Tulley and Lindmann-Tulley

[2009] FamCA 270

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

TULLEY & LINDMANN-TULLEY [2009] FamCA 270

FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – With whom a child lives

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

C & C (1996) FLC92-651

APPLICANT: Mr Tulley

RESPONDENT: Ms Lindmann-Tulley

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Ms Dooley

FILE NUMBER: BRC 1154 of 2007

DATE DELIVERED: 26 March 2009

PLACE DELIVERED: Brisbane

PLACE HEARD: Brisbane

JUDGMENT OF: Murphy J

HEARING DATE: 26 March 2009

REPRESENTATION

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT:

Mr S Bonnie

Western Legal

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT:

Ms S Harrison

McCowans Solicitors

SOLICITOR FOR INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER

Ms Dooley

Dooley Solicitors

Orders

IT IS ORDERED THAT

1. The matter be set down for 3 days final hearing before Justice Murphy, commencing at 10.00am on 12 October 2009 in the Brisbane Registry of the Family Court of Australia.

2. The Independent Children's Lawyer provide copies of Exhibit ICL1 (Letters from the child) to the legal representatives only of the mother and father.

3. The legal representatives of the parties shall confer with a view to preparing consent trial directions in respect of the final hearing commencing on 12 October 2009, and

   a.Upon reaching agreement in respect of such directions, they shall be forwarded by jointly signed correspondence through the Independent Children's Lawyer by email to the Associate to Justice Murphy in which case such directions, if considered suitable, shall be made in chambers with no appearance being required.

   b.In the event that consent directions are not agreed to and received in chambers by 4.00pm on 14 August 2009, the matter shall be listed before a Registrar on a date and time to be advised for the making of such directions.

4. A Registrar shall conduct a compliance check by telephone on a date and time to be advised in the week commencing 14 September 2009, and:

   a.in the event that all parties are represented, the parties themselves are excused from attendance and the hearing will be conducted with the legal representatives only;

   b.in the event that all parties are not represented then the parties themselves will also be required to attend by telephone at that hearing.

IT IS ORDERED UNTIL FUTHER ORDER THAT

1. Commencing Thursday 2 April 2009 the child … born … June 1997 (“the child”) live with the father.

2. The child shall spend time with the mother:

   FIRST THREE MONTH PERIOD

   a.Commencing Thursday 2 April 2009 until the weekend commencing Friday 19 June 2009, for a period of two (2) hours on each alternate weekend at the C Children’s Contact Centre, and that all parties do all such things, sign all such documents and pay equally all such fees as are necessary so as to permit such time to occur at that contact centre.

   i.During such first three month period, there shall be no telephone communication between the child and her mother.

   SECOND THREE MONTH PERIOD

   b.Commencing Friday 26 June 2009 until and including Friday 7 August 2009, from after school Friday until 5.00pm Saturday each alternate weekend.

   i.During such second three month period, the mother shall be permitted to have telephone communication with the child on a Wednesday at approximately 7.00pm.

   THIRD THREE MONTH PERIOD

   c.Commencing Friday 21 August 2009 until and including Friday 2 October 2009 from after school Friday until before school on Monday each alternate weekend.

   i.During such third three month period, the mother shall be permitted to have telephone communication with the child on a Wednesday at approximately 7.00pm.

3. Changeovers for time spent with the mother shall take place as follows:

   a.when time commences or finishes on a school day, changeovers shall be at the school;

   b.when time does not commence or finish on a school day, changeovers shall be at the C Contact Centre.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT

1. The order made on 17 December 2008 pursuant to Section 65L of the Act continue and that compliance with these parenting orders continue to be supervised by Ms B, Family Consultant, Brisbane, and in respect of such supervision, it is respectfully requested that:

   a.Ms B speak to the child, if at all possible, on 3 occasions between now and the preparation of a further report pursuant to Section 62G of the Act, and in respect of such occasions, if at all possible:

   i.the first appointment shall occur during the first 3-month period during which the child shall spend supervised time with the mother as provided in these orders;

   ii.the second appointment shall occur during the second 3-month period during which the child shall spend time with the mother as provided in these orders;

   iii.the third appointment shall occur during the third 3-month period during which the child shall spend time with the mother as provided in these orders.

   b.The further report to be prepared by Ms B shall cover all matters considered by her to be relevant to the child’s best interests, such that the report shall be available to the Court and the parties, prior to the commencement of the final hearing of this matter on 12 October 2009.

