Truong v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Truong v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1312

Citation: Truong v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1312
Appeal from: Truong v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2013] FCCA 1965
Parties: DUC THAO TRUONG v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number(s): VID 1342 of 2013
Judge(s): GREENWOOD J
Date of judgment: 3 December 2014
Catchwords: MIGRATION – consideration of an appeal from the Federal Circuit Court dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal affirming a decision of a delegate of the Minister to refuse the appellant’s application for a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK), Subclass 820 (Spouse) visa – consideration of the definition of spouse in reg 1.15A of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – consideration of the criteria for the grant of a subclass 820 visa contained in Pt 820 of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – consideration of the distinction between “time of application” criteria and “time of decision” criteria – where Tribunal failed to distinguish between matters relevant to the “time of application” criteria and matters relevant to the “time of decision criteria”
Legislation: Migration Act 1956 (Cth), s 31
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), regs 1.03; 1.15A; 2.01; 2.03; Sch 1, cl 1214C; Sch 2, cls 300.213, 820.21, 820.211, 820.22, 820.221, 820.222, 820.223, 820.226
Cases cited: Truong v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2013] FCCA 1965 – cited and quoted
Minister of State for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Dhillon (unreported, Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, 8 May 1990, Northrop, Wilcox and French JJ) – cited  
Date of hearing: 4 March 2014
Place: Melbourne
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 111
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr D Brown, Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 1342 of 2013

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

DUC THAO TRUONG
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GREENWOOD J

DATE OF ORDER:

3 DECEMBER 2014

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is allowed.

2.Orders 2 and 3 of the orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 3 December 2013 be set aside and in lieu thereof there be orders that:

(a)the application for judicial review is allowed;

(b)the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal made on 20 February 2013 be set aside; and

(c)the matter be remitted to the Migration Review Tribunal for determination according to law.

3.Pursuant to ss 17 and 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 1.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011, these orders are made in Chambers and published and pronounced from Chambers together with reasons for judgment in support of the orders, without further convening the parties.

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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 1312
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Truong v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, a citizen of Vietnam, sought judicial review of the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) affirming a delegate's refusal of his application for a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK), Subclass 820 (Spouse) visa. The appellant, accompanied by his wife, Ms Hong Dao Trieu, an Australian citizen, applied for a Subclass 820 visa, which was refused on the basis that the appellant and Ms Trieu were not spouses within the meaning of the relevant legislation. The Tribunal upheld the delegate's decision, finding the relationship to be not genuine and continuing.

The central legal issue in this appeal was whether the Tribunal erred in its consideration of the evidence and in its application of the criteria for determining whether the appellant and Ms Trieu were spouses for the purposes of the visa application. Specifically, the Court had to determine whether the Tribunal correctly distinguished between the criteria relevant to the time of application and those relevant to the time of the Tribunal's decision. The appellant argued that the Tribunal failed to consider relevant matters and instead focused on aspects of the relationship at the time of the Tribunal's decision rather than at the time of the visa application.

The Court held that the Tribunal did indeed err by not adequately distinguishing between the criteria relevant to the time of the visa application and those relevant to the time of the Tribunal's decision. The Court found that the Tribunal's focus on the circumstances at the time of the Tribunal's decision, rather than at the time of the visa application, was a misapplication of the statutory criteria. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Tribunal's decision, and remitted the matter to the Tribunal for reconsideration in light of the correct criteria.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. Orders 2 and 3 of the orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 3 December 2013 be set aside and in lieu thereof there be orders that:

(a) the application for judicial review is allowed;

(b) the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal made on 20 February 2013 be set aside; and

(c) the matter be remitted to the Migration Review Tribunal for determination according to law.

