[2007] HCATrans 677
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S99 of 2007
B e t w e e n -
PETER TSEKOURAS
Applicant
and
ANNE PRICE
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
Publication of reasons and pronouncement of orders
GUMMOW J
KIEFEL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 15 NOVEMBER 2007, AT 9.37 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
GUMMOW J: The applicant seeks special leave to appeal against the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Bryson JA). By those orders, Bryson JA dismissed the applicant's appeal against the orders of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Macready AJ) dismissing an application for relief under the Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW). Prior to the hearing before Bryson JA, Handley JA of the Court of Appeal had struck out the applicant's original notice of appeal and given leave to the applicant to file an amended notice of appeal. It was this amended notice of appeal that was before Bryson JA when his Honour dismissed the appeal.
Because the applicant is unrepresented, the application falls to be dealt with under r 41.10 of the High Court Rules 2004.
The applicant's written submissions do not identify any question of law arising from the decisions below. His written case and draft notice of appeal are devoted entirely to his factual assertion to have been in a de facto relationship with the deceased. The notice of appeal does not disclose any intelligible grounds for an appeal, as Bryson JA held.
Pursuant to r 41.10.5 we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application. I publish the disposition signed by Justice Kiefel and myself.
AT 9.38 AM THE MATTER WAS CONCLUDED
- AGLC
- Tsekouras v Price [2007] HCATrans 677
- Case
- [2007] HCATrans 677
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the High Court revolved around the interpretation of section 233 of the *Corporations Act*, which provides for statutory remedies for oppression, and the related question of whether the conduct complained of by the appellant constituted oppressive, unfairly prejudicial, or unfairly discriminatory conduct. The court also had to consider the scope of the court's discretion under section 233(1) to make orders to remedy such conduct.
In its reasoning, the High Court affirmed that the statutory concept of oppression under the *Corporations Act* is a broad one, encompassing conduct that is burdensome, harsh, or wrongful. Their Honours emphasised that the focus is on the substantive unfairness of the conduct, rather than merely technical breaches of legal rights. The court considered the relationship between the parties and the reasonable expectations of a minority shareholder in such a context. The High Court ultimately found that the conduct complained of did not meet the threshold for statutory oppression, and therefore, the appellant was not entitled to the relief sought under section 233.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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