TUTTON and JORDISON

[2018] FCWA 130

JURISDICTION : FAMILY COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

ACT: FAMILY LAW ACT 1975

LOCATION: PERTH

CITATION: TUTTON and JORDISON [2018] FCWA 130

CORAM: O'BRIEN J

HEARD: 28 JUNE 2018

DELIVERED : 25 JULY 2018

FILE NO/S: PTW 3149 of 2010

BETWEEN: MR TUTTON

Applicant

AND

MS JORDISON

Respondent

Catchwords:

FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY SETTLEMENT – Where the parties’ applications for property settlement were previously dismissed but the issues had not been resolved on their merits – Where husband reinstituted proceedings for property settlement – Where husband is seeking 100% of the wife’s superannuation entitlements and other significant funds from her –Where husband also seeking restitution and compensation from the wife – Where husband also seeking compensation from, or, alternatively, “punishment” of a judicial officer – Where wife seeks reimbursement of expenses from the husband – Where neither party has any assets of significance – Where the husband has not given required notice to the trustee of the wife’s superannuation fund despite being alerted to the need to do so.

Legislation:

Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 11
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 75, s 79, s 90
Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) Part 21.1

Category: Not Reportable

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant	:	Self Represented Litigant
Respondent	:	Self Represented Litigant

Solicitors:

Applicant	:	Self Represented Litigant
Respondent	:	Self Represented Litigant

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Omitted.

Rzetelski and Johnson (1988) FLC 91-945

WORDS IN SQUARE BRACKETS REPLACE WORDS USED IN THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT - PARTIES’ NAMES AND IDENTIFYING DETAILS HAVE BEEN CHANGED

1[Mr Tutton] (“the husband”) and [Ms Jordison] (“the wife”) were married in 1997. They separated in June 2009 and were divorced in November 2010. There are no children of the marriage.

2Proceedings for alteration of property interests were commenced by the wife on 18 January 2011. The husband was occupying a jointly owned home at [Property A] (“the home”), the modest equity in which, on the wife’s case at the time, represented virtually the entirety of their property.

3Difficulties in the proceedings emerged almost immediately. The husband did not comply with orders made on 9 February 2011 requiring him to file responding documents, and had still not complied by the time the parties attended a conciliation conference on 13 June 2011.

4On 15 July 2011, orders were made by the presiding magistrate for the sale of the home, and for the net proceeds of sale to be placed in an interest-bearing account pending agreement or further order. Further orders were made by the presiding magistrate on 1 November 2011 to implement the order for sale. Still further orders to implement the sale were made on 12 December 2011, including an order that the husband vacate the home by no later than 18 December 2011. After further orders were made on 19 January 2012, an order was made on 17 July 2012 appointing the wife as sole trustee for the sale of the home.

5Orders were made by consent on 8 October 2012 for each party to receive the sum of $20,000 from the net proceeds of sale of the home prior to any balance being deposited into the joint interest-bearing account. A further order was made by consent empowering a registrar to execute any document necessary to give effect to the sale in the event that the husband failed to do so. Still further orders were subsequently made to deal with issues such as the removal of chattels from the home upon sale.

6On 1 July 2013, the Chief Judge made orders requiring the husband to transfer to the wife his interest in a car, for the equal division of any balance of proceeds of sale of the home and, until further order, for the parties to each retain the assets in their possession. The competing substantive applications were dismissed, on the notation that the issues had not been resolved on their merits. An order was made requiring either party who sought to file a further application for property settlement to also file an affidavit setting out all of the evidence to be relied upon at trial together with an affidavit of each witness, an up-to-date statement of financial circumstances, and an affidavit of documents.

7The husband sought to recommence proceedings for alteration of property interests in June 2016.

8The proceedings were initially listed for trial before me on 30 November 2017. Before the evidence commenced, there was a dispute between the parties as to whether or not the husband had been served with the wife’s most recent financial statement. The husband asserted that he had not. He also asserted that he was at a disadvantage as a result, saying that the wife had newly disclosed in that document that she retained superannuation entitlements. He sought an adjournment on that basis, indicating that he wished to amend his application so as to seek a superannuation splitting order.

