FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Turaga v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 58
Appeal from: Application for extension of time: Turaga v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] AATA 270 File number: WAD 368 of 2016 Judge: MCKERRACHER J Date of judgment: 3 February 2017 Catchwords: MIGRATION – limitation period – calculating time – application for review of decision to cancel visa made out of time – whether the Tribunal has power to grant an extension of time Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 36(2)
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44(2A)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 33.13
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 500(6B), 501(2), 501G(1), 501G(2), 501G(3)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 2.55
Cases cited: Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541
Commonwealth of Australia (Department of Defence); Ex parte Marks (2000) 177 ALR 491
Gallo v Dawson (1990) 93 ALR 479
Tran v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 533
Date of hearing: 7 December 2016 Registry: Western Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 27 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr P Macliver Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submits to any order of the Court, save as to the question of costs ORDERS
WAD 368 of 2016 BETWEEN: GEORGE TURAGA
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MCKERRACHER J
DATE OF ORDER:
3 FEBRUARY 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for extension of time be refused.
2.The application be dismissed.
3.The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent, to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MCKERRACHER J:
THE APPLICATION
Mr George Turaga applies for an extension of time of more than six years within which to bring an appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. In that decision, the Tribunal refused to extend time within which Mr Turaga could seek review of a decision of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (as the Minister was then was) to cancel his visa on the basis that it had no jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
Mr Turaga is a non-Australian citizen who previously held a Class BS subclass 100 (Partner) visa (Partner visa). He was served with a notice of intention to consider cancellation of his visa dated 27 August 2009 after he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more. On 10 March 2010, a delegate of the Minister made a decision that Mr Turaga’s Partner visa be cancelled pursuant to s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
Mr Turaga was informed of the delegate’s decision to cancel his Partner visa by letter from an officer of what…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Turaga v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2017] FCA 58
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the delay in lodging the appeal was extreme, and the appellant had not provided an adequate explanation for the delay. The court noted that the appellant had been incarcerated and detained in immigration detention for most of the period in question, but this did not justify the excessive delay. The court also found that the appellant's grounds for appeal were not arguable, and even if they were, the excessive delay alone would preclude an extension of time being granted. The court referred to the case of Commonwealth of Australia (Department of Defence); Ex parte Marks, where it was held that an extension of time could only be granted if it was necessary to do justice between the parties and the public interest required an end to litigation about the efficacy of public acts or decisions.
The court refused the application for an extension of time and dismissed the appeal. The appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent. The court emphasised that the rules of court must be obeyed, and the periods for applying for certiorari and mandamus give a person affected by an adverse decision or judgment ample time to commence proceedings. In all but very exceptional cases, these periods should be rigidly applied.
This case highlights the importance of timely lodging of appeals and the need for applicants to provide adequate explanations for any delay. The court's decision underscores the principle that the rules of court must be obeyed and that the public interest requires an end to litigation about the efficacy of public acts or decisions.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for extension of time be refused.
2. The application be dismissed.
3. The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent, to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The delay is extreme. Mr Turaga is, effectively, seeking extension of time of more than six years from the Tribunal’s decision within which to bring his appeal. Although there is no evidence on the precise circumstances of Mr Turaga in that period, it is clear from what he has said that the combination of incarceration following some criminal conviction (which satisfies the requirements of the Migration Act) and detention in immigration detention have consumed most of that time. However, this does not mean an appeal could not be lodged years earlier than it was. There is no explanation for some sudden realisation as to the entitlement to appeal, and even if there was, the excessive period of time would make it an exceptional case if leave were granted. There are some cases where the amount of time involved is so excessive, without adequate explanation, that that alone will be sufficient to preclude an extension of time being granted, even if there are arguable grounds of appeal. But as will be seen, in this instance, the appeal grounds are simply not arguable. I will come to the grounds shortly. As noted by McHugh J in Commonwealth of Australia (Department of Defence); Ex parte Marks (2000) 177 ALR 491 (at [13]-[16]) (footnotes omitted):[13] In Gallo v Dawson, I said that the grant of an extension of time under O60 r6 is not automatic. This is as true of an application for constitutional relief under s75(v) as it is in respect of an appeal. I also said that, when the application is for an extension of time in which to file an appeal, it is always necessary to consider the prospects of the applicant succeeding in the appeal. A similar inquiry must be made when the application is for an extension of time in which to commence s75(v) proceedings to quash an act, decision or judgment. A "case would need to be exceptional" before the time for commencing proceedings was enlarged by many months. The explanation for such a delay is also a relevant consideration.[14] In this case, the Full Bench gave its orders on 19 February 1999 and delivered its reasons for the decision on 16 April 1999. The applicant did not file his notice of motion in this Court until 21 July 2000. Assuming that the time limits in r17 and r30 of O55 of the High Court Rules apply when constitutional relief is sought against the AIRC and that his delay is reasonably explained - which I very much doubt in this case - I would not grant the applicant an extension of time. For the reasons that I give below, the applicant has not been able to advance even an arguable case of jurisdictional error by the Full Bench.[15] An extension of time for seeking relief against a decision or judgment can only be granted if it is necessary to do justice between the parties. That means that it is necessary to have regard to the history of the matter, the conduct of both parties, the nature of the litigation and the consequences for the parties of a grant or refusal of the extension. Where an applicant seeks the issue of the constitutional or prerogative writs, a further factor must be considered. Those writs are directed at the acts or decisions of public bodies or officials, and the public interest requires that there be an end to litigation about the efficacy of such acts or decisions. In that respect, the present case, although important to the applicant, is not as important as many other cases. Nevertheless, the applicant is seeking the quashing of a decision of the AIRC made 17 months before he filed his application for relief in this Court.[16] Independently of the merits of the case, I find it difficult to see how a person who, with knowledge of the decision, delays 17 months before seeking relief could ever be granted an extension of time to quash such a decision unless some conduct of the respondent or the public body or official had brought about the delay. As the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council said in Ratnam v Cumarasamy, "[t]he rules of court must prima facie be obeyed". The time for seeking certiorari is six times, and the time for seeking mandamus is twice, the period in which an application for special leave to appeal to this Court can be brought against a judgment or decision. The periods for applying for certiorari and mandamus give a person affected by an adverse decision or judgment ample time in which to commence proceedings in this Court. In all but very exceptional cases, they should be rigidly applied when, as here, more than one year has elapsed between the decision and the commencement of proceedings in this Court.(emphasis added)