TULLO & TULLO

[2016] FamCA 716

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

TULLO & TULLO [2016] FamCA 716

FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – INTERIM – Injunctions – Cross-vesting – Application by the husband to restrain the wife from continuing with civil proceedings commenced by her in the District Court and to join them with the current proceedings – Where the wife seeks that the husband’s application be dismissed and that the Family Court proceedings be stayed pending an outcome of the District Court proceedings – Where there is no common substratum of facts to both proceedings – Where there is no basis for restraining the wife in relation to the proceedings in the District Court or for this Court to exercise accrued jurisdiction in that matter – Where the husband’s application is dismissed – Where the wife’s application for a stay of these proceedings is dismissed.

FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – INTERIM – Where the husband seeks an order for a payment of $93,000 for interim costs and a payment of $150,000 by way of interim property settlement – Where it is appropriate to order that the husband have access to funds to pay his legal costs – Where the Court is satisfied that there will be a property settlement for the husband of an amount sufficient to meet the costs – Order made for the wife to pay the husband $93,000 by way of interim costs – Order made for the wife to pay the husband $80,000 by way of interim property settlement.

FAMILY LAW – COSTS – Application by the husband for costs arising out of this application – Where some issues should have been capable of compromise – Order made requiring the wife to pay half of the costs of the husband of an incidental to these interlocutory proceedings on a party and party basis.

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 79, 117

Barro and Barro (1983) FLC 91-300
Fencott v Muller (1983) 152 CLR 570
Harris & Harris (1993) FLC 92-378
Kennon & Kennon (1997) FLC 92-757
Pierce & Pierce (1999) FLC 92-844
Poletti and Poletti (1990) 15 Fam LR 794
Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108
Strahan & Strahan (Interim Property Orders) (2011) FLC 93-466
Zschokke and Zschokke (1996) FLC 92-693

APPLICANT: Mr Tullo

RESPONDENT: Ms Tullo

FILE NUMBER: SYC 6523 of 2010

DATE DELIVERED: 7 July 2016

PLACE DELIVERED: Sydney

PLACE HEARD: Sydney

JUDGMENT OF: Loughnan J

HEARING DATE: 7 July 2016

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Ms Gillies

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: M & K Lawyers

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Mr Livingstone

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: ALC Legal

Orders

IT IS ORDERED PENDING FURTHER ORDER THAT:

1. Orders in terms of Order 1 of the Orders sought by the husband in Exhibit A, as amended and set out hereunder: 

   1.1.        Within 28 days of the date of these Orders the wife pay to the husband:

   1.1.1.     The sum of $80,000 by way of partial property settlement; and.

   1.1.2.     The sum of $93,000 by way of interim costs.

2. The application of the husband for the orders sought in Exhibit A, save insofar as Order 1 above, is dismissed.

1. The application of wife for a stay of these proceedings pending the determination of the proceedings between the parties in the New South Wales District Court is dismissed.

1. All outstanding interim applications are otherwise dismissed.

1. The wife is to pay one half of the husband’s costs of and incidental to these interlocutory proceedings on party/party basis, as agreed or as assessed, and subject to the need for an assessment, and payment is to be made no later than the date effect is given to the property settlement of the parties.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

A.The husband does not oppose, for the purpose of giving effect to these Orders, the sale of either B Street, C Town in the State of New South Wales (Folio Identifier …) and/or the sale of D Street, E Town in the State of New South Wales (Folio Identifier …).

Note:  The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Tullo & Tullo has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY

FILE NUMBER:  SYC6523 of 2010

Ms Tullo

Applicant

And

Mr Tullo

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. These are proceedings for interlocutory orders in the context of proceedings for settlement of property.  The husband and wife are 58 and 56 years of age respectively.  They were married in 1984 and separated on 26 November 2009.  They have five children.  Ms F, Mr G, Ms H, J and K.  The older three are approaching 30 years of age, 28 and 24.  The younger two are twins at 16 years of age.  The property proceedings have not been on foot for long. 

2. The parties have identified a joint balance sheet, which identifies some contested issues.  They respectively put the net assets, including superannuation, at between $2.3 and $3 million.  In relation to a property at E Town there is going to be a call on the strata-holders for some remedial work at about a million dollars.  That might have an adverse effect on the value of that property.  It is in the balance sheet at around $470,000 but there is some issue about that. 

