TWU v DHL Exel Supply Chain (Australia) Pty Ltd (No.2)
[2008] FMCA 920
•10 July 2008
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| TWU v DHL EXEL SUPPLY CHAIN (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD (No.2) | [2008] FMCA 920 |
| INDUSTRIAL LAW – Penalties for contravention of Workplace Relations Act – lodgement of union collective agreement lacking employees’ approval – inducing employees to cease membership of their union – continuing effects of contravention – penalties reflecting need for deterrence – no reduction under the totality principle – total penalties of $43,000 imposed. |
| Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), ss.337, 340, 341, 407(1)(b), 794, 807(2), 841 |
| Australian Ophthalmic Supplies Pty Ltd v McAlary-Smith [2008] FCAFC 8 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Finance Sector Union of Australia (2007) 157 FCR 329 Jarvis v Imposete Pty Ltd (No.2) [2008] FMCA 101, (2008) 169 IR 458 Kelly v Fitzpatrick (2007) 166 IR 14 Mason v Harrington Corporation Pty Ltd [2007] FMCA 7 Sharpe v Dogma Enterprises Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1550 Transport Workers Union of Australia v DHL Exel Supply Chain (Australia) Pty Ltd [2008] FMCA 604 |
| Applicant: | TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AUSTRALIA |
| Respondent: | DHL EXEL SUPPLY CHAIN (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD |
| File Number: | SYG 2135 of 2007 |
| Judgment of: | Smith FM |
| Hearing date: | 19 June 2008 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 10 July 2008 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr A Hatcher |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Maurice Blackburn Lawyers |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr I Taylor |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Australian Business Lawyers |
ORDERS
There is imposed on the respondent, DHL Exel Supply Chain (Australia) Pty Ltd (ACN 071 798 617), pursuant to s.407(1) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) a penalty in the amount of $18,000 for its contravention of s.341 of that Act.
There is imposed on the respondent, DHL Exel Supply Chain (Australia) Pty Ltd (ACN 071 798 617), pursuant to s.807(1) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) a penalty in the amount of $25,000 for its contravention of s.794 of that Act.
The application is otherwise dismissed.
Pursuant to s.841 of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), the respondent, DHL Exel Supply Chain (Australia) Pty Ltd (ACN 071 798 617), must pay the amount of $43,000, being the whole of the above penalties, to the applicant, the Transport Workers’ Union of Australia.
The judgment debt arising under (4) shall carry interest from the date of this order at the rate prescribed by the Federal Court Rules.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 2135 of 2007
| TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AUSTRALIA |
Applicant
And
| DHL EXEL SUPPLY CHAIN (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
On 19 May 2008, I published a judgment in this matter, in which I found that the TWU had established grounds for imposing penalties on DHL Exel under ss.407(1)(b) and 807(2) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), for contraventions of ss.341 and 794 of the Act. I was not satisfied that other relief should be given. I shall not repeat my reasoning, nor the background to the matter, and my present judgment must be read as a sequel to my earlier judgment (see Transport Workers Union of Australia v DHL Exel Supply Chain (Australia) Pty Ltd [2008] FMCA 604). Neither party has sought to lead any additional evidence, nor to persuade me to depart from any of my published findings.
I must now determine the quantum of an appropriate penalty in respect of each of the two contraventions, based on my findings as to the circumstances in which they occurred. It is agreed that the maximum penalty available in relation to each contravention is $33,000, i.e. a total of $66,000.
The ultimate object of an assessment of penalty is to arrive at an amount within the range of penalties provided in the legislation which is proportionate to the gravity of the offence committed (cf. Graham J in Australian Ophthalmic Supplies Pty Ltd v McAlary-Smith [2008] FCAFC 8 at [54]). Although I must explain the considerations which influence my assessment, it has been recognised that sentencing is an ‘instinctive synthesis’ of relevant considerations. Helpful lists of considerations have been adopted in previous cases, and I am entitled to draw from these, without treating them as a substitute for “the unrestrained statutory discretion” (cf. Gyles J in Sharpe v Dogma Enterprises Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1550 at [11]).
