Tru Floor Service Pty Ltd v Jenkins (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Tru Floor Service Pty Ltd v Jenkins (No 2) [2006] FCA 632

CORRIGENDUM

TRU FLOOR SERVICE PTY LTD, PAUL ANDREW FLETCHER, VICKIE ANNE FLETCHER, COMPLEX AIR CONDITIONING PTY LTD, A P DELANEY & CO PTY LTD, KIEWA VALLEY ENGINEERING PTY LTD, C & C PRZIBELLA PTY LTD, TORNEY & ALLEN PTY LTD and EXVON PTY LTD v DAVID JOHN JENKINS and VIVIENNE ELLEN JENKINS

VID 3021 OF 2001

SUNDBERG J
26 MAY 2006 (CORRIGENDUM 31 MAY 2006)
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 3021 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

TRU FLOOR SERVICE PTY LTD
(ACN 056 201 631)
FIRST PLAINTIFF

PAUL ANDREW FLETCHER
SECOND PLAINTIFF

VICKIE ANNE FLETCHER
THIRD PLAINTIFF

COMPLEX AIR CONDITIONING PTY LTD
(ACN 064 927 939)
FOURTH PLAINTIFF

A P DELANEY & CO PTY LTD
(ACN 000 297 549)
FIFTH PLAINTIFF

KIEWA VALLEY ENGINEERING PTY LTD
(ACN 005 311 286)
SIXTH PLAINTIFF

C & C PRZIBELLA PTY LTD
(ACN 004 716 901)
SEVENTH PLAINTIFF

TORNEY & ALLEN PTY LTD
(ACN 000 759 106)
EIGHTH PLAINTIFF

EXVON PTY LTD
(ACN 054 370 357)
NINTH PLAINTIFF

AND:

DAVID JOHN JENKINS
FIRST DEFENDANT

VIVIENNE ELLEN JENKINS
SECOND DEFENDANT

JUDGE:

SUNDBERG J

DATE OF ORDER:

26 MAY 2006

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

CORRIGENDUM

1.In the first line of [12] of the Reasons for Judgment, “defendants” should read “plaintiffs”.

I certify that the preceding one (1) numbered paragraph is a true copy of the Corrigendum to the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Sundberg.

Associate:

Dated:            31 May 2006

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Tru Floor Service Pty Ltd v Jenkins (No 2) [2006] FCA 632

CORPORATIONS – director’s duty to prevent insolvent trading by company – submission of no case to answer that company insolvent – whether company insolvent – relevance of company’s accounts

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – submission of no case to answer – whether Rules of Court preclude a party who has tendered a document from making no case submission – whether party making no case submission should be put to election before no case submission decided – discretion of Court not to require election – circumstances in which discretion can be exercised – task for Court in deciding no case submission

Held: Defendants not to be put to their election as condition of deciding no case submission, no case submission upheld, company not insolvent

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 95A, 588G, 588M
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140
Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) O 32 r 4
Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic) r 49.01
Rules of the Supreme Court O 35 r 7

Tru Floor Service Pty Ltd v Jenkins [2006] FCA 119 cited
Weller v O’Brien [1962] 1 WLR 885 cited
Rasomen Pty Ltd  v Shell Company of Australia Ltd (1997) 144 ALR 497 followed
Protean (Holdings) Ltd (rec and mgr apptd) v American Home Assurance Co [1985] VR 187 followed
Compaq Computer Australia Pty Ltd v Merry (1998) 157 ALR 1 followed
William H Muller &…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCA 632
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Tru Floor Service Pty Ltd v Jenkins (No 2) involves a dispute between the plaintiffs, Tru Floor Service Pty Ltd and others, and the defendant, Jenkins. The plaintiffs brought a claim against Jenkins for damages arising from his alleged fraudulent misrepresentation and deceit. The court had to determine whether Jenkins' conduct amounted to deceit and whether the plaintiffs could prove Chick Vic's insolvency during certain periods. The central legal issues revolved around the application of the general rule requiring an election before a no case submission could be ruled upon, and whether the plaintiffs had proven Chick Vic's insolvency during specified periods. The court considered whether the defendants had to elect not to call further evidence and whether the plaintiffs' evidence sufficiently proved Chick Vic's insolvency during the periods in question. The court found that the plaintiffs had not proven Chick Vic's insolvency during any of the periods in question, as the evidence was too vague and insufficient to establish insolvency on the balance of probabilities. The court also determined that the discretion to depart from the general rule requiring an election could be exercised in this case due to the nature of the fraud allegations and the potential savings in time and expense for the parties. Consequently, the court dismissed the proceeding and ordered the plaintiffs to pay the defendants' costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The proceeding be dismissed.