3. The first of the interlocutory issues is an application for an anti-suit injunction, in respect of proceedings that have been commenced by the wife in the New South Wales District Court against the husband for assault.  The husband seeks that those proceedings be permanently stayed in that court and that they be determined by this court to be heard with the current proceedings. 

4. This is a federal court.  It is a court of limited jurisdiction, and by and large its jurisdiction arises under statute.  It is a superior court of record and has been found to have jurisdiction in accrued or associated matters.  There was a cross-vesting scheme between the Commonwealth and the states which was struck down which permitted a more relaxed scheme of courts exercising jurisdiction that were not within their natural jurisdiction in these circumstances.  Nevertheless, this Court has the power to hear a controversy that arises under state law in appropriate circumstances, with a controversy that is within its natural jurisdiction. 

5. The circumstances in which that should be done relate to overall the interests of justice but in particular to the desirability of the determination of a single justiciable controversy or a single justiciable issue in one jurisdiction rather than two.

6. In terms of private international law and forum disputes there is a significant amount of judicial comment about the inherently vexatious nature of proceedings involving similar issues and/or similar parties being conducted in different courts.

7. In this instance proceedings were instituted this year on behalf of the wife against the husband in relation to alleged assaults.  The assaults themselves, two particular assaults, were said to occur in 1992 and 1998.  Damages, including exemplary damages, are sought by her arising out of those claims.

8. The husband has brought an application that the wife be restrained in relation to those proceedings, and his intention would be that those proceedings be dealt with here and agitated in the context of the property settlement proceedings.  And as I have indicated to the parties during submissions today, I do not think there is a proper basis for that arrangement.  In Fencott v Muller (1983) 152 CLR 570 and similar authorities the essential requirement is there being a common substratum of facts or a single justiciable issue that is common to both proceedings. In my view that cannot be said here.

9. The proceedings in the District Court raise issues about a duty of care, raise issues about the particular circumstances of the incidents alleged and later, as has been submitted on behalf of the wife, issues such as exemplary damages that raise the question of public interest in deterring certain behaviours. Those are not matters that would fall to be determined in the way in which they would be determined in the District Court, for the purposes of proceedings under s 79 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”). Section 79 gives this Court power to make orders that are just and equitable to change interests in property on the breakdown of a marriage. That task is achieved through a number of steps or tasks in relation to the matters identified by s 79. Overall it has to be just and equitable to make a property division. The orders themselves have to be just and equitable.

10. In making orders the Court has to take into account contributions of various sorts and then a number of other matters that are referred to in s 79(4)(e) to (g) inclusive. There is a decision of Kennon & Kennon (1997) FLC 92-757, which allows that in some cases it can be relevant in the bare task of identifying appropriate changes of property interests to take into account the conduct of the parties. It is made clear that that is not the general business of the work of s 79. In some cases it is relevant. It is certainly not the same task that is undertaken in a court dealing with the tort of assault. They are different remedies for a different purpose. In this jurisdiction those issues may be relevant where the conduct of a party may have made it impracticable for the other party to make a contribution or may have made the making of a contribution more arduous.

11. As I have been informed briefly today, the issue is only peripheral to the wife’s case.  She will argue that the husband made virtually no contribution.  Her case is that she has made all but a tiny fraction of the contributions that were made.  In that context there is little or no room for a Kennon argument. 

12. It is said on behalf of the husband the District Court proceedings are out of time.  It is said that there is a co-incidence between those proceedings being instituted and these financial proceedings between the parties.  Those are matters that can be raised in the District Court.  If proceedings are statute-barred or out of time, that can be dealt with there.  No harm done.  If the proceedings are brought for an improper purpose, that can be dealt with in that jurisdiction.  Finally there is evidence about the delays in the District Court, and it is clear on the face of that evidence that long before this Court would be able to provide a final hearing in relation to property proceedings the proceedings in the District Court are likely to be over. 