UPON NOTING THAT the mother may seek counselling assistance from either Ms

K, or some other such family therapist or other qualified person, in that event

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT

1. To the extent that the exception provided for in s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 or the other provisions of that subsection do not otherwise authorise same, publication of an account of part of the proceedings being the three reports prepared by Ms B on 24 June 2008, 9 December 2008 and 9 March 2009, for the purpose of these proceedings, the reports of Mr W, Ms R and Ms M, together with the Reasons for Judgment and Orders of today, be approved for publication to:

   a.such therapist from whom the mother may seek counselling assistance;

   b.the Director of the C Contact Centre.

2. In the event that the mother avails herself of counselling assistance from Ms K or any other such therapist, she do all such things and sign all such documents as might be necessary to authorise that person to discuss with Family Consultant Ms B, any matters considered by each of them to be relevant to the best interests of the child.

AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT

1. Pursuant to s 65DA(2) and s 62B, the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders and details of who can assist parties adjust to and comply with an order are set out in the Fact Sheet attached hereto and these particulars are included in these orders.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Tulley & Lindmann-Tulley is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE

FILE NUMBER: BRC1154 of 2007

MR TULLEY

Applicant Father

And

MS LINDMANN-TULLEY

Respondent Mother

EX TEMPORE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. On 17 December 2008, I delivered ex tempore reasons for judgment in respect of a then application with respect to a child born in June 1997 who is nearly 12 years of age. 

2. It is, I think, important in the context of the current proceedings and, in particular, in light of the most recent report received from family consultant, Ms B, to repeat here what I said in those reasons (which, in turn referred to earlier reasons):

   “On 11 September this year I made orders and delivered Reasons for Judgment in this puzzling and very sad case.  The reasons I am about to deliver ought to be seen as additional to those earlier reasons in the sense that these reasons incorporate many of the matters there referred to.  In particular, I referred in those earlier reasons to a number of profoundly distressing themes that this then 11 and a half year old child was expressing, not the least of which in a document purportedly addressed to me was a statement allegedly made by [the child] saying ‘can you just let this be finished.  I’m sick and tired of this happening.  Can you let my life go on normal.  It is not happening a normal life with issues.  Please stop it’”.

3. From an earlier part of that same document, I record - with profound sadness - that the child said: “I wish I was dead so all this stuff with [T] can stop”.  T is a reference to the father. 

4. I said in those earlier reasons that:

   “clearly enough when any child let alone a pubescent child aged 11 and a half purportedly writes a letter to a Judge and says as part of the letter “I wish I was dead” a Judge is likely to be – and I record here that I am – very significantly concerned.  Clearly enough any such statement and the issues surrounding the making of any such statement allegedly made by a child were of profound concern also to Ms [B] who prepared a family report on 24 June. 

5. For the reasons then delivered, I made orders among others for Ms B to be the supervisor as that expression is used in section 65L of the Act and made orders pursuant to that section.

6. Ms B has prepared now three reports including her most recent report prepared pursuant to the order made under s 65L to which I have just referred.  Ms B’s most recent report is dated 9 March 2009. 

7. In a moment I will quote at some length from that report because the issues there contained, and, the discussion of them, even within the context of these interim proceedings, I consider to be profoundly important. 

8. Before moving to Ms B’s report, I should, however, record, given the long and sad history of these proceedings, that the child has been seen by a number of professionals during the course of, or associated with, these proceedings. 

9. In discussions with the legal practitioners for the parties, it transpires that the child has seen about five such people, all of whom, even doing the best they can to make such interventions as least harmful as possible, have, as part of their processes, sought from the child her views about a miscellany of matters.

10. In Ms B’s previous report dated 9 December 2008, she says at para 44:

    “It is my opinion that it will not benefit this matter to further impose more assessments on the child and/or the parents.  It is possible that further assessments might formally identify some level of attachment disorder in the child originating back to her adoption […] that has been compounded by the subsequent separation of her adopted parents.  I am confident that Ms [P] is sufficiently skilled to identify this issue and competently address it during her therapeutic sessions with this family”.