9The wife opposed the application for an adjournment, saying that she had never given evidence that she had no superannuation. She asserted, therefore, that the husband was not taken by surprise regardless of when he was served with her most recent financial statement. In response to a question from me, she confirmed that she had been unemployed since 2013. I then drew to the wife’s attention her financial statement sworn on 21 November 2016, in which she stated unequivocally that she had no superannuation.

10On reflection, the wife withdrew her opposition to the adjournment.

11The husband filed an amended application on 5 January 2018, and the wife filed an amended response on 23 January 2018. Closer to trial, the husband filed a further amended application on 6 June 2018, to which the wife responded on 8 June 2018.

Relief sought by the parties

12The relief sought by the husband in his amended application filed on 6 June 2018 is not easily summarised. For the sake of completeness, therefore, a copy of that part of his amended application which shows the final orders sought by him is annexed to these reasons.

13In broad terms, the husband seeks:

1.reimbursement of certain expenses paid by him during the course of the proceedings;

2.that the wife be “charged with contempt”, and that she and her mother be “charged with perjury”;

3.“restitution” from the wife in the sum of $1,000,000 and payment of a specific sum to reflect the husband’s assessment of his financial contributions;

4.reimbursement of various monies from the wife and from her previous lawyers;

5.an order that the wife’s mother “be adjoined to this case”. The specific relief proposed to be sought against her was not entirely clear, although some indication is found in the husband’s affidavit, in which he proposed that the wife’s mother should pay him a sum in excess of $900,000 or otherwise surrender to him her home, chattels and superannuation;

6.reimbursement by the wife of monies he would say she has misappropriated, and the return to him of a motor vehicle;

7.“compensation for the violation of [his] right to a fair and impartial hearing”;

8.orders requiring the wife to “immediately hand over her entire Australian superannuation of $57,185.37”; and

9.orders requiring the wife to provide certain documents.

14Similarly, a copy of that part of the wife’s amended response filed on 8 June 2018, which sets out the final orders sought by her, is annexed to these reasons. In broad terms, the wife seeks:

1.the dismissal of the husband’s application;

2.orders to ensure that the proceedings are not “re-entertained by [the husband] at any later or future date”;

3.the production of various documents by the husband; and

4.reimbursement by the husband of a specified sum.

Evidence relied on by the parties

15Pursuant to orders made at the status hearing on 15 June 2018, the husband relied on the following affidavits for the purposes of trial:

1.his affidavit filed 5 January 2018;

2.his affidavit filed 6 June 2018; and

3.his financial statement filed 6 June 2018.

16Pursuant to the same orders, the wife relied on the following affidavits for the purposes of trial:

1.her affidavit filed 15 June 2017;

2.her affidavit filed 8 June 2018;

3.her financial statement filed 12 June 2018;

4.two separate affidavits of her mother, [Ms J], both filed 15 June 2017; and

5.affidavit of her brother, [Mr J], filed 19 June 2017.

17At the status hearing, the husband confirmed that he required both Ms J and Mr J to present for the purposes of cross-examination, and they did so.

18Various documents were also tendered into evidence during the course of the trial.

Observations as to the oral evidence at trial

19Neither party was an impressive witness. Even allowing for the understandable difficulties faced by self-represented litigants, and the additional difficulties involved in being cross-examined by a former partner, both showed little ability to direct their attention to matters relevant to the issues. Not infrequently during the course of what was not a long trial, I had to remind the parties that it was not appropriate that they simply engage in a heated argument with each other, seemingly oblivious to the court setting.

20To the extent either party gave factual evidence during cross-examination, each demonstrated a clear tendency to consciously or unconsciously tailor their evidence to their present needs. Each tended to argue their perspective on matters rather than simply answer questions directly. Each clearly felt very aggrieved, both at the other party and at “the system”; that permeated most aspects of their presentation.

