Tu v University of Sydney

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:      TU v UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY [2003]  NSWCA 170

FILE NUMBER(S):
40956/02

HEARING DATE(S):               25 June 2003

JUDGMENT DATE: 18/07/2003

PARTIES:
John-Hasio Kong Tu - Appellant
Unviersity of Sydney - Respondent

JUDGMENT OF:       Sheller JA Beazley JA Tobias JA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Administrative Decisions Tribunal

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):          ADT 019002

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:     Appel Panel

COUNSEL:
B J Toomey QC/P Gow - Appellant
J N West QC/J Oakley - Respondent

SOLICITORS:
Harish Prasad & Associates - Appellant
Minter Ellison - Respondent

CATCHWORDS:
Administrative Law - Administrative Decisions Tribunal - Replacement of Tribunal Member - Unavailability of Member - Lack of consent of parties - Constitution of new Tribunal - Whether discretion of Acting President - Tribunal wrongly constituted - Appealable decision - Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 ss 22, 79, 112

LEGISLATION CITED:
Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1977
Anti-Discrimination Act 1977
Supreme Court Act 1970

DECISION:
1  Appeal allowed
2  Respondent's notice of motion dismissed
3  Set aside the orders of the Appeal Panel made on 31 May and 13 August 2002.  In lieu thereof, order that the appeal to the Appeal Panel be upheld, the orders made by the Tribunal on 10 January 2001 dismissing the appellant's complaint and any consequential costs orders be set aside and that the complaint be remitted to the Administrative Decisions Tribunal for determination of the complaint as referred to the Tribunal under s94 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977
4  The respondent should pay the appellant's costs of this appeal and of the appeal to the Appeal Panel.  The costs of the proceedings to date in the Administrative Decisions Tribunal should be in the discretion of the Tribunal constituted to hear the complaint.

JUDGMENT:

IN THTE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL

CA 40956/02
ADT 019002

SHELLER JA
BEAZLEY JA
TOBIAS JA

TU v UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY

The appellant lodged a complaint against the respondent with the President of the Anti-Discrimination Board, who referred the complaint to the Administrative Decisions Tribunal.  Some two years later, in December 2000, the matter was set down for hearing.  Due to illness the appellant was not able to attend the Tribunal hearing, however his counsel and instructing solicitor were present.  The Tribunal was constituted by Judicial Member Lees and Members Edwards and Nemeth de Bikal.  The appellant’s counsel opened the case, outlining the general nature of the complaint.  The Judicial Member of the Tribunal then announced that the matter would be adjourned and that the Tribunal would reconvene two days later.  On that day, the appellant was again unable to attend due to illness.  After lengthy debate, the matter was adjourned to the following month.

On 10 January 2001, the Tribunal was differently constituted in that the Judicial Member was R Bartley.  When the matter was called on, the Judicial Member announced that the previous chairperson of the Tribunal had had a death in the family and was in Melbourne.  The Judicial Member asked if either party…

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Details
Case
[2003] NSWCA 170
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Tu, appealed to the Supreme Court of New South Wales against decisions of the Appeal Panel of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal. The dispute concerned the reconstitution of the Tribunal, which the appellant argued was improperly constituted, and the subsequent dismissal of her complaint. The Appeal Panel had dismissed the appellant's appeal against the Tribunal's decisions.

The primary legal issues before the Supreme Court were whether the Administrative Decisions Tribunal was validly constituted when it made its decisions, and whether the Appeal Panel erred in law by failing to consider this issue and by dismissing the appellant's appeal. Specifically, the court considered whether the Acting President had the power to reconstitute the Tribunal under section 79 of the *Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997* (NSW) when a member was only temporarily unavailable, and whether the Tribunal's failure to grant an adjournment to consider the reconstitution was an error of law.