11. The therapeutic sessions with Ms P there referred to have ceased.  The earlier reasons given by me referred to what I there described as some profoundly troubling aspects of the factual matrix within which this decision is made.  In particular, I said:

    “It will be evident from the transcript of these proceedings, from the matters in particular outlined by Mr Walker, counsel who appears on behalf of the father, what some of those profound concerns are.  It is apparent, indeed admitted by the mother, that a person, who she says was and has been at all times a friend, a person who she says is and has been at all times a person who enjoyed a social life with the mother and, in particular, the child, engaged in SMSing the child (on her version) on 335 occasions in approximately a month.  Included among those contacts as but one example – and I repeat only one example – is a series of alleged communications (…)

    A serious of six SMS exchanges occurring between what appears on the face of the document to be about midnight and 6.30 in the morning.  I repeat in this context that this is an alleged adult SMSing an 11 and a half year old child.  Quite how that adult thought that it could remotely be appropriate to engage in such behaviour with respect to a pubescent child staggers belief.  That person, Ms [J], will be a witness at the trial.  Her cross-examination should be fascinating”.

12. I record here that which I also recorded in those earlier reasons with respect to the nature of interim proceedings, the parameters of which have been highlighted by the Full Court in cases such as C & C (1996) FLC92-651. 

13. I also said in my earlier decision:

    “I am profoundly concerned about each and all of the matters I have raised as I think my earlier reasons will make clear. However, I am also profoundly troubled by the fact, and significantly frustrated by the fact, that I am, in the course of these current proceedings, unable to make factual findings by reason of their nature.  Suspicions are not findings.  Concerns are not findings.  This Court, if it is going to make significant orders in relation to children, needs to operate on the basis of findings and only after evidence and assertions have been tested properly and appropriately within the confines of the system otherwise offered to the public”.

14. It will be evident from the quotations from those earlier reasons that there are a number of extremely concerning issues in respect to the child’s welfare and best interests. 

15. Moreover, it will be clear that the child has been the subject of significant investigation by a number of different people and many concerns are raised about the impact on her of that. 

16. As if those issues were not enough, a further and crucial context to the proceedings can be found most readily summarised in Ms B’s earlier report dated 9 December 2008.  Ms B says:

    “40.Notwithstanding my previous comment, I am not convinced that the mother has genuinely attempted to promote [the child’s] relationship with her father simply because if she had we would not be witnessing the ambivalence and, at times, reluctance to spend time with [the father] that [the child] currently displays.  I also find the probability of a supposed independent citizen such as Ms [J] taking the time and the energy to write to another woman’s child encouraging her to run away and behave badly while in the care of her father.  It is very unlikely, unless there was direct pressure and/or encouragement by the child’s mother.  [The mother] reported that Ms [J] has prepared an affidavit for the Court and it is anticipated this may explain her motivation for doing what she allegedly did”.

17. Against that sad and troubling background and the concerns there expressed, an initial proposition raised by the Court that the matter should be prepared and ready for a trial in April or May was abandoned in favour of making orders pursuant to s 65L of the Act together with orders that made provision for relatively significantly blocks of time for the child to spend with her father. 

18. The report prepared most recently by Ms B is a report prepared consequent upon the child spending those significant blocks of time with her father. 

19. I reiterate here that the mother’s position has always been that the child says things about the father which she, the mother, believes and which have, in a sense, dictated her position with respect to the child seeing her father.  Ms B has, in the past, expressed some concerns about whether that is correct.

20. It is important, I think, given the very lengthy history and pre-existing examinations of the child by both Ms B and other people, to quote at some length from Ms B’s most recent report which is the only data I have in determining the child’s best interests on an interim basis that has as its foundation an opportunity to observe the child at times when she was in her mother’s predominant care and to compare it with occasions when the child has had the opportunity to spend significant amounts of time with her father. 

21. It is in that specific respect that I find Ms B’s most recent report most compelling.  Ms B says this:

    “27.This matter continues to be perplexing and concerning.  What is the most telling and noticeable feature of this time since the orders were made in December 2008 was [the child’s] affect after having spent almost six weeks with her father with limited contact with the mother.

    28.As mentioned above, [the child’s] happy lighter affect as presented on 22 January 2009 indicated, in my opinion, that she had indeed had a very positive experience while spending time with her father.  Gone was the flat depressive non verbal child I had encountered for most of my involvement with this family and it was pleasing to see her behave in a manner that suggested that she was happy and carefree”.

