Trendor & Trendor (No 2)
[2025] FedCFamC1A 74
•1 May 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1) APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Trendor & Trendor (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1A 74
Appeal from: Trendor & Trendor (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1F 842 Appeal number: NAA 2 of 2025 File number: BRC 5389 of 2016 Judgment of: JARRETT, KARI AND STRUM JJ Date of judgment: 1 May 2025 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – PROPERTY – Where the appellant’s obligation to file a transcript was discharged – Where the appellant submits that the primary judge ignored key financial matters – Where the appellant submits that medical evidence was improperly excluded affecting the primary judge’s adjustments under s 75(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) – Where the appellant’s grounds of appeal failed to illuminate any appealable error – Where the appellant misapprehends the Court’s jurisdiction and powers – Appeal dismissed. Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 79
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) r 13.23
Cases cited: Australian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation v The Commonwealth (1953) 94 CLR 621; [1953] HCA 25
Bahonko v Sterjov (2008) 166 FCR 415; [2008] FCAFC 30
Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577; [2006] HCA 55
Gronow & Gronow (1979) 144 CLR 513; [1975] HCA 63
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40
Neil v Nott (1994) 68 ALJR 509; [1994] HCA 23
Royal Guardian Mortgage Management Pty Ltd v Nguyen (2016) 332 ALR 128; [2016] NSWCA 88
Trendor & Trendor [2018] FamCA 944
Trendor & Trendor [2025] FedCFamC1A 57
Number of paragraphs: 55 Date of hearing: 1 May 2025 Place: Brisbane Solicitors for the Appellant: Litigant in person Solicitors for the Respondent: Litigant in person ORDERS
NAA 2 of 2025
BRC 5389 of 2016FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DIVISION 1 APPELLATE JURISDICTIONBETWEEN: MR TRENDOR
Appellant
AND: MS TRENDOR
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JARRETT J
DATE OF ORDER:
1 MAY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The time and date provided for in order 13 of the procedural orders made by Judicial Registrar Kane on 5 February 2025 be extended to 4.45 pm on 22 April 2025.
2.The Application in an Appeal filed by the Appellant on 20 March 2025 is dismissed.
3.Notice of Appeal NAA2 of 2025 filed on 2 January 2025 is dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Trendor & Trendor (No 2) 2025 FedCFamC1A 74 has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JARRETT J:
The appellant appeals final property adjustment orders made by a judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) on 5 December 2024. By those orders, the primary judge divided funds then resident in a solicitor’s trust account between the parties, but otherwise left the parties possessed of the property and liabilities to which they were then each legally and beneficially entitled. The effect of those orders was to divide the parties’ property, found by the primary judge to have a net value of $1,349,912 comprising $1,239,012 in non-superannuation property and $110,000 in superannuation: 72.5 per cent to the respondent and 22.5 per cent to the appellant.
The respondent resists the appeal.
The proceeding determined by the primary judge’s order was commenced by the appellant on 7 June 2016 in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (as the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) was then known). In it, he sought unparticularised property adjustment orders and orders relating to the parties’ two children, who were then 16 (nearly 17) and 11 and a half years of age. For reasons that are not relevant to this appeal, it was not until May 2018 that the application was identified as appropriate for transfer to the Family Court of Australia (as this Court was then known). By that time, the parties’ oldest child had attained her majority.
The trial took place over four separate tranches of hearing dates, namely 10-12 March; 7 April; 9-10 August and 4 November 2021. The appellant, who at that time resided and continues to reside in City J or perhaps in Country AB more recently, was granted leave to attend the trial using electronic means. The reasons for the disjointed nature of the final hearing are not now important, save to record that the orders made by the primary judge between 10 March 2021 and 5 October 2021 demonstrate an effort on the part of the primary judge to deal with issues raised by the appellant about the evidence of a particular single expert, the failure by the respondent to make proper and timely disclosure and a desire on the appellant’s part to lead further evidence in the property adjustment case.
