for a visa.
That a writ of mandamus is to issue directing that Respondent to reconsider and redetermine the Applicant’s application for a subclass 497 visa according to law.
That the Respondent is to pay the Applicant’s costs of this application, fixed in the sum of $7500.00 professional costs and $1,076.00 disbursements, a total of $8,576.00.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SYG 1313 of 2005

MOHAMMAD AHSAN UDDIN

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Revised from transcript)

This is an application for review of an automatic cancellation of the applicant's student visa on 6 March 2005 by the operation of s.137J of the Migration Act1958 and the subsequent decision of a delegate of the respondent Minister to reject the applicant's application for a subclass 497 visa.
The applicant claims that his student visa was not lawfully cancelled by the operation of s.137J and therefore his application for a subclass 497 visa was validly made.
The applicant seeks the following declarations and orders:
1)a declaration that his student visa was not cancelled by operation of law under s.137J (2) of the Act;
2)a declaration that he was not an unlawful non-citizen at any stage as a result of the purported automatic cancellation;
3)the issue of a writ of prohibition restraining the respondent Minister and her servants or agents from acting upon or giving effect to the purported automatic cancellation of 6 March 2005;
4)a writ of certiorari removing the purported rejection decision of 6 April 2005 into this Court to be quashed;
5)a writ of prohibition restraining the respondent Minister and her servants and agents from acting upon or giving effect to the purported rejection decision of 6 April 2005; and
6)a writ of mandamus directing the respondent to reconsider and redetermine the applicant's application for a subclass 497 visa according to law.
The applicant relies on two grounds:
1)he submits that an automatic cancellation of his student visa under s.137J did not occur because notice under s.20 of the Education Services for Overseas Students Act2000 was not sent to him;
2)he submits that any reliance on that automatic cancellation or that purported automatic cancellation as being a cancellation at law is a misunderstanding of the law or a misapplication of the law to the facts.
As such he submits the decision to rejection the application for a subclass 497 visa relying on that cancellation is infected with jurisdictional error.
The applicant has provided particulars of those grounds. As to the first ground, the applicant says that the purported notice under s.20 of the Education Services for Overseas Students Act dated 5 February 2005 did not comply with the mandatory requirements of that section, and as a result was not a notice under that section. First, the notice did not notify the applicant that he could report to an officer for the purpose of explaining the alleged brief, but instead it required the applicant to report to a compliance officer, which is a subgroup of officer, and thus this was a more restrictive requirement than permitted by s.20 of the Act. The applicant submits this narrowing of the class of people to whom the applicant could report was ultra vires the Education Services for Overseas Students Act and the Migration Act.
Further the applicant submits that the notice did not set out the effects of ss.137J and 137K of the Migration Act.
There are two ways in which the applicant submits that the notice was erroneous in that case. First of all he says that the notice stated that an application for revocation must be made before the visa would have expired, whereas it was required to state under s.137K (2) that a non-citizen in the migration zone cannot apply for revocation at a time when, because of s.82 of the Act, the visa would no longer have been in effect anyway had the visa not been cancelled under s.137J. The applicant says that expiry is merely one of many ways in which a visa ceases to be in effect under s.82.
Further, the applicant submits that the notice erroneously required the applicant to report to a compliance officer which is a subgroup of officer at the specific address in order to avoid the automatic cancellation. That is a more restrictive requirement to avoid automatic cancellation than s.137J (2) stipulates.
The applicant says that the notice did not set out the effect of s.137J (2) because it did not set out that the applicant had a second option.

It stated only that the applicant could avoid automatic cancellation by complying with the notice.
As to the second ground, the applicant says that the s.20 notice, or the purported s.20 notice, did not comply with s.20 and as a result it was not a notice under that section. If it was not a notice under that section it must follow that the automatic cancellation by operation of law under s.137J (2) did not take place.