13. In my view, on all grounds there is no basis for restraining the wife in relation to the proceedings in the District Court, and there is no basis for this Court exercising accrued jurisdiction in that matter.  That is important because, as was said on behalf of the husband, if the Court is satisfied that there is a basis for this Court exercising that jurisdiction, then it should.  Insofar as that relief is sought on behalf of the husband, his application will be dismissed. 

14. Related to those issues, not only does the wife seek that the husband’s application be dismissed, but she seeks that these proceedings be stayed pending the outcome of the assault proceedings.  There is no reason to do that.  The very sad fact is that this Court cannot deal with its workload in anything like a proper time-frame.  In Sydney we are going backwards at about 20 matters a month at the moment.  We have a time from filing to hearing of something like two years and growing.  There is no reason to delay these proceedings.  I suppose the only point of delaying them would lend weight to the argument that the proceedings should be heard together, but that is not my view.  That order will not be made. 

15. Nextly there are two applications for interim financial relief on behalf of the husband.  He seeks an order for payment of $93,000 for interim costs and a payment of $150,000 for interim property settlement.  There are some common areas in relation to that, but fundamentally the relief arises under different provisions.  I suppose interim costs the court over time has considered that it might be dealt with under a number of heads.  Possibly the maintenance power.  Possibly the costs power.  Possibly the property power.  I think where the application is distinguished from an application for interim property settlement in the way that it is here, a safe place to go is the costs power. 

16. Normally costs orders are not made in advance of proceedings.  That is because the matters taken into account include things relevant to the outcome of the proceedings, but there is no doubt that costs orders can be made at any stage.  There is specific provision, for example, for security of costs orders to be made.  The general position under s 117 is that the parties bear their own costs.  The Court can make an order for costs and in doing so is to take into account certain matters.  It is an unending list because of a catchall provision, but the nominated topics include the financial circumstances of the parties, any offers of settlement in writing, whether the proceedings have been brought about by reason of a failure to comply with court orders, the conduct of the parties in relation to the proceedings.  As I say, there is also a catchall provision.

17. As to the financial circumstances of the parties, they are both in paid employment with the wife earning about $2,000 a week net and the husband, $600 a week net.  In each case I think their outgoings exceed their income.  As to their property we have a balance sheet to rely on.  It identifies the figures that I have indicated.  Net assets, subject to the arguments about value at either $2.3 million or $3 million.  And relevantly, significant assets are held jointly. There is a property at Suburb I which has a value between 2.25 million and 2.875 million, which is jointly held.  The property at E Town, which has the remedial problems, is valued at $475,000 to $470,000 subject to those problems.  It is also jointly held.  There are some other assets that are held individually, but they represent a very significant part of the property pool. 

18. The proceedings were not caused by a breach of court orders.  I am not told about any offers of settlement under s 117C or otherwise.  There is no legal aid.  We do not know whether either party has been wholly unsuccessful in the proceedings.  I suppose the argument that is really fundamentally made about this, and it is an argument that comes through in the older cases about interim costs in Barro and Barro (1983) FLC 91-300; and Poletti and Poletti (1990) 15 Fam LR 794 and Zschokke and Zschokke  that it is said that there is an unfairness and unevenness about the fact that the wife has been able to service her legal costs and the husband has not. 

19. That is important, and it is an argument in aid of the interests of justice, because there can be a mischief if there is an unevenness about the way in which the parties are able to present their arguments.  The other thing to say about all of that is normally an order about costs in this area would be an order made where the treatment of the character of the payment would be a matter for the ultimate trial judge. It is often the approach that moneys paid to legal costs of the subject proceedings are added back to the pool.  That itself is born of the principle of s 117(1), which is that the parties normally bear their own costs.  In that way preliminary payments of costs on either side would be added back and then a decision can be made about whether one party should be contributing to the costs of the other.

20. The husband has legal costs.  He has been provided with estimates.  In this case, like most, it is likely – although you would not think so today – that the parties will reach a settlement.  That is the fate of most proceedings in this Court.  Some unfortunate cases take longer to settle but I would think more than 80 per cent of cases are resolved by agreement.  Therefore most cases do not involve the parties in incurring the costs of a final trial.  In relation to this issue and in relation to the other application the wife says she has not paid all of her costs.  She has had to borrow to pay some costs.  She says that she does not have the wherewithal to find the money for this payment. 

