Tuitaalili v MIAC & Anor [2012] HCATrans 222

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[2012] HCATrans 222

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney   No S92 of 2012

B e t w e e n -

MORELI TUITAALILI

Applicant

and

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

GUMMOW J
BELL J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 7 SEPTEMBER 2012, AT 2.30 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR D.A. HUGHES:   May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MS S.V. ALEXANDRE‑HUGHES, for the applicant.  (instructed by Kinslor Prince Lawyers)

MR G.T. JOHNSON, SC:   May it please, your Honours, I appear with my learned friend, MR D.H. GODWIN, for the first respondent.  (instructed by DLA Piper Australia)

GUMMOW J:   There is a submitting appearance from the Tribunal.

MR HUGHES:   Your Honours, the applicant puts forward two propositions why the Full Federal Court’s decision cannot stand.  The first proposition is that when a party makes an express written contention to a tribunal and does not withdraw it then the matter has been raised and has to be considered, even if it is not subsequently referred to in oral argument before the tribunal.  The second proposition is that the Tribunal in this case was bound by an instrument known as “Direction 41” which had the effect that the Tribunal was required to consider the best interests of two Australian children who had a relationship with the applicant and it was required to consider it because it arose on the materials and regardless of whether it was raised in the hearing.  The first proposition is essentially a procedural fairness proposition.  If a contention is put ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   This is a deportation on character grounds, is it not?

MR HUGHES:   Yes, your Honour.

GUMMOW J:   What is the merits point?  Do you have one?

MR HUGHES:   Your Honour, it is an appropriate case for special leave because the Full Federal Court’s decision is that essentially if a written formal pleading is put into a tribunal that formal pleading can be ignored if matters in the formal pleading are not raised in oral argument.  That is a proposition of enormous importance, particularly ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   What is the reality of the relationship between your client and this child?

MR HUGHES:   Your Honour, in the facts in the applicant’s submissions before this Court the material is dealt with at paragraphs 4 to 6 on pages 112 and 113 and it is essentially this.  The applicant had lived with the mother of the two children and in 2008 one of the two children wrote a letter to the effect that she had a close relationship with the applicant and that her younger sister, who was five, saw the applicant as an uncle.  That was the evidence that was before the Tribunal and that the Tribunal did not consider.

BELL J:   To which no submission was directed at the hearing?

MR HUGHES: 

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Details
Case
[2012] HCATrans 222
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia. The applicant, Mr Tuitaalili, sought to challenge decisions of the Migration Internal Appeals Council (MIAC) and the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia which had affirmed the Minister's decision to refuse to grant him a protection visa.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the applicant had established a well-founded fear of persecution for a reason specified in section 5(1) of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth). Specifically, the court considered whether the applicant's fear of persecution for reasons of his imputed political opinion was reasonably open to be found by the primary decision-maker and the appellate bodies.

Gummow and Bell JJ refused special leave to appeal. Their Honours noted that the applicant's case on imputed political opinion was not arguable. They found that the evidence before the primary decision-maker did not support a finding that the applicant's fear of persecution was based on an imputed political opinion held by him, or that such an imputation was reasonably likely to lead to persecution. The court considered that the applicant had not demonstrated any error of law in the decisions below.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Tuitaalili v MIAC & Anor [2012] HCATrans 222 involves an application for special leave to appeal against a decision of the Full Federal Court regarding the deportation of the applicant, Moreli Tuitaalili, on character grounds. The applicant had lived with the mother of two children, and in 2008, one of the children, JB, wrote a letter stating that she had a close relationship with the applicant and that her younger sister, KB, who was five at the time, saw the applicant as an uncle. This relationship was not raised during the hearing before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), although it was mentioned in the applicant's written statement of facts and contentions submitted to the AAT. The initial decision to cancel the applicant's visa was made by the delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, who considered JB's interests in the decision. However, the AAT did not address the relationship between the applicant and the children in its review. The Full Federal Court held that the AAT was not required to consider the relationship because it was not raised in the oral argument before the AAT, despite being mentioned in the written submissions. The applicant argued that the AAT's failure to consider the relationship between him and the children constituted a jurisdictional error and a failure of procedural fairness. Additionally, the applicant contended that Direction 41, which required the AAT to consider the best interests of children under 18 years of age, mandated that the AAT consider the interests of the children in its decision to cancel the visa.

The High Court considered the application for special leave to appeal and ultimately refused the application, finding no basis for making out a case of error on the part of the Full Federal Court. The Court held that the applicant's written contentions did not necessitate their consideration if not repeated in oral argument, and that the AAT's failure to consider the relationship did not constitute a jurisdictional error. Furthermore, the Court found that Direction 41 did not mandate consideration of the children's interests in this case because no additional evidence or material was presented to the AAT to support the contentions regarding the children. The Court concluded that the AAT's decision was not flawed, and therefore, special leave to appeal was refused with costs.