22. The reference by Ms B to the “happy, lighter affect” is, in turn, a reference to paragraph 16 of the report where Ms B says this: 

    “[The child’s] demeanour was noticeably more upbeat and more positive than in previous interviews.  She had a lovely smile and sparkling eyes and freely talked about her likes and dislikes and her love of dancing.  Her happy positive affect was in direct contrast to the sullen, flat, non communicative affect that she had routinely presented with in previous interviews and one could not help thinking that the time she had spent with her father had been an overwhelmingly positive experience for her”.

23. I emphasise that the contrast there referred to occurred in circumstances where Ms B is the only independent person who has had the opportunity to make observations of the child in circumstances after spending a significant amount of time with the father and to compare it with observations made and things said by the child when she has been in the predominant care of her mother. 

24. That is exemplified by what Ms B herself says in her most recent report.  For example at para 29 Ms B says: 

    “In stark contrast, [the child’s] presentation on 11 February was once again flat, sullen and depressive.  She maintained very little eye contact, mumbled her words and looked at the floor for a good part of the interview”.

25. The presentation on 11 February occurred in circumstances where the period of six weeks with her father had ceased and the child had again spent some significant time with her mother.  Again, in that context, Ms B goes on to say: 

    “31.[the child] accuses me of betraying her confidence by telling her father things that she had told me. But [the child] hadn’t told me these things; her mother had.  I did inform Mr and Mrs [Tulley] of the allegations [the child] allegedly told her mother.  It was disappointing to learn that Mr and Mrs [Tulley] spoke to [the child] about what she allegedly told her mother. as this merely served to feed into the “she said/he said” mentality of this dispute and clearly places [the child] in the middle of the emotional firing range”.

26. The background just described, together with significant assessments made on two earlier occasions over a lengthy period of time informs the ultimate opinions arrived at by Ms B:

    “33.I am satisfied that the six week period that [the child] spent with the father was indeed a successful experience and has indeed provided [the child] with an opportunity to share a family life with the father.  It is my opinion that, given her affect on 22 January 2009, she is desirous of continuing that time with her father but fears the consequences of her mother’s reactions if she is seen to be enjoying herself at her father’s.

    34.[The child] is fearlessly loyal to her mother and she fears having her relationship with her mother compromised if she continues to have an okay relationship with her father.  This places [the child] in the tenuous situation of having to maintain two separate alliances and ‘never the twain shall meet’.  Hence [the child] experiences tremendous pressure to keep up the ‘anti dad’ appearances for her mother’s sake while in her mother’s care and then establish and maintain a healthy ongoing relationship with her father when in his care.  This ‘manic’ (almost double agent) type existence must be placing the child under an unimaginable amount of psychological and emotional pressure.  If this situation continues, it is my greatest fear that [the child] will soon develop serious psychological issues, will experience difficulties developing and maintaining social and intimate relationships, experience poor academic outcomes and she will be susceptible to poor mental health outcomes such as depression and anxiety”.

1. In arriving at an interim decision about the child’s best interests, I am of course aware of the decision of the Full Court in Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286.

2. I am also aware of what the legislation has to say about the mandatory considerations necessary to be taken into account by me.  In particular, I am aware of the provisions of s 60CC and the Primary and Additional Considerations which I must consider in arriving at ultimate findings and decisions about best interests. 

3. What the Full Court made clear in Goode was that that process must necessarily still occur in the context of interim proceedings, albeit that that is done in a significantly truncated way, and based on a number of matters that have not been the subject of cross-examination and resulting factual findings.

4. What clearly emerges from all three reports prepared by Ms B, but most particularly from the most recent report, is that the child gives the appearance (as observed by Ms B) when in her mother’s care of feeling what Ms B describes as “an unimaginable amount of psychological and emotional pressure” to portray to the world, and to her father, a view of her father which is, it seems, consistent with that which she experiences in her mother’s household. 

5. Secondly, what is now clear, because of the opportunity provided to Ms B by the order for block time for the child with the father, is clear evidence from Ms B of a lighter, happier, significantly less stressed child after spending significant amounts of time in her father’s care. 