The subclass 497 visa was rejected as invalidly made on the basis of an error of law in relation to the purported automatic cancellation, and that error went to the very heart of the delegate's jurisdiction in relation to the purported rejection decision and was therefore a jurisdictional error at law.
The background to this matter is that applicant is a citizen of Bangladesh where he completed his primary and secondary education. He arrived in Australia on 9 March 1999 to continue his tertiary education. He completed a course in English language at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology in the first part of 1999. He then studied full time and completed a certificate in Information Technology Programming, Diploma of Information Technology Technical and User Support, Diploma of Information Technology Software Development, on 28 June 2001 and 13 August 2003 at the Hales Institute in Melbourne.
On 6 October that year the applicant commenced full time study in the Diploma of Hospitality Management Commercial Cookery at the ACTH Management in Melbourne and completed all requirements for this course on 25 February 2005. Notwithstanding that he completed the diploma course on 25 February, 20 days previously the education provider purported to issue a notice under s.20, on 5 February, which contained as particulars:
Student had low attendance in T4-04 47 per cent.
meaning student had low attendance in term 4 of 2004. The applicant never received the notice. The applicant admits that even if the notice was never received, s.137J still set in train the automatic cancellation provisions.
The Department of Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs was of the belief that the s.20 notice was a valid one and the applicant's student visa was deemed to be automatically cancelled on 6 March 2005 by operation of s.137J (2).
The applicant lodged an application for a subclass 497 temporary graduate skilled visa on 14 March 2005. That was the day before his earlier student visa was due to expire by effluxion of time.
On 31 March 2005 the applicant lodged an application for a subclass 880 permanent skilled independent overseas student visa and he relied on the previous lodgement of his subclass 497 visa application, and a standard bridging visa A that should have been granted.
On 6 April 2005 the delegate of the Minister rejected his application for a subclass 497 visa as not being validly made. The reason for this given by the delegate was it was an alleged failure to satisfy the criterion in Schedule 1 clause 1212A (3) (f) stating:
Applicant must not have been an unlawful non-citizen at any time in the six months immediately before making the application.
The delegate said that:
Due to the automatic student visa cancellation on 6 March 2005 the applicant had been an unlawful non-citizen in Australia from that day up to 14 March 2005 when he lodged the application for the subclass 497 visa.
The purported decision to reject the subclass 497 application is not being validly made. It is not an MRT reviewable decision.
What the applicant submits is that the purported notice under s.20 of the Education Services for Overseas Students Act was not a valid notice under that section. That being so, it did not trigger the operation of s.137J to cancel automatically the applicant's student visa.
The relevant provisions of s.20 of the Education Services for Overseas Students Act sets out in sub-s.(1):
(1)A registered provider must send an accepted student of the provider a written notice if the student has breached a student visa condition relating to attendance or satisfactory academic performance;
(2)The registered provider must send the notice as soon as practicable after the breach;
(3)The notice must be in a form approved by the secretary of the Immigration Minister's Department;
(4)The notice must:
(a)contain particulars of the breach; and
(b)state that the student is required to attend in person before an officer within the meaning of the Migration Act 1958 at a specified place within 28 days after the day specified in the notice as the date of the notice for the purpose of explaining the breach; and
(c)state that the student must present photographic identification when so attending; and
(d)set out the effect of s137 and 137K of that Act.
The notice is contained on pages 1 and 2 of the green book of relevant documents. It is dated 5 February 2005. It states:
This notice is sent to you pursuant to s20 of the Education Services for Overseas Students Act 2000 as you have breached a condition of your student visa relating to attendance in the course in which you have been enrolled at this institution. Particulars of breach student had low attendance in T4-04 47 per cent. Pursuant to s 137J of the Migration Act 1958 your student visa will cease on the 28th day after the date of this notice unless you report to DIMIA by that date. The day count begins on the first day after the date of this notice and ends on the 28th day thereafter. You must report personally to a compliance officer at the following Department of Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs DIMIA office Australia Melbourne City Vic, Casselden Place, 2 Lonsdale Street, Melbourne, Vic 3000 Australia Telephone 131881.
