Truman (a pseudonym) v Chapman

Case

[2025] ACTSC 340

21 July 2025

No judgment structure available for this case.

SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

Case Title:  Truman (a pseudonym) v Chapman
Citation:  [2025] ACTSC 340
Hearing Dates:  21 July 2025
Decision Date:  1 August 2025
Before:  Kelly AJ
Decision:  The appeal is dismissed.

Catchwords: 

APPEAL CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal from ACT Magistrates Court – family violence – choking – appeal against conviction – failure to negate self-defence – errors in assessing complainant’s evidence – whether verdicts are inconsistent – whether verdict is

unreasonable
Cases Cited:  Liberato v The Queen [1985] HCA 66; 159 CLR 507
Parties:  Ethan Truman (a pseudonym) (Appellant)
Kara Chapman (Respondent)
Representation:  Counsel
WDB Buckland (Appellant)
E Wren (Respondent)
Solicitors
Andrew Byrnes Law Group (Appellant)
ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent)
File Number:  SCA 53 of 2024
Decision Under Appeal: 
Court/Tribunal:  Magistrates Court of the ACT
Before:  Special Magistrate Richter
Date of Decision:  19 September 2024
Case Title:  Police v [Redacted]
Court File Number:  231477
KELLY AJ: 
Introduction 
1․  This is an appeal from orders made by a Special Magistrate on 19 September 2024.
2․  On that date, the Special Magistrate found the appellant guilty of two offences:
aggravated common assault of a child and aggravated choke, suffocate or strangle the
complainant. At the same time, the Magistrate dismissed two further charges of
aggravated common assault both allegedly committed against the complainant.
3․  In the notice of appeal dated 17 October 2024, the appellant appealed from the findings
of guilt in respect of both charges. In argument on appeal the appellant no longer
presses the appeal against the finding of guilt on the aggravated assault charge against
the child.
4․  The appellant appealed on the following grounds:
(a) The prosecution did not negate the reasonable possibility that the appellant

acted in self-defence.

(b) The learned Special Magistrate:
1․ Erred in rejecting the oral evidence given by the complainant.
2․ Rejected the oral evidence of the complainant without showing a chain of

logical reasoning justifying the Special Magistrate to do so.

(c) The finding of guilt on CC2022/12063 was inconsistent with the acquittals on

CC2022/12061 and CC2022/12062.

(d) The learned Special Magistrate reversed the onus of proof.
(e) The conviction is unreasonable, or cannot be supported, having regard to the

evidence.

(f) That, as a result of a wrong decision on a question of law, or of mixed law and

fact, the conviction was wrong in law and that a substantial miscarriage of justice

has occurred.

(g) That, in all the circumstances of the case, the conviction is unsafe and

unsatisfactory.

5․ The appellant’s counsel acknowledged that although there are seven grounds of appeal,
there is substantial overlap between them and some of those grounds may be
conveniently dealt with together.
6․ The thrust of the appellant’s complaints overall is that the Special Magistrate made
material errors and that his finding on the choking count was unreasonable, cannot be
supported having regard to the evidence, or is unsafe and unsatisfactory.
7․ The appellant submitted that when this Court performs its own assessment of the
evidence, the only logical conclusion is that the verdict of guilty on the choking count
should be substituted for a verdict of not guilty.

Jurisdiction and legal principles on appeal

8․ I accept that the principles to be applied, in an appeal of this nature, are accurately
described in the prosecution’s written submissions dated 16 July 2025 at [5] to [7].

Factual background

9․ It is convenient to set out the four charges against the appellant.
10․ The appellant was charged with the following:

1.    CC2022/12060: that he, in the Australian Capital Territory, on 13 November, 2022,

did assault [the complainant] and the offence involved family violence.

2.    CC2022/12061: that he, in the Australian Capital Territory, on 13 November, 2022,

did assault [the complainant] and the offence involved family violence.