6. There is no question that, if an order is made essentially consistent with Ms B’s ultimate opinion that the child live with her father for a period of six months, that this represents for her a significant and profound change in her erstwhile care arrangements. There is no doubt that that is a matter to which - particularly on an interim basis – I must give very earnest consideration.  I do so.  I am acutely conscious of the change that such an order represents for the child. 

7. However, that is not the only consideration directly relevant in this case.  I also need to consider factors such as the nature of the relationship between the child and each of her parents (and other loved individuals in her life); the respective capacities of the parties to parent her and, importantly, whether orders have the prospect of promoting, or diminishing any potential for emotional harm or psychological harm to her.  That last matter is accorded the status of a Primary Consideration within the legislation. 

8. It seems to me tolerably safe to assume, even in the context of interim proceedings, that the experience that the child had in her father’s care was an overwhelmingly positive one. 

9. It is also safe, it seems to me, to proceed on the basis that there is a marked change in the child’s appearance after spending time with her father and after spending time with her mother.  The contrast evident in that marked change is between a light and happy and essentially effervescent child and a depressed and sad child who, to use a common expression, appears to be carrying the weight of the world on her shoulders. 

10. In truth, of course the child is not carrying the weight of the world on her shoulders; she is carrying the weight of her parents on her shoulders. 

11. Accordingly, it seems to me, on an interim basis, and notwithstanding the significant change which such an order provides, that I should order that the child live with her father for a period of approximately six months. 

12. Ms B recommends a period of six months for the child in the care of the father or more accurately “a minimum of six months” in the care of her father. 

13. As to that timeframe, the earliest trial dates that I can offer the parties here commence on 12 October.  By coincidence, that is approximately six months so that, whatever I might think of that time period, the proposed period of time between now and the trial is, in any event, marked by that sort of period.

14. Ms B goes on to recommend ultimately, by reason of all of the matters just discussed, two things:  first, that the child attend therapeutic intervention with a child psychologist, Mr U, for six months and that he provide a report at the conclusion of that time.  Secondly, Ms B recommends a continuation of the s 65L order.  Thirdly, Ms B says of the child’s time with her mother should occur on Saturday or Sunday of each alternate weekend and that she communicate via telephone once a week.

15. In that latter respect, the independent children’s lawyer submits, essentially consistent with what Ms B recommends, that that time occur at the C Children’s Contact Centre.  The father essentially supports that proposition. The mother obviously submits to the contrary. 

16. I am concerned that, if the child is to spend six months in her father’s care pending the trial and the only time that the mother has with the child in that time, places a significant restriction on the relationship or potential relationship between the mother and the child, that such time, if applicable for the whole period, is not in the child’s best interests. 

17. Two things are relevant in that respect.  First, the s 65L process which Ms B recommends continues (and which I agree should continue) will result in a report designed to provide the most helpful data to the Court at the final hearing of the matter with respect to the child’s best interests.  She will have turned 12 by the time of the final hearing.

18. I have found the comparison between the child presenting after being in the care of her father and her mother to be particularly helpful and to have been particularly helpful in informing the opinions of Ms B.  So, too, I consider that at the final hearing of this matter, the Court should have the opportunity of such a comparison. 

19. It seems to me to be not in the child’s best interest that any such comparison be drawn from observations of the child when the only time she has had with her mother during that six month period is supervised time. 

20. Secondly, it is axiomatic that supervision provides a very significant restriction in both the nature and extent of the relationship between child and parent.  It is common ground that the C Contact Centre has facilities to avail parents only in blocks of two hours.  The significantly curtailed nature of the time between the child and her mother and the significantly curtailed circumstances of that time mean that supervision is almost always highly restrictive of a relationship between the child and the parent.  That is all the more so in my view with a child of this age. 

21. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the matters addressed in my earlier reasons, the matters addressed in Ms B’s early reports including her most recent report and the stark change in the child observed when she has had the opportunity to spend a significant period of time with her father and the consequent observations of what clearly appear to be a regression in her psychological and emotional health after having spent time with her mother indicate to me that she experiences significant pressure when spending time with her mother. 

22. Certainly, that has been a theme of the very many reports prepared previously in these proceedings including, in particular, the two earlier reports of Ms B. 

23. It seems to me that there should be as few opportunities as possible for there to be any overt pressure brought to bear upon the child whilst she is given the freedom to enjoy the time with her father that the orders will otherwise provide.

