Turner v Director of Public Prosecutions

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

TJS v Director of Public Prosecutions [2024] QDC 122

PARTIES:

TJS

(Appellant)

v

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (QLD)

(Respondent)

FILE NO:

165/24

DIVISION:

Appellate

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Brisbane Magistrates Court

DELIVERED ON:

7 August 2024

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

12 July 2024

JUDGE:

Farr SC DCJ

ORDER:

1.   Appeal allowed.

2.   Sentences imposed in Magistrates Court at Brisbane be set aside in respect of each charge.

3.   The appellant is re-sentenced as follows:

Charge 1: nine months imprisonment

Charge 2: six months imprisonment

Charge 3: 12 months imprisonment

Charge 4: six months imprisonment

All terms of imprisonment are to be served concurrently. 

Each term of imprisonment is suspended immediately with an operational period during which the appellant must not commit any other offence punishable by imprisonment for a period of nine months in respect of Charge 1, six months in respect of Charges 2 and 4 and 12 months in respect of Charge 3. 

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL – Justices Act 1886 – section 222 – appeal against sentence – where the appellant was convicted on his own pleas of guilty to two counts of penile intercourse with a child under 16 and two counts of indecent treatment of a child under 16 – where the appellant was sentenced to 15 months imprisonment on each count with each sentence to be suspended after the appellant had served a period of three months imprisonment with an operational period of 15 months – whether the sentences imposed were excessive

LEGISLATION:

Justices Act 1886 (Qld)

Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld)

CASES:

Forrest v Commissioner of Police [2017] QCA 132

R v BCX [2015] QCA 188

R v Lawley [2007] QCA 243

COUNSEL:

T Ryan KC for the Appellant

L Kerr, Legal Officer for the Respondent

SOLICITORS:

Taylor Rose Lawyers for the Appellant

Officer of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld) for the Respondent

  1. This is an appeal against sentence pursuant to s. 222(2)(c) of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld).

  2. The appellant was convicted upon his own pleas of guilty in the Magistrates Court at Brisbane on 22 January 2024 to four charges:

    1.Charges 1 and 3: penile intercourse with a child under 16 on dates unknown between 1 January 2022 and 13 March 2022;

    2.Charges 2 and 4: indecent treatment of a child under 16 on a date unknown between 6 February 2022 and 13 March 2022.

  3. The appellant was initially sentenced to 15 months imprisonment on each count with a parole release date set after the appellant served three months actual imprisonment.  On 25 January 2024 the sentence hearing was re-opened[1] and the order for parole was vacated and substituted by an order that each sentence be suspended after the appellant had served a period of three months imprisonment.

    [1]Pursuant to s. 188 of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld).

  4. Unfortunately, contrary to s. 144(5) of the Penalties and Sentences Act, the Magistrate failed to state an operational period during which…

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Details
Case
[2024] QDC 122
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Turner v Director of Public Prosecutions, the appellant appealed against the sentences imposed by the Magistrate in the Magistrates Court at Brisbane. The appellant was convicted on his own pleas of guilty to two counts of penile intercourse with a child under 16 and two counts of indecent treatment of a child under 16. The Magistrate sentenced the appellant to 15 months imprisonment on each count, with each sentence to be suspended after the appellant had served a period of three months imprisonment with an operational period of 15 months. The appellant argued that the sentences imposed were excessive.

The court considered several legal issues, including whether the sentences imposed were excessive and whether the Magistrate had erred in her approach to sentencing. The court examined whether the Magistrate had failed to order that the sentences imposed be subject to an operational period, had not properly assessed the appellant's culpability for the offences, had erred by sentencing the appellant by way of a "two-step process," and had failed to apply the correct approach established by authority in determining whether there were exceptional circumstances which warrant the imposition of a sentence that did not involve custody. The court also considered whether the Magistrate had failed to apply the principle that youthful offenders, with limited criminal histories and promising prospects of rehabilitation, who have pleaded guilty and co-operated with the administration of justice, even having committed serious offences, should be treated with leniency.

The court found that the Magistrate had erred in her approach to sentencing, and that the sentences imposed were excessive. The court found that the Magistrate had not properly assessed the appellant's culpability for the offences and had failed to apply the correct approach established by authority in determining whether there were exceptional circumstances which warrant the imposition of a sentence that did not involve custody. The court found that the sentences imposed were excessive because the Magistrate had not taken into account all relevant factors when assessing if exceptional circumstances had been demonstrated. The court found that the appellant's youth, good prospects of rehabilitation, and remorse were not sufficient to warrant a non-custodial sentence.

The court allowed the appeal and set aside the sentences imposed by the Magistrate. The court re-sentenced the appellant to nine months imprisonment for Charge 1, six months imprisonment for Charges 2 and 4, and 12 months imprisonment for Charge 3. All terms of imprisonment were to be served concurrently and were suspended immediately with an operational period during which the appellant must not commit any other offence punishable by imprisonment.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Sentences imposed in Magistrates Court at Brisbane be set aside in respect of each charge.

3. The appellant is re-sentenced as follows:

Charge 1: nine months imprisonment

Charge 2: six months imprisonment

Charge 3: 12 months imprisonment

Charge 4: six months imprisonment

All terms of imprisonment are to be served concurrently.

