| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
GROUP PROCEEDINGS LIST
S ECI 2023 01055
| KATHERINE TUCK & Ors (according to the Schedule) | Plaintiffs |
| v | |
| AUSTRALIAN FOOTBALL LEAGUE (ACN 004 155 211) & Ors (according to the Schedule) | Defendants |
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JUDGE: | Keogh J |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 14 March 2024 |
DATE OF RULING: | 20 March 2024 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Tuck v Australian Football League |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2024] VSC 126 |
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GROUP PROCEEDING — Application to discontinue proceeding — Application to dispense with requirement to notify group members — Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) ss 33V, 33X — Crawford v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2022] VSC 297 — Hassan v Van Diemen [2021] VSC 839 — Where same cause of action pursued for group members in related proceeding — Expense and inconvenience of notice — Discontinuance approved — Notification requirement dispensed with.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiffs | P Hamilton | Griffins Lawyers |
| For the First Defendant | B Ihle KC with R Singleton | |
| For the Second to Fifth Defendants | B Jellis |
HIS HONOUR:
This group proceeding was commenced by filing a writ and statement of claim on 17 March 2023. The plaintiffs now apply to discontinue the proceeding and for an order dispensing with the requirement under s 33X(4) of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) (‘SCA’) that notice be given to group members of the discontinuance application.
Discontinuance of the proceeding requires approval of the Court.[1] The question of approval is to be approached from the perspective of how the discontinuance would affect the interests of group members.[2]
[1]Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 33V (‘SCA’).
[2]Laine v Thiess Pty Ltd [2016] VSC 689, [14].
The application is supported by affidavits sworn by Gregory Michael Griffin, solicitor for the plaintiffs, sworn 18 September 2023 and 6 March 2024.
Background
This proceeding relates to alleged concussion and brain injuries suffered by former and current players in the Australian Football League (‘AFL’) on or after 23 December 1997. The claim is brought on behalf of players (including the estates of deceased players) who have suffered head knocks leading to symptoms consistent with concussion and resulting in brain damage (‘players’), and persons in close relationships with players who have suffered mental harm from the mental decline or death of those players (‘relationship claimants’). The claim made for relationship claimants includes, where applicable, loss of dependency damages.
The three plaintiffs named in the proceeding are: Katherine Tuck, who is the wife of Shane Tuck (‘Tuck’) and the personal representative of his deceased estate; Jay Schulz (‘Schulz’); and Darren Jarman (‘Jarman’).
Tuck played for the Richmond football club. Schulz played for the Richmond and Port Adelaide football clubs. Jarman played for the Hawthorn and Adelaide football clubs.
The named defendants are the AFL and the Richmond, Port Adelaide, Hawthorn and Adelaide clubs.
There are 57 persons registered with the plaintiffs’ lawyers as prima facie group…
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- Case
- [2024] VSC 126
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the nature of the proceeding and the implications of discontinuance and the waiver of notification on other group members. The court recognised that discontinuance of a group proceeding could result in significant expense and inconvenience for other group members, particularly if they were unaware of the discontinuance. However, the court also acknowledged that discontinuance might be appropriate in circumstances where the proceeding had become unviable or where the applicant had a compelling reason to discontinue. The court further noted that the requirement to notify group members served to protect their interests and ensure they had an opportunity to make an informed decision about their participation in the proceeding.
The court concluded that the applicant's proceeding was unviable and that discontinuance was appropriate. The court also found that the applicant had satisfied the threshold for dispensing with the notification requirement, as the expense and inconvenience of notice outweighed the benefits to other group members. The court approved the discontinuance and excused the applicant from the obligation to notify other group members, subject to certain conditions. The court ordered that the applicant provide written notice of the discontinuance to the court and the respondent and that the applicant take reasonable steps to inform other group members of the discontinuance and the court's decision to excuse the notification requirement.