Tsovolos v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue
[2011] NSWADT 123
•27 May 2011
Administrative Decisions Tribunal
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Tsovolos & anor v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2011] NSWADT 123 Hearing dates: On the papers Decision date: 27 May 2011 Jurisdiction: Revenue Division Before: Judicial Member M Hole Decision: The assessments made on 1 February 2010 and 8 February 2010 are confirmed
Catchwords: Right to reside - life estate - principal place of residence Legislation Cited: Land Tax Management Act 1956 Cases Cited: Glenn v Federal Commissioner of Land Tax [1915] HCA 57
Firriolo v Firriolo [2000] NSWSC 1039
CPT Custodian Pty Limited v Commissioner of State Revenue of the State of Victoria (2005) 224 CLR 98
Glenn v The Federal Commissioner of Land Tax (1915) 20 CLR 490
Re Humphreys [2002] QSC 90
Hurley v Hurley (1947) 75 CLR 289
Pagano & Ors v Ruello [2001] NSWSC 63
Binetter v Dunkel (NSWSV, unreported, 28 May 1993, BC9301728)
Stevenson v Myers (1929) 47 WN (NSW) 94Category: Principal judgment Parties: Chris Tsovolos and Arthur Tsovolos (applicants)
Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (respondent)Representation: T L Wong, Barrister for respondent
Chris Tsovolos for applicants
Crown Solicitors for respondent
File Number(s): 106056
REasons for decision
This is an application by Chris Tsovolos and Arthur Tsovolos ("the applicants") for review of a decision of the Chief Commissioner of State Revenue ("the respondent") made on 1 February 2010 and 8 February 2010.
The parties have requested that this matter be considered on the papers. Both the applicants and the respondent have provided comprehensive written submissions to the Tribunal for consideration. The applicants have supplied a note dated 31 January 2011 signed by the occupant of the property at Earlwood ("the subject property"). This letter has originated from the office of Bartier Perry.
The matter concerns the assessment to land tax of the subject property for the land tax year 2010.
Facts
The factual matter of this application as disclosed in the Section 58 documents filed by the respondent and relating to the assessment issued on the subject property for the 2010 land tax year is as follows:
(a) on 19 January 2010 a land tax assessment notice was issued to A Tsovolos atf A & P Tsovolos, F A Tsovolos & C Tsovolos and others in respect of the subject property. This assessment notice was forwarded to a post office box at Bexley North. This assessment related only to the subject property and assessed the subject property at a taxable value of $436,667.00 and raised land tax on that amount less the threshold of $376,000.00;
(b) on 1 February 2010 a land tax assessment notice was issued to Mr Chris Tsovolos atf J & Z Tsovolos Grandchildren Family Trust and also to the Bexley North post office. This assessment disclosed a half share in the subject property and also another property. The full taxable value of the half share of the subject property and the full taxable value of the second property were assessed to be subject to land tax. No threshold was applied therefore total land tax was raised on both properties including the half share of the subject property;
(c) on 8 February 2010 a land tax assessment notice was issued to A Tsovolos atf A & P Tsovolos Family Trust also to the Bexley North post office. This assessment related only to the other half share in the subject property and no threshold was applied resulting in land tax being payable;
(d) an objection to the assessments made on 1 February 2010 and 8 February 2010 were made on 2 March 2010;
(e) the objections were referred to a Review Officer of the respondent and this took place and was completed on 19 May 2010; and
(f) a letter was forwarded to the applicants dated 8 June 2010 from the respondent noting the disallowance of the objections.
On 29 May 2003 the applicants, described as purchasers, entered into a sale agreement for the subject property from the vendor ("the vendor") who continued to be and is now the occupant of the subject property. This agreement is not in a standard form of a contract for sale. Further specific terms of the agreement upon which the claim is made by the applicants are recited below.
The agreement and the Transfer entered into pursuant to that agreement were stamped. The Transfer was then registered on Title on or before 5 June 2003.
A caveat was prepared on behalf of the occupant (formerly the vendor) of the subject property and was entered on Title on 18 December 2009. This caveat has been entered on Title and bearing the requisite statutory declaration of the applicant Chris Tsovolos acting for the caveator and noting that he is a solicitor. This caveat purports to protect "a life estate - right to reside" and has been drawn by virtue of the facts of "Agreement granted a life estate to reside in the stipulated residence as his main residence". The transfer to the applicants by the vendor discloses a consideration of $130,000.00.
