IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M50 of 2020
B e t w e e n -
TU PHAN (A PSEUDONYM)
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M51 of 2020
B e t w e e n -
JIN WU (A PSEUDONYM)
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
BELL J
KEANE J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON WEDNESDAY, 11 NOVEMBER 2020, AT 12.53 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
____________________
MR P.J. MORRISSEY, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with MS C.A. BOSTON for the applicants. Ms Boston is present but not on camera. (instructed by Melasecca Kelly & Zayler)
MR L.K. CROWLEY, QC: May it please the Court, I appear for the respondent in each case with MR D.P. HOLDING who is also present but not on camera. (instructed by Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions)
BELL J: Yes, Mr Morrissey.
MR MORRISSEY: Your Honours, the key special leave question for us today is question No 2: does Part 1AB of the Crimes Act affect and augment the exclusionary weight of the matters in section 138(3)(d), (g) and (h) of the Evidence Act and particularly in circumstances such as those of the current case. Our contention is that the police do need guidance and incentive and encouragement to comply with the important scheme in Part 1AB. Deterrence is a relevant – unusually relevant consideration in that and the trial courts need guidance if they are faced with applications under section 138 arising from breaches of Part 1AB as in this case.
So, the first part I would turn to, obviously welcoming any interruptions or questions that emerge, is the question of section 138(3)(g), that is the subsection that concerns deterrence, and the submissions here also capture what we have to say about the application of Part 1AB. Subparagraph (g) is an important provision. In Kadir and Grech at paragraph 16 the Court observed that:
Where an officer is likely to be dealt with in another forum for his or her misconduct, the need to exclude evidence as a deterrent is reduced.
Now, there can be a danger of reducing deterrence to the status of an incantation, to use that comment from Ridgeway at paragraph 9, the “hollow and unavailing” statements. Deterrence in 138(3)(g) focuses chiefly on the response to the breach in conduct. Deterrence is not irrelevant where the breach is careless. Analogy could be drawn with sentencing for negligent manslaughter or culpable driving. What has been deterred in that setting is the carelessness.
So, we have an initial contention at 138(3)(g) is not ameliorated by the absence of recklessness and we argue that deterrence applies particularly when considering Part1AB and it applies regardless of whether the failure to comply was reckless or careless. We have described it as a goad to compliance, in our submissions, and I would briefly seek to amplify the…
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- Case
- [2020] HCATrans 186
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the police had lawfully obtained the audio recordings. This involved determining whether the police had complied with the requirements of the *Crimes (Surveillance Devices) Act 2004* (Cth) in obtaining warrants for the installation and use of the listening device. Specifically, the Court had to consider whether the warrants were properly issued, given the nature of the information provided to the issuing officer and the scope of the surveillance authorised.
Bell and Keane JJ held that the audio recordings were unlawfully obtained. Their Honours found that the information provided to the issuing officer in support of the warrant applications was insufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements for authorising surveillance. The Court reasoned that the police had failed to demonstrate that the surveillance was necessary for the purposes of investigating the alleged offences and that less intrusive means were unavailable. Consequently, the recordings were obtained in contravention of the law, and their admission into evidence was an error.
The Court allowed the appeals, quashed the convictions, and ordered that the applicants be retried.
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