Evidence in the trial concluded on 4 November 2021. At that time, the primary judge made directions for the filing and service of written submissions. The timetable provided for submissions to be complete by 4.00 pm on 21 January 2022. However, as it turned out, the last set of written submissions (delivered by the appellant) were filed and served on 7 April 2022. Those submissions, responsive to the submissions (in reply) of the respondent filed and served on 21 January 2022, dealt with both parenting and property adjustment matters. By that time however, the parties’ youngest child was about eight months short of his eighteenth birthday. He had not spent time with the appellant for some time and the competing proposals recognised that the parties’ youngest child would remain living in Australia with the respondent. The parenting orders in issue generally concerned the time this child would spend with the appellant and how that time would occur.
By the time the primary judge delivered his judgment, the parties’ youngest child had turned 18 years of age. The Court was then bereft of any power to make a parenting order in respect of that child and all that remained for determination was the competing property adjustment claims.
In this respect, we note that final submissions closed in April 2022 but his Honour’s judgment was not delivered until December 2024. Whilst his Honour recounts the torturous course of the proceedings up to the date of the final submissions there is no explanation as to the reasons for the inordinate delay in the delivering of judgment and orders. The parties are entitled to feel aggrieved by this delay and such a delay should be discouraged.
After procedural orders were made for the preparation of this appeal for hearing, the appellant made an application to be relieved of the obligation to pay for a transcript of the trial before the primary judge. For reasons I delivered on 7 April 2025, I discharged the obligation on the appellant to file a transcript. In doing so, I remarked that the absence of a transcript will have a practical consequence for his appeal, namely that the appellant will necessarily be limited to arguments that do not rely upon references to the transcript: Trendor & Trendor [2025] FedCFamC1A 57 at [31].
THE NOTICE OF APPEAL
The relief that the appellant seeks in his Notice of Appeal is noteworthy:
1.The ‘Judgement’ of Baumann J of 5 December 2024 be vacated in full.
2.The Court either grant leave for criminal proceedings to commence against the Wife or exercise discretion under the Family Law Acts to determine the offence of Kidnap and unlawful abduction based on admission of same by the Wife for no cause or legal reason.
3.The Court exercise discretion to ‘Stay’ and vacate all the ‘decisions’ of the Child Support Agency (“CSA”).
4.All property and chattels improperly garnished, without due process or Court Order, from the Father be returned or monetary equivalent be remitted to the Father by the CSA.
5.The proceeds of the sale of S Street be paid to the father without deductions by the CSA or whatsoever.
6.Subpoena’s sought by the Father and granted but barred from service be immediately served and the defence of sovereign immunity voided.
7.Indemnity costs and damages be awarded to the Husband.
(as per the original)
Before making some observations about these orders, some context is helpful.
Two consistent themes ran through the appellant’s case before the primary judge. The first concerned the circumstances in which he and the respondent separated. At the time of separation, the appellant was overseas. The respondent sent him an email informing him of her separation from him and that she had moved to an undisclosed location with the children. The appellant characterises this as child abduction or kidnapping of the children by the respondent, a criminal offence, or offences, for which he says she should be punished. According to the appellant these matters have not been acknowledged, nor have they been satisfactorily addressed at any point. He feels aggrieved by that.
The second theme concerned matters of child support. The respondent applied for an administrative assessment of child support in early 2017. An assessment was issued, but the appellant did not pay the assessed child support. He says that he had no notice of it, but having regard to the letter from the Commonwealth Ombudsman dated 14 March 2018 (Appeal Book, p. 328-336), that does not seem accurate. Arrears of child support accrued. Some of the arrears were met when funds were garnisheed from a bank account maintained by the appellant with the Westpac Bank. The balance was discharged when the appellant was prevented from departing Australia in November 2017 pursuant to a departure prohibition order issued by the Child Support Registrar. The appellant takes the view that these actions of the Child Support Registrar were unlawful, in breach of his rights and compensable. However, he has found few that agree with him about that and he remains aggrieved by those actions.