21. That is strictly not true.  She has not had to borrow money.  It has pleased her to borrow money rather than make some other decisions about where she might find money for the costs, and that is perfectly proper.  And similarly in relation to the husband, he has chosen not to access all of the moneys that are available to him and decided to make an application for moneys that he needs.  That is quite proper, but it is not true to say that he had no other choices about some of the moneys that he might have needed, and it is similarly the position with the wife. 

22. Each of the parties, for example, have joint and several interests in shares.  The wife has sold some shares.  The husband says $61,000 worth.  But there are still some other shares there.  They could be sold rather than borrowing money or selling something else.  There is the real estate.  In relation to the E Town property, there was said to be an issue about the children having an interest that the parties hold the moneys on trust because of advances made by the children to complete the purchase of that property.  As is said on behalf of the husband, there is no acknowledgement of that in the wife’s application, no mention of that in her amended response to the initiating application recognising the rights.  Three of the children are adults.  They could be served and they would have a right to be heard in relation to it so they could be parties.  They have not done that. 

23. There is an argument about those things, but it does not seem to have immediate expression in the case.  And those things can be done in all sorts of ways, and importantly, those other adults could seek to protect their interests.  Or it might be perhaps the wife has in mind that she would accommodate those interests by the orders that she seeks.  That she would deal with those in a different way.  Perhaps that is the answer.

24. The Court has power to make an order in favour of a child under s 79. As I say, I do not understand that such an order has been sought.

25. On balance it seems to me that the order sought by the husband should be made.  Legal costs are a fact of life.  It always amazes me that lawyers argue against the payment of legal costs.  The same practitioners turn up on a different day arguing for the payment of legal costs, so I suppose that is just the way of things.  It is simple.  Parties will incur legal fees in order to conduct litigation.  It assists them and it assists the court if they are represented.  Those legal costs have to be paid, and in proceedings such as this the argument is about whether they are paid today or tomorrow.

26. The law used to be that a solicitor’s contract was entire and they were not allowed to claim their costs until the end of the proceedings.  In my view, that worked a significant mischief to parties.  It allowed them build up a huge debt and in their anger and frustration they did not focus on the costs until it was too late.  Now we have a regime of interim billing where solicitors are entitled to interim bill.  Counsel traditionally get paid when they do their work and whatever you might think about it, it is like the fridge breaking down.  These are costs that have to be paid.  They will be paid.  We are just talking about whether they are paid one day or another. 

27. For reasons that I will come to I am satisfied that in these proceedings there will be a property settlement for the husband of sufficient magnitude to meet his costs if it is the case that he alone will be responsible for them.  I will make that order. 

1. There is also an application for interim property settlement. That involves a preliminary consideration of the arguments to be made under s 79. Now, the law has changed about this to some extent. It used to be that there had to be a special reason for such an order. A decision of Strahan & Strahan (Interim Property Orders) (2011) FLC 93-466. In the decision of Strahan the court was satisfied that there was no special requirement.  A reason is needed for a payment.  I think that was probably just in aid of the fact that the court did not want to be involved in doling the parties’ own money every few months while the trial was in prospect.   

2. The parties’ funds are tied up because they are involved in litigation.  There is no reason why they should not be able use their money for any proper purpose and that is what the husband is asking here.  He would like to use $150,000 of the money he says is his.  There is a decision of Medlow & Medlow (2016) FLC 93-692 which I know something about because I was reversed by the Full court in making an interim costs order. That decision is distinguishable from this. There the husband was seeking funds that were said to be the funds of the wife. In that case, a property had been sold. It was equally held and I think something like $30 million represented the net proceeds of sale. $15 million was otherwise constrained and the husband wanted access to more of that money and the Full Court said, “Well, that’s the wife’s money. She’s a co-owner, and prima facie held the legal interest in the balance of the funds”. That is not the situation here.

3. It continues to be the case after Strahan that decisions about interim property settlement are to be undertaken by reference to s 79, and the power is to be exercised cautiously. The order should not be one that cannot be remedied or clawed back in the final proceedings. The principles in Harris (Harris & Harris (1993) FLC 92-378) and related cases, remain. Those were the arguments made in the wife’s case. It was put in the wife’s case that the husband’s claim is as to two per cent of the pool of assets based on a finding the Court will make that he made two per cent of the contributions, contributions of all sorts, and that by reference to s 79(4)(d), (e), (f) and (g) no adjustment to him is warranted.

