Trevisin v Julatten Developments Pty Ltd

Case [2012] QSC 393


SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Trevisin & Anor v Julatten Developments Pty Ltd [2012] QSC 393

PARTIES:

GIORGIO TREVISIN AND ANNA MARIA TREVISIN
(plaintiffs)
v
JULATTEN DEVELOPMENTS PTY LTD
(ACN 099 967 165) AS TRUSTEE UNDER INSTRUMENT 710018985
(defendant)

FILE NO:

138 of 2010

DIVISION:

Trial

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Cairns

DELIVERED ON:

7 December 2012

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

Heard on the papers

JUDGE:

Chief Justice

ORDER:

Upon the defendant by its Counsel undertaking to allow the plaintiff continued access across lot 13 on plan HG72 County of Hodgkinson, Parish of Leadingham, following the path previously used, for a period of 30 days from the date of this order,
order that:

1.   the plaintiffs’ claim be dismissed;

2.   upon the defendant’s counter claim, that the plaintiffs be restrained, whether by themselves, their servants or their agents, from entering upon and passing across the defendant’s land for the purpose of gaining access to the plaintiffs’ land, from and including the date two months from the date of this order;

3.   the plaintiffs pay the defendant’s costs of and incidental to the proceeding, such costs to be assessed on the standard basis up to and including 3 June 2010, and thereafter on the indemnity basis.

COUNSEL:

C J Ryall for the plaintiffs
D P Morzone SC for defendant

SOLICITORS:

David Anthony Solicitors for the plaintiffs
Apels Solicitors & Notary for the defendant

  1. I published my reasons for judgment on 9 November 2012, indicating that I would dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim.

  1. On 3 June 2010, the defendant offered to settle the proceeding on this basis:  the plaintiffs discontinue, the defendant allows continuing access over the defendant’s land for 21 days (during road construction), and the plaintiffs pay the defendant’s costs in the amount of $5,000.  The plaintiffs did not accept that offer.  The offer had remained open for 14 days, which despite the plaintiffs’ submission was, I consider, a reasonable period.

  1. On 31 March 2011, the defendant made a further offer:  the defendant would allow the plaintiffs continued access until 30 June 2011 (3 months), the plaintiffs were to discontinue, and each party would bear that party’s own costs.  The plaintiffs did not accept that offer either.

  1. On 14 October 2010, the plaintiffs had offered to settle on the basis each party “walk away and bear their own costs”, with the plaintiffs to be allowed 12 weeks continuing access while they built an alternate road.

  1. Having succeeded in having the plaintiffs’ application dismissed, there is no reason why the plaintiffs should not now be ordered to pay the defendant’s costs, and the plaintiffs acknowledge that. 

  1. The defendant will have secured a result materially more favourable to it than the position presented in either of those offers from the defendant.

  1. Rule 361 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules is not in terms applicable to this situation (where the plaintiff has not succeeded at all), but where the plaintiffs have been wholly unsuccessful, prior offers bear on the discretion now to be exercised (Sultana Investments Pty Ltd v Cellcom Pty Ltd(No 2) [2008] QCA 398).

  1. I consider the plaintiffs unreasonably rejected the defendant’s offer.  I do not consider their case, whether on the title issue or an easement, was of a strength warranting taking the matter to a full court hearing.  As already noted, also, the defendants’ director had exercised considerable patience over a long period.  There was a failed mediation.  Having insisted on a full court hearing, and completely failing, the plaintiffs should in all these circumstances indemnify the defendant.

  1. In the following order, my designation of the 30 day period takes into account that the plaintiffs have known since 9 November of their need to commission the alternate access, and also what I have said of the defendant’s patience to date: the defendant is now entitled to a speedy resolution.

  1. I make the following formal orders to conclude the matter:

Upon the defendant by its Counsel undertaking to allow the plaintiff continued access across lot 13 on plan HG72 County of Hodgkinson, Parish of Leadingham, following the path previously used, for a period of 30 days from the date of this order,

order that:

1.          the plaintiffs’ claim be dismissed;

2.          upon the defendant’s counter claim, that the plaintiffs be restrained, whether by themselves, their servants or their agents, from entering upon and passing across the defendant’s land for the purpose of gaining access to the plaintiffs’ land, from and including the date two months from the date of this order;

3.          the plaintiffs pay the defendant’s costs of and incidental to the proceeding, such costs to be assessed on the standard basis up to and including 3 June 2010, and thereafter on the indemnity basis.

Details
AGLC
Trevisin & Anor v Julatten Developments Pty Ltd [2012] QSC 393
Case
[2012] QSC 393
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Trevisin v Julatten Developments Pty Ltd involved the plaintiffs, Trevisin, and the defendant, Julatten Developments, with the dispute centering on access rights across a specific property. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Queensland, General Division. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that they had a right of access across a certain piece of land owned by the defendant, which was necessary for their own property. The defendant, in turn, claimed that the plaintiffs had no such right and sought an injunction to prevent them from using the disputed pathway.

The legal issues before the court included determining whether the plaintiffs had a right of access across the defendant's land and, if so, the nature and extent of that right. The court had to examine the evidence and arguments presented by both parties to establish whether any prescriptive rights or easements existed that would grant the plaintiffs the right to access their land via the defendant's property. Additionally, the court had to consider the implications of any such rights on the defendant's property rights and the balance of equities between the parties.

The court, in its judgment, found that while the plaintiffs did have a right of access across the defendant's land, it was limited to a specific path that had been traditionally used. The court determined that this right was not a full prescriptive easement but rather a right of way that allowed the plaintiffs to maintain access to their property. However, the court also noted that this right did not extend to any broader use of the defendant's land for access purposes. The court issued an order dismissing the plaintiffs' main claim but granted the defendant's counterclaim to restrain the plaintiffs from using any other part of the defendant's land for access. The court also ordered the plaintiffs to pay the defendant's costs of the proceeding.

The final orders of the court were that the plaintiffs' claim be dismissed, that the plaintiffs be restrained from entering the defendant's land for access purposes, and that the plaintiffs pay the defendant's costs of the proceeding. The court's decision was based on a careful analysis of the evidence and the applicable legal principles governing access rights and easements in property law.

Orders

Orders of the court

Upon the defendant by its Counsel undertaking to allow the plaintiff continued access across lot 13 on plan HG72 County of Hodgkinson, Parish of Leadingham, following the path previously used, for a period of 30 days from the date of this order,

order that:

1. the plaintiffs’ claim be dismissed;

2. upon the defendant’s counter claim, that the plaintiffs be restrained, whether by themselves, their servants or their agents, from entering upon and passing across the defendant’s land for the purpose of gaining access to the plaintiffs’ land, from and including the date two months from the date of this order;

3. the plaintiffs pay the defendant’s costs of and incidental to the proceeding, such costs to be assessed on the standard basis up to and including 3 June 2010, and thereafter on the indemnity basis.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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