Legislation
The applicable legislation is Section 20 Land Tax Management Act 1956 ("the Act"):
"Owner of freehold
20 Owner of freehold
The owner of any freehold estate less than the fee-simple (other than an estate of freehold arising by virtue of a lease for life under a lease or an agreement for a lease) shall be deemed to be the owner of the fee-simple, to the exclusion of any person entitled in reversion or remainder."
and Section 10(1)(r):
"Land exempted from tax
10 Land exempted from tax
(1) Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Act the following lands shall, subject to sections 10B, 10D, 10E, 10G and 10P, be exempted from taxation under this Act:
...
(r) land that is exempt from taxation under the principal place of residence exemption, as provided for by Schedule 1A,
..."
and Section 3:
"Definitions
3 Definitions
(1) In this Act, unless the context or subject-matter otherwise indicates or requires:
...
"Owner" includes:
(a) in relation to land, every person who jointly or severally, whether at law or in equity:
(i) is entitled to the land for any estate of freehold in possession, or
(ii) is entitled to receive, or is in receipt of, or if the land were let to a tenant would be entitled to receive, the rents and profits thereof, whether as beneficial owner, trustee, mortgagee in possession, or otherwise,
(c) in relation to any leasehold estate in land, whether legal or equitable (other than under any lease to which section 21C or 21D applies), a person, or a person who is a member of a class or description of persons, prescribed for the purposes of this paragraph, and
(d) a person who, by virtue of this Act, is deemed to be the owner.
..."
9 Also Schedule 1A clause 2(3):
"SCHEDULE 1A - Principal place of residence exemption
...
Part 2 - Principal place of residence exemption
2 Principal place of residence exemption
...
(3) If the owner of land is entitled to the exemption conferred by this clause, no other person is liable to be assessed for taxation under this Act in respect of the land during the period of the owner's entitlement to the exemption.
..."
Relevant clauses of the agreement dated 29 May 2003
The specific clauses of Annexure "A" of the agreement to which the applicants and the respondent have referred and as set out in the Agreement dated 29 May 2003 are the Recitals and clauses 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, 3.2, 4.3, 5.1, 6.1 and 6.2 being:
"RECITALS:
A. The Vendor is the registered owner of the Property.
B. The vendor has agreed to sell and the Purchasers have agreed to purchase the Property in accord with the terms and conditions contained herein.
C. The Vendor will have a right to continue to reside at the Property without charge as specified in this Agreement.
...
2. SALE
...
2.2 In respect of the acquisition of the Property, the Purchasers agree to provide the following consideration to the Vendor:
(a) payment of $50,000 to the Vendor (or to such other person as the Vendor may in writing direct) on the execution of this Agreement;
(b) payment of $50,000 to the Vendor within one week of the execution of this Agreement;
(c) payments of $250 to the Vendor each month (such payment to be paid prior to the end of each month) for a ten year period, commencing the first month following the date of this Agreement; and
(d) the Vendor being granted the right to continue reside in the Property until the first to occur of the following:
(i) the date of death of the Vendor; or
(ii) the date upon which the Vendor ceases to permanently reside at the Property;
and the expression "ceases to permanently reside" will have its ordinary meaning, but to put the matter beyond doubt will be taken to have at least occurred no latter (sic) than the date following the expiration of a continuous six month period in which the Vendor has not occupied the Property.
2.3 Upon the date of death of the Vendor or upon the date the Vendor ceases to permanently reside at the Property in accordance with paragraph (d) of clause 2.2, the Vendor's right to continued possession will cease and the Purchasers will have the right to immediate and unrestricted possession of the Property.
...
3. POST COMPLETION COSTS/DESTRUCTION OF RESIDENCE
3.1 During the period that the Vendor continues to permanently reside at the Property, the Purchasers agree to pay the following costs:
(a) Council rates;
(b) Water rates and water usage charges; and
(c) the costs of maintaining the Property in a good and habitable state of repair, fair wear and tear excepted (including building insurance).