4. I have not done the calculation.  The order the wife seeks is that he receive a payment of $50,000.  I think that is a hard case to make.  True it is that there is no starting point of equality, no presumption of equality.  There are a raft of decisions whereby this Court and the High Court has said it is not unusual in a long marriage that there would be found to be something like equality of contributions.  But Mr Livingstone, with respect, is quite right.  There is no starting point or whatever. 

5. But it is a matter of looking at each individual case, and I think the Court over the years has flirted with a starting point at the legal title.  That would get the parties – because they jointly hold some of the real estate, that would get the parties to a starting point of somewhere near equality.  And I think in a decision of Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108 there is a suggestion that the first step in the proceedings is to identify the legal title. Perhaps there is something in that approach.

6. In any event I am happy for the arguments to be made from the ground up. It is just that when Mr Livingstone started from the ground up, he started as if this was a taking account in winding up a partnership. He thought we would give the husband an allowance for $14,000 he brought in at the start of the marriage, give him some interest on that money and send him on his way. That is a significant oversimplification of the task under s 79(4)(a), (b) and (c).

7. The wife says that the husband was in paid employment for less than 11 years of the marriage, and that he was unemployed for seven and a half years.  That adds up to 18 years.  I am not quite sure what happened to the other years.  But that seems to involve a concession that he was in full-time paid employment for 11 years.  She concedes some parenting contribution from him, albeit not much.  She concedes some non-financial contribution from him, albeit not much.  The parties were both involved in a business, a shop or some related business, and there is some concession made in the wife’s case about the husband’s contributions in that regard.  She says that her contribution as parent and homemaker was variously at the level of 80 per cent, 90 per cent and 95 per cent at various periods.  Even on her arguments that concedes some contribution by him. 

8. You have to be careful about it.  She says she earned a lot more money than he did.  There tends to be a gendered approach to family law, but it is invariably the case, that the parties to a marriage earn different amounts?  I suppose there are some marriages where they might earn the same, but usually they earn different amounts.  And in none of those cases does the Court add up the amount of the income by the husband and say, “Well, he earned more as a tax partner at a major accounting firm and the wife only earned this much in her full-time; therefore, he wins.”  That is a nonsense. 

9. Where the parties were both engaged in full-time employment, subject to one of them making a decision to deliberately not exercise their earning capacity, then the Court would normally equate those contributions for those periods.  There are some marriages where one party earns money all of the marriage and the other party does not earn any money.  That rarely results in a distribution of 98 per cent to two per cent.  True it is in this case the husband’s contribution as parent and homemaker is impugned.  The wife says, “Well, we agreed that for two years he would be the primary caregiver.  That turned into six for reasons that I do not agree with.  But I would get home from work and he would drop everything and I would be left on duty.”  Therefore she has an argument about her making a greater contribution than the husband. 

10. Her father has made a wonderful contribution.  Something like $700,000 is said to have come from him.  I have been given an aide-mémoire about that.  And asserted advances from him add up to $690,000, I accept.  Whether that case can be made or not I do not know.  But the problem overall is, of course, the monetary contributions to a marriage are often more than the value of the remaining net assets.  Like the business enterprise, not every contribution makes a profit.  And this is not, as I said before, the winding up of a partnership where you get your $700,000 back.  There is Pierce & Pierce (1999) FLC 92-844 and a raft of cases where the Court is reminded to evaluate contributions.

11. Now, some contributions are more fundamental than others.  Some have generated more of a return than others.  The Court is at large in relation to how those things are taken into account.  And I accept, although it is hard to think of the circumstances, there may be circumstances where in a 25 year marriage one party makes 98 per cent of the contribution and the other makes two per cent.  I will allow for that possibility.  However, this is not such a marriage.  The husband is asking for an amount of money that represents less than 10 per cent of the pool.  That would be an unusual outcome but perhaps this is the case.  It is not likely, but it could be so.

