Travaglini v Spencer

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Travaglini v Spencer [2008] FCA 1618

BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – claim that property transferred under value should be void as against the Trustee in Bankruptcy – motion for dismissal - transferor was not the subsequent bankrupt but an entity allegedly acting on his instruction and direction – property said to be held on bare trust on behalf of the bankrupt – whether trustee or agent – novel point - not obviously without reasonable prospects – not dismissed

Held:  Minute of Amended Statement of Claim permitted.

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 120, 120(1), 121, 120(7)(b)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A

Boston Commercial Services Pty Ltd v GE Capital Finance Australasia Pty Ltd (2006) 236 ALR 720
Dandaven v Harbeth Holdings Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 955
In the matter of Rose, a bankrupt; Whitton v Regis Towers Real Estate Pty Ltd (in administration) [2006] FCA 1553
J F Keir Pty Limited v Sparks [2008] FCA 611
Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company Australia Ltd and Others (2008) 167 FCR 372
Peldan v Anderson (2006) 227 CLR 471

Whitton v Regis Towers Real Estate Pty Ltd (in administration) (2007) 161 FCR 20

DINO TRAVAGLINI (AS TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY FOR THE ESTATE OF CARMELO FRANSCESCO RACCUIA) v HALFORD GRAHAM SPENCER, ANTONIO GUISEPPE RACCUIA, VASTO (WA) PTY LTD ACN 008 935 313, TRIVIEW HOLDINGS PTY LTD ACN 079 339 914, MICHAEL PATERSON & ASSOCIATES, KING & OH and PPB ASHTON READ

WAD 36 OF 2008

MCKERRACHER J
31 OCTOBER 2008
PERTH


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

WAD 36 OF 2008

BETWEEN:

DINO TRAVAGLINI
(AS TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY FOR THE ESTATE OF CARMELO FRANSCESCO RACCUIA)
Applicant

AND:

HALFORD GRAHAM SPENCER
First Respondent

ANTONIO GUISEPPE RACCUIA
Second Respondent

VASTO (WA) PTY LTD ACN 008 935 313
Third Respondent

TRIVIEW HOLDINGS PTY LTD ACN 079 339 914
Fourth Respondent

MICHAEL PATERSON & ASSOCIATES
Fifth Respondent

KING & OH
Sixth Respondent

PPB ASHTON READ
Seventh Respondent

JUDGE:

MCKERRACHER J

DATE OF ORDER:

31 OCTOBER 2008

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The minute of proposed amended substituted statement of claim dated 18 September 2008 do stand as the amended substituted statement of claim.

2.The fifth, sixth and seventh respondents pay the applicant’s costs of opposition to the minute to be taxed if not agreed. 

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

WAD 36 OF 2008

BETWEEN:

DINO TRAVAGLINI
(AS TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY FOR THE ESTATE OF CARMELO FRANSCESCO RACCUIA)
Applicant

AND:

HALFORD GRAHAM SPENCER
First Respondent

ANTONIO GUISEPPE RACCUIA
Second Respondent

VASTO (WA) PTY LTD ACN 008 935 313
Third Respondent

TRIVIEW HOLDINGS PTY LTD ACN 079 339 914
Fourth Respondent

MICHAEL PATERSON & ASSOCIATES
Fifth Respondent

KING & OH
Sixth Respondent

PPB ASHTON READ
Seventh Respondent

JUDGE:

MCKERRACHER…

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Details
Case
[2008] FCA 1618
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Travaglini v Spencer, the respondent sought an order to dismiss the amended substituted statement of claim lodged by the applicant. The applicant had previously been declared bankrupt, and the dispute arose from the transfer of property by the applicant to Mr Spencer. The issue before the court was whether the applicant, through their control of Ladell and subsequent direction to Mr Spencer, could be considered to have transferred property by creating the Paterson Charge, despite Mr Spencer being the registered proprietor at the relevant time. The court had to decide if the applicant's actions constituted a transfer of property within the meaning of section 120(7)(b) of the relevant Act.

The court found that the applicant's argument was not so weak as to be obviously devoid of reasonable prospects of success. While the claim was novel, the risk of injustice by summarily dismissing it outweighed the potential for permitting the claim to proceed. The applicant had argued that, apart from directing Mr Spencer to sign the Deed, there was nothing more they could have done in transferring the property. The court agreed that the risk of injustice by dismissing the claim was significant, and thus the application to dismiss the amended substituted statement of claim was not successful.

Accordingly, the court ordered that the minute of the proposed amended substituted statement of claim dated 18 September 2008 stand as the amended substituted statement of claim. Furthermore, the fifth, sixth, and seventh respondents were ordered to pay the applicant's costs of opposition to the minute, to be taxed if not agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The minute of proposed amended substituted statement of claim dated 18 September 2008 do stand as the amended substituted statement of claim.