Bearing those matters in mind, I turn to the orders sought by the appellant in this appeal.
Order 1 is unremarkable and speaks for itself.
Order 2 is not an order that this Court can make, either in its original or appellate jurisdiction. The initiation of criminal proceedings is a matter for the relevant prosecutorial authorities. Nor does this Court make findings that a party has committed an offence.
Orders 3 and 4 relate to child support matters. There are a number of child support related applications to acknowledge. The first appears to have been contained in an Amended Application in a Case filed on 19 July 2018 by the appellant. That application came before the primary judge on 6 August 2018 for hearing and determination. Both parties were represented by counsel. In his reasons for judgment delivered on 20 November 2018, the primary judge records that: “[t]he husband no longer seeks a departure from the administrative child support assessment” (Trendor & Trendor [2018] FamCA 944 at [4]). Thus, it seems that application was abandoned.
Next, on 5 November 2018, the appellant filed an application to set aside the garnishee order that led to the draining of funds in his Westpac Bank account in 2017. He sought repayment of the funds and damages. He also sought a child support departure order for various periods between 26 July 2017 and 31 December 2018, and other ancillary relief.
Further, by his Amended Initiating Application filed on 3 March 2021 the appellant sought a child support departure order, that the appellant’s child support liability for a nominated period be set to “nil” and that the respondent repay to the Child Support Registrar (to the credit of the appellant) any amounts received by her by way of child support for that period (see orders 25-28 sought in the Amended Initiating Application filed on 3 March 2021).
However, by orders made by the primary judge on 10 March 2021, the Application in a Proceeding filed on 5 November 2018 was dismissed and those paragraphs of his Amended Initiating Application dealing with child support were struck out. There was and is, no appeal against those orders.
Orders 3 and 4 are not relief that can be ordered in the event this appeal is successful. The primary judge made no child support orders and no application relating to child support was before the primary judge at the time of judgment.
Order 5 concerns steps taken by the Child Support Registrar to garnishee the funds to which the appellant was entitled under the primary judge’s order. It is uncontentious that the Child Support Registrar gave a notice to the solicitors holding the funds that were to be distributed to the parties pursuant to the primary judge’s order that required those solicitors to pay the appellant’s share of the funds held in trust to the Registrar. Consequently, the appellant received no funds pursuant to the primary judge’s order. That garnishee by the Child Support Registrar, which plainly occurred after the impugned orders were made, cannot be challenged in this appeal.
The subject matter of order 6 and its place in this appeal is not readily apparent. The reference to the “defence of sovereign immunity” might suggest a connection with the child support matters, but it is not clear. So too, the reference to “damages” in order 7. In any event, neither order is one which is available should the appeal be successful.
THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL
The appellant seeks to disturb a discretionary judgment. The relevant principles which govern such appeals are well known. Error of the type identified in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 must be established. There, the majority of the High Court said at 504–505:
…The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance. In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred…
There is a strong presumption in favour of the correctness of the decision and the orders from which an appeal is brought. The decision should therefore be affirmed except where the court of appeal is satisfied that the decision is clearly wrong: Australian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation v The Commonwealth (1953) 94 CLR 621 at 627.