3. Pursuant to ss 17 and 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 1.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011, these orders are made in Chambers and published and pronounced from Chambers together with reasons for judgment in support of the orders, without further convening the parties.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

At the hearing of the appeal on 4 March 2014, the appellant appeared in person before the Court assisted by an interpreter skilled in the Vietnamese and English languages. The appellant was accompanied at the bar table by a woman whom the Court understood to be his wife, Ms Hong Dao Trieu.BACKGROUND The appellant is a citizen of Vietnam. While in Ho Chi Minh City, he applied for and on 24 November 2006 was granted, a Prospective Marriage (Temporary) (Class TO), Subclass 300 (Prospective Marriage) visa (a “Subclass 300 visa”) which entitled him to enter and remain in Australia until 24 August 2007. The appellant’s application for that visa was “sponsored” by Ms Hong Dao Trieu, who was, for the purpose of the application, the appellant’s “prospective spouse” (see cl 300.213 of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the “Regulations”)). Ms Trieu is (and has been since 5 May 2003) an Australian citizen. Although she had previously been married to a Mr Tee Tran (whom the Tribunal sometimes erroneously referred to as “Mr Tan”), she had become divorced from him on 26 October 2003. The appellant entered Australia on 9 December 2006. It was a condition of his Subclass 300 visa that he lodge an application for a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK), Subclass 820 (Spouse) visa (a “Subclass 820 visa”) and a Partner (Residence) (Class BS), Subclass 801 (Spouse) visa (a “Subclass 801 visa”). The appellant married Ms Trieu in Victoria on 3 January 2007. On 31 May 2007, the appellant applied to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (as it was then called) for a Subclass 820 visa and a Subclass 801 visa. That application was (as is required) sponsored by the same sponsor, Ms Trieu. The application was refused by a delegate of the Minister on 8 April 2011 on the ground that although the appellant (the visa applicant) and Ms Trieu (the visa sponsor) were married, they were not “spouses” within the meaning of that term in the relevant provisions of the legislation. On 20 February 2013, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision.THE LEGISLATIVE SCHEME The relevant legislation, as it was in force on 31 May 2007 (the date of the appellant’s application for a Subclass 820 visa), is this. Section 31 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the “Act”) provides that there are to be “prescribed classes of visas” (s 31(1)) and that the “regulations may prescribe criteria for a visa or visas of a specified class” (s 31(3)). Regulation 2.01(a) of the Regulations provides that for the purposes of s 31 of the Act, the prescribed classes of visas are “such classes (other than those created by the Act) as are set out in the respective items in Schedule 1”. Clause 1214C of Sch 1 provides for there to be a class of visa known as a “Partner (Temporary) (Class UK)” visa. That visa has subclasses “820 (Spouse)” and “826 (Interdependency)”: cl 1214C(4). Regulation 2.03(1) of the Regulations provides that:For the purposes of subsection 31(3) of the Act (which deals with criteria for the grant of a visa), the prescribed criteria for the grant to a person of a visa of a particular class are:(a)the primary criteria set out in a relevant Part of Schedule 2; or(b)if a relevant Part of Schedule 2 sets out secondary criteria, those secondary criteria.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The appellant advised the Tribunal, in response to the second letter, that he had decided to make no further comment on these issues, and that he believed that he had, in his previous response, “provided the Tribunal with all the facts, comments and information regarding the issues mentioned” by the Tribunal. The appellant’s letter in response to the Tribunal’s second letter also took the opportunity to confirm that the relationship the appellant had with his wife was “genuine and ongoing”.THE TRIBUNAL’S FINDINGS ARISING OUT OF ITS CONSIDERATION OF THE EVIDENCE The Tribunal considered that the “principal issue in the present case is whether the applicant is the spouse of the sponsor at the time of application” [emphasis added] (para 11 of the decision record), and the Tribunal’s ultimate findings were directed only to the “time of application” criteria for the granting of a Subclass 820 visa. In his submissions on behalf of the Minster in this appeal, by way of explanation of the Tribunal’s approach, Mr Brown said this (at Transcript, p 10, ll 13‑16):… for the purposes of the decision the tribunal considered that it did not need to go beyond the time of application criteria because, in the view of the tribunal, this was not a genuine spousal relationship, and that was a necessary condition at the time of application for the visa application to succeed. Some of the Tribunal’s particular findings of fact and reasoning, however, appear to refer to circumstances prevailing at the time of