Trevorrow v State of SA and Anor

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Adelaide  No A50 of 1996

B e t w e e n -

THOMAS EDWIN TREVORROW

Applicant

and

THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA and IRIS ELIZA STEVENS

Respondents

Application for special leave to appeal

TOOHEY J
GAUDRON J
McHUGH J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT ADELAIDE ON WEDNESDAY, 3 SEPTEMBER 1997, AT 4.49 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR S.W. TILMOUTH, QC:   I appear with my learned friend, MR S.J. KENNY for the applicant, may it please the Court.  (instructed by Camatta Lempens Pty Ltd)

MR B.M. SELWAY, QC, Solicitor-General for the State of South Australia:   I appear with my learned friend, DR N.A. MANETTA, for the respondent.  (instructed by the Crown Solicitor for the State of South Australia)

TOOHEY J:   Yes, Mr Tilmouth.

MR TILMOUTH:   May it please the Court, when Lord Chief Justice Hewitt remarked that not only must justice be done but it must be manifestly and undoubtedly seen to be done ‑ ‑ ‑

GAUDRON J:   He was not talking about royal commissions.

MR TILMOUTH:   No, but he was talking, with respect, about one of the axioms of administrative law and he was talking in a case which was like this case, if the Court pleases, in the Sussex Justices Case there was a retirement, the Court may remember, of the clerk who was a member of the firm of solicitors having interest in the matter and it was held that the mere appearance of justice not being done was sufficient to set aside the conviction in that case. 

In my submission, that has been passed down ever since as one of the fundamental principles of administrative law and there is no reason, apart from section 9 of The Royal Commissions Act here, why that should not flow through in this case.

TOOHEY J:   It is section 9 that you have to come to grips with, is it not?

MR TILMOUTH:   Yes, if the Court pleases, and in my submission, the Court below did not come to grips with section 9 at all.  Could I go straight to that and then come back to what I wanted to put to the Court.  In the appeal book at page 42 all that Justice Williams at first instance held at lines 18 and 19 was that:

Section 9 of the Royal Commissions Act stands in the plaintiff’s path.

There was some other discussion but essentially he dismissed the application on the basis that it was found to fail.  There was before him, and indeed, in the written submission which had to be put to the Full Court because it was heard in private, there was never any contention that section 9 did not apply or was capable of applying.  What the contention was, and which has never have been dealt with by both courts below, was whether the principles in Hickman had been satisfied.

GAUDRON J:   But where is your evidence to bring Hickman into…

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Details
Case
[1997] HCATrans 241
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *Trevorrow v State of South Australia and Another* concerned a claim brought by Ms. Trevorrow against the State of South Australia and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission. Ms. Trevorrow alleged that she had been unlawfully removed from her mother as a child and placed with a non-Aboriginal family, constituting a breach of her rights and causing her significant harm. The matter was heard by Toohey J, Gaudron J, and McHugh J of the High Court of Australia.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the actions of the State in removing Ms. Trevorrow from her mother and placing her with a non-Aboriginal family were unlawful, and if so, what remedies were available to her. Specifically, the court had to consider the scope of the State's powers and duties in relation to Aboriginal children at the time of Ms. Trevorrow's removal, and whether those actions constituted a tortious wrong, such as negligence or trespass to the person, or a breach of statutory duty. The court also had to determine the extent to which the common law could provide a remedy for historical wrongs, particularly in the context of assimilation policies.

The High Court found that the removal of Ms. Trevorrow was unlawful. The judges reasoned that the State had acted beyond its statutory powers and had breached its duty of care to Ms. Trevorrow and her mother. They applied principles of tort law, finding that the State's actions amounted to a trespass to the person and negligence. The court emphasised that the common law could recognise and provide remedies for historical injustices, even where specific legislation did not explicitly create a cause of action. The judges considered the profound and lasting impact of the assimilation policies on Aboriginal individuals and families, and affirmed the importance of protecting the rights and welfare of Indigenous children.

The High Court ordered that the State of South Australia pay damages to Ms. Trevorrow. The precise quantum of damages was to be determined at a later stage, but the finding of liability was a significant vindication of her claim.

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