3.    CC2022/12062: that he, in the Australian Capital Territory, on 13 November, 2022,

did assault [the child] and the offence involved family violence.

4.    CC2022/12063: that he, in the Australian Capital Territory, on 13 November, 2022,

intentionally and unlawfully, choked, suffocated or strangled another person,

namely, [the complainant] and the offence involved family violence.

11․ Each of these charges arose out of an episode which occurred at the home of the
appellant and the complainant on the night of 13 November 2022.
12․ The appellant is married to the complainant. They have one child who is the victim in
respect of the charge CC2022/12062. The conviction of the appellant on this count is
not challenged.
13․ The remaining three counts all arose out of an episode which occurred after the
complainant went to the bathroom to prepare a bath for the child at about 5:00pm on
Sunday, 13 November 2022.
14․ In the Magistrate’s unpublished reasons, the Magistrate summarised what occurred
thereafter in [9] to [17]:

9. The task of bathing the child fell to the defendant. After a short time the defendant left the bathroom and joined his wife in the kitchen where they had a brief argument about whether the child had been washed. This resulted in the complainant becoming upset.

10. After this argument the defendant went back in the bathroom. The complainant heard a hard slapping sound and immediately proceeded to the bathroom where the child told her that the defendant had slapped her on the face.

11. The complainant observed some redness on the child’s face and this gives rise to charge

12062 of 2022.

12. The complainant then started yelling at the defendant to get out of the bathroom and The

defendant stated “she’s wiped a booger on me!” The argument between the two adults then

escalated and became physical.

13. The defendant told the complainant to “fuck off” and started pushing her on the chest. It

is this conduct that is said to give rise to charge 12060 of 2022.

14. Thereafter the parties were pushing each other for about 22 seconds back and forth. the

complainant grabbed and broke the defendant’s chain necklace. The defendant then pushed

the complainant onto the bed in the bedroom adjacent to the bathroom.

15. The defendant then climbed on top of the complainant and applied pressure to her neck

with one or two hands. The complainant couldn’t breathe during that incident. She felt that

that her face was hot at the time and she thought she was going to die. She thought that her neck was held for more than five seconds. This conduct gives rise to charge 12063 of 2022.

16. While the defendant was choking the complainant she was kicking his lower body. The child was also in the room at this point yelling at the defendant to stop and she was pushing or striking him.

17. The defendant then let go and stepped back. The complainant got up off the bed and attempted to comfort the child. As she stood up the defendant pushed her, causing her to fall against the bed and then onto the ground hitting head on the wall. This conduct gives rise to charge 12061 of 2022.

15․ The version of events which the prosecution relied on at trial was the account given by
the complainant in a 000 call to the police on 13th of November 2022, the account she
gave to the police officer same day when the police attended the home and the Family
Violence Evidence in Chief interview (FVEIC) with the complainant on Tuesday, 15
November 2022.
16․ The evidence of the child in an interview with police on 7 December 2022 was also
admitted over objection by the appellant.
17․ At the trial the complainant gave evidence which was completely at odds with what she
had said in the FVEIC. The Magistrate then gave leave to the prosecution to cross-
examine her.
18․ During the course of her evidence in chief, the complainant had viewed the FVEIC which

she provided to the police as it was played in Court. Essentially her evidence at the trial was that she had lied to police when she called 000 and on both occasions that she