I propose to discuss what I regard as significant considerations in the present case under headings which reflect the matters listed by Branson J in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Finance Sector Union of Australia (2007) 157 FCR 329 at [181] and the longer list of considerations which was distilled by Mowbray FM in Mason v Harrington Corporation Pty Ltd [2007] FMCA 7, as summarised by Tracey J in Kelly v Fitzpatrick (2007) 166 IR 14 at [14].
The circumstances in which the relevant conduct took place, including whether there was deliberate defiance or disregard of the Act, and whether senior management were involved.
The relationship between the conduct constituting the two contraventions.
The contravention of s.341.
I have found that DHL Exel was in breach of s.341 by lodging on 13 March 2007 a union collective agreement with the NUW which had not been approved by the relevant employees in accordance with the requirements set out in s.340(2). I described the non-compliance arising from four aspects of the procedures followed by DHL Exel:
a)The employees’ approvals relied upon by DHL Exel were not obtained at the time and in the manner foreshadowed in the information statement last given to the employees under s.337. In fact, the foreshadowed procedure produced a majority decision of the relevant employees not to approve the agreement.
b)DHL Exel did not give all of the relevant employees “a reasonable opportunity” to give their decisions in the decision-making process by which the approvals it relies upon were obtained. Most obviously, this was because a significant number of them, mostly employed at the Matraville site for the afternoon and evening shifts on 9 March 2007, but also others at all sites who were absent through illness or other reasons, were given no notice of an intention to conduct a second vote at the meetings held on that day at Matraville and on 12 March at the other sites.
c)There also was a disturbed atmosphere at the Matraville workplace arising from DHL Exel’s secret negotiation of the agreement with the NUW, from its discriminatory restriction on access by the employees’ union recognised under the 2005 agreement, the TWU, and from its promotion of a different union, the NUW, with no historical connection with the workplace. In these circumstances, the conducting of an improvised vote by a show of hands under the supervision of the managers was not a reasonable procedure for obtaining a second decision from the employees. If a second decision were to be sought, it required a procedure which allowed the employees sufficient time to absorb the outcome of the secret ballot, to take advice, and to arrive at a decision uninfluenced by the managerial pressure inherent in the circumstances of the 9 March meeting. It required a voting process to be conducted in which the proposition put to the employees was made clear to them, and was clearly recorded, and in which the voting was properly supervised, counted and recorded. The procedures at the 9 March 2007 meeting lacked all of these attributes. For all these reasons, also, they were denied a reasonable opportunity to make a second decision.
d)The show of hands which was taken at Matraville on 9 March 2007 did not approve the agreement which was lodged by DHL Exel, but approved a substantially different agreement. This was because the employees who raised their hands were indicating that they wished to adopt an agreement which would apply only to relevant employees working at Matraville, and not to other employees working at other sites who had previously participated in the secret ballot. The agreement which was lodged by DHL Exel did not do this, since its coverage shown in clauses 2 and 12 was unlimited geographically.
I described how the relevant conduct had occurred on Friday 9 March, and Monday and Tuesday 12 and 13 March 2007. It essentially occurred because senior managers of DHL Exel made a series of errors of judgment over that period. Importantly, the general manager, who conducted the staff meeting called to announce the negative result of the secret ballot, failed properly to assess the appropriateness of his supporting, and conducting, the ‘show of hands’ which he and the other managers subsequently accepted as sufficient under the legislation. Rather than pausing to reflect and take advice upon the circumstances which, in my opinion, made the procedure patently unreasonable, the managers conducted similarly flawed procedures at other worksites on 12 March. The national human resources manager then hastened to lodge the agreement early in the morning of 13 March.
When referring to the ‘disturbed atmosphere’ at the workplace, I referred to the background to the events of 9, 12 and 13 March 2007, in which the collective agreement had been negotiated and presented to the employees. I located elements in these events which satisfied me that it was part of the DHL Exel managers’ strategy to implement the proposed union collective agreement, that the employees should be induced to move to the union of the company’s choice and to cease to belong to their current union, in contravention of s.794 (see [38] to [43], and [82] to [94] of my judgment).
