Turner, Paul Frederick v Belsand Pty Ltd
[1997] FCA 615
•10 JULY 1997
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
TORT ‑ appeal ‑ whether the primary judge erred in holding on the facts that a breach of duty in the failure to provide accountant’s statements caused loss ‑ whether primary judge erred in holding that the appellant’s duty of care required it to inform the respondent of the fact that the respondent’s money was invested with particular company ‑ whether executor of respondent made it clear that she wished the invested money to be withdrawn
CONTRACT ‑ whether primary judge erred in holding on the facts that the contractual breach of failing to provide accountant’s statements caused loss
PAUL FREDERICK TURNER & ORS v BELSAND PTY LTD
NG 516 of 1995
SPENDER, WHITLAM AND LEHANE JJ
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) ) NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) NG 516 of 1995 ) GENERAL DIVISION )
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE
OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: PAUL FREDERICK TURNER
BRUCE WILLIAM PHILLIPS
JOHN WILLIAM BEALE AND
BRIAN ALBERT McSWEENEY t/as
PHILLIPS McSWEENEYAppellants
AND: BELSAND PTY LTD
Respondent
JUDGES: SPENDER, WHITLAM AND LEHANE JJ PLACE: SYDNEY DATED: 10 July 1997
MINUTES OF ORDER
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The appeal is dismissed with costs.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) ) NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) NG 516 of 1995 ) GENERAL DIVISION )
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE
OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: PAUL FREDERICK TURNER
BRUCE WILLIAM PHILLIPS
JOHN WILLIAM BEALE AND
BRIAN ALBERT McSWEENEY t/as
PHILLIPS McSWEENEYAppellants
AND: BELSAND PTY LTD
Respondent
JUDGES: SPENDER, WHITLAM AND LEHANE JJ PLACE: SYDNEY DATED: 10 July 1997
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
LEHANE J:
This is an appeal from orders made by Beazley J, by which her Honour ordered that there be judgment for the respondent (Belsand) against the appellants, (Phillips McSweeney). The judgment was based on findings of breach of contract and tortious breach of a duty of care.
FACTS
Except where I indicate otherwise, what follows is an abbreviated statement of facts found by her Honour, not now in contention.
Belsand was a shelf company acquired by the Deaton family in 1986; it became the trustee of a family trust. It received, as trustee, about $1,500,000. This case concerns the investment of about $520,000 of that sum.
The member of the Deaton family principally concerned in the operation of Belsand was Mrs Veda Deaton. She knew Mr McSweeney, a partner of Phillips McSweeney, and Mr Turner, in 1986 an employee and later a partner of the firm. Mr McSweeney introduced Mrs Deaton to Mr John Preston, then employed by a firm of stockbrokers, Bridges, Son & Shepherd, as one who could arrange money market investments for Belsand. Mrs Deaton arranged for the investment of Belsand’s funds, through Mr Preston, in commercial bills and on “at call” deposit.
Mr Preston moved to another firm, Aetna Preston Securities Limited (Aetna Preston); Mrs Deaton, on behalf of Belsand, continued to deal with Mr Preston, and thus with Aetna Preston; in 1989 Mr Preston moved to Bridgeland Securities Ltd (Bridgeland), a company owned by the partners of Phillips McSweeney and of which Mr McSweeney, Mr Turner and Mr Preston himself were directors. After some initial hesitation, Mrs Deaton transferred Belsand’s business from Aetna Preston to Bridgeland. Bridgeland was a respondent to the proceedings below, but Belsand’s claim against it was settled; and, as Bridgeland no longer plays any part in these proceedings, it is convenient simply to refer to Mr Preston as the party with whom Mrs Deaton dealt throughout in relation to the short term investment of Belsand’s funds.
Before turning to the procedures adopted for investing Belsand’s money, it is convenient to mention the role of Phillips McSweeney, played principally through Mr Turner. Phillips McSweeney did accounting work of a conventional kind for Belsand and also for a number of members of the Deaton family and entities associated with them. That work included the keeping of books and records and the preparation of annual accounts and tax returns. Mrs Deaton saw Mr Turner, on average, about twice a month in relation to the family affairs, including those of Belsand, on which Phillips McSweeney were engaged. Their discussions related to some extent to investment matters, and accounts rendered to Belsand by Phillips McSweeney included, among the professional services for which charges were made, items bearing descriptions such as “general taxation investment and other professional advice”.
