Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Twigg v Twigg (No 2) [2019] NSWSC 1356 Hearing dates: 8 October 2019 Decision date: 08 October 2019 Jurisdiction: Equity - Commercial List Before: Stevenson J Decision: Defendants restrained from enforcing interlocutory costs order until the conclusion of the proceedings
Catchwords: COSTS – party/party – costs orders in interlocutory proceedings – consent order that costs be assessable forthwith – whether order also payable forthwith Legislation Cited: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) Cases Cited: G&S Engineering Services Pty Ltd v MACH Energy Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2019] NSWSC 463
His Eminence Metropolitan Petar, Diocesan Bishop of the Macedonian Orthodox Church of Australia and New Zealand v The Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Incorporated (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 142
Twigg v Twigg [2019] NSWSC 373Texts Cited: Practice Note SC Eq 3 Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: Diane Twigg (First Plaintiff/Applicant)
Ipswich Landfill Pty Ltd as trustee for the Ipswich Landfill Trust (Second Plaintiff/Applicant)
Brooklyn Landfill & Waste Recycling Pty Ltd as trustee for the Brooklyn Landfill Trust (Third Plaintiff/Applicant)
Twigg Plant Hire Pty Ltd as trustee for the Twigg Family Trust (Fourth Plaintiff/Applicant)
Maxwell James Twigg (First Defendant/Respondent)
Twigg Landfill Pty Ltd (Second Defendant/Respondent)
Byron Bay Beach Hotel Properties Pty Ltd (Third Defendant/Respondent)
Twigg Consulting Pty Ltd (Fourth Defendant/Respondent)
B Bay H Pty Ltd (Fifth Defendant/Respondent)
Twigg Investments Pty Ltd (Sixth Defendant/Respondent)
Maly Holdings Pty Ltd (Seventh Defendant/Respondent)
Twigg Property Development Pty Ltd (Eighth Defendant/Respondent)
Twigg Motor Sport Pty Ltd (Ninth Defendant/Respondent)
Vision Motor Sport Pty Ltd (Tenth Defendant/Respondent)
Twigg Motor Racing Pty Ltd (Eleventh Defendant/Respondent)
Surf Street Holdings Pty Ltd (Twelfth Defendant)
W&E Twigg Pty Ltd (Thirteenth Defendant)Representation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
M R Elliott SC with D K Smith (Plaintiffs/Applicants)
J C Giles SC with M Bersten (Defendants/Respondents)
Roberts and Partners Lawyers (Plaintiffs/Applicants)
O’Loughlin Westhoff (Defendants/Respondents)
File Number(s): SC 2019/71329
Judgment
-
On 5 April 2019, I dismissed the plaintiffs’ application for a freezing order: Twigg v Twigg [2019] NSWSC 373. I shall use the same abbreviations here.
-
At [106] of my judgment, I said I would hear submissions as to costs.
-
The parties agreed the form of the costs order that should be made. On 11 April 2019, by consent, I made the following order in chambers:
“The plaintiffs are to pay the defendants’ costs of the notice of motion dated 8 March 2019 assessable forthwith.”
-
Max and the other defendants contend that they are entitled to enforce that costs order forthwith, and have indicated their intention to proceed to enforcement.
-
Diane and the Corporate Trustees contend that, by reason of Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) r 42.7(2), the costs that I have ordered “do not become payable until the conclusion of the proceedings” and, in those circumstances, by notice of motion filed on 2 September 2019 seek the following orders:
that the defendants take no step to enforce any assessment of the costs order made by Stevenson J on 11 April 2019 until further order…
Continue reading Twigg v Twigg (No 2)
Sign in free to access the full text
- AGLC
- Twigg v Twigg (No 2) [2019] NSWSC 1356
- Case
- [2019] NSWSC 1356
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issue before the court was whether the consent order, which provided that costs were to be assessed forthwith, also mandated that the costs were payable forthwith. The court had to determine the precise meaning of "forthwith" in this context and whether it applied to both the assessment and payment of costs. The case hinged on interpreting the language of the consent order and understanding the implications of the term "forthwith" as used in the context of both assessment and payment of costs.
The court found that the term "forthwith" in the consent order referred only to the assessment of costs and did not extend to the payment of those costs. The order for costs to be assessable forthwith did not imply that the costs were also payable forthwith. The court emphasised that the terms of the consent order needed to be interpreted in their ordinary and natural meaning. The use of "forthwith" in relation to assessment did not extend to payment unless explicitly stated. Consequently, the court ruled that the costs were assessable forthwith but not necessarily payable forthwith. The court's decision clarified the distinction between assessment and payment of costs in the context of consent orders.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.