3.2 In the event Vendor is continuing to permanently reside at the Property and the residence located at the Property is damaged by fire, rain, storm etc, such that it ceases to be fit for a person to reside at the Property, then the Purchasers agree to arrange and pay for the Vendor to tenant a residence (such residence to provide internal cooking facilities and bathroom, and off street parking) of an equal standard as that at the Property until such time as the residence situated at the Property is fit for the Vendor to resume his residing at the Property.
4. VENDOR'S WARRANTIES
...
4.3 The Vendor agrees that he will not allow any other person other than himself to reside at the Property without the prior written consent of the Purchasers.
...
5. PURCHASERS' WARRANTIES
5.1 The Purchaser agrees to not interfere with the Vendor's quiet enjoyment and possession of the Property throughout the duration of their possession, other than in accordance with clause 3.
6. SUCCESSORS
6.1 This Agreement binds and enures for the benefit of the parties.
6.2 The Vendor acknowledges that the right to reside in the Property is personal and wholly represented by this Agreement and according to its terms no interest in the Property will enure for his assigns or successors, including his legal personal representatives."
Independent Evidence
The Vendor currently resides in the property and in a note addressed to the Tribunal he says:
"...
1. I currently reside in the Property and have done so for more than 30 years.
2. In June 2003, I sold the Property to Arthur Tsovolos and Chris Tsvolos. I sold the Property to them as they agreed to purchase the Property from me on terms that satisfied my primary objective, being that I would have the right (that could not be lost) to continue to live in the Property for the remainder of my life or until such time as due to ill health I could not reside in the Property.
3. I understand that under the terms of the Sale Agreement when I sold the Property, that I have been provided with the right to continue to live in the Property for the remainder of my life or until such time as due to ill health I can no longer reside in the Property.
..."
Applicants' submissions
The applicants submitted that the relevant definition in Section 3 of the Act provides that:
"(a) an equitable interest in land for an estate or freehold in possession is sufficient;
(b) the expression freehold in possession is not defined for the purposes of the Act and as such takes its ordinary meaning."
The applicants submitted that an owner can be such in circumstances where they do not hold a life estate interest as section 3 of the Act requires that the person "merely ... they hold an equitable interest in land for an estate of freehold in possession". In support of this submission the applicants drew attention to Glenn v Federal Commissioner of Land Tax [1915] HCA 57 ("Glenn's case") and noted that the judgement of the High Court in this case has been repeatedly followed and cited as the leading judicial authority for the interpretation of the definition of "owner" and in particular the meaning of the expression "an equitable interest in land for any estate of freehold in possession". Attention was drawn to an extract from Griffith CJ in the judgement in Glenn's case including a reference to:
"In my opinion the term "estate in possession" is used in the Land Tax Assessment Act in the sense explained by Mr. Butler. This is not only the natural, but the only just, interpretation that can be put on the words. For the tax is an annual tax, and the "owner" of the land is the person who is in the present enjoyment of the fruits which presumably afford the fund from which it is to be paid."
The applicants submitted that:
"[the vendor] has a present vested right of enjoyment in relation to the Property and is the sole person who has a current interest to possess the Property (such an interest being unconditional and vested as it cannot be removed). [the vendor's] interest in the Property can only cease upon his death or as otherwise noted in the agreement which arises from ill health. There is no contingency or conditions that need to be satisfied which overrides or makes [the vendor's] interest in the Property at risk of being defeated or removed. His interest has vested and cannot be removed or denied by the Applicants, whose interest is in remainder."
The applicants also submitted that:
"[the vendor's] interest in the land is to reside into until his death or he otherwise ceases to permanently reside in the property. Whilst pursuant to the Sale Agreement [the vendor] provides warranties to the Applicants, a breach by him of those warranties does not entitle the Applicants to possess the land nor does [the vendor] interest in the land cease. His interest in the land cannot be extinguished or lost by any act that [the vendor] may do. There are no conditions contained in the sale agreement pursuant to which his interest in the Property may be terminated by the Applicants or any other person."
The applicants submitted that the comments of Isaacs J in Glenn's case supported the contention that an interest will be vested for the purposes of a person being an owner if:
"that the appellants are in a position to obtain from a Court of equity an order permitting them to enter into actual possession of the land or the receipt of profits".
Submitting further that of particular note is that Isaacs J only required that a person be able to obtain a Court order for possession of the property or a receipt of profits. Isaacs J did not state that the person must be able to obtain a Court Order for possession and also a Court Order for a receipt of profits.