12. On balance, it seems to me that the Court is able to find that with all the vagaries of the matter and on a conservative estimate the husband would receive $150,000 in property settlement or more. I do not think I am going way out on a limb in relation to that. And, of course, the s 79 exercise is not only about contributions. There are the other matters. Section 79(4)(d) involves the impact of the orders on the earning capacities of the parties; (e), which takes up all of the elements of s 75(2), and that includes importantly the fact that on the wife’s case about contributions, she would be receiving 98 per cent of the assets. Say she was only able to sustain an argument that she made 90 per cent of the contributions. Such a distribution would be a very substantial s 75(2) factor.

13. It is not the function of s 75(2) simply to even up the wealth of the parties, but such a finding on contribution would likely exclude the idea of any allowance to the wife, and none is pressed, and it would invite consideration of an allowance to the husband.  Both of the parties say that they have health issues.  Those are matters that need to be factored into the calculation.  The wife does not argue that the husband can earn $2,000 a week net.  She does not assert it.  He never earned at that rate.  In fact, that is part of her complaint.  On the face of it, her earning capacity is greater than his.  There are two children left with the wife.  As to the financial support from the parents, that is geared to their financial circumstances.  The husband has no financial resources and little income.  Things might change after a property settlement, although the wife does not favour much of a property settlement for the husband. 

14. The fact of the contributions that the husband can make is to be taken into account.  The fact of the costs of the children for the wife is a matter to be taken into account.  The fact of any child support assessment must be taken into account.  It is hard to see the fact of the financial support for the children excluding an adjustment in favour of the husband.  The remaining children under 18 years are 16 years of age.  There is not much time left for their support to be relevant in any event.

15. There are those matters to be taken into account, and many of them will favour the husband substantially and that would be a reason for an adjustment in his favour.  It is not necessary to identify what the property settlement would be.  It is just that I think it would accommodate this claim. 

16. The husband does not have to account to the wife for a particular reason for his need for funds.  The wife’s concern is that this is going to be good money after bad.  The husband does not pretend that he contemplates a moneymaking exercise.  He says that his parents or one of them has some health issues.  He wants to spend some time with them.  They live in Europe and he wants to go there.  He thinks that there will be difficulties in him having an income if he goes there.  It might jeopardise his subsidised housing status in Australia.  He wants some money to provide some backup for him.  It seems to me that undertaking this exercise in a conservative way and recognising that he has some moneys, an amount of $80,000 would be appropriate.  He has some shares and – he has some debts, but the shares have a greater value.  There is no science to the exercise.

17. As to the source of these funds, the orders sought are in the form of a bare order, and I think that is the appropriate course.  A fall-back position would be allowing the wife to sell something, and presumably the husband will happily join in that process.  There are jointly owned shares.  They could be sold.  The wife has some shares in her own name.  There is the E Town property, there is a property at C Town.  I think probably rather than picking those things out for the wife, on the basis that the husband will cooperate in the sale of any jointly owned asset and will not object to the sale of an asset owned solely by the wife, I should just make a bare order.  That leaves the spectre of the parties coming back on an enforcement issue and I would be disappointed if that happened but perhaps then we would be able to address the priority that might be given to one property or another. 

Costs

1. There is an application for costs arising out of today.  I have said what I have said about the parties’ financial circumstances.  There was an offer of settlement, which would have been advantageous to the wife and would have saved the parties a lot of trouble.  When this offer was made there were no proceedings in the District Court, although they were foreshadowed about that time.  Today we have spent about half the time on each issue.  In my view, the issue of the interim distribution of funds should have been capable of compromise and it is vexing that a proposal like this was not responded to in a more positive way, perhaps at all.

2. True it is the husband was unsuccessful in relation to the other matter, the anti-suit injunction.  That has its own complexity to it and the whys and wherefores of that are more complicated and something will be known about that at some later date.  The issue of the costs of those proceedings will be a matter for the District Court.  It seems to me that there should be some payment of costs.  Doing the best I can, I am going to require the wife to pay one half of the costs of the husband of and incidental to the interlocutory proceedings before the court today.

I certify that the preceding forty-six (46) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Loughnan delivered on 7 July 2016.

Associate:

Date:  26 August 2016