These background events, in my opinion, raised a particular need for the second approval process to be properly considered and conducted. They may also explain the mangers’ failure to appreciate the flaws in their procedures on 9, 12 and 13 March. However, on balance, I have not been satisfied that any of the defects in the approval process also provide elements in the conduct which contravened s.794.
It is reasonable to speculate that the managers’ desire to exclude the TWU from the company’s dealings with its employees, and to weaken the TWU’s relationship with its employees, may have clouded the managers’ judgment about the propriety of the second approval processes conducted on 9 and 12 March 2007. I touched upon this concern at [68]-[70], when referring to the unexplained speed with which the agreement was lodged with the Employment Advocate. However, none of the parties chose to explore the managers’ reasons for the urgency they gave to the proceedings on 9, 12 and 13 March. Other, ‘innocent’ explanations might be possible. I therefore would not find that the manager’s conduct giving rise to the contravention of s.341 should be assessed as part of the conduct constituting the contravention of s.794. Similarly, I would not find that the contravention of s.794 included their conduct involving the breaches of s.340(2) which I have found.
Nor would I find that the managers’ decisions to conduct, and rely upon, a flawed second approval process involved a conscious or deliberate disregard of the statutory requirements of s.340(2) for obtaining employees’ approval of a collective agreement. I have found that the call for a second vote on 9 March probably came from an employee, and not from a manager, and was unplanned by the managers (see [47] of my judgment).
Their subsequent conduct when responding to that call should, however, be characterised as displaying recklessness as to compliance with the approval requirements of the Workplace Relations Act. Moreover, this occurred in a situation where they should have been aware that there could be irreversible consequences from a defective approval process, and that this called for a high degree of care in relation to compliance with the Act.
There is no evidence that any manager ever paused to consider whether an obviously unsatisfactory procedure properly complied with legal requirements, before lodging the agreement. I accept that the degree of culpability shown in the circumstances of the contravention of s.341 is not at the highest levels, but I consider that it points towards a penalty at a significant level.
The contravention of s.794.
The contravention of s.794 involved separate conduct which, in my opinion, should be assessed as revealing a higher level of culpability. Although the Court was not asked to penalise separate contraventions in relation to each of the affected employees, the contravening conduct was directed at a substantial group of DHL Exel’s employees. It occurred over several months. It was part of a deliberate strategy evolved by managers at the highest level in the company, which was kept secret from the relevant employees and from their chosen union representatives. The undermining of the relevant employees’ rights of freedom of association should have been apparent to the managers, and I am not satisfied that this was not fully appreciated by them.
In explanation and mitigation of the contravening conduct, DHL Exel repeated its submission which denied that its managers’ conduct carried any intention or design to induce its employees to change their union and to cease to join or belong to the TWU. It submitted that the proposed new collective agreement with the NUW was fully explained by ‘business exigencies’ arising from corporate restructuring, in which DHL Exel acquired a business previously conducted by a different DHL company at Matraville.
In effect, DHL Exel submitted that the situation of the employees at Matraville had appeared anomalous to the managers of DHL Exel, so that they pursued a commendable business desire to bring uniformity to all of its employees’ terms and conditions at 18 sites throughout NSW, through negotiations with the NUW which created ‘template’ collective agreements. From their perspective, the existing union collective agreement with the TWU at the Matraville site was an anachronism. So also was any involvement of the TWU in negotiations about the employees’ future conditions. They considered that the previous union collective agreement with the TWU(NSW) could legitimately be replaced with an agreement negotiated solely with the NUW, and their conduct towards the affected employees was directed at achieving the approval and efficacy of that agreement.
DHL Exel’s submissions on penalty accepted that that the managers took actions which promoted the company’s chosen union to the employees in preference to the employees’ chosen union, but submitted that inducing a change in the employees’ choice of union at Matraville was not their ultimate objective. It was incidental to their goal of gaining the employees’ approval and future support for its union collective agreement with the NUW. The inducements which their conduct presented to the Matraville employees to give up their membership of the TWU were, at most, collateral to their business objectives for the future conditions of employment of those employees. In these circumstances, it was submitted that the culpability of the DHL Exel managers for their contravention of s.794 was not significant.