The notice goes on to say that the applicant must report with photographic identification of himself, preferably his current passport and a copy of the notice to explain the breach of his student visa condition. It tells the applicant that if he fails to bring satisfactory identification the automatic visa cancellation process will continue and his student visa will be cancelled.
The notice goes on to say:
If you report to DIMIA as required under this notice the automatic cancellation of your student visa will not proceed, but a decision will then be made whether or not to cancel your visa. Your student visa will not be cancelled if you can show that no breach occurred.
The applicant submits that the requirements for a notice under s.20 of the Education Services for Overseas Students Act are mandatory so that a failure to comply strictly with those requirements will render that notice invalid. In making that submission, he relies on the recent decision of SAAP v The Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2005) HCA24 which was handed down on 18 May 2005. In that judgment the Court cited with approval its earlier decision in Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194CLR355.
The decision in SAAP v The Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs refers to s 424A of the Migration Act. It involved an analysis of the meaning of the word "must" in that context and whether it was used in an imperative or a permissive form.
In referring to the Court's decision in Project Blue Sky, the Court stated that whether an act done in breach of a condition regulating the exercise of a statutory power is invalid:
depends upon whether there can be discerned a legislative purpose to invalidate any act that fails to comply with a condition. The existence of a purpose is ascertained by reference to the language of the statute, its subject matter and object, and the consequences for the parties of holding void every act done in breach of the condition. Unfortunately a finding of purpose or no purpose in this context often reflects a contestable judgment. The cases show various factors that have proved decisive in various contexts but they do not no more than provide guidance in analogous circumstances. There is no decisive rule that can be complied. There is not even a ranking of relevant factors or categories to give guidance on the issue.
The Court went on to say:
A better test for determining the issue of validity is to ask whether it was a purpose of the legislation that an act done in breach of the provisions should be invalid. In determining the question of purpose regard must be had to "the language of the relevant provision and the scope and object of the whole statute".
At paragraphs 133 and 134 of the decision, Gummow J undertook an analysis of the meanings of the words "must" and "may" in s.424A. His Honour referred to s.33(2)A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 which provides:
Where an Act provides that a person, Court or body may do a particular act or thing and the word "may" is used, the act or thing may be done at the discretion of the person, Court or body.
His Honour was on the view that the carefully posed juxtaposition of the words "may" and "must" indicated distinction between a power and a duty.
Also in SAAP, Hayne J stated at paragraph 206:
The language of s424A is, of course, imperative. The Tribunal must take the several steps it prescribes. That imperative language stands in sharp contrast with the permissive terms of, for example, s424 which says that the Tribunal may take various steps.
Kirby J, paragraph 137 of the judgment approved of the approaches taken by Gummow and Hayne JJ.
It is the applicant's view that s.20 of the Education Services for Overseas Students Act is clear and unambiguous. He submits that the use of the word "must" throughout that section clearly demonstrates the Parliamentary intention that it was imperative that registered education providers issue a notice containing the mandatory particulars and information outlined in s.20 that the automatic visa cancellation process under s.137J(2) would not activate unless such a notice was issued. In my view, there is a great deal of strength in that submission.
The applicant also referred the Court to the decision of Lander J in Chen v The Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2005) FCA229 which was handed down on 11 March 2005. In my respectful view, even though this decision is not binding on the Federal Magistrates Court, I regard it as persuasive and I intend to follow it. I refer to Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v SZANS (2005) FCAFC41.
In Chen's case, his Honour examined the provisions of s.20 of the Education Services for Overseas Students Act. His Honour had these things to say at paragraphs 43 to 46:
43.Two things may be noticed: first the section applies even if the non-citizen does not receive the notice under s20 of the ESOS Act s137J (1); secondly, if the student non-citizen does not comply with s137J (2) of the Migration Act the visa is cancelled by force of the section itself (see s137J (2)).