21Both parties were focused almost exclusively on past events, rather than the factual circumstances which face them now. In particular, each blamed the other for the circumstances which led to the sale of the home, and for delays in that sale. Prior to the sale of the home, orders had been made directed to the collection of chattels from the home by the husband; each party blamed the other for difficulties which arose in that regard, and a significant component of the husband’s complaints turned on his contention that there were items of chattel property to which he was entitled, or which it had been agreed would be returned to him, and which he did not receive. The husband blamed the wife for that; the wife acknowledged that there were items which the husband had not received but blamed him for not collecting them, and asserted that they had been left behind when possession of the home was given to the purchasers.

22Fortunately, for the reasons which follow, little or nothing turns on the credibility of the parties.

23Mr J and Ms J were each cross-examined by the husband by reference to a list of chattels which he asserted were at the home at the time of its sale, and not returned to him. Each gave evidence in a straightforward and direct manner as to their recollection of which items were still at the home when they assisted in preparing it for sale.

The law

24The parties were married. The proceedings therefore fall to be determined pursuant to the provisions of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”).

25The Court has a wide discretion conferred by s 79(1) of the Act. That discretion is to be exercised in accordance with legal principle, and without assuming that the parties’ interests in assets are or should be different from those determined by common law and equity.

26The Court must be satisfied that it is just and equitable to make an order altering existing property interests. That requirement is readily satisfied in most cases, including this one. Notwithstanding the earlier orders made by the Chief Judge, and the wife’s assertion that the proceedings had been completed by those orders, the husband sought orders clearly intended to alter existing property interests, and the wife also sought orders properly characterised as such. The parties are divorced and neither proposes ongoing common use of property.

27In determining what orders will be just and equitable, the Court’s power is not confined by any “steps” or “stages”. Having said that, the Court will satisfy the legislative requirements if (to the extent the evidence permits) it identifies and values the existing interests of the parties in property and superannuation and their liabilities, assesses their contributions to the property (including any property which has ceased to be owned by them), assesses the factors in s 79(4)(d) to (g) of the Act, and considers whether the proposed orders are just and equitable.

28The Court is required to consider the respective contributions of the parties holistically over the whole period to trial. There is no requirement (legislative or otherwise) for the entitlements of the parties to be expressed in the form of percentages, nor is a strict mathematical or accounting approach required.

29As noted above, the husband sought an order to the effect that he receive the whole of the wife’s superannuation. The Court’s power to make orders in relation to superannuation interests of spouses is contained in s 90MS. Section 90MT sets out the types of orders the Court may make and requires the Court, before making such an order, to make a determination as to the value of the superannuation interest in question.

30Section 90MZD permits the Court to make an order in relation to superannuation interest expressed to bind the trustee of the relevant fund, but makes it clear that no such order can be made unless the trustee has been accorded procedural fairness.

31The Court does not have the power to make the orders sought by the husband characterised by him as “restitution” or “compensation” for what he would contend to be breaches of the Court’s orders, or obligations under the Family Law Rules2004 (Cth) (“the Rules”): Rzetelski and Johnson (1988) FLC 91-945 at 76,831.

32Similarly, the Court does not have the power to “charge [the wife and her mother] with perjury” as sought, whether the alleged perjury occurred in evidence given to this or some other court. The Court does, however, have the power to hold a party or parties in contempt of its own motion, or on application. Perjury is conduct capable of amounting to contempt, although more typically it will be dealt with by way of criminal charges in another court, whether arising from a referral by this Court for consideration of prosecution or otherwise.

33An application by a party for an order that another person be punished for contempt of court must be filed in accordance with Part 21.1 of the Rules. Such an application must be made in accordance with the prescribed form; no such application was properly filed in these proceedings.

The parties as self-represented litigants

34The parties were both self-represented.

35At the hearing on 30 November 2017, when it was anticipated that the trial would proceed that day, I explained to both parties the sequence of events at trial, and the nature and effect of evidence in chief, cross-examination and re-examination. I explained to them the purpose of opening and closing statements and the importance of cross-examining on any matter relevant to an issue in the proceedings where there was a factual dispute.

36I explained the legislative requirements in relation to an application for alteration of property interests, including the need for the Court to be satisfied that the making of any order would be just and equitable in all the circumstances, the need for the Court to identify the existing legal and equitable interests of the parties in property, and relevant values if possible, and the need for an assessment both of their respective contributions and the prospective factors referred to in sub-s 79(4)(d) to (g) inclusive of the Act. I explained the need for those issues to be addressed both in evidence and submissions.