I am prepared to determine a penalty upon the assumption that business rationalisation provided the underlying objective of DHL Exel, when making inducements to the Matraville employees to change their union to the union of its choice. I do, however, note that Mr Aird’s evidence set out at [103] and [104] of my judgment casts doubt whether uniformity of union coverage was the sole object of its secret negotiations with the NUW concerning its Matraville employees. Even ignoring this evidence, I do not consider that the submitted background motives of DHL Exel allow the contravention to be assessed lightly.
In essence, its submission argues that the business strategy of DHL Exel justified the proscribed elements in the tactics adopted when seeking to achieve it. However, as I explained at [88]-[89] of my judgment, the tactics were inconsistent with the restraints imposed by the Workplace Relations Act in relation to employees’ rights of freedom of association. In my opinion, the submitted justification of the contravening conduct reveals a past and continuing lack of appreciation of the protection of those rights given by s.794 of the Workplace Relations Act.
Moreover, I have difficulty finding that the contravening actions were inadvertent. This is because the managers gave to the relevant employees, and have maintained to the Court, unbelievable disclaimers that they did not intend that their conduct would have the effect of inducing their employees to give up or not pursue TWU membership. Yet they have been unable to give any rational justification for their exclusionary conduct in relation to access by TWU organisers to the worksite and the negotiation of the agreement. Moreover, the very agreement which they and the NUW organisers promoted for their employees’ approval, imposed a different union on the employees as their purported union of choice, and as the only union with which the employer would be bound to negotiate with during its currency.
On all the evidence before me, I am unable to find that the managers’ actions when pursuing their collective agreement with the NUW were merely reckless as to a collateral contravention of s.794. Nor am I satisfied that the managers were unaware that their conduct involved contravention of the policy underlying the freedom of association protections of the Workplace Relations Act.
I am not persuaded that the contravention of s.794 is excusable, but consider that the circumstances of the contravention points to a penalty which reflects a substantial degree of culpability on the part of DHL Exel.
The consequences of the contravening conduct.
As I explained in my judgment, the agreement which was lodged by DHL Exel in contravention of s.341 took immediate and irreversible legal effect, binding all of the employees which it purported to cover, notwithstanding that their approval had never been given according to the requirements of s.340. Addressing the statutory restraint on the Court’s powers, I found it not possible to be positively persuaded as to a financial loss to all of the employees sufficient to justify declaring the agreement void, particularly since this would have left them with only the ‘safety net’ protections of the Workplace Relations Act.
However, my conclusions in relation to ss.409 and 412 cannot be twisted into a reverse finding that no significant ‘loss and damage’ to the employees resulted from the agreement. The evidence to which I referred at [102], and Mr Aird’s unchallenged opinions set out at [103]-[104], raise a serious concern whether a better agreement could have been arrived at with DHL Exel, if the employees had been allowed the assistance of their chosen union, and if they had been given reasonable opportunities to negotiate and approve the terms of their future employment in accordance with a reasonable procedure. Certainly, it seems reasonable to infer from the negative vote in the secret ballot, that a substantial number of the employees thought that a better agreement could have been arrived at if DHL Exel had conducted bona fide negotiations which included the TWU. The flawed second approval procedures denied all the employees an opportunity, required by the Act, to seek to achieve a better outcome.
The combined long term consequences of the contraventions of ss.341 and 794 appear significant. On the evidence before me, there is little prospect that DHL Exel will attempt, or be forced, to reconsider the employment conditions which it achieved by the conduct constituting both contraventions. It has made no offer to re-negotiate the 2007 agreement, or even to re-submit it for its employees’ approval. It has maintained its apparent hostility against acknowledging any rights of representation by the TWU, other than those which can be achieved by litigation and proceedings in the Australian Industrial Relations Commission under the current legislation. It has not even offered an apology to the employees whose rights were disregarded.
In relation to the consequences of the conduct contravening s.794, neither party submitted that I should reconsider my prediction in [94] of my judgment that it is likely that TWU membership at Matraville will diminish very substantially in future years. I regard the absence of any expression by DHL Exel of regret at this consequence, nor any proposal to rectify its contravening conduct which has produced that outcome, to be circumstances which support the imposition of a significant penalty for both contraventions.