Initially, dealings in relation to the investment of Belsand’s money took place directly between Mr Preston and Mrs Deaton. Mrs Deaton gave instructions directly to Mr Preston concerning the investment of funds and withdrawals from money on deposit. Mr Preston sent confirmations, as to instructions acted on, and notices, for example, of maturing investments, directly to Mrs Deaton. Mrs Deaton subsequently gave the information to Mr Turner so that Phillips McSweeney could enter up the books appropriately and prepare tax returns. After a time, however, Mr Turner suggested that it would be more convenient if confirmations and notices were sent to him, so that he could be sure of having them promptly, and that he would send copies to Mrs Deaton. Mrs Deaton accepted that proposal, and it was implemented for a period; Mrs Deaton, however, found it unsatisfactory because of delays in sending copies to her. As a result, there was introduced what her Honour described as the statement system. The basis of that system was that documents would still be sent by Mr Preston to Phillips McSweeney but that, instead of sending copies to Mrs Deaton, Phillips McSweeney would at the end of each month prepare and send to Mrs Deaton a statement summarising transactions during the month.
There seems to be a degree of confusion about the form of the statements. Her Honour sets out in her judgment a form of statement of which she says, at 9:
“Although no formal admission was made, the matter proceeded on the basis that this statement was most likely in the same format as the Belsand statements.”
The form of statement set out, however, appears fairly clearly to be not a statement sent by Phillips McSweeney to Mrs Deaton but a confirmation by Mr Preston of the making of an investment. Senior counsel for Phillips McSweeney referred us to a number of the Phillips McSweeney statements which are in evidence, and counsel for Belsand did not suggest that the documents to which we were referred were not statements sent under the system or were in any way atypical of the statements sent. Set out below are two of the statements to which we were referred; the first is dated 21 December 1989 and the second is the last of the statements, dated 16 May 1990. The statement of 21 December 1989 is addressed to Mrs Deaton and reads as follows:
“Dear Veda,
BELSAND NO. 2 TRUST AT CALL ACCOUNT
BRIDGELANDS SECURITIES LIMITED.The account was opened on the 31st August, 1989, when $518,735.44 was transferred from the Aetna Preston At Call Account.
Please find enclosed a copy of a letter sent to John Preston which accompanied the dividend cheque received from Brierley Investments Limited during the period from the 31st August, 1989 to the 11th December, 1989.
The other receipts to, and payments from, the account for this period are as follows:-
Payments $
14/09/89 L.S. Deaton Holdings Pty Limited 5,000.00
10/10/89 Rik Deaton - Westpac 1,000.00
20/10/89 L.S. Deaton Holdings Pty Limited 5,000.00
14/11/89 Rik Deaton - Westpac 7,048.16
15/11/89 G. Neville - arranged by Rik Deaton 10,000.00
29/11/89 Celtic Studios - Westpac 5,339.00Receipts
‑ Interest 19,130.77
‑ Interest ‑ Aetna Preston 17,061.49The balance of funds as at the 11th December, 1989, was $521,675.18 and was earning an interest rate of 17.5% p.a.
Yours faithfully
PHILLIPS MCSWEENEY”
The second of the statements is similarly addressed and reads:
“Dear Veda,
BELSAND NO 2 TRUST AT CALL ACCOUNT
BRIDGELANDS SECURITIES LTDThe movements in the account for the period from 12 December 1989 to the 5 April 1990 are as follows:-
RECEIPTS $
14/09/89 L.S. Deaton Holdings Pty Limited 5,000.00
02/01/90 Interest 12,270.23
15/01/90 Interest 350.58
21/03/90 Bill Repayment 506,652.00
02/04/90 Interest 15,383.31$534,656.12
WITHDRAWALS
21/12/89 L S Deaton Holdings P/L 5,000.00
29/01/90 Ti Deaton Young 3,000.00
29/01/90 L S Deaton Holdings P/L 2,000.00
08/02/90 Rik Deaton 2,000.00
12/02/90 L S Deaton Holdings P/L 2,000.00
19/02/90 Bill Purchase (30 days at 16.65%) 499,999.50
05/03/90 Rik Deaton 2,000.00
22/03/90 Rik Deaton 3,000.00
30/03/90 Phillips McSweeney 6,100.00
30/03/90 Austpac Gold 120.00
06/04/90 Rik Deaton 2,000.00
18/04/90 Office of State Revenue - Land Tax 8,550.00$535,769.50
The balance of funds as at 4 May 1990 was $520 561.80 and was earning an interest rate of 17.5% per annum.