Each term of imprisonment is suspended immediately with an operational period during which the appellant must not commit any other offence punishable by imprisonment for a period of nine months in respect of Charge 1, six months in respect of Charges 2 and 4 and 12 months in respect of Charge 3.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant has particularised the learned Magistrate’s alleged errors resulting in such alleged excessiveness as follows:1.The learned Magistrate erred in failing to order that the sentences imposed be subject to an operational period.2.The learned Magistrate failed to properly assess the appellant’s culpability for the offences and sentence of the appellant on an incorrect basis.3.The learned Magistrate erred by sentencing the appellant by way of a “two-step process” in that her Honour first, considered whether exceptional circumstances existed and secondly, determined the sentence to be imposed. 4.The learned Magistrate erred in failing to apply the correct approach established by authority, the principle in s. 9(5) and the considerations in s. 9(6) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 in determining whether there were exceptional circumstances which warrant the imposition of a sentence that did not involve custody.5.The learned Magistrate failed to apply the principle that youthful offenders, with limited criminal histories and promising prospects of rehabilitation, who have pleaded guilty and co-operated with the administration of justice, even having committed serious offences, should be treated with leniency.Facts relating to offences The appellant’s date of birth is 19 December 2002. He had therefore just turned 19 at the time of the event the subject of Charge 1 and was approximately 19 years 2-3 months of age at the time of the events the subject of Charges 2, 3 and 4.[5][5]Page 9, l 34 of Appeal Record Book. The complainant was aged approximately 15 years nine months at the time of the event the subject of Charge 1 and 15 years 11 months at the time of the events the subject of Charges 2, 3 and 4.[6][6]Ex. 1. At the relevant times the appellant and the complainant were in a boyfriend/girlfriend relationship. In relation to Charge 1, the complainant attended the appellant’s house and when in his bedroom they had sexual intercourse. In relation to Charges 2, 3 and 4, the complainant was again at the appellant’s home and the appellant attempted to initiate sexual activity by touching and kissing the complainant intimately. The complainant stated that due to a medical condition she was in too much pain to have sex. Subsequently, although reluctant, the complainant acquiesced and performed oral sex on the appellant which occurred for over an approximate period of five minutes. They then attempted intercourse at the appellant’s request. The penetration proved too painful for the complainant and she started to bleed. Intercourse immediately ceased and the complainant, at the appellant’s request, performed further oral sex on the appellant until he ejaculated. They both then fell asleep. The complainant ended the relationship about two weeks later. The Statement of Facts (Ex. 1) then (rather curiously) states:“The sentence proceeds on the basis that the Crown cannot exclude that the defendant mistakenly but honestly and reasonably believed that the complainant consented to sexual intercourse.”[7][7]It is unclear whether this statement relates to both Charges 1 and 3 or just Charge 3. I also have some difficulty in understanding this statement as, pursuant to the admitted facts, the complainant did consent to sexual intercourse on each occasion. In any event, little of relevance turns on the issue.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant also evidenced his remorse by not only making admissions in the pretext phone call but also by writing a letter of apology (Ex. 3) and entering timely pleas of guilty.Consideration Given that the appellant was convicted of offences of a sexual nature committed in relation to a child under 16 years, s. 9(4)(c) of the Penalties and Sentences Act provides that he must serve an actual term of imprisonment unless there are exceptional circumstances. Section 9(5) of the Penalties and Sentences Act states:“For subsection (4)(c), in deciding whether there are exceptional circumstances, a court may have regard to the closeness in age between the offender and the child.” Section 9(6) states:“In sentencing an offender to whom subsection (4) applies, the court must have regard primarily to—(a) the effect of the offence on the child; and(b) the age of the child; and(c) the nature of the offence, including, for example, any physical harm or the threat of physical harm to the child or another; and(d) the need to protect the child, or other children, from the risk of the offender reoffending; and(e) any relationship between the offender and the child; and(f) the need to deter similar behaviour by other offenders to protect children; and(g) the prospects of rehabilitation including the availability of any medical or psychiatric treatment to cause the offender to behave in a way acceptable to the community; and(h) the offender’s antecedents, age and character; and(i) any remorse or lack of remorse of the offender; and(j) any medical, psychiatric, prison or other relevant report relating to the offender; and(k) anything else about the safety of children under 16 the sentencing court considers relevant.” In this matter the learned Magistrate concluded that no exceptional circumstances existed. In assessing that issue, she took the following matters into account:[8][8]Page 28, l 39 – p 29, l 20 of Appeal Record Book.(a)the age difference between the complainant and the defendant;[9][9]During submissions the age difference was said to be four years. In fact, it was approximately three years, four months.(b)the effect of the offending conduct on the complainant; (c)the complainant’s age being 15 years; (d)the nature of the offending conduct; and(e)the fact that the complainant experienced pain on one occasion;(f)the appellant’s low risk of re-offending;(g)general deterrence;(h)the appellant has good prospects of rehabilitation; (i)the appellant has no relevant psychiatric condition; (j)the appellant’s youth; and(k)the appellant’s remorse. Whilst the Magistrate did not make specific mention of considering these matters in combination when assessing if exceptional circumstances have been demonstrated, I note that she did make reference to such an approach when discussing relevant authorities on the topic. I infer therefore that her Honour did adopt such an approach. However, it is immediately apparent that not all matters of relevance were taken into account by her Honour when determining if exceptional circumstances had been demonstrated, or alternatively, it was not made clear just what was being taken into account when making such an assessment.