Tuilau v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs

Case [2000] FCA 96


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Tuilau v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs [2000] FCA 96

JONE LUI TUILAU v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND ETHNIC AFFAIRS

N 1426 of 1999

LINDGREN J
9 FEBRUARY 2000
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1426 of 1999

BETWEEN:

JONE LUI TUILAU
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND ETHNIC AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

LINDGREN J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 FEBRUARY 2000

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1426 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

JONE LUI TUILAU
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND ETHNIC AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

LINDGREN J

DATE:

9 FEBRUARY 2000

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(ex tempore)

  1. In this matter the applicant filed his application on 9 December 1999.  The proceeding has come before the Court for the first time today. 

  2. The form of the application is confusing.  The applicant is in immigration detention.  He applied for a protection visa and in connection with that application applied for a bridging visa.  I have been informed by Mr Allatt of the Australian Government Solicitor’s Office that a bridging visa of one class was erroneously issued and then cancelled and the applicant applied for a visa of the correct class.

  3. The applicant has made it clear today that he agrees that the decision which he intends to challenge in this proceeding is the decision to cancel the bridging visa initially granted to him.  This is consistent with his use of the word “cancel” in his application, although as I said earlier, the form of the application is confusing. 

  4. As is well known, the jurisdiction of the Court is found in ss 475, 476 and 486 of the Migration Act l958 (Cth).  The jurisdiction is granted only in respect of “judicially-reviewable decisions”.  What matters for present purposes is that excluded from the notion of a “judicially reviewable decision” is an “IRT - reviewable decision”, now “MRT - reviewable decision”: see s 475(2)(c) of the Act.  The notion of an “MRT reviewable decision” is defined in s 338 of the Act.  Subsection 338(4) provides, relevantly, that “a decision to cancel a bridging visa held by a non-citizen who is in immigration detention because of that cancellation” is an MRT-reviewable decision. 

  5. Accordingly, the decision which the applicant seeks to have reviewed in this proceeding is excluded from the range of decisions in respect of which this Court is given jurisdiction and I have no alternative but to dismiss the application on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 

  6. Accordingly, the Court orders that the application be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 

I certify that the preceding six (6) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Lindgren.

Associate:

Dated:             11 February 2000

The applicant appeared in person
Solicitor for the Respondent: Mr M Allatt of The Australian Government Solicitor’s Office
Date of Hearing: 9 February 2000
Date of Judgment: 9 February 2000
Details
AGLC
Tuilau v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [2000] FCA 96
Case
[2000] FCA 96
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Tuilau against the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, the Federal Court was tasked with determining whether the court had jurisdiction to hear the matter. The dispute centred around the respondent's decision to cancel the applicant's visa, leading to the applicant's application for judicial review. The court was required to examine whether the court had the authority to hear this application under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Federal Court had jurisdiction to review the decision of the Minister. The court needed to determine if the decision fell within the scope of reviewable decisions under the ADJR Act and whether the applicant had locus standi to bring the application. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the applicant had complied with the procedural requirements necessary to initiate judicial review.

The court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter. The court found that the decision in question was not a decision that could be reviewed under the ADJR Act as it did not involve a statutory power or duty. Furthermore, the court held that the applicant did not have standing to bring the application because they did not suffer a special injury due to the decision. The court also noted that the applicant had not complied with the procedural requirements, including the requirement to apply for an internal review before seeking judicial review. Therefore, the application was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

LINDGREN J

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: LINDGREN J

Full text does not contain this section.