Yours faithfully
PHILLIPS McSWEENEY”
The statements were not sent with great regularity: rather than every month, statements apparently were sent in January, May, October and November 1987, January, March, May, August, October and December 1988, each month from February to September 1989, December 1989 and, finally, in May 1990. Her Honour held, and this finding is not challenged, that in failing to provide statements monthly, particularly in failing to provide any statements between December 1989 and May 1990, Phillips McSweeney were guilty of tortious negligence and breached their contract of retainer with Belsand. Her Honour also found that the failure to provide statements in that latter period was causative of a portion of the loss alleged by Belsand: that finding is challenged, and I shall return to it.
When Belsand’s money was invested in bills, that was arranged by Mr Preston through Bill Acceptance Corporation Limited (BAC). At the outset, money invested on deposit was placed with BAC as well. At one period, during 1987, funds were deposited with a company (apparently Estate Mortgage Financial Services Limited) in what was known as the Estate Mortgage group. Then, in November 1989, Mr Preston wrote to Mrs Deaton recommending that Belsand invest on deposit with the “Estate Mortgage Trusts Group”:
“... because money placed with Estate Mortgage is backed by mortgages on large commercial properties, as it appears more secure than a deposit with Bill Acceptance, and as the Estate Mortgage interest rate is higher, it appears to make sense to transfer your funds from Bill Acceptance to Estate Mortgage.”
That advice was accepted and approximately $520,000 was invested in accordance with the recommendation.
As well as controlling the affairs of Belsand, Mrs Deaton was one of two executors of the estate of someone referred to in the judgment as her sister but who in fact appears on the evidence to have been her sister‑in‑law. The estate also had money invested, through Mr Preston, in Estate Mortgage. On 15 February 1990, her co‑executor told Mrs Deaton that there seemed to be problems with Estate Mortgage and that it would be a good idea to withdraw the estate funds from it. That was immediately done.
There followed a series of conversations (which I shall need to discuss in more detail later) between Mrs Deaton and Mr Turner and between Mrs Deaton and Mr Preston. The upshot of those discussions was that on 19 February 1990 Mrs Deaton, to put the matter neutrally for the present, instructed Mr Preston to withdraw money from Estate Mortgage and to invest $500,000 in a 30 day bill. She told Mr Turner of the conversation with Mr Preston. The investment was made on the same day and Mr Preston sent a confirmation to Mr Turner informing him that Belsand’s at call account had been debited with the funds necessary to purchase the bill. A further confirmation, dated 5 March 1990, following some additional minor withdrawals from the account made it clear that the balance of the deposit remained with Estate Mortgage. Mr Turner did not inform Mrs Deaton that that was so. Then, on 12 March 1990, Mr Preston again wrote to Mr Turner informing him that the bill would mature on 21 March 1990 and that, because Mr Preston did not expect the rate of interest paid by Estate Mortgage to fall, he would place the proceeds of the bill at call (by inference with Estate Mortgage) unless Mr Turner told him not to. No contrary instructions were given, and the proceeds of the bill were deposited with Estate Mortgage. Mrs Deaton was not told about this but, in a conversation with an employee of Phillips McSweeney, she was told, on about 20 or 21 March, that the balance of Belsand’s deposit funds was $517,000 and that the bill had matured. Further conversations took place between Mr Turner and Mrs Deaton in which Mrs Deaton said that she wished to leave the money at call for the time being; there was also some discussion about the situation of Estate Mortgage. There was no suggestion that Mrs Deaton was told (directly, at least) that Belsand’s money was deposited with Estate Mortgage and her evidence was that she believed that it was deposited with BAC.