24. That freedom to enjoy her father is evident, at least in part, from the quotations from Ms B’s report made earlier, and is a significant component or a significant theme in Ms B most recent report. 

25. On balance, I am satisfied that, for the initial three months of that six months period, supervision of the time between the child and her mother will provide the maximum opportunity for the child to develop the relationship with her father and other members of her father’s household, free of any such pressure.

26. It seems to me that that period of three months though, provides a sufficient time within which that relationship can grow and develop.  I would be very concerned about any potential for regression or change in what I anticipate is likely to be a lighter happier child were she to return to her mother’s care for any significant periods of time after that three months.

27. However, after that three months, it seems to me entirely appropriate that the child have the opportunity, particularly prior to the final hearing of this matter, to spend time with her mother away from the contact centre so that the relationship between the two can be enjoyed in much more “normal” circumstances and settings.

28. With that in mind, I have provided initially for a period of overnight time from Friday after school until the end of Saturday and, thereafter, in the final lead up to trial, as it were, for weekend time from after school on Friday until the commencement of school on Monday. 

29. In order to embrace what I consider to be a likely helpful process both to the Court and to the child - and, if hope can triumph over expectation, for the parties - I will continue the s 65L order, and, as part of that, indicate my preference that, if at all possible, Ms B should see the child, and the parties, during each of the three different forms of time between the child and her mother provided for in the orders.

30. Two further issues need to be briefly addressed.  The first is the proposed counselling from Mr U.  Mr U is well known to this Court.  His expertise is not challenged in these proceedings and one might think it almost heretical to suggest that counselling from an experienced qualified therapist might not necessarily be in the child’s best interests. 

31. There are, though, first, difficulties with respect to payment.  It seems the father has already paid all of such fees as were necessary for earlier therapeutic interventions.  He is unwilling to pay either half, or any of, the fees for Mr U. The mother’s financial circumstances have been outlined and are extremely modest.  They are likely to become more modest, it is submitted, in circumstances where the child spends the amounts of time with the father as these orders contemplate.

32. It was suggested by Ms Harrison, who appears on behalf of the mother, that the mother might be able to borrow some money to allow that therapeutic intervention to take place.  What concerns me more, however, is that, in the six month period between now and the trial, the child be allowed to experience her father’s care with as little “interference” as possible. 

33. I would not hesitate to order the therapeutic intervention contemplated if there was good evidence to suggest, on an interim basis, that risks of emotional harm in the father’s household were high.  I do not believe that such evidence exists.  I am comforted by the evidence in Ms B’s most recent report.  Six months is not an inordinate period of time. 

34. It is, of course, entirely open to the father as a parent, should he perceive during that time that the child is in need of therapeutic intervention, to raise that issue with the independent children’s lawyer at which time it can, of course, be considered.

35. I repeat: the child has seen at least five separate counsellors in one form or another.  It seems to me I should give her the opportunity to not do so.  Also, I have in mind that, pursuant to my orders, Ms B (who by now should be well known to the child) will see her if at all possible on three occasions during that six month period and during each of the three blocks of time that such six month period contemplates. 

36. Bearing all of those factors in mind, I do not propose to make an order for the therapeutic intervention by Mr U as contemplated in the proposals put forward by the independent children’s lawyer and, in effect, supported by the mother.

37. The mother’s proposals include a suggested order that the mother attend upon Ms K, family therapist, for the purpose of obtaining counselling assistance to address the issues raised in the various reports and for that purpose, Ms K be at liberty to receive the reports from these proceedings prepared by Mr W, Ms R, Ms M, Ms B and this order. 

38. It seems to me that, to the extent that the mother perceives in herself a need for any counselling assistance - whether as a result of issues raised in the various reports or otherwise - that is a matter for her voluntary actions as distinct from any order made by this Court.

39. I do, however, consider it important that, if the mother decides to voluntarily pursue any such counselling or therapeutic assistance, any such counsellor have access to the reports that are referred to in that proposed order including the reports of Ms B. 

40. I also consider it important that any such counsellor have access to the Reasons for Judgment given by me in this case. 

41. To the extent that the orders provide for time other than at a contact centre, I will provide that changeovers occur at school in circumstances where time commences or finishes at school or in the event that time does not finish at school, changeovers occur at the C Contact Centre.

I certify that the preceding sixty-seven (67) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Murphy.

Associate:

Date:  8 April 2009