Tyger Financial Services Pty Ltd v Lovrinov

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil)

TYGER FINANCIAL SERVICES PTY LTD v LOVRINOV

[2010] SASC 349

Reasons of Judge Burley a Master of the Supreme Court

21 December 2010

PROCEDURE

Application for summary judgment - plaintiff a mortgagee - seeks possession order - defendant alleges duress - whether defendant has disclosed a reasonable basis for defending the claim - factual dispute - defendant's factual assertions differ markedly from pleading in defence and from earlier affidavit evidence - whether defendant's varying evidence capable of establishing duress - if summary judgment denied whether defendant should be ordered to pay alleged mortgage debt into Court.

Wicklow Enterprises Pty Ltd v Doysal Pty Ltd & Anor (1986) 45 SASR 247; Windella (NSW) Pty Ltd v Hughes (1999) 49 NSWLR 158; Grimwade & Ors v Beresford (1974) 9 SASR 157; Inglis & Anor v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia (1971-1972) 126 CLR 161; Glandore Pty Ltd v Elders Finance & Investment Co Ltd (1984) 4 FCR 130; Harvey v McWatters (1948) 49 SR (NSW) 173, considered.

TYGER FINANCIAL SERVICES PTY LTD v LOVRINOV
[2010] SASC 349

  1. JUDGE BURLEY.  By application filed on 13 September 2010 (FDN 7) the plaintiff has sought a number of orders including, by paragraph 7, the following:

    7.Possession of the property at 20 Paxton Street Semaphore South pursuant to the mortgage and/or a Warrant of Sale pursuant to the Enforcement of Judgments Act;

  2. At the hearing of the application on 25 November 2010, the plaintiff did not rely upon the reference to a Warrant of Sale.  I shall refer to the residence referred to above as “the property”.

  3. The plaintiff relies upon r 232 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 which enables a court to enter judgment where a matter may be summarily disposed of.  Various affidavits have been filed, all of which were admitted on the application.

  4. Pleadings have been filed, namely a statement of claim and the defendant’s defence and cross-claim against both the plaintiff and a Mr Patrick Bouhamdan.  The order for possession does not affect the second defendant by counterclaim and consequently he did not participate in the plaintiff’s application.

  5. Much of what has been pleaded in the statement of claim was not in dispute at the hearing.  Where factual assertions were made in the evidence of the defendant in order to counter assertions made in evidence adduced by the plaintiff, Mr Dart, counsel for the plaintiff, submitted that even on the affidavit evidence, it was demonstrably clear that no reliance could be placed upon what was said by the defendant.  He accepted that on a summary application the Court did not determine a matter where there were material disputes of fact.[1]  He, nevertheless, sought to persuade me that in reality, when the evidence given by the plaintiff in various affidavits is examined carefully, there was no factual basis disclosed which was capable of supporting the defendant’s defence to the proceedings. 

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Details
Case
[2010] SASC 349
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Tyger Financial Services Pty Ltd v Lovrinov, the plaintiff, a moneylender, sought possession of a residential property owned by the defendant, Lovrinov, based on a loan agreement and mortgage for $20,000. Lovrinov admitted signing the documents but claimed he did so under duress, rendering them voidable. The court had to determine whether the defendant's signature was indeed coerced, and if so, whether this nullified the loan agreement and mortgage. The interest rate on the loan was 8% per month, reducing to 5% if timely payments were made.

The legal issues revolved around the enforceability of the loan agreement and mortgage under the duress claim. Specifically, the court needed to assess the validity of the defendant's duress defence and its impact on the contractual obligations. The court also needed to consider whether the plaintiff could exercise its power of sale under the mortgage and the applicable legal provisions that permit an equitable mortgagee to do so.

In examining the evidence, the court found that the defendant failed to provide sufficient evidence of duress to warrant voiding the agreement and mortgage. The court ruled that the loan agreement and mortgage were valid and binding, and therefore, the defendant was liable to the plaintiff for the outstanding amounts. The court determined that the plaintiff could proceed with its power of sale under the mortgage, which would allow it to convey legal title to a third party. The court did not accept the defendant's argument regarding the de facto director of the plaintiff and the potential conflict of interest, as this was not substantiated by the evidence presented.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The nature of the dispute between the parties both factually and legally is within a relatively narrow compass. The plaintiff relies upon a loan agreement between it and the defendant for the sum of $20,000.00 and a mortgage in registrable form, both of which the defendant admits having signed. His defence is that he signed the documents under duress and that accordingly each of them is voidable and should be voided by order of the Court. It is little wonder that the defendant is anxious to avoid the transactions, given that the interest rate provided for in the loan agreement is 8 per cent per month reducing to 5 per cent per month if payments due under the loan agreement are made on time.The Facts In what follows, I propose to set out my factual findings and identify those matters that raise material factual disputes. The plaintiff is a money lender. The defendant owns the property which is a residential property. On 19 June 2009 the plaintiff lent to the defendant the sum of $20,000.00. A written loan agreement was entered into, a copy of which is in evidence. The loan was for a period of three months with instalments of principal and interest to be made on the nineteenth day of each month. The loan agreement was supported by a mortgage also signed on 19 June 2009. A copy of the mortgage is in evidence. It is in registrable form but it has not been registered. The plaintiff therefore holds an equitable mortgage.[2][2] Windella (NSW) Pty Ltd v Hughes (1999) 49 NSWLR 158 The plaintiff has lodged a caveat claiming an interest as equitable mortgagee. Since 19 September 2009 the defendant has been in default under the mortgage because of his failure to pay the instalments due thereunder and the additional failure to pay the principal amount at the expiration of the three month period. By notice dated 20 October 2009 the plaintiff purported to give notice pursuant to s 132 of the Real Property Act 1886 (SA) demanding payment of the amounts due. Because the property is a residential property s 55A of the Law of Property Act 1936 (SA) applies. The notice dated 20 October 2009 complies with the provisions of s 55A. The notice was served on the defendant on 29 October 2009. The defendant has not complied with the terms of the notice. The plaintiff wishes to claim possession of the property because it intends to exercise its power of sale under the mortgage. I mention at this stage that the reference to s 132 is incorrect because that section deals with the rights of a mortgagee whose mortgage has been registered. That is not to say that the plaintiff may not exercise a power of sale and in pursuance thereof convey legal title to a third party. The provisions which enable an equitable mortgagee to do so are to be found in ss 47 and 48 of the Law of Property Act 1936. No point was taken by Mr Magarey, counsel for the defendant, that the notice contained reference to s 132 of the Real Property Act. The initial position taken by the defendant in relation to the proceedings brought by the plaintiff is to be found in his defence which bore the endorsement, as required by the Rules, that the “pleading is put forward in accordance with the instructions of the Defendant”. The defendant asserts that Mr Bouhamdan, the second defendant by counterclaim, is the de facto director of the plaintiff and is also a director of a number of other companies in the “Tyger Group”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established