FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Truong v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1312
Citation: Truong v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1312 Appeal from: Truong v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2013] FCCA 1965 Parties: DUC THAO TRUONG v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number(s): VID 1342 of 2013 Judge(s): GREENWOOD J Date of judgment: 3 December 2014 Catchwords: MIGRATION – consideration of an appeal from the Federal Circuit Court dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal affirming a decision of a delegate of the Minister to refuse the appellant’s application for a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK), Subclass 820 (Spouse) visa – consideration of the definition of spouse in reg 1.15A of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – consideration of the criteria for the grant of a subclass 820 visa contained in Pt 820 of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – consideration of the distinction between “time of application” criteria and “time of decision” criteria – where Tribunal failed to distinguish between matters relevant to the “time of application” criteria and matters relevant to the “time of decision criteria” Legislation: Migration Act 1956 (Cth), s 31
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), regs 1.03; 1.15A; 2.01; 2.03; Sch 1, cl 1214C; Sch 2, cls 300.213, 820.21, 820.211, 820.22, 820.221, 820.222, 820.223, 820.226Cases cited: Truong v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2013] FCCA 1965 – cited and quoted
Minister of State for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Dhillon (unreported, Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, 8 May 1990, Northrop, Wilcox and French JJ) – citedDate of hearing: 4 March 2014 Place: Melbourne Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 111 Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr D Brown, Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 1342 of 2013
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: DUC THAO TRUONG
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
GREENWOOD J
DATE OF ORDER:
3 DECEMBER 2014
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is allowed.
2.Orders 2 and 3 of the orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 3 December 2013 be set aside and in lieu thereof there be orders that:
(a)the application for judicial review is allowed;
(b)the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal made on 20 February 2013 be set aside; and
(c)the matter be remitted to the Migration Review Tribunal for determination according to law.
3.Pursuant to ss 17 and 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 1.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011, these orders are made in Chambers and published and pronounced from Chambers together with reasons for judgment in support of the orders, without further convening the parties.
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 1312
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue in this appeal was whether the Tribunal erred in its consideration of the evidence and in its application of the criteria for determining whether the appellant and Ms Trieu were spouses for the purposes of the visa application. Specifically, the Court had to determine whether the Tribunal correctly distinguished between the criteria relevant to the time of application and those relevant to the time of the Tribunal's decision. The appellant argued that the Tribunal failed to consider relevant matters and instead focused on aspects of the relationship at the time of the Tribunal's decision rather than at the time of the visa application.
The Court held that the Tribunal did indeed err by not adequately distinguishing between the criteria relevant to the time of the visa application and those relevant to the time of the Tribunal's decision. The Court found that the Tribunal's focus on the circumstances at the time of the Tribunal's decision, rather than at the time of the visa application, was a misapplication of the statutory criteria. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Tribunal's decision, and remitted the matter to the Tribunal for reconsideration in light of the correct criteria.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is allowed.
2. Orders 2 and 3 of the orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 3 December 2013 be set aside and in lieu thereof there be orders that:
(a) the application for judicial review is allowed;
(b) the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal made on 20 February 2013 be set aside; and
(c) the matter be remitted to the Migration Review Tribunal for determination according to law.
3. Pursuant to ss 17 and 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 1.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011, these orders are made in Chambers and published and pronounced from Chambers together with reasons for judgment in support of the orders, without further convening the parties.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The primary Judge therefore concluded that the appellant’s criticisms were all “in substance either misconceived and/or merits review”. His Honour held that the Tribunal’s finding was “clearly open to it”.CONSIDERATION OF THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL Before turning to consider each of the particulars of the ground of appeal in the notice of appeal, it is necessary to say something about two particular matters: first, the way that the primary Judge approached the appellant’s assertion in the Federal Circuit Court that the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error; and second, the apparent failure of the Tribunal and the primary Judge to distinguish between matters relevant, on the one hand, to whether the appellant and respondent were in a spousal relationship at the time of the visa application and, on the other hand, to whether they were in a spousal relationship at the time of the Tribunal’s decision. As to the first matter, the primary Judge’s only discussion of the relevant law is in these terms:[4] All concerned agree that the only issue before the Tribunal relevant to these purposes was whether or not the applicant was in a spousal relationship with his visa sponsor. The Tribunal asserted at [para 13 of the decision record] that:“In the case of both married and de facto relationships, the Tribunal must be satisfied that there is a mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife to the exclusion of all others, that the relationship is genuine and continuing, and that the couple live together, or do not live separately and apart on a permanent basis.”[5] In my view that is a correct enunciation of the relevant applicable, and critical, principle. [6] The Tribunal’s decision commences by setting out a Review of the Application and the Relevant Law. As I have indicated there is no dispute about what the relevant law is, and that the passage cited sufficiently indicates what the relevant test is. [bold emphasis added] The primary Judge’s reasons do not contain any discussion of the fact that, pursuant to reg 1.15A(3) (reproduced at [22] of these reasons), there are particular aspects of the circumstances of the relationship to which the Minister (and therefore the Tribunal in place of the Minister) must have regard in forming an opinion whether two persons are in a married relationship. If it were simply the case that the statement quoted at [4] of the primary Judge’s reasons was the extent of the statutory test, then the primary Judge’s discussion of the particulars of the appellant’s ground of review and whether or not each of the Tribunal’s findings were open to it, may well have been a correct approach. But where, as here, there is a comprehensive (although not exhaustive) legislative statement of matters to which the Tribunal must have regard, it is necessary to examine the Tribunal’s reasons in light of those matters. That is, whether or not any of the particulars of the ground of review (or, in the case of this appeal, the ground of appeal) correctly assert that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by failing to consider relevant matters or by considering irrelevant matters, the relevance (or not) of those matters is to be determined by reference to reg 1.15A(3).