The need, in the circumstances, for the protection of the due approval of collective agreements and industrial freedom of association.
The important statutory policies which explain the approval requirements of s.340 should be obvious from my judgment. In s.341, the Act placed upon DHL Exel the responsibility to ensure that only a properly approved union collective agreement was lodged with the Employment Advocate. The whole legislative structure, which gives such agreements overriding legal effects in relation to the employment conditions of the employees covered by the agreements, depends upon the employer’s compliance.
Under the legislative scheme which prevailed in 2007, the employer’s responsibility was particularly important, since agreements which were improperly lodged took full legal effect, and the Court’s powers to rectify the situation are significantly limited. Where, as in the present case, the failures to observe s.340 were far from technical or insignificant, the present employees have cause to feel a continuing sense of outrage that they have been saddled with an agreement which will govern their employment conditions until 2010, and which they have not approved. The Court should reflect these considerations in its assessment of penalty.
Similarly, in relation to the contravention of s.794. The obligation on an employer to respect its employees’ choice of a relevant union to represent them in their dealings with the employer, is central to the proper operation of the scheme of industrial relations supported by the Workplace Relations Act. Section 794’s obligation not to make inducements to employees to change their choice is unqualified. If it is not enforced by the Court, the important role of industrial organisations as chosen negotiating agents would be significantly jeopardised.
DHL Exel’s previous record of compliance.
It is common ground between the parties that DHL Exel has not previously been found to have been in contravention of the Workplace Relations Act or other industrial legislation in similar circumstances as the present. I accept that this is an important consideration which allows me to mitigate the severity of my assessment of its contravening conduct.
However, in view of my findings that its contravention of s.341 involved recklessness about crucial statutory obligations, and that its contravention of s.794 involved deliberate conduct directed at inducing the employees to change their union, I do not consider that a substantial reduction in penalty should result from its previous ‘good record’.
DHL Exel’s responses to the complaints and to the adverse findings.
DHL Exel was entitled to resist the claims of the TWU, and to put it to proof of the alleged contraventions. It has exercised that right. It successfully persuaded the Court that no remedy was available, apart from the imposition of pecuniary penalties.
Its submissions on penalty in the light of my findings offered no apologies to the affected employees, nor any ex-gratia remedies for the infringements to the employees’ rights under the Act.
However, some expressions of contrition were offered to the Court in mitigation of pecuniary penalty. Although no additional evidence was led, I was informed from the bar table that a vice-president of ‘DHL Logistics South Pacific’ was present in Court, and that he was a person to whom all the managers of DHL Exel were responsible. I was informed that he, on behalf of the company, accepted that more care should have been taken at the time of the events of March 2007, to ensure that the requirements of the Act were observed. I was assured that more care would be taken in the future to observe the legislation. I was informed that the vice-president regarded the managers of DHL Exel as good, honest, and caring people, and was concerned that my findings might affect their careers. In relation to the employees’ rights to union representation, I was assured that the company had no general anti-union policies, and did not believe that its past or intended actions had interfered or would interfere with its employees’ freedom of choice in relation to their union membership.
I accept that these statements are true, and that the company’s future observance of the requirements of the Workplace Relations Act is honestly intended. I have taken them into account in mitigation of penalty. However, in my opinion, the assurances of DHL Exel fall short of the sort of remediating responses to my findings, which would have caused me to conclude that a penalty proportionate to the seriousness of the contravening conduct should be significantly reduced.
The size of DHL Exel’s operations and the consequences of a penalty for its business and employees.
There was little evidence presented by any party, as to the corporate structure, finances or employment statistics of DHL Exel. I am asked to assume that it is part of a “DHL” group of companies, but this is unexplained. There was evidence that DHL Exel has operations “nationally”, including 18 sites in NSW, and 1300 employees. No evidence was led suggesting that even the maximum penalties could have any direct effect on its business operations, even if I also take into account the greater sums which it has probably incurred in legal expenses when opposing the present application. Nor could I anticipate any adverse consequences for its employees from the imposition of pecuniary penalties. I therefore consider that these considerations do not have any significant bearing on my assessment of penalties.