The Supreme Court reasoned that section 79 of the *Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997* (NSW) required specific preconditions to be met before the Acting President could reconstitute a Tribunal, particularly when a member's unavailability was temporary. The court found that the unavailability of Judicial Member Lees for only one week was insufficient to warrant reconstitution under section 79, and therefore the Tribunal constituted by Mr Bartley and his colleagues was improperly constituted. The Appeal Panel had erred by not addressing this fundamental issue and by dismissing the appellant's appeal.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, dismissed the respondent's notice of motion, and set aside the orders of the Appeal Panel. The court ordered that the appeal to the Appeal Panel be upheld, the orders of the Tribunal dismissing the appellant's complaint and any consequential costs orders be set aside, and that the complaint be remitted to the Administrative Decisions Tribunal for determination. The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal and the appeal to the Appeal Panel.

Orders

Orders of the court

1 Appeal allowed

2 Respondent's notice of motion dismissed

3 Set aside the orders of the Appeal Panel made on 31 May and 13 August 2002. In lieu thereof, order that the appeal to the Appeal Panel be upheld, the orders made by the Tribunal on 10 January 2001 dismissing the appellant's complaint and any consequential costs orders be set aside and that the complaint be remitted to the Administrative Decisions Tribunal for determination of the complaint as referred to the Tribunal under s94 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977

4 The respondent should pay the appellant's costs of this appeal and of the appeal to the Appeal Panel. The costs of the proceedings to date in the Administrative Decisions Tribunal should be in the discretion of the Tribunal constituted to hear the complaint.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Tu v University of Sydney revolves around a dispute concerning the composition and decisions of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal (ADT) in Australia. The appellant, Tu, appealed against several decisions of the ADT, arguing that the Tribunal was improperly constituted and that its decisions were therefore invalid. The Tribunal had initially been constituted by a member, Mr Bartley, but later became part-heard and was reconstituted under the authority of section 79 of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997. This section allows for the replacement of a Tribunal member if they are unavailable. The appellant argued that the replacement was not carried out in accordance with the statutory requirements, leading to the Tribunal being wrongly constituted.

The Tribunal had ruled that Judicial Member Lees would be unavailable for only one week, which the appellant contended was insufficient to warrant reconstitution of the Tribunal. The Tribunal's decision to proceed without reconstitution was challenged on the grounds that it was an error of law and unreasonable. The appellant sought an adjournment to allow for the proper reconstitution of the Tribunal or, alternatively, to challenge the Acting President's decision to replace Judicial Member Lees. The Tribunal denied the adjournment application, leading to the appellant's appeal to the Appeal Panel. The appellant argued that the failure to grant an adjournment was itself an error of law and that the appeal panel had the power to review the merits of the Tribunal's decisions.

The Appeal Panel, however, dismissed the appeal, leading to the appellant's further appeal to a higher court. The appellant argued that the Tribunal's decisions were flawed due to its improper constitution and sought to set aside the Appeal Panel's orders. The appellant also sought leave to review the merits of the Tribunal's decisions if necessary to uphold the appeal. The court was asked to consider whether the Appeal Panel had the jurisdiction to determine if the Acting President had acted ultra vires and whether the Tribunal's failure to grant an adjournment constituted an error of law.