37I provided each party with a copy of ss 79 and 75(2) of the Act. I also confirmed that they had each received the handbooks produced by the Court for the assistance of self-represented litigants.

38At the status hearing on 17 November 2017, and again at the hearing on 30 November 2017, I explained to the parties that it was open to either of them to seek an order for the splitting of superannuation, but that such an order could not be made without the relevant trustee first being served and given the opportunity to be heard, and compliance with that process having been proven to the Court.

39As some months passed between the giving of those explanations to the parties and the eventual trial before me, at the status hearing on 15 June 2018, I provided each party with a copy of the transcript of the hearing on 30 November 2017, and directed their attention to the information I had provided to them at that time, recommending that they read that material carefully before the trial commenced.

40Given the nature of allegations raised by the husband, and some of the relief sought by him, I also explained the provisions and operation of s 11 of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA).

41I am satisfied that the trial proceeded in a manner which afforded procedural fairness to both parties, and that they were both assisted by the Court in the presentation of their cases to the extent reasonably possible and appropriate.

42I turn first to the consideration of the husband’s application for alteration of property interests and the wife’s response to that application.

The existing interests of the parties in property

43The parties no longer jointly own property. It was common ground that they each received approximately $20,000 from the proceeds of sale of the home, and each gave evidence that their share of the proceeds had been spent.

44The husband’s evidence was that he owns modest personal items only, to which he attributed a value of $500, that he has no savings and no superannuation. He was not challenged on that evidence.

45The wife’s evidence was that she owns modest personal items only, to which she did not attribute any value, and that she has no savings. She gave evidence that the current value of her superannuation is $57,853.53. She was not seriously challenged on that evidence; while the husband made it clear that he harbours some suspicions that the wife has undisclosed property, to the extent he put such propositions to the wife in cross-examination, they were denied.

46On the wife’s evidence, a significant component of her superannuation accrued post separation. In a financial statement filed on 18 January 2011, she estimated the value of her superannuation at $10,000. In a financial statement filed on 19 June 2017, she said that her superannuation had a value of $46,400. The facts leading to the increase in the value of her superannuation, both between those two dates and in the 12 months leading up to trial, were not explored at trial.

47I accept the evidence of each of the parties as to the property owned by them. I accept the evidence of the wife as to her superannuation.

48The husband gave evidence that he presently makes various loan repayments totalling $50 per week. His financial statement did not specify any liabilities. I am accordingly unable to quantify any present liabilities he may have, but nothing turns on that. I accept that he has no sources of income other than government benefits, that he has no assets of substance, and that he may have modest liabilities.

49The wife gave evidence that she has current liabilities of $900. Her financial statement, while suggesting that the total of her liabilities is $900, shows an ongoing liability of $225 per week to the Commonwealth Bank for a car loan, plus payments of $100 per week on a visa card and a weekly $50 payment for education fees. Her financial statement does not disclose the ownership of any motor vehicle. Her unsworn papers for the judge filed shortly prior to trial, similarly, make no reference to a motor vehicle, but suggest that she has liabilities of $41,500 including a $19,000 personal loan and a $21,000 credit card debt.

50Those discrepancies were not explored at trial, other than to the extent that the wife denied any present ownership of a car when challenged on the point by the husband.

51I am, accordingly, unable to make precise findings as to the extent of the wife’s liabilities.

52As appears below, given my acceptance of the evidence of each party as to their own property and superannuation, my inability to quantify their liabilities does not affect the determination of what is a just and equitable alteration of their property interests.

Contributions

53Neither party had assets of significance at the commencement of the relationship. Both worked at different times during the relationship. Both contributed their earnings to joint expenses at different times, while also spending money on their own pursuits or otherwise without the express consent of the other. While there were disputes between them on the evidence as to who had paid various bills, and mortgage payments in particular, even were it possible on the state of the evidence for me to resolve those disputes, nothing would turn on them.

54Similarly, both parties were critical of the efforts made by the other in terms of non-financial contributions.