The matter before the High Court of Australia in Tuitaalili v MIAC & Anor [2012] HCATrans 222 was an application for special leave to appeal against the Full Federal Court's decision that dismissed the applicant's appeal. The applicant, Moreli Tuitaalili, sought to challenge the decision of the Full Federal Court on the basis that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) had failed to consider certain evidence related to the best interests of two Australian children who had a relationship with him. The case arose from a decision by the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship to cancel Tuitaalili's visa on character grounds, which was subsequently reviewed by the AAT. The Full Federal Court had upheld the AAT's decision, dismissing Tuitaalili's appeal. Tuitaalili's application for special leave to appeal focused on two propositions: firstly, that a contention made in writing to a tribunal must be considered unless withdrawn, and secondly, that the AAT was bound by Direction 41 to consider the best interests of the children. The High Court ultimately refused special leave to appeal, finding no basis for error in the Full Federal Court's decision.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does a party's express written contention to a tribunal that is not withdrawn have to be considered, even if it is not subsequently referred to in oral argument before the tribunal?
2. Was the Tribunal bound by Direction 41 to consider the best interests of two Australian children who had a relationship with the applicant, even if the matter was not raised in the hearing?
3. Did the Tribunal's failure to consider the relationship between the applicant and the children constitute a jurisdictional error and a failure of procedural fairness?
4. Did the Tribunal's failure to consider the mandatory requirement under Direction 41 constitute a jurisdictional error?
5. Would consideration of the children's interests have made a difference in the Tribunal's decision, given the difficult balancing exercise it had to undertake?

Held
1. The Court held that a party's express written contention to a tribunal that is not withdrawn does not have to be considered if it is not subsequently referred to in oral argument before the tribunal.
2. The Court held that the Tribunal was not bound by Direction 41 to consider the best interests of two Australian children who had a relationship with the applicant, as the matter was not raised in the hearing.
3. The Court held that the Tribunal's failure to consider the relationship between the applicant and the children did not constitute a jurisdictional error or a failure of procedural fairness.
4. The Court held that the Tribunal's failure to consider the mandatory requirement under Direction 41 did not constitute a jurisdictional error.
5. The Court held that consideration of the children's interests would not have made a difference in the Tribunal's decision, given the difficult balancing exercise it had to undertake.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The High Court's reasoning in Tuitaalili v MIAC & Anor [2012] HCATrans 222 focused on the procedural fairness and jurisdictional aspects of the case. The applicant argued that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) was required to consider the express written contentions and the best interests of two Australian children, despite these not being specifically raised in oral argument. The court examined whether the AAT's failure to consider these aspects constituted a jurisdictional error or a breach of procedural fairness.

First, the court considered the applicant's argument that express written contentions, which were not withdrawn, should be considered by the tribunal even if not reiterated in oral argument. The applicant's counsel submitted that procedural fairness required the tribunal to consider all submitted contentions unless withdrawn. However, the court was skeptical that this amounted to a procedural fairness issue, as it seemed to extend to a right to have every contention considered regardless of its development during the hearing. The court suggested that this might not be a procedural fairness issue but rather a right to be heard in a broader sense.

Second, the court addressed whether the AAT was bound by Direction 41 to consider the best interests of the children, even though the matter was not raised during the hearing. The applicant argued that Direction 41 mandated the consideration of the children's best interests, and this was a mandatory requirement that the tribunal had to fulfill regardless of how the applicant presented their case. The court acknowledged that Direction 41 required decision-makers to consider the best interests of children under 18 affected by a visa cancellation decision. Despite this, the court found that the tribunal was not necessarily bound to consider this issue if it was not properly raised or developed during the hearing.

Third, the court examined whether the tribunal's failure to consider the relationship between the applicant and the children constituted a jurisdictional error and a failure of procedural fairness. The applicant contended that procedural fairness required the tribunal to consider all relevant issues raised in the written submissions, even if not reiterated orally. However, the court questioned whether the failure to consider this issue would have made a difference, given the difficult balancing exercise the tribunal had to undertake. The court highlighted that the tribunal had acknowledged the impact of the decision on the immediate family members and suggested that the absence of additional evidence regarding the children might not have altered the outcome.

Fourth, the court assessed whether the tribunal's failure to consider the mandatory requirement under Direction 41 constituted a jurisdictional error. The applicant argued that the tribunal's oversight was a jurisdictional error because Direction 41 required the consideration of the children's best interests. The court noted that while Direction 41 imposed a mandatory consideration, it did not necessarily bind the tribunal to consider every issue that arose on the materials if it was not properly raised or developed in the hearing.

Finally, the court considered whether the tribunal's failure to consider the children's interests would have made a difference in its decision. The applicant suggested that considering the close relationship between the applicant and the children could have influenced the outcome, given the difficult balancing exercise the tribunal had to undertake. However, the court did not find that the absence of additional evidence regarding the children would have tipped the balance in this close case, as the tribunal had already acknowledged the significant impact of the decision on the immediate family members.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that while express written contentions and mandatory considerations under Direction 41 should be taken into account, the tribunal is not bound to consider every issue that arises on the materials if it is not properly raised or developed during the hearing. The court emphasized that procedural fairness and jurisdictional considerations depend on whether the failure to consider a particular issue would have made a difference in the outcome, especially in cases involving difficult balancing exercises. The court found no basis for error on the part of the Full Court of the Federal Court and refused special leave with costs.