The applicants submitted that:
"In this matter the Sale Agreement does not provide any term and conditions in relation to rent of the Property. The Property can not be rented by either the Applicants or [the vendor]. The renting out of the Property was not contracted as this was not a relevant objective of [the vendor]; he only wished to confirm that he can reside in the property without being forced to relocate. This right and interest in the Property is contained in the Sale Agreement."
The applicants submitted that:
"By reference to Isaacs J's judgment in Glenn's case, if required, [the vendor] has the right to obtain a Court order for possession of the Property. As such, [the vendor] holds a present vested equitable right in the Property."
The applicants submitted that:
"In considering the breadth of the definition "Owner", whilst it has been accepted that the definition is exhaustive despite its use of the term "includes" as opposed to exhaustive language, such as "means", there is nothing in the Act to imply that the only type of equity interest holder that can satisfy the definition of Owner is a life estate tenant."
The applicants referred to Firriolo v Firriolo [2000] NSWSC 1039 ("Firriolo") wherein a determination was made that the words "right to reside" amounted to the granting of a life estate. This was determined by reference to another clause in the Will which confirmed that the creation of a life estate was the testator's objective. Further that the applicants and the vendor in entering into the agreement at all times intended for and had agreed that the vendor's interest in the property was a vested interest being a life estate and reference was made to the note provided to the Tribunal by the vendor and that the parties have at all times acted in that manner.
The applicants submitted that:
"... many cases refer to the distinction between a right of residency and life tenants as being able to be determined by reference to whether the tenant is responsible for the outgoings of the residence during their lifetime. In this matter, whilst these outgoings are the responsibility of the registered owners, this arises from the terms of purchase and not the rights granted to the life tenant. That is, the consideration payable by the purchasers including the making of the payments referred to in clause 3.1. Had these amounts not been agreed to be paid by the Applicants during the course of the tenants residency, then the up front purchase amount would have been higher. As such, this factor is not determinative."
The applicants submitted that the owner of the property being the vendor is entitled to the principal place of residence exemption contained in Schedule 1A of the Act and that accordingly by operation of Sections 11(2) and 20 of the Act and clause 2(3) of Schedule 1A of the Act all owners are exempt from the assessment while the same circumstances continue.
The applicants submitted that:
"In these circumstances, the life interest held by [the vendor] is such that he satisfies the definition of Owner for the purposes of section of the Act. Further, given that [the vendor] has the right to possess the Property, then the Applicants rights as the registered owners of the Property are not taken into account whilst [the vendor] continues to exercise his interest in possession. This is because the Applicants' interests are a remainder interest in the Property and have no right to current possession of the Property."
Respondent's submissions
The respondent submitted that the decision of the respondent may be summarised as follows:
"...
(a) any rights held by [the vendor] to reside in the Property are personal and not proprietary rights;
(b) [the vendor] is therefore not an "owner' of the Property, within the meaning of s 3 of the Land Tax Management Act 1956 (NSW) ("LTMA") and is not entitled to claim the PPR exemption.
..."
The respondent submitted that the Agreement does not create a life estate. The Agreement provided for the vendor to retain "the right to reside in the property" and that this right was personal to the vendor as described in clause 6.2 of the Agreement and as consequence no interest then passes to his assigns or successors. The right to reside being restricted in that if the vendor ceases to permanently reside at the property as referred to in clause 2.2(d) then the vendor's rights cease and the purchasers, being the applicants, will have the right to immediate and unrestricted possession of the property. Further that while the vendor continues to permanently reside at the property then the purchasers, being the applicants, pay all of the outgoings as referred to in clause 3.1 of the Agreement. Clause 3.2 provides that the applicants will arrange and pay for the vendor to be a tenant in a residence of an equal standard until the subject property is fit for habitation. Further that the vendor is restricted and may not permit any other person to reside at the property without prior written consent of the applicants as set out in clause 4.3 of the Agreement.
The respondent submitted that land tax is payable on all land in New South Wales unless there is an exemption provided within the Act.
Section 3 of the Act defines "Owner" as a person who is entitled to the land for an "estate of freehold in possession". The respondent drew attention to the applicants' concession that the definition of owner as set out in clause 3(a)(ii) does not apply and that this is because the vendor is not entitled to receive the rents and profits from the property.