44.In the case of this notice it is not easy to see how the applicant could comply with the notice s137J (2)(a) except by reporting to the Department of Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs s137J (2)(b). In any event the non-citizen who is in the migration zone immediately becomes liable to be detained under s189 of the Migration Act and becomes liable to be removed from Australia under s198 of the Migration Act. Thus a notice which is not complied with sets in train a procedure which may have significant repercussions for the person to whom the notice is directed.
The applicant sets out what the applicant submits are a number of failings of the notice in this case. It is the applicant's view that it was a mandatory requirement for the notice under s.20: first of all to state that the applicant was required to attend in person before an officer within the meaning of the Migration Act 1958 as opposed to a compliance officer at a specified place with photographic identification for the purpose of explaining the breach; second, the notice had to set out the effect of s.137J(2)(b) of the Migration Act that if the applicant could or would not comply with the purported notice the applicant could also avoid automatic cancellation if before the end of the 28th day after the date of the purported notice the applicant attended at any immigration officer at Australia and made himself available to any officer within the meaning of the Act for the stated purpose of explaining the breach alleged in the notice; third, that the notice had to set out the effect of s.137K(2) of the Migration Act that the applicant could not apply for revocation of the automatic cancellation at a time when, because of s.82, the visa would no longer be in effect anyway had it not been cancelled under s.137J; (d) the notice should set out the effect of s.82 of the Migration Act in relation to when a visa is no longer in effect so as to set out the effect of s.137K(2).
The applicant says that the notice did none of these things and must therefore be regarded as failing to comply with the mandatory requirements of s.20 (4). The applicant goes on to say that the notice that was sent to the applicant significantly limited his options. The notice specified that the applicant had to report to a compliance officer at the Melbourne office of the DIMIA within the specified period with photographic identification. A compliance officer is merely one of a wide range of individuals who fall under the definition of "officer" in s.5 of the Migration Act. This restriction was not authorised by s.20 and is direct contrast to the wider category of "officer" permitted by s.20 and by s.137J (2). The notice therefore did not comply with s.20(4) (b) of the Act.

The applicant submits that the automatic nature of the cancellation together with the dire consequences for the visa holder, which may include detention and deportation, illustrate why it is imperative and mandatory that the s20 notice accurately and fully set out the matters required by s.20, including the effects of ss.137J and 137K of the Migration Act which relate to automatic cancellation and an application for revocation.
The applicant says that the notice failed to do that and cannot therefore be regarded as a notice that is compliant with s.20. As such, the applicant says it is not a notice under s.20 for the purpose of s.137J of the Migration Act and refers to Chen’s case at paragraph 148. Thus, the applicant submits the automatic cancellation never took place.
The respondent, Mr Kennett of counsel, submitted that there has not been a failure to comply with the requirements of sub-s (4) of s.20. As counsel pointed out the only issue is whether in fact the applicant's student visa had been cancelled on 6 March, and that issue turned on whether the notice sent by the education provider was sufficient to trigger s.137J of the Migration Act.
For some reason, the respondent's submission refers to the notice having been sent on 7 March 2005, although the fact is that the notice was, in fact, dated 5 February 2005. Mr Kennett submitted that the notice did comply with s20. He said s.20 (4) (b) expressly envisages that the class of officer specified will be limited to officers present at a specified place and that the student is to report to an officer for a particular purpose, that is explaining the breach. It is clearly consistent with the scheme of s20 of the Education Services for Overseas Act and s.137J of the Migration Act for a notice to specify that the student is to report to a particular officer or one of a group of officers who is in a position to deal with and act upon the explanation that is to be given, that is officers who hold relevant delegations in respect of visa cancellations.
