Turner v Turner

Case [1918] HCA 66


25 CLR 569

TURNER AND OTHERS

APPELLANTS; PLAINTIFFS, TURNER

RESPONDENT. DEFENDANT,

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF

WESTERN AUSTRALIA. Contract-Family settlement-Services in working farm-Compromise of action-

The wife and children of the owner of a farm alleged that he had verbally agreed that, in consideration of their future services in working the property, it would belong to him and them in equal shares; and that after the commence- ment of an action to enforce this agreement an agreement to compromise the action had been made.

Held, that there was no evidence to support the jury's finding that either of these agreements had been made.

Judgment of the Supreme Court of Western Australia (McMillon C.J.)

APPEAL from the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

In 1892 John Purser Turner purchased 928 acres of land from the Government of Western Australia under the Crown Lands Regulations, and took up his residence on the land with his wife and children. As his children grew up they assisted in working and developing the farm. About 1915 Turner left the farm and subsequently contracted to sell it. The wife and children then instituted an action against him in the Supreme Court, alleging that he had agreed that in consideration of their future services on the

25 CLR 570

farm it would belong to him and them in equal shares. After the

commencement of the action an interview took place between one of the children and the defendant, and the plaintiffs alleged that a compromise of the action had been then agreed to on certain terms. There was no writing to support either of the alleged agreements. The defendant pleaded the Statute of Frauds to the first alleged agreement, and, by leave of the Supreme Court, the case was treated as though the Statute had been pleaded to the second also. The case was tried before McMillan C.J. and a special jury of six. The jury found for the plaintiffs as to both agreements, but the learned Chief Justice entered judgment for the defendant, holding that there was no part performance to take the first agreement out of the Statute of Frauds, and that the Statute was also an answer to the second agreement.

The plaintiffs now appealed from the judgment, and the defendant cross-appealed from the findings of the jury.

R. S. Haynes K.C. (with him Harold Haynes), for the appellants. Villeneuve Smith K.C. (with him Hensman), for the respondent.

BARTON J. The appellants rely on two agreements. The first may be regarded as a family settlement under which the respon- dent is supposed to have undertaken to dispose of his property among the members of his family in consideration of their future service, or, one may suppose, the promise of it, in helping him to work and develop his farm. That agreement would be a very extra- ordinary one we know that people who are settlers on the land are in the habit of utilizing the labours of the members of their families, whether…

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AGLC
Turner v Turner [1918] HCA 66
Case
[1918] HCA 66
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case involved an appeal from the Supreme Court of Western Australia concerning two alleged agreements between a father, John Purser Turner, and his wife and children. The wife and children claimed that the father had verbally agreed that in consideration of their future services in working the farm, the property would be owned by them in equal shares. They further alleged a second verbal agreement to compromise an action brought to enforce the first agreement.

The legal issues before the court were whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings that either the family settlement agreement or the subsequent compromise agreement had been made. The defendant also raised the Statute of Frauds as a defence to both alleged agreements.

The court found that there was no evidence to support the jury's findings on either agreement. Regarding the first agreement, the court noted that such a family settlement, based on future services for equal ownership, was extraordinary and required clear evidence, which was lacking. The expressions relied upon by the plaintiffs were considered too vague. Concerning the compromise agreement, the court determined that the son who allegedly negotiated it lacked authority from the other plaintiffs, and the negotiations were merely preliminary and subject to further settlement, not a concluded agreement.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the judgment entered for the defendant by the Chief Justice was upheld.

Orders

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

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Ratio Decidendi

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