Litigants who seek to challenge a judge’s orders on appeal are required to particularise and demonstrate the error in the primary judge’s consideration leading to the challenged orders. That presents particular difficulties where litigants in person represent themselves on appeal. As the High Court in Neil v Nott (1994) 68 ALJR 509 at 510 observed: “A frequent consequence of self-representation is that the court must assume the burden of endeavouring to ascertain the rights of parties which are obfuscated by their own advocacy”. Nonetheless, the burden cast upon the appeal court in such cases is not overbearing. In Bahonko v Sterjov (2008) 166 FCR 415 at [3], the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia said:
Notwithstanding the obligation of an appeal court, where it is able to do so, to make its own evaluation of the material at first instance, it is a fundamental aspect of the appellate process that appeals are made available for the correction of error (see Coal & Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194 at [14]; Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424 at [22]-[30]; Poulet Frais Pty Ltd v The Silver Fox Company Pty Ltd (2005) 220 ALR 211 at [45]). This basic principle imposes an obligation upon an appellant to identify where error is to be found in a judgment under appeal, whether it be an error of fact, law or general principle. It is not necessary for an appeal court to hunt through all the material at first instance and recanvas every aspect of it unless an occasion arises for suspecting, on reasonable grounds (generally those provided by the appellant), that such an examination may yield a conclusion of appellable error.
The Notice of Appeal commences with a general statement as follows:
Baumann J stated on the last day of the trial that he expected an appeal. It is submitted this is because the trial was unfair, did not address the actual application made by the Father, was judicially biased, racist, without basis in statutory (international and domestic) law and procedurally unjust.
I see this as a general statement leading into the grounds of appeal adumbrated thereafter, rather than a ground of appeal itself warranting separate consideration. In the event that I have misapprehended what the appellant intended and it is in truth intended to be a ground of appeal, the statement fails in that regard because of its lack of particularity.
Many of the grounds of appeal relied upon by the appellant can be immediately discarded because they are directed to the orders, already identified, that the appellant impermissibly seeks on this appeal.
Thus, of the 17 grounds of appeal, Grounds 1, 2, 10 and 15 may be disregarded because they relate to parenting matters. The primary judge made no parenting orders and, in circumstances where both of the parties’ children were over the age of 18 years at the time of the judgment, nor could he. These grounds are incompetent and warrant no further consideration.
Similarly, Grounds 4 (there are two of them), 5, 6 and 14 all relate to complaints about the Child Support Registrar or the Child Support Agency. As I have already pointed out, there was no application for relief against the Child Support Registrar or in respect of any child support assessment more generally before the primary judge at the conclusion of the trial. These grounds are incompetent and warrant no further consideration.
Ground 7 asserts that the primary judge denied the appellant the ability to cross-examine financial witnesses and “rushing” the end of the trial. However, in the absence of a transcript of those parts of the trial where the appellant argues that this occurred, the appellant cannot establish the factual basis for this ground. The respondent points out, and I see it as uncontentious (having regard to the terms of the order made on 5 October 2021), that there were two days allocated to complete the hearing (4 and 5 November 2021), but only one was needed. This ground demands no further consideration.
Similarly, Ground 8, which asserts error on the part of the primary judge by “Improperly denying English evidence on the basis it was ‘English’ (Racial Discrimination, UCPR)” cannot be made out in the absence of a transcript because the factual basis for the ground is not otherwise demonstrated.
Ground 16 of the Notice of Appeal is in the same category. In it, the appellant asserts that the primary judge erred in that his Honour unfairly disallowed the appellant access to his personal and financial records that were “kept/taken solely by the Wife, in circumstances where access to the Father’s record without Court Order was refused (Unfair prejudice, UCPR and procedure)”. Nothing referred to by the appellant in the summary of argument or in his oral argument bears this out.
The remaining grounds
On a benevolent construction, Grounds 3 and 9 might be seen as complaints that the primary judge denied the appellant procedural fairness. Additionally, Grounds 11, 12 and 13 arguably have some work to do in this appeal. I will deal with each but first a word about the appellant’s summary of argument.