The word "officers" within the meaning of the Migration Act includes all officers of the department, customs officers, and members of all Australian police forces. It would be strange if a notice under s.20 were required to be framed in terms it could satisfied by reporting to any of these persons.
The respondent submits that the obligation to set out the effect of ss.137J and 137K has been complied with. He said that s.20 refrains from requiring the terms of those provisions to be set out. The notice did give a sufficient account of the effect of s.137J and K. In particular the notice told the applicant that his visa would be cancelled:
unless you report to DIMIA
which would therefore take account of the effect of s.137J (2) (b).
The notice did not fail to mention that the applicant's right to reply for revocation was limited in time. It set out the relevant time limits including relevantly that a student in Australia could only apply for revocation in the period before the visa was scheduled to expire. Thus, he submits, there was no failure to comply with the requirement of s.20(4).
Mr Kennett went on to submit that even if some or all of the applicant's complaints about the notice were made out it would not follow that the notice failed to bring s.137J into effect. He too referred to the decision of Lander J in Chen v The Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs. He pointed out that the Court noted that in the context, at least in relation to particulars of the alleged breach which was the issue in Chen's case, that s.20 did not require the same degree of particularity as s.119 of the Migration Act which is a formal mechanism for giving notice of an intention to cancel the visa. His Honour also said:
In my opinion a notice under s20 of the ESOS Act which does not contain sufficient particulars but which contains particulars which are wrong is not invalid and of no effect.
Like Mr McNally for the applicant, Mr Kennett for the respondent, submitted the Court should follow the decision of Lander J in Chen's case.
He submitted that it is noteworthy that s.20 is part of an Act which imposes obligations enforced by criminal penalties and other sanctions on education providers. He went on to say that that consideration must bear on the stringency with which the requirements of s.20 are seen to be imposed. It is unlikely that Parliament intended a breach to be found in cases where the notice falls short of s.20 (4) in a technical or insubstantial way.
Thus, turning to s.137J of the Migration Act a notice sent to the non-citizen under s.20 must be taken to mean a notice sent in compliance with the provider's obligation under s.20 that is a notice that is sufficient to order a breach of that obligation.
He went on to say that it is noteworthy that s.137J is expressed to operate even if the student does not receive the s.20 notice. He pointed out that the applicant asserted that that is exactly the case in the matter before me, which adds an air of unreality to his argument the notice was defective in failing to inform him precisely of his rights and obligations.
If, he says, as is clear the legislature intended automatic cancellation to occur in a case where the visa holder receives no prior notice at all, it cannot be concluded that the legislature intended cancellation to be avoided by reason of some relatively minor deficiency in a notice that is sent to a visa holder.
In my view, the applicant's contentions about the adequacy of the notice and its compliance with s.20 of the Education Services for Overseas Students Act are correct. In my view, the notice did fail to comply strictly with the requirements of sub-s (4) of s.20 of the Act.

I am mindful of the decision of his Honour, Lander J, in Chen's case and as I said I intend to follow it.
I note that in Chen's case what the Court said was that:
…a notice under s20 which does not contain sufficient particulars or which contains particulars which is wrong is not invalid and of no effect.
That relates to the particulars of the breach which is alleged.
What must be borne in mind is the draconian effect of the notice under s.20. It sets in train an automatic process which can lead to an applicant's visa being cancelled with dire consequences for the applicant as a result. Whilst the purpose of the section may primarily be to place obligations on an education provider, the section also sets in train a state of affairs which places heavy obligations on the student. If those obligations are not complied with the consequences for the student are extremely serious.
To my mind, the notice issued must therefore comply strictly with the terms of the section. As I said under sub-s/(4)(a) the fact of the particulars of the breach are insufficient or are wrong, as indicated by Lander J, relates only to sub-s.(a). In my respectful view, s.20(4)(b) must be taken at its face value when it says:
The notice must state that the student is required to attend in person before an officer within the meaning of the Migration Act 1958 at a specified place within 28 days after the day specified in the notice.