55It is clear that the parties faced financial difficulties throughout most of their relationship. I accept the evidence of the husband to the effect that hardship payments from his superannuation entitlements, and compensation payments he received, were applied to the joint benefit of the parties. By the same token, I accept the evidence of the wife that her income was primarily applied to the joint benefit of the parties.

56It is also clear that the financial difficulties faced by the parties continued after the separation, at least in part because of the conduct of each of them in relation to the ongoing dispute. While it was suggested that the difficulties encountered in selling the home contributed to a reduction in the value of the property available for division between the parties, by preventing any opportunity for a higher sale price, there was no admissible evidence as to what sale price might have been achieved had those difficulties not been encountered. It would accordingly be a sterile exercise to endeavour to apportion responsibility for those difficulties between the parties.

57Doing the best that I can on the evidence presented, I conclude that the contributions of the parties from the commencement of their relationship until separation are appropriately to be assessed as being approximately equal. I conclude further that the wife has made a greater contribution than the husband to the increase in the value of her superannuation post separation. Because of the paucity of the evidence, I am unable to quantify that contribution.

Matters to be considered pursuant to s 79(4)(d) to (g) inclusive

58The financial circumstances of each party are extremely modest. Neither is presently employed.

59I accept the evidence of the husband that he has significant health issues and is unlikely to be gainfully employed in the foreseeable future. While the wife is in better health than the husband, she says she has been unemployed since 2013, and she was not challenged on that evidence. That said, she acknowledges having the “qualifications, physical and mental capacity to gain full-time employment”.

60Neither party has a duty to maintain any other person. There are no children of the marriage. Both parties are presently entitled to income tested pensions and benefits. Neither party is cohabiting with another person. It appears to be common ground that they enjoyed only a modest standard of living during the relationship, and that each presently has a standard of living somewhat inferior to that.

61The only significant difference in the financial circumstances of the parties is that the wife has superannuation entitlements and the husband does not. That said, the wife is 46 years of age and her entitlement to access her superannuation (absent the application of any hardship provisions) is some years away.

62The husband made various complaints in relation to the wife’s conduct which he would assert either amounted to a premature disposition of assets by her in the form of a gift to her mother, or wastage in the sense of allowing chattel items to deteriorate and thereby lose value. While those matters are capable of being taken into account pursuant to s 75(2)(o) in some circumstances (even though the husband did not articulate his claim in that manner), the evidence does not support the conclusions the husband would wish me to draw. I accept the evidence of the wife as to the approximate amount gifted by her to her mother; that amount was not significant. As already noted, there is no evidence as to the value of the chattels to which the husband claims he was entitled and which he did not receive, nor is there any evidence as to the value of the chattels which he claims were damaged.

Conclusion in relation to the application for alteration of property interests

63As is apparent from what is set out above, apart from personal items, there is simply no real or personal property available for division between these two parties.

64While the husband sought a superannuation splitting order to the effect that 100% of the wife’s superannuation would be split in his favour, at trial he acknowledged that the required notice had not been given to the trustee of the wife’s superannuation fund, despite the need for that step being drawn to his attention at earlier hearings.

65Even were I inclined to make a superannuation splitting order, absent the requisite notice I cannot do so in any way that would be binding on the trustee. I do not consider it appropriate to make a superannuation splitting order that is not binding on the trustee.

66I record that even were that not the case, and had the requisite notice being given to the trustee, I would not regard it as just and equitable in all the circumstances to make the order sought by the husband. As already noted, a significant proportion of the value of the superannuation entitlements of the wife has accumulated since the parties separated, and in the absence of any ongoing contribution by the husband of any nature.

67It is, in my view, appropriate to make an order for alteration of property interests so as to ensure that the financial relationship of these two parties is finally terminated. I accordingly propose to make orders whereby any interest each party might have in the property of the other will vest in the party in possession of the property, and any interest the husband might have in the wife’s superannuation will vest with her.

The other relief sought by the parties

68As already noted, the Court does not have the power to “charge [a person] with perjury” as sought by the husband. That aspect of his application will be dismissed. I do not propose to refer the papers in these proceedings to the prosecuting authorities; the evidence does not persuade me to do so, even had such a course been directly requested.