In April 1990 Estate Mortgage collapsed and companies in the group were wound up. Belsand, as a result, lost about $520,000.
PRIMARY JUDGE’S DECISION
Beazley J concluded that, applying tests laid down in a series of decisions of the High Court (particularly Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549, Gala v Preston (1991) 172 CLR 243 and Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539), there was a relationship of proximity between Phillips McSweeney and Belsand sufficient to give rise to a duty of care on the part of Phillips McSweeney. The relationship was held to arise from a number of factors: there was a long standing relationship of accountant and client; additionally, the adoption of the statement system meant that Belsand’s information concerning the investments made for it by Mr Preston came through Phillips McSweeney, and Belsand was reliant on Phillips McSweeney to pass on the information, in accordance with the statement system, promptly and accurately; and the relationship was one in which Phillips McSweeney gave investment advice (albeit of a somewhat limited character) to Belsand. It followed that the relationship imported a duty of care, to provide statements promptly and accurately in accordance with the system. Additionally, the circumstances of the conversations in February and March 1990 gave rise to a particular duty of care on the part of Phillips McSweeney (through Mr Turner) to warn Belsand (through Mrs Deaton) of the circumstance that Belsand’s money, first the balance of the deposit and then the proceeds of the bill as well, were invested with Estate Mortgage. Both the duty in relation to the statements and the more particular duty were breached. Because a statement for February 1990, issued during March, would have revealed that approximately $20,000 remained with Estate Mortgage, that breach caused the loss of that sum (as did the corresponding breach of the term of the contract of retainer requiring prompt provision of the statements in accordance with the statement system); the breach of the particular duty caused the loss of the full sum invested with Estate Mortgage, because if a warning had been given the money would have been withdrawn before Estate Mortgage collapsed. Thus Belsand was entitled to judgment for the full amount lost.
On a number of matters the evidence of Mrs Deaton (and on some that of her son, Mr Rik Deaton) conflicted with that of Mr Turner. Save as to one matter about which her Honour found it unnecessary to reach a conclusion (and to which I shall return), her Honour preferred the evidence of Mrs Deaton. On the appeal, Phillips McSweeney accepted her Honour’s general conclusions on credit.
THE APPEAL
Of the numerous grounds stated in the notice of appeal, Phillips McSweeney pressed three. In substance they are:
Accepting that the failure to provide a statement for February 1990 was a breach of duty, her Honour erred in holding that it caused loss.
Her Honour was in error as to the formulation of the particular duty to which the conversations in February and March 1990 gave rise, and in her conclusion that the duty was breached.
Her Honour erred in a related aspect of the matter, viz the way in which she dealt with the conversation between Mrs Deaton and Mr Turner, of which she found it unnecessary to decide which version was correct.
THE STATEMENTS
The argument for Phillips McSweeney on this ground was simple. The form of statement provided by Phillips McSweeney, apparently without objection on the part of Belsand, did not indicate with what institution Belsand’s money was invested. Belsand’s duty, in respect of a statement for February 1990, did not require the provision of a statement in a form different from that which had become customary between the parties. Such a statement, if issued in the customary form, would not have shown (as the statement finally issued in May in fact did not show) that the money was invested with Estate Mortgage. It followed that the failure to provide a statement did not cause any part of the loss suffered. Belsand’s submissions on the appeal did not deal specifically with this aspect of the matter, and the submission of Phillips McSweeney seems to me clearly correct. That, however, does not help them if they fail on the other aspects of the matter, to which I shall turn.
THE ESTATE MORTGAGE CONVERSATIONS
The issue was, in large part, as to whether her Honour’s findings, that Mrs Deaton on 19 February 1990 instructed Mr Preston to withdraw all the money from Estate Mortgage (rather than merely the $500,000 required to purchase the bill) and informed Mr Turner that she had done so, should stand.