2. The plaintiffs pay the defendants’ costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Tru Floor Service Pty Ltd v Jenkins (No 2) involves multiple plaintiffs who were sub-contractors to Chick Vic, a company that entered into administration. The plaintiffs claimed that Chick Vic was insolvent at various times before its administration, which they argued affected their contractual rights and obligations. They sought damages for losses allegedly incurred as a result of Chick Vic's insolvency. The plaintiffs presented evidence from various individuals, including Mr. Lamb, Mr. Chamberlain, Ms. Mann, Mr. Jones, and Mr. Wagner, to support their claims. Their evidence focused on the payment practices and financial status of Chick Vic, aiming to demonstrate that the company was unable to meet its financial obligations.

The case of Tru Floor Service Pty Ltd v Jenkins (No 2) was determined in the Supreme Court of Victoria. It followed a lengthy examination of evidence, including witness testimonies and documentary submissions. The plaintiffs argued that Chick Vic was insolvent during specified periods prior to its administration. The trial judge considered the evidence presented and the relevant legal principles concerning insolvency. The court examined whether the plaintiffs had proven on the balance of probabilities that Chick Vic was insolvent during the periods in question. Ultimately, the court dismissed the proceeding and ordered the plaintiffs to pay the defendants' costs.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In Protean the trial judge had not adopted the course I have described at [17]. Rather he had indicated that he would both entertain the no case submission and rule on it without requiring an election to be made by the moving party. While Tadgell J did not think this an incorrect approach, his Honour clearly considered preferable that described at [17]. At238-239 he said:“In deciding whether or not the general rule [requiring an election] should be followed the Judge will sometimes be assisted to know the basis on which the moving party seeks to rest his submission of no case. To that end the Judge might find it useful to allow the submission to be made and answered without first requiring an election to be made, before deciding whether he will rule on it, ie to take the second course summarized above …. When that course is followed the Judge will know, before he commits himself to rule, whether the no case submission is (a) that there is no evidence at all in support of the respondent party’s case, ie accepting all the evidence at face value, no case has been established in law …, or (b) that, although there is some evidence in support of the respondent party’s case, the Judge should not act on it because, for example, it is so unsatisfactory or inherently unreliable or equivocal that he should find that the burden of proof resting on the respondent party has not been discharged …, or (c) a combination of (a) and (b).”See also per Young CJ at 215.MUST THE DEFENDANTS ELECT NOT TO CALL FURTHER EVIDENCE? The general rule is that a decision will not be given on a submission of no case unless the moving party elects to call no evidence. However, the judge has a discretion to depart from the general rule where the particular circumstances require it. It has been said that in deciding which course to follow, the judge will be guided by the nature of the case, the stage it has reached, the particular issues involved and the evidence that has been given. The imposition of the requirement that the moving party make an election before the judge entertains the submission or rules on it will depend on the just and convenient disposition of the litigation. See Protean at 238 and Rasomen at 504. In William H Muller & Co’s Algemeene etc v Ebbw Vale Steel, Iron & Coal Co Ltd [1936] 2 All ER 1363 at 1365-1366 Branson J said:“It seems to me that it must be a matter for the judge who is to try the case to decide for himself whether, in the particular case before him, and having regard to all the circumstances of it, it is likely to save the litigants before him expense and time and trouble to deal with the case by way of ruling upon the submission without putting any terms upon counsel upon either side, or whether it is better to say: ‘In this case I think it would be desirable that before I rule I should hear the whole of the evidence.”This passage has been referred to or quoted with approval in many cases. See, for example, Protean at 238, Rasomen at 504, J-Corp Pty Ltd v Australian Builders Labourers Federated Union of Workers (Western Australian Branch) (No 2) (1992) 38 FCR 458 at 461-462 and Union Bank of Australia Ltd v Puddy [1949] VLR 242. In Puddy at 245-246, after reviewing the earlier decisions on the circumstances in which, in the exercise of the discretion, it is appropriate to depart from the general rule requiring an election, Fullagar J said:“I would add only two observations of my own. In the first place … something may turn on the nature of the case itself. … [W]here, as in the case before me, fraud is alleged, it may often be wrong to suggest that a party should submit himself to cross-examination before it is seen that there is really some evidence against him. In the second place, it would seem that the exercise of the discretion must generally involve an estimating of probabilities. If I accede to the application made to me, I may save the parties a great deal of time and expense, or I may cause them much greater expense and delay in the event of a new trial being ordered. In order to assess these probabilities, it seems to me that it must generally be necessary to form some preliminary estimate of the evidence before ruling as to whether the submission is to be entertained without election.In the present case I felt no doubt that I ought to entertain and rule on the submission without requiring the plaintiff to elect to call no evidence. I felt clearly of opinion that the balance of convenience was heavily in favour of this course. The case for the defendant, consisting of the opening and examination in chief, with very little cross-examination, had lasted over three and a half days. Then, coming to determine the application on its merits, I have felt satisfied that there was no case for the plaintiff to answer on defence or counterclaim.”Other cases which show that the discretion to depart from the general rule requiring an election is more readily exercised where fraud is alleged are Protean at 215 and 236 and Merry at 7.