2. The fifth, sixth and seventh respondents pay the applicant’s costs of opposition to the minute to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Section 120(1) provides in substance that a transfer of property by a person who later becomes bankrupt to another a person is void against the trustee in bankruptcy if it took place within 5 years of the bankruptcy (as this transfer did) and if there was insufficient consideration or no consideration. The expression ‘transfer of property’ is given an extended meaning by s 120(7)(b) BA. Accordingly a person ‘who does something that results in another person becoming the owner of the property that did not previously exist is taken to have transferred the property to the other person’. THE PLEADED FACTS The relevant pleaded facts and contentions as against these respondents are that:·at all relevant times until 2 January 2002, the registered owner of the property was Ladell Pty Ltd (Ladell). Thereafter the registered proprietor of the property was Mr Spencer;·the bankrupt was director and secretary of Ladell;·on or about 1 July 1999, Ladell granted an initial charge called the ‘Ladell Charge’ to these respondents;·in or about July 2001, the bankrupt entered into a so-called oral ‘Front Man Agreement’ with Mr Spencer. Under this agreement the bankrupt agreed that Mr Spencer was to acquire the property and to hold it for the bankrupt;·by a deed dated 6 July 2001 signed by Mr Spencer and by the bankrupt on behalf of Ladell as agent for the bankrupt’s son, Antonio Raccuia, the third respondent (Antonio), the purported Antonio Trust was created;·under the Antonio Trust, Mr Spencer would hold the property on trust for Antonio and further, Mr Spencer would not deal with the property in any way without consulting Antonio or his agent, Ladell;·in or around August or September 2001, Mr Spencer acting on instructions and under the direction of the bankrupt entered into an agreement (the Paterson Agreement) with the fifth, sixth and seventh respondents. Under this agreement, these respondents agreed to withdraw a caveat over the property in consideration of the bankrupt, Mr Spencer, Ladell and another entity entering a deed (the ‘Paterson Deed’);·on or about 29 October 2001, these respondents as lender, Mr Spencer as borrower and each of the bankrupt, Ladell and another corporation as guarantors entered into a deed known as the Paterson Deed. The effect of that Deed was that Mr Spencer acknowledged that he was indebted to these respondents in the principal sum of $100,000 plus interest. He granted to them a charge known as the Paterson Charge over the property in order to secure the debt; and·at all times Mr Spencer held the property on trust for and on behalf of the bankrupt. Essentially the arguments of these respondents is that given that it is pleaded that Ladell and thereafter Mr Spencer were the registered proprietors of the property, there is no basis on which it can be alleged that the bankrupt (as opposed to Ladell or Mr Spencer) transferred the property, that is, by creating the Paterson Charge. For the purposes of the argument, it is accepted that the bankrupt controlled Ladell so while no issue is taken for present purposes concerning the bankrupt’s control of Ladell, the question is how Mr Spencer as registered proprietor at the relevant time could effect a transfer by the bankrupt. The argument raised is that even assuming for present purposes the correctness of this assertion, there is no basis at law upon which the bankrupt as beneficial owner of the property (under a bare trust) actually ‘did something’ that ‘results’ in the charge over that property within the meaning of s 120(7)(b) BA.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MCKERRACHER J
The applicant argues in this case that short of actually signing the Deed which he directed Mr Spencer to do, there was nothing more that the bankrupt could have done in transferring the property. CONCLUSION Whether or not this submission is correct as a fact or whether it will ultimately have the legal effect for which the applicant contends, I am not satisfied that it is so weak that it is obvious that there are no reasonable prospects of success. As novel as the claim is, it seems to me that the risk of doing injustice by summarily dismissing it, is significantly greater than permitting the claim to stand. In my opinion, the minute should be permitted. Accordingly, I will order:1.The minute of proposed amended substituted statement of claim dated 18 September 2008 do stand as the amended substituted statement of claim.2.The fifth, sixth and seventh respondents pay the applicant’s costs of opposition to the minute to be taxed if not agreed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MCKERRACHER J

The central issue in this case was whether the bankrupt, as the beneficial owner of the property, 'did something' that resulted in the creation of the Paterson Charge over the property within the meaning of s 120(7)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act (BA). The respondents argued that since Mr Spencer was the registered proprietor of the property, there was no basis to allege that the bankrupt transferred the property by creating the Paterson Charge. The applicant countered that the bankrupt directed Mr Spencer to sign the Deed and that this action constituted a transfer under s 120(7)(b) BA.

In addressing the first issue, the court recognised the complexity and novelty of the claim. The court acknowledged that the bankrupt controlled Ladell, the original registered proprietor of the property, and that Mr Spencer acted as a front man for the bankrupt. Despite this, the respondents' argument hinged on the legal interpretation of 'doing something' that results in a transfer. The court did not definitively conclude on whether the bankrupt's direction to Mr Spencer constituted a transfer under s 120(7)(b) BA, but found that the submission was not so weak as to make the prospects of success obvious.

Regarding the second issue, the court evaluated the risk of injustice if the claim were summarily dismissed. The court concluded that the risk of doing injustice by dismissing the claim outweighed the risk of permitting it to stand. Consequently, the court allowed the claim to proceed. The court’s decision emphasised the need to avoid prejudicing the applicant’s rights in the absence of a clear legal basis to dismiss the claim. The binding legal principle here is that novel claims should not be dismissed summarily unless it is clear that there are no reasonable prospects of success.