Turner v Kostoglou

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Magistrates Appeals: Civil)

TURNER v KOSTOGLOU & ANOR

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Sulan

8 April 2005

LANDLORD AND TENANT - RENT - RECOVERY - DISTRESS FOR RENT

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL GENERAL PRINCIPLES - INTERFERENCE WITH DISCRETION OF COURT BELOW

Appeal against a decision of a magistrate in relation to costs - whether the magistrate erred in refusing to disqualify herself on the grounds of perceived bias - whether the magistrate erred in ordering the appellant to pay costs calculated by reference to the scale for claims in excess of $80,000 - whether the magistrate erred in failing to apportion costs - appeal dismissed.

Landlord and Tenant Act 1936 (SA) s 24; Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) s 37(1); Magistrates Court (Civil Rules) 1992 (SA) r 106(1), r 106(7); Valuation of Land Act 1960 (Vic), referred to.
Kellett v Buchanan [1935] SASR 144; Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288; Reg v Hore ex parte Brisbane City Council [1969] Qd R 75; Rex Tyre and Auto Services (Richmond) Pty Ltd v Country Roads Board [1979] VR 608; Southern Resources Ltd & Ors v Residues Treatment and Trading Company Ltd & Ors (1991) 56 SASR 455; Melbourne Auto Wreckers Pty Ltd v Country Roads Board, unreported, 26 May 1975, considered.

TURNER v KOSTOGLOU & ANOR
[2005] SASC 132

Magistrates Appeal

  1. SULAN J: This matter has a long and involved history.  It is unfortunate that the parties are yet again before the Court, appealing the decision of a magistrate’s order for costs.  In order to understand how it has come about that there is an appeal against a costs order in the sum of $11,157.66, it is necessary to trace the history of the litigation between the parties and a third person, Mr Zollo, who was a party to earlier proceedings.

    The issues to be determined

  2. The appeal raises a number of issues.  The appellant contends that the magistrate should have disqualified herself on the ground of perceived bias.  She also alleges that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction to make an order for costs.   The appellant submits that the order for costs should be set aside as the magistrate should not have ordered costs on an indemnity basis.  I reject the appellant’s contentions for the following reasons.

    Background

  3. The respondents, Mr and Mrs Kostoglou, were the owners of premises at 355 Main North Road, Enfield.  On 1 September 1998, they leased the premises to Mr Tennyson Turner, the husband of the appellant (“the 1998 lease”).  Mr Turner is a bankrupt.  The appellant carried on a business of selling art and craft from the premises.

  4. Prior to the appellant commencing her business, Mr Turner and Mr Zollo had leased the premises as tenants-in-common. Mr Zollo is an artist, and had used the premises to exhibit and store his paintings.  The term of the lease was for three years and commenced on 1 April 1995.  Mr Zollo did not enter into…

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Details
Case
[2005] SASC 132
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Turner v Kostoglou, the appeal focused on a dispute between the respondents, Mr and Mrs Kostoglou, who were the owners of premises at 355 Main North Road, Enfield, and the appellant, Mrs Turner, who leased the premises and operated a business selling art and craft. The respondents had terminated the lease due to unpaid rental arrears, exceeding $30,000, and seized items from the premises by way of distress for rent. The primary legal issues revolved around whether the magistrate erred in refusing to disqualify herself due to perceived bias, whether she had jurisdiction to order costs, and if she was correct in ordering costs on an indemnity basis without apportioning them. Additionally, the appeal contested the calculation of costs by reference to a scale for claims in excess of $80,000.

The court examined the appellant’s contentions and concluded that the magistrate did not err in any of the areas raised. Regarding the perceived bias, the court found no grounds for disqualification. It also confirmed the magistrate's jurisdiction to order costs and upheld the decision to order costs on an indemnity basis. The court found no error in the calculation of costs and dismissed the appeal on all grounds. The reasoning was based on the principles of judicial impartiality, jurisdictional authority, and the appropriateness of the costs order in line with statutory provisions and court rules.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and no further orders were made. The court's decision upheld the magistrate's exercise of discretion in the management of the case and the calculation of costs, finding no basis for the appellant's claims of error.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

