NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL
CITATION: TU v UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY [2003] NSWCA 170
FILE NUMBER(S):
40956/02
HEARING DATE(S): 25 June 2003
JUDGMENT DATE: 18/07/2003
PARTIES:
John-Hasio Kong Tu - Appellant
Unviersity of Sydney - Respondent
JUDGMENT OF: Sheller JA Beazley JA Tobias JA
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Administrative Decisions Tribunal
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): ADT 019002
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Appel Panel
COUNSEL:
B J Toomey QC/P Gow - Appellant
J N West QC/J Oakley - Respondent
SOLICITORS:
Harish Prasad & Associates - Appellant
Minter Ellison - Respondent
CATCHWORDS:
Administrative Law - Administrative Decisions Tribunal - Replacement of Tribunal Member - Unavailability of Member - Lack of consent of parties - Constitution of new Tribunal - Whether discretion of Acting President - Tribunal wrongly constituted - Appealable decision - Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 ss 22, 79, 112
LEGISLATION CITED:
Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1977
Anti-Discrimination Act 1977
Supreme Court Act 1970
DECISION:
1 Appeal allowed
2 Respondent's notice of motion dismissed
3 Set aside the orders of the Appeal Panel made on 31 May and 13 August 2002. In lieu thereof, order that the appeal to the Appeal Panel be upheld, the orders made by the Tribunal on 10 January 2001 dismissing the appellant's complaint and any consequential costs orders be set aside and that the complaint be remitted to the Administrative Decisions Tribunal for determination of the complaint as referred to the Tribunal under s94 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977
4 The respondent should pay the appellant's costs of this appeal and of the appeal to the Appeal Panel. The costs of the proceedings to date in the Administrative Decisions Tribunal should be in the discretion of the Tribunal constituted to hear the complaint.
JUDGMENT:
IN THTE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL
CA 40956/02
ADT 019002SHELLER JA
BEAZLEY JA
TOBIAS JA
TU v UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY
The appellant lodged a complaint against the respondent with the President of the Anti-Discrimination Board, who referred the complaint to the Administrative Decisions Tribunal. Some two years later, in December 2000, the matter was set down for hearing. Due to illness the appellant was not able to attend the Tribunal hearing, however his counsel and instructing solicitor were present. The Tribunal was constituted by Judicial Member Lees and Members Edwards and Nemeth de Bikal. The appellant’s counsel opened the case, outlining the general nature of the complaint. The Judicial Member of the Tribunal then announced that the matter would be adjourned and that the Tribunal would reconvene two days later. On that day, the appellant was again unable to attend due to illness. After lengthy debate, the matter was adjourned to the following month.
On 10 January 2001, the Tribunal was differently constituted in that the Judicial Member was R Bartley. When the matter was called on, the Judicial Member announced that the previous chairperson of the Tribunal had had a death in the family and was in Melbourne. The Judicial Member asked if either party…
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- Case
- [2003] NSWCA 170
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the Supreme Court were whether the Administrative Decisions Tribunal was validly constituted when it made its decisions, and whether the Appeal Panel erred in law by failing to consider this issue and by dismissing the appellant's appeal. Specifically, the court considered whether the Acting President had the power to reconstitute the Tribunal under section 79 of the *Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997* (NSW) when a member was only temporarily unavailable, and whether the Tribunal's failure to grant an adjournment to consider the reconstitution was an error of law.
The Supreme Court reasoned that section 79 of the *Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997* (NSW) required specific preconditions to be met before the Acting President could reconstitute a Tribunal, particularly when a member's unavailability was temporary. The court found that the unavailability of Judicial Member Lees for only one week was insufficient to warrant reconstitution under section 79, and therefore the Tribunal constituted by Mr Bartley and his colleagues was improperly constituted. The Appeal Panel had erred by not addressing this fundamental issue and by dismissing the appellant's appeal.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, dismissed the respondent's notice of motion, and set aside the orders of the Appeal Panel. The court ordered that the appeal to the Appeal Panel be upheld, the orders of the Tribunal dismissing the appellant's complaint and any consequential costs orders be set aside, and that the complaint be remitted to the Administrative Decisions Tribunal for determination. The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal and the appeal to the Appeal Panel.
Orders
Orders of the court
1 Appeal allowed
2 Respondent's notice of motion dismissed
3 Set aside the orders of the Appeal Panel made on 31 May and 13 August 2002. In lieu thereof, order that the appeal to the Appeal Panel be upheld, the orders made by the Tribunal on 10 January 2001 dismissing the appellant's complaint and any consequential costs orders be set aside and that the complaint be remitted to the Administrative Decisions Tribunal for determination of the complaint as referred to the Tribunal under s94 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977
4 The respondent should pay the appellant's costs of this appeal and of the appeal to the Appeal Panel. The costs of the proceedings to date in the Administrative Decisions Tribunal should be in the discretion of the Tribunal constituted to hear the complaint.
Background
Background to the litigation
The Tribunal had ruled that Judicial Member Lees would be unavailable for only one week, which the appellant contended was insufficient to warrant reconstitution of the Tribunal. The Tribunal's decision to proceed without reconstitution was challenged on the grounds that it was an error of law and unreasonable. The appellant sought an adjournment to allow for the proper reconstitution of the Tribunal or, alternatively, to challenge the Acting President's decision to replace Judicial Member Lees. The Tribunal denied the adjournment application, leading to the appellant's appeal to the Appeal Panel. The appellant argued that the failure to grant an adjournment was itself an error of law and that the appeal panel had the power to review the merits of the Tribunal's decisions.