The case of Tu v University of Sydney originated in the Administrative Decisions Tribunal (ADT) where the appellant, Tu, lodged a complaint against the University of Sydney. The Tribunal, initially constituted by Mr Bartley, issued several decisions including the dismissal of Tu's complaint. Dissatisfied with these decisions, Tu filed an appeal to the ADT Appeal Panel. The appeal, which was heard on 12 March 2002, contested the Tribunal's decisions on the grounds of improper reconstitution and procedural errors. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had wrongly reconstituted itself without satisfying the requirements of section 79(1) of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997, leading to an improperly constituted Tribunal. This issue was further complicated by the contention that Judicial Member Lees's unavailability for one week did not warrant reconstitution. Tu's appeal sought to set aside the Tribunal's decisions and have the complaint remitted to the ADT for redetermination. The appeal was subsequently heard and determined by the ADT Appeal Panel, which issued several orders, including the dismissal of the respondent's notice of motion and the setting aside of previous orders made by the Appeal Panel on 31 May and 13 August 2002. The Appeal Panel upheld Tu's appeal, remitted the complaint to the ADT for determination, and directed the respondent to pay Tu's costs of the appeal and of the appeal to the Appeal Panel.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The notice of appeal to the Tribunal constituted by an Appeal Panel was filed by the appellant on the same day. In its amended form it was directed to what were described as “The First Adjournment Application Decision”, “The Second Adjournment Application Decision”, and “The Dismissal Decision”. Paragraph 5 in the first section was “The Tribunal erred in law by misconstruing s79 of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997”. Paragraph 7 in the second section was “The Tribunal erred in law in finding that it was governed by s79(3) of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act when the preconditions set out in s79(1) have not been met”. Under a final heading “Review of the Merits of the Decisions” were found the following paragraphs:“16If it is necessary for the Appeal Panel to review the merits of the decisions in order for it to set aside the decision of the Tribunal, and to make a decision in substitution for the decision to be set aside, then the Appellant seeks leave to extend the appeal to a review of the merits of the decisions to the extent necessary.17The Appellant applied to have the proceedings adjourned as the Tribunal had been reconstituted without the requirements of s79(1) of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act having been satisfied.18In its reasons for decision the Tribunal stated that Judicial Member Lees would be unavailable for one week. A period of absence of only one week is not sufficient to warrant reconstitution of the Tribunal, in circumstances when the Tribunal is part heard.”Decision of the Appeal Panel The hearing before the Appeal Panel took place on 12 March 2002. In the course of her submissions, Ms Winters, in answer to questions from his Honour Judge O’Connor, the President of the ADT, who was sitting as a member of the Appeal Panel, said that the decision to reconstitute the Tribunal was not under challenge. That was said in the context of the judge’s concern about his position. It appears that at the relevant time her Honour Judge Latham was the Acting President. Ms Winters argued a point that Judicial Member Lees was not unavailable within the meaning of s79 at the time set down for the hearing in January 2001. The following interchange took place between Judicial Member Rees and Ms Winters:“REES: Ms Winters, I wonder if I could just ask you a question here? If we assume – proceed on what seems to be some hypothetically agreed facts anyway that it was the Acting President that made the decision pursuant to section 79, as I understand your submission you’re saying that the Acting President acted ultra vires in those circumstances. Do we have any jurisdiction to determine whether the Acting President of the Tribunal has acted ultra vires, and did Mr Bartley and his colleagues at first instance have any jurisdiction to deal with that?WINTERS: In my submission, it is not necessary for this panel to make that determination because this panel has been asked to hear the appeal against the three decisions of the Tribunal constituted by Mr Bartley. The improper reconstitution of the Tribunal is the reason for the adjournment having been sought and in the circumstances of there having been a submission that there was an improperly constituted Tribunal, my submission here today is that that was a proper reason for an adjournment to have been granted, it was quite clearly only going to be a short adjournment. It was not as though there had been some indication there would be many months before the original Tribunal could have been reconstituted and then the subsequent decisions made by that Tribunal are what are here today under challenge.The only other course open to an appellant in a situation like this would be to have gone straight to the Supreme Court. Now, there is a lot of discouraging legislation on that point – on that approach in the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act to start with and a most effectively and efficient means of resolving the ultimate termination of the complaint is the appeal panel here, properly constituted, with due power, functions, etcetera to be able to set aside the decisions made by the Tribunal constituted by Mr Bartley and then reconsider the matter from there.If the appeal were to be upheld on all three counts, I mean I have no idea where Ms Lees would be for example, whether she is still a member of the Tribunal. So obviously, the matter would then need to be in a separate exercise of power, reconsidered by the President with a view to considering whether the Tribunal should be reconstituted, if it’s necessary to reconstitute it, if the appeal is upheld.REES: But isn’t your only argument that you can challenge the decision not to grant you an adjournment on the basis that arguably you should have been given the right to go somewhere else to challenge the exercise of power under section 79, but we can’t determine that the Acting President acted ultra vires because we don’t have the jurisdiction to do that.WINTERS: But what I am submitting is it is not necessary to go that far, that it is only necessary to consider whether, in the circumstances of a submission having been put, that the Tribunal was improperly constituted that the Tribunal erred by failing to adjourn.REES: But was the submission put that you wanted an adjournment to go elsewhere to challenge the constitution of the Tribunal and therefore challenge the exercise of the Acting President’s power?WINTERS: No, it wasn’t put in those terms. It was put on a practical basis that if there was a problem with the constitution of the Tribunal because Ms Lees was not available from a statutory point of view, then an appropriate and practical course would have been to grant an adjournment.Now, a failure to grant that adjournment in those circumstances, in my submission, is firstly an error of law. It is a decision that was so unreasonable, no reasonable maker would have made it. But secondly, if necessary, the notice of appeal seeks leave to review the merits of the decision and if be necessary to go that step, that leave is sought. The merits of that decision ought to be reviewed by this appeal panel.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Appeal Panel was tasked with examining the decisions made by the Tribunal in relation to the appellant's complaint and the manner in which the Tribunal handled the absence of one of its members, Judicial Member Lees. Firstly, the Appeal Panel addressed whether the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 s79 provided the Acting President with the discretion to replace a Tribunal member if the original member was unavailable for only one week. The appellant argued that the Tribunal's decision to proceed without reconstitution was unlawful because the absence of Judicial Member Lees for one week warranted reconstitution under s79(1). However, the Tribunal found that the absence of Judicial Member Lees for one week did not satisfy the requirements for reconstitution under s79(1). The Appeal Panel upheld this finding, holding that the absence of Judicial Member Lees for one week did not warrant reconstitution of the Tribunal.