The appeal raises a number of issues. The appellant contends that the magistrate should have disqualified herself on the ground of perceived bias. She also alleges that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction to make an order for costs. The appellant submits that the order for costs should be set aside as the magistrate should not have ordered costs on an indemnity basis. I reject the appellant’s contentions for the following reasons.Background The respondents, Mr and Mrs Kostoglou, were the owners of premises at 355 Main North Road, Enfield. On 1 September 1998, they leased the premises to Mr Tennyson Turner, the husband of the appellant (“the 1998 lease”). Mr Turner is a bankrupt. The appellant carried on a business of selling art and craft from the premises. Prior to the appellant commencing her business, Mr Turner and Mr Zollo had leased the premises as tenants-in-common. Mr Zollo is an artist, and had used the premises to exhibit and store his paintings. The term of the lease was for three years and commenced on 1 April 1995. Mr Zollo did not enter into the 1998 lease. Some of Mr Zollo’s artwork remained at the premises after the appellant commenced her business. As at 22 February 2002, Mr Turner owed in excess of $30,000 to the respondents in rental arrears, payable under the 1998 lease. On that day, the respondents re-entered the premises and terminated the lease. Items of personal property were seized by the agent acting on behalf of the respondents, purportedly by way of distress for arrears of rent. Section 24 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1936 (SA) (“the Act”) provides:(1) When any claim is made by service of a declaration and inventory, by any person other than the immediate tenant, to or in respect of any agisted cattle or goods distrained, or threatened to be distrained, by any landlord for rent, any justice of the peace, upon complaint in writing by either the landlord of the claimant preferred before the sale of such goods under the distress (where the cattle or goods have been actually distrained) by the person making the claim, may –(a) issue a summons in the form in Schedule 5, or in a form to the like effect, directed as well to the landlord as to the person making the claim; and(b) in his discretion order such sale to be postponed until the summons has been disposed of.(2) Any two or more justices may adjudicate on such claim in a summary manner, and make an order in, or to the effect of, the form in Schedule 6, and such order as to costs to be paid by either party as to them shall seem just.(3) Service of the summons or order on a person authorised by the landlord to distrain shall be deemed service on the landlord, and service of the summons or order on a person who has made a claim on behalf of another shall be deemed service on the principal. The Act requires a person who distrains for rent to make an inventory of the goods distrained. That inventory must be delivered to the tenant, or some other person, residing at the premises. If distress is levied on goods being the property of a person other than the tenant, that person may serve upon the landlord a declaration that the tenant has no right of property or beneficial interest in the goods, and the goods are his or her property. A summons can issue to the landlord and the claimant, and any two justices can adjudicate on any competing claims in a summary way.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The matter was remitted to the magistrate to determine the quantum of costs. The decision of the magistrate Mr and Mrs Kostoglou sought the following orders:1.That this matter be certified a complex action, pursuant to r 106(7) of the Magistrates Court Rules. 2.Directions and orders as to the taxation of costs.3.Costs of the application.4.Such further or other orders as the Court sees fit. In his affidavit in support of the application, the solicitor for the respondents stated that the respondents intend to render a bill of costs to Mrs Turner and Mr Zollo, regarding the Magistrates Court proceedings. He submitted that the actions constitute a complex action, and sought certification of the action as a complex action. An objection was lodged by the appellant on 6 September 2004. She contended that the Magistrates Court had no jurisdiction, as the Full Court had concluded that the Magistrates Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the original applications. She further contended that the issue before the Magistrates Court as to the ownership of goods did not render the matter a complex action. In the alternative, she submitted that no more than one day’s costs should be allowed in any event. She contended that the court had been alerted on the first day of trial that she and Mr Zollo claimed the distraint was illegal. She submitted that the length of the trial was substantially due to the lengthy cross-examination of witnesses by the respondents’ then counsel. A further affidavit dated 23 September 2004 was filed by the solicitors for the respondents, to which they attached invoices of their charges and counsel fees, totalling the sum $11,157.66. In support of the application before the magistrate, the respondent provided a table which set out the appellant’s costs of the magistrates proceedings, calculated on three different bases. The first was a routine scale claim of $20,000, the second a routine scale claim of $80,000, and the third being a complex scale claim of $20,000. The amounts calculated, which included the first day of trial and six subsequent days, plus solicitor’s costs, totalled $9,650, $16,300, and $13,140 respectively. The actual costs charged to the respondents totalled $11,157.66, which are the costs calculated on an indemnity basis. Rule 106(1) of the Magistrates Court Rules 1992 provides:106. (1) Subject to these Rules or to an order of the Court, a successful party in an action (other than a minor civil action) is entitled on judgment to costs against an unsuccessful party, or any other party that the Court may order, in accordance with the following principles - (a) where judgment is in respect of an action for a sum of money -(i)a successful plaintiff is entitled to costs on the relevant scale in the Third Schedule applicable to the sum actually recovered;(ii)a successful defendant is entitled to costs on the relevant scale in the Third Schedule applicable to the sum claimed:(b) where judgment is in respect of any other action – a successful party is entitled to costs on the scale in the Third Schedule specified by the Court;or(c) where the action involved unusual difficulty or intricacy, or other property cause exists – a successful party is entitled to costs on such percentage of the Supreme Court scale as the Court specifies.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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