This is an appeal to which r 13.23(2) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 applies. Relevantly, that rule requires that the appellant’s summary of argument must set out each ground of appeal and, for each ground of appeal, a statement of the arguments setting out the points of law or fact and the authorities relied on (together with references to the relevant pages of the appeal book and transcript). It must also set out the orders sought (if they differ from the orders sought in the Notice of Appeal or any Amended Notice of Appeal). However, the appellant’s summary of argument does none of those things. It exceeds the page limit imposed by the Rules. Its discursive form is unhelpful, but it serves to demonstrate the appellant’s seemingly unshakeable focus upon matters that were not relevant to the issues before the primary judge or in this appeal. Much of it scandalises the primary judge, the Child Support Agency, the Australian judiciary generally, the Australian Government and this Court. Those matters do not bear repeating.
The summary of argument commences to deal with “Property Matters” at page 11 of 23 and continues for eight pages. It sets out, in narrative form, a restatement of the appellant’s case at trial. The argument is not directed to any particular ground of appeal. It does not identify any error of law, fact or principle said to infect the primary judge’s judgment. It merely seeks to cavil with the primary judge’s discretionary judgment and the weight attributed to various matters leading to that judgment. Questions of weight are matters quintessentially for the primary judge: Gronow & Gronow (1979) 144 CLR 513 at 519. The summary of argument illuminates no appellable error referrable to the grounds of appeal in the Notice of Appeal or otherwise. So too in the course of hearing this appeal, the appellant’s oral arguments consisted of a number of discursive statements which did not illuminate, in any real fashion, the grounds of appeal.
Turning to the grounds of appeal that require further consideration, Grounds 3 and 9 raise potential arguments about procedural fairness. It is necessary to deal with these grounds first: Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577 at [117]; Royal Guardian Mortgage Management Pty Ltd v Nguyen (2016) 332 ALR 128 at [9].
Ground 3 asserts that the primary judge conducted an unfair trial “by disallowing subpoenas issued by the Father rendering the Father at a complete judicial disadvantage”. The ground asserts that:
…The key subpoena’s (granted) were prevented from being served by Baumann J (erring in Family Law Act). The disallowed subpoenas pertained to evidence of the Wife’s real financial position and the behaviour of the Child Support Agency (CSA) whose illegal actions prevented the Father remaining in Australia.
(as per the original)
It is difficult to understand what is alleged by this convoluted ground. The appellant’s summary of argument does not assist, although there is reference within it to the appellant’s “January subpoena to Mr DD” which the appellant says he was not permitted to enforce. Just how that came about is not clear. It could be a reference to one of the Applications in a Proceeding dismissed by the primary judge on 10 March 2021, but the absence of a transcript makes it impossible to confirm this. This ground reveals no appellable error.
Ground 9 asserts some form of error by virtue of an earlier order made by the primary judge restricting the budget of the forensic accountant who was to act as a single entity for the purpose of valuing certain assets of the parties. He contends that in so doing, the single expert “focused on irrelevant aspects of the ‘limited’ evidence (recognised by Baumann J) rendering the report incomplete, invalid and prejudicial (Family Law Act and Evidence Acts, UCPR)”. This argument is a reference to an order made by the primary judge on 20 November 2018. It was made after a contested hearing where both parties were represented by counsel. His Honour ordered the appointment of a single expert (the identity of whom was to be settled between the parties) on certain terms specified in the order. One of those terms limited the expert’s remuneration to $50,000. However, the appellant advances no argument to demonstrate how this order, in the context of the trial, worked a procedural unfairness to him. At best his argument seems to be that which is set out in the text of the ground. This, without more, is insufficient to establish appellable error.
Moreover, it seems to me unlikely that error could be established because the primary judge records in his reasons (at [25]) that the single expert “was the subject of detailed cross-examination by the husband; further questions were raised after he gave evidence, and a further report was produced”. Later, when recounting the procedural history of the application, the primary judge said, at [31]:
When the matter returned to the Court on 22 September 2020 with the benefit of Mr B’s valuation report (and the child’s wishes report), because the parties raised that they wished to clarify some points of that report with the single expert, an Order was made granting leave for the parties to seek to clarify the valuation report by asking questions of the single expert witness, with such questions to be put to the expert by 6 November 2020. …
There is no suggestion in the reasons for judgment that the limit placed upon the single-expert’s fees meant that either party was unable to properly articulate the case they wished to run. Of course it would have been open to the appellant to have made an application to extend the funding of the single expert if he considered the restriction that had been placed infected the process. Where no such application was made, it is difficult to see where there can now be a complaint.