The need, in the circumstances, for deterrence.
My above discussion points clearly to the relevance of considerations of deterrence when determining penalties in the present case. The difficulties of reversing or remedying the effects of the breaches of ss.341 and 794 in the present case, leave to the Court only its penalty powers to mark its disapproval of the contravening conduct. I consider that strong disapproval needs to be shown generally, to deter a repetition of the conduct by all relevant persons involved in industrial relations in Australia.
At the level of specific deterrence, I accept that the particular managers at DHL Exel who have been involved in the present proceedings are likely in the future to be concerned to avoid a repetition of the contravening conduct, notwithstanding that the company has shown no inclination to remedy the effects of the past contravening conduct.
However, for a large company, it might not be enough for the Court to be so satisfied, before concluding that deterrence of the offender is not an influential consideration when determining its penalty. As I said in Jarvis v Imposete Pty Ltd (No.2) [2008] FMCA 101, (2008) 169 IR 458 at [47], there is a need in relation to an employer such as the present, to determine a penalty which will impact on the corporate memory of DHL Exel, so that its present and future proprietors and managers will be active to instruct and supervise their subordinates’ conduct, to ensure that no repetition will occur.
I accept that the monetary amount of any penalty which I could determine in the present matter might appear insufficient in itself to carry a desirable deterrent impact. This is because the business goals which were achieved through the present contraventions might not be easily valued in monetary terms, but it is quite possible that a large employer might consider that they were worth the price of the maximum penalties which might be incurred under the legislation.
However, the penalties which I have arrived at also carry my findings which explain them. For a company which seeks the respect of the Australian community, my findings are likely to carry a greater impact than the penalties themselves. In the present case, I accept that my findings will probably have a substantial impact on DHL Exel, and this consideration has caused me not to consider imposing the maximum penalties available under the legislation.
The appropriate separate penalties, and the ‘totality principle’.
After reflection on all the above considerations and the parties’ submissions, I have concluded that the appropriate penalty to be imposed under s.407(1) for the contravention of s.341 is the amount of $18,000. This reflects the seriousness of the contravention, and the need to send a strong deterrent message. It has been mitigated to take into account that managerial recklessness, rather than deliberation, caused the contraventions, and to give recognition of DHL Exel’s good record and genuine - if limited - expressions of regret.
I have concluded that a greater penalty is appropriately imposed under s.807 for the contravention of s.794. The contravening conduct was deliberate, and showed disregard for the industrial rights of a relatively powerless group of its employees. I can detect in the evidence and submissions of DHL Exel little appreciation of the gravity of its conduct, and no regrets. Some mitigation from the maximum penalty has been given to recognise DHL Exel’s previous good record, and to recognise that the contraventions resulted from the managers’ mistaken belief that the company’s business goals justified their conduct, rather than from company or personal hostility towards the employees and the TWU. In all the circumstances, I consider that a penalty of $25,000 is appropriate.
It is necessary, under the ‘totality principle’, that I should consider whether a total penalty of $43,000 is “out of proportion to the overall conduct” (cf. Australian Ophthalmic Supplies Pty Ltd v McAlary Smith [2008] FCAFC 8, per Gray J at [23], also Graham J at [71], and Buchannan J at [94]-[101]). As I have suggested above, the aggregate can hardly be regarded as ‘oppressive’ or ‘crushing’ in monetary terms. Nor do I consider that it is an inappropriate response to DHL Exel’s overall contravening conduct in relation to its 2007 union collective agreement with the NUW. I have explained above that, although the conduct relevant to each contravention had temporal and other relationships, my findings of contravention essentially were based on different conduct. In all the circumstances, I do not consider that any reduction under the ‘totality principle’ is required.
I accept the submissions of the applicant that I should order under s.841 of the Workplace Relations Act that the whole of the penalties should be paid to it. Its expenses in bringing the application probably exceed that amount very substantially, and no order for costs will be made. I shall order that this amount will carry interest after judgment until it is paid (cf. s.723 of the Act, s.77 of the Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth), and r.26.01 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth)).
I certify that the preceding forty-four (44) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Smith FM
Associate: Michael Abood
Date: 10 July 2008
4
6
1