FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| TROUTON v OFFICIAL RECEIVER IN BANKRUPTCY | [2014] FCCA 2345 |
| Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – Annulment application – where applicant presented a debtor’s petition – where applicant suffering under a mental disability when petition presented – whether petition ought to have been accepted – whether court should exercise its discretion to annul the bankruptcy. |
| Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966, ss.6A, 40(1)(daa), 55, 55(2), 153B, 153B(1), 153B(3), 308, 308(c), 308(d) |
| Drake v Jones [2009] FMCA 298 In re Goo Tuck (1892) 2 BC (NSW) 95 Re A Debtor [No. 1 of 1941] [1941] Ch. 487 Re John Coote, Petitioning Creditor Reference by Registrar in Bankruptcy under subsection 55(3) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 [1993] FCA 627 R v Davison (1954) 90 CLR 353 |
| Applicant: | CHRISTINE NICOLE TROUTON |
| Respondent: | OFFICIAL RECEIVER IN BANKRUPTCY |
| First Supporting Creditor: | SUBWAY SHOE DIFFUSION PTY LTD |
| Second Supporting Creditor: | GEORGE ANTHONY CHEBIB |
| File Number: | BRG 187 of 2014 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Jarrett |
| Hearing date: | 10 October 2014 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 10 October 2014 |
| Delivered at: | Brisbane |
| Delivered on: | 18 October 2014 |
REPRESENTATION
| The Applicant appeared on her own behalf. |
| The Respondent entered a submitting appearance and appeared by Mr Powell of the office of the Australian Government Solicitor. |
| Counsel for the First Supporting Creditor: | Mr McGlade |
| Solicitors for the First Supporting Creditor: | Bennett & Philp |
| Counsel for the Second Supporting Creditor: | Mr Sheaffe |
| Solicitors for the Second Supporting Creditor: | McKays Solicitors |
ORDERS
The application filed on 3 March, 2014 is dismissed.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
BRG 187 of 2014
| CHRISTINE NICOLE TROUTON |
Applicant
And
| OFFICIAL RECEIVER BANKRUPTCY |
Respondent
| SUBWAY SHOE DIFFUSION PTY LTD |
First Supporting Creditor
GEORGE ANTHONY CHEBIB
Second Supporting Creditor
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
revised from the transcript
On 14 November, 2013 the applicant, Christine Trouton became bankrupt on her own petition. By this application, she seeks to have her bankruptcy annulled on the basis that at the time she presented her petition for bankruptcy she was so bereft of legal capacity by reason of mental illness that her debtor’s petition ought not to have been presented. She does not argue that the petition ought not to have been accepted by the Official Receiver.
The Official Receiver in bankruptcy entered a submitting appearance.
Two creditors appeared to oppose Ms Trouton’s application. The first, Subway Shoe Diffusion Pty Ltd, has a judgment against Ms Trouton for $21,403.98. At the time Ms Trouton presented her debtor’s petition, she had been served with a bankruptcy notice issued at the request of Subway Shoe Diffusion based upon that judgment.
The second creditor, George Chebib, has been engaged with Ms Trouton in significant litigation in the Supreme Court of Queensland, and subsequently the Court of Appeal, arising out of a domestic relationship between them. Mr Chebib has judgments for costs against Ms Trouton.
Three issues arise on this application. The first is whether, as a matter of law, a person who is devoid of capacity by reason of mental illness might validly present a debtor’s…
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- Case
- [2014] FCCA 2345
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine two primary legal issues. Firstly, it needed to consider the meaning of "unsound mind" in the context of the *Bankruptcy Act 1966* (Cth), particularly in relation to a person's capacity to present a debtor's petition. Secondly, the court had to assess whether the applicant's alleged mental disability was of a nature and degree that rendered her incapable of forming the necessary intention to present the debtor's petition, thereby preventing it from constituting a valid act of bankruptcy.
Judge Jarrett reasoned that section 308 of the *Bankruptcy Act* does not mandate that a person of unsound mind must act through an authorised representative, but rather appears permissive. The judge noted that the ability to form an intention to perform the relevant act is crucial. An act of bankruptcy, such as presenting a debtor's petition, requires a voluntary and intentional act. Therefore, if a person's unsoundness of mind is sufficient to remove their capacity to act intentionally, they may be incapable of committing such an act of bankruptcy. In this instance, there was no evidence that anyone else was authorised to act on the applicant's behalf, and the debtor's petition itself indicated that the applicant's mother had assisted due to "mental incapacity."
The application filed on 3 March 2014 was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
The application filed on 3 March, 2014 is dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Just what is meant by a person of unsound mind is unclear. There is, of course, a plethora of authority that deals with that phrase in various areas of law in which it appears. The phrase “unsound mind” appears in s.308 of the Bankruptcy Act but its appearance in that section is not particularly helpful. Section 308 of the Bankruptcy Act provides:Representation of corporation etc.Subject to this Act, for the purposes of this Act:(a) a corporation may act by any person duly authorized in that behalf by the corporation;(b) a partnership may act by any of its members or a duly authorized agent;(c) a person of unsound mind may act by a person authorized or empowered by law to act for him or her; and(d) any person may act by his or her agent duly authorized in that behalf. Section 308 does not require a person of unsound mind to act by way of a person authorised or empowered by law to act for him or her. The section appears to be permissive. It seems to contemplate that for some purposes a person of unsound mind might nonetheless be competent to act for the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act. I reach that conclusion because s.308(d) permits a person to act by his or her agent duly authorised in that behalf. It does not require a person to act by an agent. A similar form of words is used by s.308(c) of the Act. If it was the intention of Parliament that a person of unsound mind should act only by an agent, the section could have used words to that effect. But it does not. There is no evidence that suggests that at the time Ms Trouton lodged her debtor’s petition there was any other person authorised or empowered by law to act for her. The debtor’s petition does not purport to have been lodged by anyone else on Ms Trouton’s behalf although, the following appears at the foot of the debtor’s petition:Declaration of person who assisted with the completion of formsI declare that before this form was completed, I carefully read through/interpreted for the person name above the prescribed information and the questions on this form or[where the person is physically incapacitated] satisfied myself that the person had read and understood the information and questions. The responses provided in this form are those of the persons named above.Reason the debtor required your assistanceMental incapacity Full name and address of person assistingPatricia Ann Trouton … Patricia Ann Trouton is the mother of the applicant in these proceedings. Section 40(1)(daa) of the Bankruptcy Act provides that a debtor commits an act of bankruptcy if the debtor presents a debtor’s petition under the Bankruptcy Act. If the presentation of a debtor’s petition is an act of bankruptcy and if the presentation of the debtor’s petition must be a voluntary and intentional act by the debtor, it follows having regard to the observations of Farwell and Morton JJ in Re a Debtor (above), that a person of unsound mind, whatever that might mean, is incapable of committing an act of bankruptcy constituted by the presentation of a debtor’s petition if the unsoundness of mind was sufficient to remove from them their capacity to act intentionally. It appears to be the ability to form an intention to perform the relevant act that is important.