No error is revealed by this ground.
Ground 11 contends that the primary judge ignored “key financial matters” namely:
- The ‘contrived’ behaviour of the CSA whose actions were an ‘abuse of process’; and
- The fact that the Father has had no income or access to financial support since 2015 yet allowing the wife to receive substantial income and financial support.
(As per the original)
This ground cannot succeed. The primary judge was very aware of the actions taken by the Child Support Registrar and the appellant’s view of those actions (see the primary judge’s reasons at [26], [28] and [96] for example). Despite the appellant’s view, those actions had no bearing upon the orders the primary judge was asked to make, except to the extent that the appellant’s liability for child support and his discharge of that liability was a matter to be taken into account under s 79(4)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). The primary judge considered these matters at [96], [105] and [107].
As to the second matter dealt within Ground 11, one of the issues in the trial was the appellant’s income and his income earning capacity, both as to the past and the future. The primary judge gave consideration to these matters. Both parties’ written submissions addressed these issues in detail. The primary judge found, at [98], that the appellant’s extensive experience in commercial and mining ventures and as a consultant should allow him to generate an income, although perhaps not at the levels he previously enjoyed. The primary judge recorded that the appellant had not practiced as a lawyer for many years. Later (at [108]), he accepted that the appellant’s earning capacity was superior to the respondent’s for the reasons there set out. The primary judge recorded that he was unable to determine, the extent of the future income potential of the appellant given the state of the evidence.
Ground 12 contends that the primary judge ignored medical evidence “(because the evidence was from City J not Australia) that the Father was unable to work due to proven medical issues (Racial Discrimination, International Conventions)”. At [98] of his reasons, the primary judge records his acceptance that the appellant was diagnosed and hospitalised with COVID-19, but said that “he produced no medical evidence that says he is unable to earn an income”.
In his summary of argument, the appellant says:
54.…The medical reports were contained in submissions to the Court in November 2021 but because they were from City J they were not included in evidence. There is no precedent that entitles a judge to ignore formal evidence from another country that pertains to the ability to earn. The same applies to the CSA.
It is not clear to which submissions the appellant is referring. No oral submissions were made at the conclusion of the trial as far as I can tell (in the absence of a transcript). There is reference to evidence in the appellant’s written submissions filed on 12 January 2022 (paragraph 105), but the particular evidence is not described. Perhaps this is a reference to emails that the appellant sent to the primary judge’s chambers in April 2021 and then again in October 2021. Contrary to the appellant’s summary of argument, these documents were in evidence (Exhibits 24 and 35B respectively). In oral argument before us, the appellant confirmed that these were the emails to which he was referring. However, neither exhibit suggests that the appellant has a medical condition that prevents him from earning an income.
This ground of appeal has no merit.
Ground 13 asserts appellable error because the primary judge allowed “an admitted criminal” to benefit from the proceeds of her crime. This ground fails at a factual level. The respondent is not an admitted criminal as the appellant asserts. There is nothing to suggest that she has ever been convicted of a crime. This ground of appeal is scandalous and nothing further need be said about it.
CONCLUSIONS
Those grounds of appeal that are not incompetent do not reveal appellable error.
The appeal, in my view, must be dismissed.
KARI J
I agree with the reasons of his Honour Jarrett J and I agree that the appeal should be dismissed.
STRUM J
I agree with the orders proposed by Jarrett J and with his Honour’s reasons therefor.
I certify that the preceding fifty-five (55) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justices Jarrett, Kari & Strum. Associate:
Dated: 9 May 2025
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