The respondent submitted that the applicants must show that the vendor is entitled to an estate of freehold in possession either being an estate in fee simple or a life estate these being the only estates of freehold recognised in New South Wales. The applicants have cited no authority which would allow the phrase "estate of freehold in possession" to be expanded to incorporate other types of proprietary or personal interests. Reference was made to CPT Custodian Pty Limited v Commissioner of State Revenue of the State of Victoria (2005) 224 CLR 98 ("CPT Custodian") wherein the High Court of Australia rejected the proposition that "owner" for land tax purposes would include any person who had rights that would be protected by a court of equity.
In response to the applicants reliance upon Glenn v The Federal Commissioner of Land Tax (1915) 20 CLR 490 the respondent drew attention to the majority of the High Court which held that three residuary beneficiaries under a Will were not "entitled to an estate of freehold in possession" within the meaning of the relevant land tax legislation in circumstances where they had no present right of enjoyment of the property.
The respondent submitted that the rights conferred upon the vendor by the agreement did not give him an estate in fee simple whether legal, equitable, determinable or defeasible for the following reasons:
"33. First, under clause 6.2 of the Sale Agreement, [the vendor's] rights are described in the Sale Agreement as "personal", and he has no right to assign or devise his interest under the Sale Agreement whatsoever. This is antithetical to [the vendor] having any proprietary interest in the Property, let alone an estate in fee simple or any other estate of freehold in possession.
34. Secondly, under clause 4.3 of the Sale Agreement, [the vendor] agreed that he would not allow any other person other than himself to reside at the Property without the prior written consent of the Applicants. Once again, the inability to determine who will be permitted to reside on the Property is inconsistent with the conferral of absolute ownership of the land.
35. Thirdly, when clauses 4.3 and 6.2 are considered together, it is apparent that [the vendor] has no right to lease the Property, as this would require [the vendor] to hold a proprietary interest in the Property which the Sale Agreement expressly disclaims."
The respondent submitted that the agreement does not confer an estate in fee simple upon the vendor as the property is transferred by the vendor to the applicants without any reservation or limitation on the interest being conferred and the agreement does not provide any language from which it could be inferred that the parties intended that the vendor would continue to hold an estate or other proprietary interest in the property after the transfer of his estate in fee simple to the applicants.
The respondent submitted that:
"38. The essential characteristics of a life estate are as follows:
(a) a life estate is a proprietary interest in land which the life tenant can alienate for value Re Humphreys [2002] QSC 90 at [18] - [20]. By way of contrast, a "right to reside", is a personal right and is not assignable Hurley v Hurley (1947) 75 CLR 289 ("Hurley") at 290 - 291 per Rich J; Pagano & Ors v Ruello [2001] NSWSC 63 at [10]; and
(b) the life tenant is entitled to rent the property and to retain the rent received from renting the land. Notably, a person having but a personal "right to reside" has no such rights Binetter v Dunkel (NSWSV, unreported, 28 May 1993, BC9301728) at 32; Stevenson v Myers (1929) 47 WN (NSW) 94."
The respondent submitted that the agreement is the sole source of any rights that the vendor may have in relation to the property. The note from the vendor to the Tribunal provides his objective understanding of the meaning of the agreement and it is not evidence of the nature of those rights. The note from the vendor reiterates the wording from the agreement and does not use the words "life estate".
The respondent submitted that the wording of the agreement are "entirely and without exception consistent with" the vendor receiving a personal right to reside in the property. Clause 2.2(d) of the agreement states that the vendor is granted "the right to continue [to] reside in the property". The authorities establish that the use of the words "right to reside" or "right to live" demonstrate that the intention was that the grantee received a personal right to live in the property and not a life estate. Reference was made to Hurley.
Clause 2.2(d) of the agreement allows the vendor to continue to reside in the property until either his death or upon him ceasing to permanently reside in the property indicating that the vendor's rights can only be exercised personally by his continued occupation of the property.
The respondent submitted that clause 6.2 of the agreement states:
"(c) clause 6.2 again refers to the interest granted to [the vendor] as a "right to reside', and states that the right is "personal" and that "no interest in the Property will enure from his assigns or successors, including his legal personal representatives". The express categorisation of [the vendor's] right as "personal" is consistent with the conferral of a "right to reside", and demonstrates the intention of the parties that [the vendor] should not receive any proprietary interest, such as a life estate, in the Property."