The student would comply with the notice, in my view, if he or she were to report to the specified place, which in this case was given as the Melbourne office of the Department of Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs and reported to an officer within the meaning of the Migration Act. The words "officer within the meaning of the Migration Act" has only one meaning, that is the definition as set out in s.5 of that Act.
It does not follow that the applicant is in breach of the notice if he or she reports personally to an officer at the specified office of the department, armed with photographic identification and a copy of his notice, to explain the breach of his student visa condition in a circumstance where, say, there was no compliance officer available. All the student could do is to report to an officer say who he or she is, why he or she is there, produce photographic identification, and set out why it is that he or she has turned up.
In my view, the notice also does not set out the effects of ss.137J and 137K of the Migration Act. In particular, s.137J(2) sets out that:
The non-citizen's visa is cancelled by force of this section at the end of the 28th day after the day that the notice specifies as the date of the notice unless before the end of that 28th day:
(a) the non-citizen complies with the notice; or
(bthe non-citizen while attending in person at an office of Immigration within the meaning of the regulations that is either:
(i) in Australia; or
(ii)approved for the purposes of this paragraph by the Minister by notice in the gazette, and makes himself or herself available to an officer for the stated purpose of explaining the breach alleged in the notice.
In my view, a student who receives such a notice may comply with s.137J either by complying with the notice or by attending at another office of the Department of Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs, say the Parramatta office, and reporting to an officer at that office and explaining why he or she is there to explain the breach alleged in the notice. The notice does not set that out. It just says:
If you report to DIMIA as required under this notice the automatic cancellation of your student visa will not proceed.
And that does not indicate a right under s.137J for an alternative procedure, and again the words:
Pursuant to s137J of the Migration Act 1958 your student visa will cease on the 28th day after the date of this notice unless you report to DIMIA by that time.
That does not specify that the person can report to any office. The notice goes on to provide that the person must report to the Melbourne office in 2 Lonsdale Street, Melbourne. Yet at s.137J (2) (b) would allow a person who received that notice to report to the Parramatta office or the Perth office, as long as he or she followed the procedure.
In my view the requirements of s.20 (4) are mandatory. In my view, the notice issued did not comply with the requirements of s.20 (4). It must follow therefore that the application must succeed.
I note there is no contest to the question of whether or not a costs order should be made and in my view the costs follow the event in the ordinary course of events and I think this is such a case.
I am of the view that the scale of costs in Schedule 1 does apply. Migration matters did form a substantial part of the Court's general Federal Law jurisdiction in March 2004. They certainly do now.
With respect, I disagree with the contention on behalf of the respondent that this was a relatively straight forward matter. I must confess I did not find it so. I heard submissions last Friday afternoon and I was certainly in a situation where I was coming down with some sort of a winter virus and I was not feeling particularly well, to the extent that I was not in a position where I felt that I could do justice to the submissions by Mr McNally for the applicant, or Mr Kennett for the respondent, each of whom, to my mind, prepared and presented very good and cogent submissions.
Whilst I seem to have been restored to health by Saturday, I am pleased to say, it has taken me some considerable amount of time and consideration to work my way through to a decision which I believe to be correct. I considered the submissions very carefully and there were, to my mind, strong points made by counsel for the respondent and the solicitor for the applicant.
That being the case, I am of the view that this is a matter that I had a greater degree of intellectual difficulty in deciding than most of the matters that come my way.
In my view this is a matter for an order for costs. I note the disbursements. I am not sure why the applicant sought to file in the Federal Court rather than in this Court. But in my view, the situation is certainly going to be that unless matters are of a greater deal of complexity they are going to be heard in this Court no matter where they are filed. In my view it is appropriate that the resources of the Federal Court should be used in a way other than dealing with the normal run of first instance migration matters.

I certify that the preceding sixty-two (62) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Scarlett FM

Associate: A. Coutman

Date: 17 June 2005