Decision

Reasons for decision

SUNDBERG J
Finally, two persons gave evidence for the fourth plaintiff. I have already referred to Mr Jones at [139]. Some time after Chick Vic went into administration, he was succeeded as general manager of the fourth plaintiff by John Wagner. In cross-examination, Mr Jones said that some of Chick Vic’s payments to the fourth plaintiff were late, but that late payment was not unusual in the building and construction industry. However, after about July 2000 Chick Vic’s payments were no longer “consistent”. Nonetheless, Mr Jones agreed with the proposition that “at no time in the year 2000 was there any conduct by Chick [Vic] that made [him] suspect that Chick [Vic] wouldn't be able to make payment[s].” In cross-examination, Mr Wagner agreed with a similar proposition that in the period leading up to Chick Vic’s administration “[t]here was nothing unusual about the commercial arrangements, the terms of trade, the doing of work or the paying of bills that might have given rise to any suspicion at all that Chick Vic was in any sort of financial trouble”.Conclusion as to the periods I have already said that:(a)Mr Lamb’s evidence cannot, on its own, support a finding that Chick Vic was insolvent in any of the periods (see [92]);(b)Mr Chamberlain’s evidence cannot, on its own, support a finding that Chick Vic was insolvent in the third period (see [113]);(c)Ms Mann’s evidence cannot, on its own, support a finding that Chick Vic was insolvent in the second or third periods (see [132]); and(d)the plaintiffs’ evidence – such as it was – as to Chick Vic’s insolvency tended to undermine their case (see [133]). I must now turn to what emerges from the totality of that evidence – namely, whether it has been proved on the balance of probabilities that Chick Vic was insolvent in any of the periods. In deciding that question, I take the approach set out at [50]. It has not been proved that Chick Vic was insolvent in any of the periods. It follows that it has not been proved that Chick Vic was insolvent for the duration (see [55]). It is clear that Chick Vic suffered from a substantial, though variable, working capital deficiency throughout the duration. It is also clear that Chick Vic suffered substantial losses throughout the duration. Further, Chick Vic’s accounts disclose a relatively high proportion of aged creditors. Beyond that, the evidence that Chick Vic was in fact unable to pay its debts as and when they became due and payable is scant and far too vague to act upon. The extent to which Chick Vic deliberately withheld cheques until they could be safely presented remains unclear. Similarly, the extent to which sub-contractors were paid late remains unclear. Those extents might have been made clearer had the plaintiffs undertaken the detailed scrutiny of Chick Vic’s records suggested by Ms Mann (see [130]). After all, neither Mr Chamberlain nor Mr Lamb had done so – thus exposing their evidence to the (well-founded) criticism that it relied on assumptions that had not been tested. Further, the reasons whysub-contractors were paid late remain unclear. There is some evidence that it was because of liquidity problems. However, there is also some evidence that the plaintiffs saw it as common practice in the building and construction industry. In any case, the evidence is, again, far too vague to act upon. Indeed, it is so vague that any question that may arise from the (apparent) conflict between the authorities on the relevance of creditors’ forbearance – canvassed at [45] to [48] – does not arise for determination in these reasons.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SUNDBERG J

The court considered the evidence provided by the plaintiffs, including the testimonies of Mr Lamb, Mr Chamberlain, and Ms Mann, and determined that it was not sufficient to prove Chick Vic's insolvency in any of the periods. The court took into account the nature of the industry and common practices, which made the evidence even more unreliable. The court also noted that the reasons for late payments to sub-contractors were unclear, with some evidence pointing to liquidity problems and other evidence suggesting that it was a common practice in the industry. The court held that the evidence was too vague to act upon, and therefore, the plaintiffs' claims could not be supported. The ratio decidendi of this case is that in order to establish insolvency, clear and convincing evidence must be provided, and vague or industry-standard practices cannot be relied upon to prove insolvency.