The starting point is the conversation (or conversations) between Mrs Deaton and Mr Turner on 15 February. Mrs Deaton’s evidence was that she telephoned Mr Turner and said: “I have just heard from [her co‑executor] that there is a problem with Estate Mortgage. He says that we should get our money out of Estate Mortgage”. Mrs Deaton could not recall Mr Turner’s reply, but she said that immediately afterwards she had a phone conversation with Mr Preston who told her there was no cause for alarm. She then said that during the same day she spoke to various members of her family and that, on that day or within one or two days thereafter, she had a further conversation with Mr Turner in which she said “I am still worried about Estate Mortgage. Mr Preston has assured me its okay, but I am still worried” and he replied “I don’t think there is any need for you to worry.”
Mr Turner’s evidence was that on 15 February he attended a seminar. He said that on telephoning his office he was told that Mrs Deaton wished him to ring her. He did so, and his account of the conversation is as follows:
“Mrs Deaton:
I’ve been speaking to [my co‑executor]. He believes there are problems with Estate Mortgage and is taking out the Estate money and purchasing a 30 day Bill. I don’t know what to do about Belsand’s investments.
Mr Turner:
If you’re worried about it why don’t you do the same.
Mrs Deaton:
I’ll ring John Preston and get him to move Belsand ... into [a] 30 day Bill.”
Mr Turner’s evidence was that he made a diary note of the conversation the following day. The entry reads as follows:
“12.10PT spoke to VRD & suggested for her piece [sic] of mind to put funds into 30 Day Bill. She was to organise direct with J.P. for her funds.”
He denied that the second conversation alleged by Mrs Deaton took place.
It was as to the conversations on 15 February, and only those conversations, that her Honour explicitly declined to choose between the versions given in evidence by the participants; her expressed reason for doing so was the existence of the diary note which supports Mr Turner’s version. From the point of view of the submission made to us, the significant difference between the two accounts is no doubt that whereas Mrs Deaton speaks simply of getting “our money” out of Estate Mortgage, Mr Turner’s, though conceding that Mrs Deaton expressed concern about problems with Estate Mortgage, refers to the purchase of a bill: the suggestion being, no doubt, that there would be a balance left over which might remain with Estate Mortgage. I greatly doubt, however, that the difference is of any great significance. Far more important, in my view, are her Honour’s findings about later conversations and what seem to me the inherent probabilities.
On Monday, 19 February Mrs Deaton gave Mr Preston the instructions to withdraw money from Estate Mortgage and to invest $500,000 in a bill. She told Mr Turner of the instructions she had given to Mr Preston. According to Mrs Deaton’s version of her conversation with Mr Turner, she told him that she had instructed Mr Preston “to take our monies out of Estate Mortgage” and had told Mr Preston “to take our money out of Estate Mortgage and place them [sic] with Bill Acceptance Corporation with $500,000 in a bill and $20,000 at call”. In response to a suggestion by Mr Turner that Estate Mortgage was safe, Mrs Deaton gave evidence that she told him that she was “worried sick about it” and definitely wanted “our money out of Estate Mortgage”. Mr Turner, on the other hand, says there were no assurances and that what Mrs Deaton told him was that she had instructed Mr Preston “to take our money out of the Estate Mortgage and to purchase a thirty day bill”.
As her Honour noted, both versions record an instruction to Mr Preston to withdraw “our” money from Estate Mortgage. It was submitted on behalf of Phillips McSweeney that Beazley J thus accepted both versions as meaning that all of the money was to be withdrawn from Estate Mortgage, but in my view that is not so. Her Honour (at 21) clearly recognised that, whereas Mr Turner’s evidence might be taken as referring to an instruction to withdraw only so much as was required to purchase a bill, Mrs Deaton’s version could be taken only as referring to all the money. There is no specific finding at that point that Mrs Deaton’s version of the conversation is to be preferred; but it seems clear that her Honour proceeded on the footing that Mrs Deaton in the conversation did refer to all the money and preferred her account. I have mentioned the inherent probabilities. They do not, in my view, support a version of the events which would have Mrs Deaton and her family seriously concerned by reports they had heard of troubles at Estate Mortgage, insisting on withdrawing the bulk of their money from that institution but nevertheless content to leave what was still a substantial sum on deposit with it in circumstances where there were other, safe (if slightly less profitable), havens for it. In other words, it seems to me that quite apart from the view taken by Beazley J as to credit, her Honour’s conclusion was well justified by the consideration that, of the two accounts, Mrs Deaton’s is in the circumstances considerably the more likely.