spoke to them. She said she had been pressured by police to involve the child in the
proceedings. She also stated that she told the child not to tell police what “mummy” had
done to “daddy”.
19․ In her oral evidence at trial, the complainant said that they had been having issues in
their marriage and had been fighting constantly including on that day. The child had a
bath, but the complainant said that what she had said in her FVEIC that she had heard
a slap from the kitchen was untrue. She said she heard the child cry because they were
arguing and the child was being difficult and did not want to get out of the bath.
20․ The complainant said that she went into the bathroom and the child told her that her
father had slapped her face. She then had a conversation with him about the child wiping
a “booger” on the appellant. She repeated that she did not hear slap, the child did not
have a red mark on her face and the child was really carrying on. She said she became
angry at the appellant because the child was upset and she did not know why the child
was upset.
21․ She then said she started screaming at the appellant and he would not leave the
bathroom so she started hitting him with a closed fist, and they started grabbing at each
other and pulling each other’s collar. His necklace broke as he was pushing her. They
made it to the nearby bedroom and she started kicking him. She said “like laying into
him”. She fell onto the bed in the spare room and she kept trying to kick him and hit him
and he was just “pushing me away pushing me away”. He came to be on top of her, and
his hand was on her chest. She described this occurred because the appellant had lost
his balance. She also acknowledged that the child had been in the room for some of
that time. However, she specifically denied that the appellant had ever choked her.
22․ The complainant said that what when she had calmed down, she was not sure what to
do and was still very angry. She thought she would call the police and say that he had
assaulted her and then he would have to get out of the house. She then said that she
thought she would call the police and tell them that he was choking her because she just
wanted him to fight back but he would not. She then called her mother who encouraged
her to call the police and also suggested that she call the appellant’s parents. She did
that.
23․ After the appellant’s family arrived, the complainant told the appellant’s family that they
had had an argument and that the appellant had been choking her and the appellant
then started laughing, which enraged her and prompted her to call the police.
24․ The evidence of the child was admitted into evidence and the child was briefly cross-
examined as to what she told the police in her FVEIC. The defence counsel suggested
to her that she only told them what her mother had told her to say, a suggestion with
which the child agreed. As the Magistrate noted in his reasons, that suggestion was
inconsistent with the mother’s evidence on that particular topic. In any event, the child
was re-examined and confirmed that what she had told the police was everything she
could remember.
25․ In evidence, the police officer said that the complainant appeared upset when she arrived
at the home and she took her into a separate room. The complainant told her that she
and the appellant had engaged in a brief push and shove, the accused then pushed her
backwards into a room where she fell on the bed. He placed a hand on her throat to
stop her from getting up, restricting her ability to breathe for a few seconds. She
panicked and began kicking the appellant to get him off. She said she wanted the
appellant out of the house. She also said she did not want to make a statement.
26․ The appellant did not give evidence at trial. He relied on the version of events which he
gave to the police on the night of 13 November.

She liked grabbed me and starts punching me, I don’t let her punch me, I say ‘get off, stop it’ She grabs me by my shirt, had this chain which is broken, she started it, won’t let go,

pushing her off. She dragged me onto the bed in the room down there. Pushing her off, my

hand was like here, she was like you’re choking me, she said let me go, using her knees

kicking me, pretty sure I have a bruise, kicking me. That was that. Just walked off, you started it. Who put their hands on the other person first? I said you did it, you put your hands on me.

You put your hands on me, you were hitting me. She wouldn’t let go, was grabbing me with

both hands and using her legs and all that. She dragged me, I fell on top of her.