69The husband also sought “compensation” or “restitution” from the wife. The Court does not, in my view, have the power to make the orders sought. In any event, the husband’s purported claim appears to be based on:

(a)a claim that the wife should return to him a [Vehicle A] motorcar which is no longer in her possession, or reimburse him the full purchase price from when the car was purchased many years ago;

(b)a claim that the wife had given her mother the sum of $47,000 from a payment received by the husband by virtue of his disability, with the amount now sought by the husband being calculated by applying compound interest of 18% per annum to that sum for the 14 years since the alleged payment. The wife’s evidence, which I accept, was that she gave no more than about $2000 from the sum in question to her mother, and that the balance was applied to the joint benefit of the parties and payment of joint liabilities;

(c)reimbursement of the purchase price or estimated value of a [Vehicle B] motor car no longer in the wife’s possession;

(d)a calculation by the husband of the total gross value of the financial contributions made by him over the course of the relationship by way of earnings, worker’s compensation and his superannuation payout; and

(e)an element of compensation by the wife for the “violation of [his] right to a fair and impartial hearing”.

70In addition, during the course of the trial, the husband asserted that the chattels received by him from the home were in poor condition as a result of neglect by the wife, and that he should be compensated for what he would assert to be their reduced value as a result. There was no evidence before me either as to the current value of those items or what would be their value if they were in better condition. Similarly, the husband argued that he should be compensated for the value of the chattel items to which he claims he was entitled and which he did not receive; again, there was no admissible evidence as to the value of such items.

71Even if the Court had power to make the orders sought by the husband, the evidence submitted does not support his claims. While a number of the matters raised by him would, in certain circumstances, be capable of being taken into account pursuant to s 75(2)(o) of the Act in dividing the existing property of the parties, my findings above as to the extent of the property available for division do not require repetition.

72Similarly, the evidence does not support the wife’s claim for reimbursement of various expenses, nor would such an order be appropriate in any event. That aspect of the wife’s application will be dismissed.

73The husband also maintained his claim that he should be entitled to some form of compensation from one of the judicial officers who previously conducted the proceedings. He told me that he wanted compensation from the judicial officer in question because she had allowed the wife to “get away with not complying with court orders”; as an alternative, he wanted the relevant judicial officer “punished”.

74Leaving aside the fact that the husband himself admitted during the course of cross-examination that there were a number of court orders with which he had not complied, for reasons which do not require statement I reject the proposition that any judicial officer should or could be “punished” at the request of a litigant. I record further that the judicial officer in question appears to me to have conducted the matter entirely appropriately.

75While he did not refer to the matter in evidence, the husband acknowledged when asked that he had in fact applied to the Supreme Court for leave to issue proceedings against the judicial officer in question, and against another judicial officer of this Court: Citation omitted. In those same proceedings, the husband sought unspecified damages against this Court.

76In his closing submissions, the husband told me that the relevant judicial officer in the Supreme Court had told him that nothing would happen to advance that case until the proceedings in this Court were completed. [Omitted]

77I respectfully adopt her Honour’s explanation of the relevant law, which need not be repeated. It is unnecessary to consider whether the matter in question is res judicata as, again, judicial immunity from suit presents the husband with an insurmountable obstacle, and the claim he seeks to make in this Court is an abuse of process. That aspect of the husband’s application will be dismissed.

78The husband also sought orders for reimbursement by the wife of costs incurred by him in photocopying various documents and obtaining transcripts of the proceedings. To the extent such orders could potentially be made pursuant to s 117(2), there is no evidence to support a conclusion that there are circumstances justifying the making of any order as to costs.

79The husband also sought an order that the wife’s mother be “adjoined” to the proceedings, but no specific relief to be sought against her was articulated with any clarity. She was not, in any event, joined to the proceedings by being named at any stage as a respondent and served, as would have been open to the husband prior to trial. That aspect of his application will be dismissed.