The Appeal Panel, however, dismissed the appeal, leading to the appellant's further appeal to a higher court. The appellant argued that the Tribunal's decisions were flawed due to its improper constitution and sought to set aside the Appeal Panel's orders. The appellant also sought leave to review the merits of the Tribunal's decisions if necessary to uphold the appeal. The court was asked to consider whether the Appeal Panel had the jurisdiction to determine if the Acting President had acted ultra vires and whether the Tribunal's failure to grant an adjournment constituted an error of law.
The case of Tu v University of Sydney originated in the Administrative Decisions Tribunal (ADT) where the appellant, Tu, lodged a complaint against the University of Sydney. The Tribunal, initially constituted by Mr Bartley, issued several decisions including the dismissal of Tu's complaint. Dissatisfied with these decisions, Tu filed an appeal to the ADT Appeal Panel. The appeal, which was heard on 12 March 2002, contested the Tribunal's decisions on the grounds of improper reconstitution and procedural errors. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had wrongly reconstituted itself without satisfying the requirements of section 79(1) of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997, leading to an improperly constituted Tribunal. This issue was further complicated by the contention that Judicial Member Lees's unavailability for one week did not warrant reconstitution. Tu's appeal sought to set aside the Tribunal's decisions and have the complaint remitted to the ADT for redetermination. The appeal was subsequently heard and determined by the ADT Appeal Panel, which issued several orders, including the dismissal of the respondent's notice of motion and the setting aside of previous orders made by the Appeal Panel on 31 May and 13 August 2002. The Appeal Panel upheld Tu's appeal, remitted the complaint to the ADT for determination, and directed the respondent to pay Tu's costs of the appeal and of the appeal to the Appeal Panel.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Appeal Panel was tasked with examining the decisions made by the Tribunal in relation to the appellant's complaint and the manner in which the Tribunal handled the absence of one of its members, Judicial Member Lees. Firstly, the Appeal Panel addressed whether the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 s79 provided the Acting President with the discretion to replace a Tribunal member if the original member was unavailable for only one week. The appellant argued that the Tribunal's decision to proceed without reconstitution was unlawful because the absence of Judicial Member Lees for one week warranted reconstitution under s79(1). However, the Tribunal found that the absence of Judicial Member Lees for one week did not satisfy the requirements for reconstitution under s79(1). The Appeal Panel upheld this finding, holding that the absence of Judicial Member Lees for one week did not warrant reconstitution of the Tribunal.
Secondly, the Appeal Panel considered whether the Tribunal erred in finding that it was governed by s79(3) of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 when the preconditions set out in s79(1) had not been met. The Tribunal had ruled that it was governed by s79(3) because the absence of Judicial Member Lees was not as per s79(1). The Appeal Panel agreed with the Tribunal's interpretation, holding that the Tribunal was correctly governed by s79(3) as the preconditions set out in s79(1) had not been met.
Thirdly, the Appeal Panel examined whether the Tribunal was wrongly constituted when it proceeded without reconstitution following the absence of Judicial Member Lees for one week. The appellant argued that the Tribunal was wrongly constituted because it did not follow the requirements of s79(1). However, the Appeal Panel held that the Tribunal was not wrongly constituted, as the absence of Judicial Member Lees for one week did not warrant reconstitution under s79(1).
Fourthly, the Appeal Panel considered whether the Tribunal erred in failing to grant an adjournment when the parties submitted that the Tribunal was improperly constituted due to the absence of Judicial Member Lees. The appellant argued that the Tribunal should have granted an adjournment to allow for the proper constitution of the Tribunal. The Appeal Panel held that the Tribunal did not err in failing to grant an adjournment, as the absence of Judicial Member Lees for one week did not warrant reconstitution under s79(1).
Fifthly, the Appeal Panel addressed whether it had the jurisdiction to determine whether the Acting President of the Tribunal acted ultra vires in exercising powers under s79 of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997. The appellant argued that the Appeal Panel should determine whether the Acting President acted ultra vires. However, the Appeal Panel held that it did not have the jurisdiction to determine whether the Acting President acted ultra vires, as this was a matter for the President of the Tribunal.
Lastly, the Appeal Panel considered whether the Tribunal’s decision not to grant an adjournment was an error of law or a decision so unreasonable that no reasonable Tribunal would have made it. The appellant argued that the Tribunal's decision not to grant an adjournment was an error of law and unreasonable. The Appeal Panel held that the Tribunal's decision not to grant an adjournment was an error of law, as the Tribunal should have granted an adjournment to allow for the proper constitution of the Tribunal.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Tribunal must follow the requirements of s79 of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 when considering the absence of a member. If the absence of a member warrants reconstitution under s79(1), the Tribunal must reconstitute itself. If the absence of a member does not warrant reconstitution under s79(1), the Tribunal may proceed without reconstitution under s79(3). The Appeal Panel held that the Tribunal did not err in finding that it was governed by s79(3) when the preconditions set out in s79(1) had not been met. However, the Appeal Panel also held that the Tribunal erred in failing to grant an adjournment when the parties submitted that the Tribunal was improperly constituted due to the absence of Judicial Member Lees. This case clarifies the requirements of s79 of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 and the consequences of failing to follow those requirements.