Grounds of appeal

27․ I turn now to consider the grounds of appeal. The first ground is a complaint that the
prosecution failed to negate that the appellant acted in self-defence. The appellant
contended that on any view of the evidence, self-defence was a central issue in the
hearing, including in relation to the choking charge.
28․ For the reasons which follow, I consider that submission is too broadly made. It needs
to be borne in mind that there were four charges before the Magistrate. Although self-
defence was squarely in issue in relation to the second charge as it related to the pushing
and punching allegation prior to the choking, the allegation of choking was denied
outright by the appellant in his interview with the police. In his interview, the appellant
said that he pushed her away as she was attacking him, demonstrating with his hand
that he pushed her on the neck and that this was the point at which she told him that he
was choking her.
29․ That allegation was in direct contrast to how the prosecution had particularised the
choking allegation in particular that on the appellant’s account, pushing her by the neck
would not have taken seven seconds nor caused her face to become red or her breathing
become restricted. The particulars relied on by the prosecution based on the
complainant’s FVEIC included that the appellant wrapped at least one hand around her
neck and applied pressure for longer than five seconds, causing the complainant to find
it difficult to breathe, made her face feel hot and that she felt as though she might die.
30․ The Magistrate properly considered the issue of self-defence in relation to the second
count. He found that on both the complainant’s account of the push to the chest to get
her out of the bathroom and the appellant’s account in his interview, the issue of self-
defence fairly and squarely arose on the evidence in relation to that incident. He
dismissed that charge on the basis that he could not be satisfied that the appellant’s
actions in respect of that particular incident were not done in self-defence.
31․ The issue which arose on the charge of choking was ultimately a factual one, whether
the Magistrate accepted the truth of the complainant’s evidence in the FVEIC, namely
that the accused was standing over her and holding her neck for about seven seconds
or whether there was a reasonable possibility, that appellant’s account that he was
pushing the complainant away by pushing on the neck could be true.
32․ If the Special Magistrate had considered that what the appellant said about that to be
true or possibly true, then an acquittal would inevitably have followed because the
prosecution would have failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that it was a deliberate,
intentional and unlawful choking of the complainant.
33․ In light of the Magistrate’s findings on the facts that “while the choking occurred in the
middle of a violent disturbance between the parties, on the evidence in the FVEIC, the
complainant was lying on the bed with the appellant over her and holding her neck for
approximately seven seconds”, he then correctly to my mind, observed that on these
facts, the issue of self-defence did not arise.
34․ As to the complaint made in the same context that the Magistrate did not properly apply
the principle in Liberato v The Queen [1985] HCA 66; 159 CLR 507, I consider it plain
from the Magistrate’s reasons as a whole, that in finding the allegation of choking as
alleged in the FVEIC proved beyond reasonable doubt, the Magistrate rejected the
appellant’s account beyond reasonable doubt.
35․ The Magistrate considered the entirety of the appellant’s version in the paragraphs
preceding the comments he made at [65] when he said that the police interview “is more
inculpatory, than exculpatory. In relation to the important factual contests, it supports
the version given by his wife in the FVEIC”.
36․ It needs to be borne in mind that at that stage of the proceedings, the Magistrate was
still considering four separate charges. However, in the context of discussing the
choking charge specifically, the Magistrate made it clear that he accepted the version of
events in the complainant’s FVEIC. That finding necessarily means that he rejected the
appellant’s account as the appellant had denied the central allegation of choking and his
account was markedly different to the complainant’s.
37․ In other words, acceptance of the prosecution case on the choking charge necessarily
required a rejection of the appellant’s account.
38․ I consider that this finding was open to the Magistrate. Therefore, this ground of appeal
is not made out.
39․ I turn now to the complaint that the Magistrate erred in rejecting the complainant’s in-
court evidence without cogent reasons showing a chain of logical reasoning justifying
that conclusion.
40․ The appellant complained that the bases given by the Magistrate for rejecting the
complainant’s in-court evidence were illogical and flawed. He was wrong to rely on the
complainant at the hospital, in relying on the fact that both the complainant and the
appellant had security clearances which would be adversely affected by any conviction,
and he was wrong to rely on the child’s evidence in chief in support of the complainant’s
FVEIC.
41․ I make it clear at this point that I have read the transcript of evidence at trial, and I have
both viewed and read all of the exhibits tendered including Exhibit P2 (FVEIC), P3 (the
000 call), P6 (the body worn camera footage) and P7 (the child’s evidence in chief)