80The husband also sought non-specific orders that the wife’s former lawyers pay him a sum of money. Those lawyers were not joined as parties to the proceedings, nor was any specific relief sought against them in any event. Even had those basic matters been attended to, and leaving aside the question of whether the Court has the power to make such an order in any event, there was no evidence to support any claim by the husband against them. That aspect of his application will also be dismissed.

81No proper basis was articulated by either party for the relief sought in the form of provision of documents by the other. Those aspects of their respective claims will be dismissed.

82To the extent the husband might claim that the wife is still in possession or control of items of chattel property which she was required, pursuant to earlier orders, to deliver up, no further orders are necessary or appropriate. The relevant orders remain in force.

Proposed orders

83I propose to make the following orders:

1.The husband’s interest, if any, in the following vest in the wife:

(a)any money standing to the credit of the wife in any account in a bank or other financial institution;

(b)any chattels in the possession of the wife; and

(c)the wife’s superannuation.

2.The wife’s interest, if any, in the following vest in the husband:

(a)any money standing to the credit of the husband in any account in a bank or other financial institutions;

(b)any chattels in the possession of the husband; and

(c)any superannuation or similar entitlements of the husband.

3.All outstanding applications and responses be and are hereby dismissed.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Family Court of Western Australia.

LH
ASSOCIATE

25 JULY 2018

ANNEXURE – ORDERS SOUGHT BY THE PARTIES

(Errors as they appear in original)

Final orders sought by the Wife

1[The wife] will not be reimbursing [the husband] the cost of photocopying as she has not charged [the husband] for any photocopying he has received.

2[The wife] will not pay [the husband] restitution of $1,000,000.00 as there is not the financial means to do so.

3As [Vehicle A] is no longer in [the wife’s] possession it will not be returned to [the husband]. [The husband] was left in possession of [Vehicle B] procured under the business partnership of [J] and [T] and purchased from [Financial Institution A] monies in 2007 and should have been divided at the time of divorce, however [the wife] had made no attempt to obtain her potion of this vehicle.

4 [Ms J] did not receive $47,000.00 from [the wife].

5[The husband] was ordered to pay court costs after numerous court appearances and delays and these were collected by [Firm A] at the time of property settlement, therefore [the wife] will not be reimbursing [the husband] for these costs.

6[The wife] will not be paying [the husband] any kind of compensation as at the time of all money being spent be either party was when they were still married and a few month after when bills still required payments.

7For this case to be finalised again as it was previously finalised without going to trial in 2013 and not to be re entertained by [the husband] at any later or future date.

8[The husband] to supply all completed pages and copies of the Joint [Bank B] Statements as he has not previously supplied these statements when requested via filed affidavits from [the wife].

9[The husband] to reimburse [the wife] the total amount of $8964.00 being his portion of monies paid to stop repossession and cleaning of [the home] as per previous court orders.

Final Orders Sought by the Husband

1.THE IMMEDIATE RE-IMBURSEMENT OF $922 ($2 PER PAGE) FOR THE COPYING OF [THE WIFE] OWN DOCUMENTS 461 PAGES (AS PER COURT ORDER).

2.THE IMMEDIATE RE IMBURSEMENT OF THE $ 1800 FOR THE COURT TRANSCRIPTS.

3.THAT [THE WIFE] BE CHARGED WITH CONTEMPT FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH COURT ORDERS TO RETURN PROPERTY AND TO HAND OVER DOCUMENTS.

4.THE RESITUTION OF $1,000,000:00 (ONE MILLION DOLLARS) FROM [THE WIFE].

5.THE IMMEDIATE RETURN OF THE [VEHICLE A], OR THE $19,888:00 PAID FROM THE SUPERANNUATION DISABILITY PAYOUT OF [THE HUSBAND].

6.THE REIMBURSEMENT OF $9,000:00 FOR [VEHICLE C] THAT WAS TRADED IN ON ANOTHER CAR FOR [THE WIFE], [VEHICLE C] PAID FOR FROM THE SUPERANNUATION DISABILITY PAYOUT OF [THE HUSBAND].

7.THAT [MS J] BE ADJOINED TO THIS CASE AS SHE RECEIVED $47,000:00 (FORTY SEVEN THOUSAND DOLLARS) AT 18% COMPOUNDED INTEREST FOR 14 YEARS COMES TO OVER $1,000,000:00 (ONE MILLION DOLLARS).