I have already referred to the events which followed: particularly the receipt by Mr Turner of correspondence from Mr Preston indicating that, first, approximately $20,000 remained with Estate Mortgage after the bill was purchased and, secondly, that following maturity of the bill all the money was once again deposited with Estate Mortgage. I have mentioned also that that information was not passed on to Mrs Deaton. Later, about the end of March 1990, there was a conversation between Mrs Deaton and Mr Turner. The parties’ versions of it agree that Mrs Deaton informed Mr Turner that she wished to leave the money at call, or on deposit, for the time being. Mr Turner’s version includes some discussion about what was happening at Estate Mortgage and, in response to a question from Mrs Deaton about the latest interest rates, the following answer by Mr Turner:
“The last time I checked with Kim bill rates for 30 days were around 15.7% and the Estate Mortgage at call rate is still 17.5%.”
According to Mr Turner’s version, it was after that answer that Mrs Deaton said that she would leave the money at call for the time being. Mrs Deaton did not dispute that a conversation occurred substantially as Mr Turner recounted it. She asserted, however, her belief that the money was with BAC, in accordance with her instructions.
It was not suggested that, given the undisputed findings of fact made by the trial judge, Phillips McSweeney owed no duty of care to Belsand. The question was as to its extent: as to what the duty required Phillips McSweeney, in the circumstances, to do. Senior counsel for Phillips McSweeney argued that it was reasonable that Mr Turner should have understood Mrs Deaton’s account of her instructions to Mr Preston as meaning that only the sum required to purchase the bill was to be withdrawn. Thus, on seeing the confirmations of that transaction (which indicated that about $20,000 remained with Estate Mortgage) and of the subsequent withdrawal, it was reasonable for him, remembering the conversations, to say to himself “Yes, that is no doubt what she told Preston to do” and to do nothing further about it ‑ particularly in circumstances where it was Mr Preston, not Mr Turner, who was the customary recipient of Mrs Deaton’s instructions about the making of investments. The next step which senior counsel sought to take was that, having become aware that on maturity of the bill the proceeds were redeposited with Estate Mortgage, any duty incumbent upon Phillips McSweeney to inform Belsand that that had happened was discharged by what Mr Turner said about interest rates: Mrs Deaton could then reasonably be taken by Mr Turner to have realised that the money was indeed with Estate Mortgage.
No doubt it is necessary to bear in mind that things may look much clearer to a court now than they did to Mr Turner at the time. But, for the reasons already given, in my view her Honour’s finding should be accepted that the instruction given to Mr Preston, and reported to Mr Turner, was for the withdrawal of all the money from Estate Mortgage. Given what were on any view a series of agitated phone calls to Mr Turner over the few days in February and Mrs Deaton’s clearly communicated anxiety, I do not accept that it was reasonable for Mr Turner to take the report of the instructions given to Mr Preston in any other way. It follows, I think, that her Honour was right in concluding that Phillips McSweeney’s duty of care required something to be said to Belsand when Mr Turner discovered that money was in fact left on deposit with Estate Mortgage. In any event, it seems to me that her Honour was right to hold that the duty required something considerably stronger, when it became evident that all the money (following maturity of the bill) was back with Estate Mortgage, than a mere answer to a question about interest rates. It was not reasonable in the circumstances, where Mrs Deaton had recently and in strong terms expressed anxiety about Estate Mortgage and required Belsand’s funds to be withdrawn from it, for Mr Turner to take it, following the brief conversation recounted, that she realised that all $520,000 of Belsand’s money was with Estate Mortgage and approved of that state of affairs.
Once that is accepted, it necessarily follows that there was a breach of the duty of care owed by Phillips McSweeney. It was not suggested that, if we should so hold, the breach was not causative of the loss; and in my view her Honour’s findings on causation are not open to question.
CONCLUSION
It follows, in my view, that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.
I certify that this and the preceding sixteen (16) pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Lehane
Associate:
Dated: 10 July 1997
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr C J Stevens QC Solicitor for the Appellants Gillis Delaney Brown Counsel for the Respondent: Mr R R I Harper Solicitor for the Respondent: Laurence & Laurence Date of Hearing: 29 November 1996
0
4
0