together with the transcript provided. Having done so, I consider that it was open to the
Magistrate to accept the account given by the complainant in the FVEIC and to reject her
in-court evidence. For a start, the complainant’s evidence in Court was in conflict with a
number of other critical and important aspects of the prosecution case.
42․ It was inconsistent with her 000 call to the police immediately after the incident. It was
inconsistent with her complaint to the police on the night and the evidence of the child
and the complainant’s own account in the electronically recorded interviews.
43․ The in-court evidence of the complainant was, indeed as the prosecution has submitted,
unconvincing and riddled with inconsistencies.
44․ Her demeanour and the account which she gave on the night and two days later in the
FVEIC is completely at odds with her evidence in Court that she never heard the slap.
45․ In fact, despite saying she did not hear the slap, she then said that she went to the
bathroom, she was angry because she thought the child may have been slapped. Her
evidence in Court on that topic is inherently improbable, as was her evidence about how
she came to call the police and her evidence about being annoyed with the appellant
when he laughed.
46․ She said in evidence, “I thought it’s over, and I knew he knew. He’s laughing it off and
he was telling them I was hitting him, which I knew was the truth”.
47․ It was open to the Magistrate to rely on the complainant’s actions at the hospital when
she proffered her neck to be viewed, as one of the reasons for rejecting her in-court
evidence. He found that it was completely inconsistent with her evidence that she knew
all along she was lying and she knew there were no marks on her neck.
48․ In these circumstances I consider the Magistrate was entirely justified to draw the
inference that he did as the actions of the complainant at the hospital were in fact entirely
inconsistent with the person making up a story about being choked knowing that it had
not occurred.
49․ I have reviewed the transcript and the audio visual recording of the child’s electronic
interview. Her evidence about the choking was compelling. Even on the complainant’s
own account to the police, the room where the choking happened was not that big. The
child’s account of her father standing over the mother while she was on the bed is not
therefore inherently implausible or illogical. The child gave no more detailed evidence
about the exact circumstances nor was she cross-examined about that. In these
circumstances, it was open to the Magistrate to accept the child’s evidence.
50․ I observe at this stage, having read the cross-examination of the child, that I can well
understand the Magistrate’s comment that at one stage the child appeared confused.
This was a child who has been cross-examined about things she had said 18 months
earlier.
51․ In summary, I consider the Magistrate’s reasons for rejecting the complainant’s evidence,
far from being illogical or in error were plainly open to him. This ground of appeal is not
made out.
52․ I turn now to the next ground of appeal, which is a complaint that the verdicts are
inconsistent.
53․ This ground of appeal can be dealt with briefly. In respect of the first common assault
upon the complainant, on the complainant’s own evidence she was pushing and pulling
the appellant. As the Magistrate correctly observed in those circumstances the assault
may not have been unlawful and given the complainant’s role in that episode, self-
defence was plainly an issue for him to consider. There is nothing illogical about that
conclusion.
54․ In relation to the second assault, the Magistrate determined that the sparse details given
about the final episode when she was pushed onto the floor that he was left unable to
make a positive finding relating to that charge. The allegations in respect of this charge
were significantly different to the allegations in support of the choking.
55․ There were logical reasons for the acquittal on the two other common assault counts
which have no bearing at all on the choking offence. I consider that this complaint is
without substance.
56․ I turn now to the final grounds of appeal, that the verdict is unreasonable. I acknowledge
that the test for an appellate court in determining whether a verdict is unreasonable is to
consider whether on the whole of the evidence it was open to the tribunal of fact to be
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant’s guilt.
57․ I have already made it clear that in considering the grounds of appeal, I have reviewed
the whole of the evidence and in particular have viewed all of the exhibits. The
complainant was plainly distressed on the night and two days later when the FVEIC was
recorded.
58․ There was compelling evidence to support the complainant’s account in the FVEIC,
including the 000 call, her attendance at the hospital where some red marks on her neck
were identified and the evidence of the child who demonstrated quite clearly that she
had witnessed a choking action.

59․ Notwithstanding the complainant’s recanting at trial, there was ample evidence to

corroborate the account which she gave in the FVEIC. In these circumstances, it was

open to the Magistrate on the whole of the evidence to be satisfied of the appellant’s

guilt.

Order

60․ For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding sixty [60] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of her Honour Acting Justice Kelly.

Associate:

Date: 1 August 2025

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Liberato v The Queen [1985] HCA 66