[THE WIFE] STATED SHE GAVE HER MOTHER THIS MONEY. YET FAILED TO SHOW THIS IN FULL AND FRANK DISCLOSURE.

1 COUNT CONTEMPT OF COURT.

8THAT [THE WIFE] BE CHARGED WITH MULTIPLE COUNTS OF PERJURY.

9.THAT [MS J] BE CHARGED WITH PERJURY.

10.THE RETURN MONEY PAID TO [FIRM A] FROM THE SALE OF THE HOUSE AGAINST INSTRUCTIONS.

11.COMPENSATION FOR THE VIOLATION OF MY RIGHT TO A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL HEARING. NO TRIAL WAS HELD NO EVIDENCE WAS PRODUCED BY [THE WIFE], AND [THE HUSBAND] WAS TOLD HE COULD NOT DEFEND HIMSELF OR PRODUCE EVIDENCE UNTIL HE WENT TO TRIAL. YET [THE HUSBAND] WAS STRIPPED OF OVER $1,000,000,000:00 (OVER ONE MILLION DOLLARS).

12.THAT [THE WIFE] IMMEDIATELY HAND OVER HER ENTIRE AUSTRALIAN SUPERANNUATION ([#881]) OF $57,185:37 TO [THE HUSBAND]. TO MAKE UP FOR [THE WIFE] NOT CONTRIBUTING TO THE HOUSEHOLD, AND MONEY TAKEN FROM HIS WAGES ETC. ANNEXURE "A".

13.THE FINACIAL CONTRIBUTIONS MADE BY [THE HUSBAND] TOWARDS THE MARRIAGE, TOTALLING $615,691:63 IN EARNINGS WORKERS COMP AND SUPERANNUATION PAYOUT.

14.THAT [THE WIFE] IMMEDIATELY PRODUCE COPIES OF THE AFFIDAVITS OF SERVICE FOR ALL THE FORM 2 DOCUMENTS FILED, TO PROVE THE DOCUMENTS WERE SERVED AT LEAST 2 WEEKS PRIOR TO HEARING DATES.

15.THAT [THE WIFE] BE CHARGED WITH PURGERY, PERTAINING TO THE INTERIM VIOLENCE RESTRAINING ORDER THAT WAS CANCELLED, AT HER REQUEST PRIOR TO FILING HER FORM 1 DOCUMENTS, AND FAILED TO FILE THE CANCELLATION DOCUMENT DATED 18 AUGUST 2010.

16.[THE WIFE] HANDS OVER HER CAR, AS SHE HAD PREVIOUSLY TRANSFERRED MONEY FROM THE WAGES OF [THE HUSBAND’S] WAGES TO PAY HER CAR LOAN.

17.THAT [THE WIFE] PRODUCE THE PAPERWORK FROM -FINANCIAL INSTITUTION A] PERTAINING TO THE REPOSSESSION OF THE HOUSE, AS [FINANCIAL INSTITUTION A] WAS ONLY CHASING [THE WIFE] FOR THE $4,000:00 OF ARREARS FROM THE MORITORIUM WHEN [THE HUSBAND] WAS INJURED.

DATED PRIOR TO [THE HUSBAND] BEING EVICTED FROM HIS HOME.

AND [FINANCIAL INSTITUTION A] DID NOT SUPPLY ANY DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE REPOSSION OF [THE HOME] TO [THE HUSBAND] AS HE WAS THE ONLY ONE PAYING THE MORTGAGE AND HAD BEEN FOR YEARS PRIOR TO [THE WIFE] VACATING THE PREMISES.

1 COUNT OF PURGERY.

18.THAT [THE WIFE] RETURN THE MONEY TAKEN FROM THE WAHGES OF [THE HUSBAND] AS SHE HAD CLAIMED NOT TO HAVE TOUCHED HIS WAGES SINCE 2008.

MONEY THAT COULD HAVE BEEN USED TO PAY UP THE ARREARS FROM THE MORITORIUM.

1 COUNT OF PURGERY.