The respondent referred to Firriolo and drew attention to the fact that although "right to reside" may result in the conferral of a life estate in a Will the deceased had expressly referred to the interest as a "life estate" in a subsequent clause of the Will. Bergin J held that the use of the term "life estate" was a clear indication of the deceased's intent stating:
"Certainly the deceased used a "term of art" in Clause 4 of the Will in referring to [the first defendant's] "life estate". If that term had not been used Clause 3(b) may more easily have been construed to mean that [the first defendant] only had a right to reside personally in the house subject to the proviso."
In the present case there is no reference to the words "life estate", further that there are no other words indicating an intention to confer a life estate as for example by granting a right to "use and occupy" the subject property.
Reasons for decision
On 29 May 2003 the applicants entered into an agreement with the vendor to purchase the subject property subject to certain rights remaining in the vendor. A Transfer was stamped and registered in favour of the applicants. The Transfer is not restricted in any form and is of the fee simple. Between the date of registration of the Transfer to the applicants and 19 December 2009 the applicants were registered as proprietors as tenants in common in equal shares and could have at any stage in the absence of any activity taken by the vendor dealt with the property entirely.
The sale provided for payment of the consideration over an extended period of time and, notwithstanding that, the Transfer was registered in favour of the applicants.
The sale was also subject to "the vendor being granted the right to continue reside in the property until the first to occur of the following:
(i) the date of death of the vendor; or
(ii) the date upon which the vendor ceases to permanently reside at the property.
The Agreement provided that the applicants pay the council and water rates on the subject property. That the applicants maintain the property in a good and habitable state of repair and if the subject property is damaged or ceases to be fit for a person to reside in then the applicants agreed to arrange for alternate accommodation for the vendor.
The vendor is restricted from permitting any other person to reside in the subject property without prior written consent of the applicants.
The vendor acknowledges at clause 6.2 of the agreement that his right is a right to reside in the subject property and that it is personal and wholly represented in the agreement.
Section 3 of the Act defines "owner" as set out in paragraph 8 above as a person who is entitled at law and in equity for an estate of freehold in possession. The applicants have attempted to define the right of the vendor as being an estate recognised in equity as a life estate interest.
The applicants have not demonstrated that the interest held by the vendor is an estate in fee simple or a life estate in the subject property. The interest of the vendor is a personal right as set out in the agreement.
The reference to Glenn's case by both the applicants and the respondent has been helpful. In this matter the vendor has a personal right to reside in the subject property and is not able to leave the subject property for more than six months. In fact the vendor has lost all rights in the subject property apart from the right to continue to reside in the subject property until he dies or he ceases to permanently reside in the subject property.
The reference to CPT Custodian established that it is necessary to consider whether the right that could be protected by a Court of Equity was one that would permit the conclusion that the right so established the person as an owner in the statutory sense of the land held on the trusts that were considered in that case. In this particular matter the rights that could be protected by a Court of Equity in favour of the vendor would not be a life estate it would be a right to reside. As such the vendor does not satisfy the requirements of section 3 of the Act in that he is not an owner for the purposes of the Act.
In Firriolo the deceased had expressly referred to the interest as a "life estate" in a subsequent clause in the Will. The vendor in this matter confirmed in his note to the Tribunal that he "would have the right (that could not be lost) to continue in the property for the remainder of my life" or "until such time as due to ill health I can no longer reside in the property". This is the vendor's understanding of the agreement it does not enlarge the terms of clause 6.2 of the agreement in the manner in which the clause in the Will in Firriolo permitted the construction to be considered as conferring 'a life estate'.
Likewise in Glenn's case the High Court held that the three residuary beneficiaries under a Will were not entitled to an estate of freehold in possession and therefore the contention that this supports the applicants is incorrect. The note provided to the Tribunal from the vendor does not advance the argument of the applicants. The note sets out the vendor's understanding that the agreement entered into in June 2003 satisfied his primary objective. The agreement does not cover what would occur in the event that the reason for the vendor's inability to reside in the subject property was due to ill health or any other reason other than his voluntary absence from the subject property.
Orders
The assessments made on 1 February 2010 and 8 February 2010 are confirmed.
I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal.
Registrar
Decision last updated: 27 May 2011
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