the Tribunal’s decision. I will examine that discrepancy later in these reasons. As to the first limb of the definition in reg 1.15A(1A) of a “married relationship”, the Tribunal was satisfied that the appellant and Ms Trieu had been and remained married to each other under a marriage that is recognised as valid for the purposes of the Act (reg 1.15A(1A)(a)). The Tribunal then undertook a detailed consideration of the second limb: whether the appellant and Ms Trieu had a mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife to the exclusion of all others; whether the relationship between them was genuine and continuing; and whether they lived together or did not live separately and apart on a permanent basis (regs 1.15A(1A)(b)(i) to (iii)). In assessing whether their relationship was genuine and continuing, the Tribunal explained that it had had regard to all of the circumstances of the relationship, including evidence of the financial and social aspects and the nature of the appellant’s and sponsor’s household and their commitment to each other (reg 1.15A(3)). As to the “financial aspects of the relationship”, after examining the relevant evidence, the Tribunal was “not satisfied that the parties pool resources or share day to day household expenses in a manner consistent with being in a genuine spousal relationship” (para 59). As to the “nature of the household”, the Tribunal made the following finding at para 61:The parties have told the Tribunal that they share the housework however they have provided no insights into their domestic activities. If a couple has lived together for more than 5 years they should be able to talk in detail about their household activities and provide robust evidence about their household arrangements. For these reasons, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the [appellant] and the sponsor have shared household and associated domestic activities.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary Judge therefore concluded that the appellant’s criticisms were all “in substance either misconceived and/or merits review”. His Honour held that the Tribunal’s finding was “clearly open to it”.CONSIDERATION OF THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL Before turning to consider each of the particulars of the ground of appeal in the notice of appeal, it is necessary to say something about two particular matters: first, the way that the primary Judge approached the appellant’s assertion in the Federal Circuit Court that the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error; and second, the apparent failure of the Tribunal and the primary Judge to distinguish between matters relevant, on the one hand, to whether the appellant and respondent were in a spousal relationship at the time of the visa application and, on the other hand, to whether they were in a spousal relationship at the time of the Tribunal’s decision. As to the first matter, the primary Judge’s only discussion of the relevant law is in these terms:[4] All concerned agree that the only issue before the Tribunal relevant to these purposes was whether or not the applicant was in a spousal relationship with his visa sponsor. The Tribunal asserted at [para 13 of the decision record] that:“In the case of both married and de facto relationships, the Tribunal must be satisfied that there is a mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife to the exclusion of all others, that the relationship is genuine and continuing, and that the couple live together, or do not live separately and apart on a permanent basis.”[5] In my view that is a correct enunciation of the relevant applicable, and critical, principle. [6] The Tribunal’s decision commences by setting out a Review of the Application and the Relevant Law. As I have indicated there is no dispute about what the relevant law is, and that the passage cited sufficiently indicates what the relevant test is. [bold emphasis added] The primary Judge’s reasons do not contain any discussion of the fact that, pursuant to reg 1.15A(3) (reproduced at [22] of these reasons), there are particular aspects of the circumstances of the relationship to which the Minister (and therefore the Tribunal in place of the Minister) must have regard in forming an opinion whether two persons are in a married relationship. If it were simply the case that the statement quoted at [4] of the primary Judge’s reasons was the extent of the statutory test, then the primary Judge’s discussion of the particulars of the appellant’s ground of review and whether or not each of the Tribunal’s findings were open to it, may well have been a correct approach. But where, as here, there is a comprehensive (although not exhaustive) legislative statement of matters to which the Tribunal must have regard, it is necessary to examine the Tribunal’s reasons in light of those matters. That is, whether or not any of the particulars of the ground of review (or, in the case of this appeal, the ground of appeal) correctly assert that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by failing to consider relevant matters or by considering irrelevant matters, the relevance (or not) of those matters is to be determined by reference to reg 1.15A(3).