Secondly, the Appeal Panel considered whether the Tribunal erred in finding that it was governed by s79(3) of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 when the preconditions set out in s79(1) had not been met. The Tribunal had ruled that it was governed by s79(3) because the absence of Judicial Member Lees was not as per s79(1). The Appeal Panel agreed with the Tribunal's interpretation, holding that the Tribunal was correctly governed by s79(3) as the preconditions set out in s79(1) had not been met.

Thirdly, the Appeal Panel examined whether the Tribunal was wrongly constituted when it proceeded without reconstitution following the absence of Judicial Member Lees for one week. The appellant argued that the Tribunal was wrongly constituted because it did not follow the requirements of s79(1). However, the Appeal Panel held that the Tribunal was not wrongly constituted, as the absence of Judicial Member Lees for one week did not warrant reconstitution under s79(1).

Fourthly, the Appeal Panel considered whether the Tribunal erred in failing to grant an adjournment when the parties submitted that the Tribunal was improperly constituted due to the absence of Judicial Member Lees. The appellant argued that the Tribunal should have granted an adjournment to allow for the proper constitution of the Tribunal. The Appeal Panel held that the Tribunal did not err in failing to grant an adjournment, as the absence of Judicial Member Lees for one week did not warrant reconstitution under s79(1).

Fifthly, the Appeal Panel addressed whether it had the jurisdiction to determine whether the Acting President of the Tribunal acted ultra vires in exercising powers under s79 of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997. The appellant argued that the Appeal Panel should determine whether the Acting President acted ultra vires. However, the Appeal Panel held that it did not have the jurisdiction to determine whether the Acting President acted ultra vires, as this was a matter for the President of the Tribunal.

Lastly, the Appeal Panel considered whether the Tribunal’s decision not to grant an adjournment was an error of law or a decision so unreasonable that no reasonable Tribunal would have made it. The appellant argued that the Tribunal's decision not to grant an adjournment was an error of law and unreasonable. The Appeal Panel held that the Tribunal's decision not to grant an adjournment was an error of law, as the Tribunal should have granted an adjournment to allow for the proper constitution of the Tribunal.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Tribunal must follow the requirements of s79 of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 when considering the absence of a member. If the absence of a member warrants reconstitution under s79(1), the Tribunal must reconstitute itself. If the absence of a member does not warrant reconstitution under s79(1), the Tribunal may proceed without reconstitution under s79(3). The Appeal Panel held that the Tribunal did not err in finding that it was governed by s79(3) when the preconditions set out in s79(1) had not been met. However, the Appeal Panel also held that the Tribunal erred in failing to grant an adjournment when the parties submitted that the Tribunal was improperly constituted due to the absence of Judicial Member Lees. This case clarifies the requirements of s79 of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 and the consequences of failing to follow those requirements.