FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Travaglini v Spencer [2008] FCA 1618
BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – claim that property transferred under value should be void as against the Trustee in Bankruptcy – motion for dismissal - transferor was not the subsequent bankrupt but an entity allegedly acting on his instruction and direction – property said to be held on bare trust on behalf of the bankrupt – whether trustee or agent – novel point - not obviously without reasonable prospects – not dismissed
Held: Minute of Amended Statement of Claim permitted.
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 120, 120(1), 121, 120(7)(b)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31ABoston Commercial Services Pty Ltd v GE Capital Finance Australasia Pty Ltd (2006) 236 ALR 720
Dandaven v Harbeth Holdings Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 955
In the matter of Rose, a bankrupt; Whitton v Regis Towers Real Estate Pty Ltd (in administration) [2006] FCA 1553
J F Keir Pty Limited v Sparks [2008] FCA 611
Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company Australia Ltd and Others (2008) 167 FCR 372
Peldan v Anderson (2006) 227 CLR 471Whitton v Regis Towers Real Estate Pty Ltd (in administration) (2007) 161 FCR 20
DINO TRAVAGLINI (AS TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY FOR THE ESTATE OF CARMELO FRANSCESCO RACCUIA) v HALFORD GRAHAM SPENCER, ANTONIO GUISEPPE RACCUIA, VASTO (WA) PTY LTD ACN 008 935 313, TRIVIEW HOLDINGS PTY LTD ACN 079 339 914, MICHAEL PATERSON & ASSOCIATES, KING & OH and PPB ASHTON READ
WAD 36 OF 2008
MCKERRACHER J
31 OCTOBER 2008
PERTH
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
WAD 36 OF 2008
BETWEEN:
DINO TRAVAGLINI
(AS TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY FOR THE ESTATE OF CARMELO FRANSCESCO RACCUIA)
ApplicantAND:
HALFORD GRAHAM SPENCER
First RespondentANTONIO GUISEPPE RACCUIA
Second RespondentVASTO (WA) PTY LTD ACN 008 935 313
Third RespondentTRIVIEW HOLDINGS PTY LTD ACN 079 339 914
Fourth RespondentMICHAEL PATERSON & ASSOCIATES
Fifth RespondentKING & OH
Sixth RespondentPPB ASHTON READ
Seventh RespondentJUDGE:
MCKERRACHER J
DATE OF ORDER:
31 OCTOBER 2008
WHERE MADE:
PERTH
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The minute of proposed amended substituted statement of claim dated 18 September 2008 do stand as the amended substituted statement of claim.
2.The fifth, sixth and seventh respondents pay the applicant’s costs of opposition to the minute to be taxed if not agreed.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
WAD 36 OF 2008
BETWEEN:
DINO TRAVAGLINI
(AS TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY FOR THE ESTATE OF CARMELO FRANSCESCO RACCUIA)
ApplicantAND:
HALFORD GRAHAM SPENCER
First RespondentANTONIO GUISEPPE RACCUIA
Second RespondentVASTO (WA) PTY LTD ACN 008 935 313
Third RespondentTRIVIEW HOLDINGS PTY LTD ACN 079 339 914
Fourth RespondentMICHAEL PATERSON & ASSOCIATES
Fifth RespondentKING & OH
Sixth RespondentPPB ASHTON READ
Seventh Respondent
JUDGE:
MCKERRACHER…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Travaglini v Spencer and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2008] FCA 1618
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the applicant's argument was not so weak as to be obviously devoid of reasonable prospects of success. While the claim was novel, the risk of injustice by summarily dismissing it outweighed the potential for permitting the claim to proceed. The applicant had argued that, apart from directing Mr Spencer to sign the Deed, there was nothing more they could have done in transferring the property. The court agreed that the risk of injustice by dismissing the claim was significant, and thus the application to dismiss the amended substituted statement of claim was not successful.
Accordingly, the court ordered that the minute of the proposed amended substituted statement of claim dated 18 September 2008 stand as the amended substituted statement of claim. Furthermore, the fifth, sixth, and seventh respondents were ordered to pay the applicant's costs of opposition to the minute, to be taxed if not agreed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The minute of proposed amended substituted statement of claim dated 18 September 2008 do stand as the amended substituted statement of claim.
2. The fifth, sixth and seventh respondents pay the applicant’s costs of opposition to the minute to be taxed if not agreed.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: MCKERRACHER J
The central issue in this case was whether the bankrupt, as the beneficial owner of the property, 'did something' that resulted in the creation of the Paterson Charge over the property within the meaning of s 120(7)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act (BA). The respondents argued that since Mr Spencer was the registered proprietor of the property, there was no basis to allege that the bankrupt transferred the property by creating the Paterson Charge. The applicant countered that the bankrupt directed Mr Spencer to sign the Deed and that this action constituted a transfer under s 120(7)(b) BA.
In addressing the first issue, the court recognised the complexity and novelty of the claim. The court acknowledged that the bankrupt controlled Ladell, the original registered proprietor of the property, and that Mr Spencer acted as a front man for the bankrupt. Despite this, the respondents' argument hinged on the legal interpretation of 'doing something' that results in a transfer. The court did not definitively conclude on whether the bankrupt's direction to Mr Spencer constituted a transfer under s 120(7)(b) BA, but found that the submission was not so weak as to make the prospects of success obvious.
Regarding the second issue, the court evaluated the risk of injustice if the claim were summarily dismissed. The court concluded that the risk of doing injustice by dismissing the claim outweighed the risk of permitting it to stand. Consequently, the court allowed the claim to proceed. The court’s decision emphasised the need to avoid prejudicing the applicant’s rights in the absence of a clear legal basis to dismiss the claim. The binding legal principle here is that novel claims should not be dismissed summarily unless it is clear that there are no reasonable prospects of success.