Written submissions received 30 October 2020, 16 November 2020 and 23 November 2020
JUDGE:
Kefford DCJ
ORDER:
The matter be listed for review at 9 am on 5 March 2021
CATCHWORDS:
PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT – APPLICATION – COSTS – where the appellant’s appeal against a condition of a development approval was dismissed – where respondent sought an order as to costs – whether the proceeding was frivolous or vexatious – whether costs should be assessed on the indemnity basis
Moreton Bay Regional Council (“the Council”) has applied for an order that Traspunt pay its costs of the appeal for the period from 27 November 2019 on an indemnity basis, or such other or further order the Court…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Traspunt No. 7 Pty Ltd sought to appeal a condition of a development approval granted by the Moreton Bay Regional Council, concerning the reconfiguration of a lot into 46 lots and an access easement at 18-26 Burbury Road, Morayfield. The appeal was dismissed by the Queensland Planning and Environment Court. The Council subsequently applied for costs, arguing that the appeal was frivolous or vexatious under s 60(1)(b) of the Planning and Environment Court Act 2016, and that the appeal should be assessed on the indemnity basis. The court had to decide whether the appeal was frivolous or vexatious, and if so, whether it should be assessed on an indemnity basis.
The court considered the nature of the appeal and the submissions made by Traspunt. The court noted that Traspunt had conceded that the condition would be lawful under s 145 of the Planning Act 2016 if it failed to demonstrate that it was lawful under s 128 of the Planning Act 2016. The court found that the appeal was conducted without reasonable prospects of success from 27 November 2019, as Traspunt had conceded the lawfulness of the condition under s 145 of the Planning Act 2016. The court held that the appeal was frivolous or vexatious and should be assessed on an indemnity basis.
The court ordered that the matter be listed for review at 9 am on 5 March 2021. The court found that Traspunt's appeal was frivolous or vexatious as it was conducted without reasonable prospects of success from 27 November 2019. The court considered the example in s 60(1)(b) of the Planning and Environment Court Act 2016, which provides meaning to the expression "frivolous or vexatious". The court held that Traspunt's appeal was frivolous or vexatious as it was conducted without reasonable prospects of success from 27 November 2019, and that the appeal should be assessed on an indemnity basis.
Orders
Orders of the court
The matter be listed for review at 9 am on 5 March 2021
Background
Background to the litigation
Before dealing with each issue, it is convenient to set out some background matters.Background The appeal involved a challenge to condition 6 of a development permit for reconfiguring a lot (2 into 46 lots and an access easement) granted by the Council with respect to land located at 18-26 Burbury Road, Morayfield (“the subject premises”). Condition 6 required land that was identified on the approved layout plan as “Road Resumption” to be dedicated as road reserve at no cost to the Council. The area of land was 1 264 square metres. Condition 6 was imposed under s 665 of the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Qld), the equivalent of which is now s 145 of the Planning Act 2016 (Qld). Amongst other restrictions, a condition under s 145 of the Planning Act 2016 cannot be imposed if it is about trunk infrastructure. Trunk infrastructure is relevantly defined in schedule 2 of the Planning Act 2016 to mean only three things:(a)development infrastructure identified in a LGIP as trunk infrastructure; (b)development infrastructure that, because of a conversion application, becomes trunk infrastructure; or (c)development infrastructure that is required to be provided under a condition under s 128(3) of the Planning Act 2016. By the end of the hearing, the parties agreed the appeal was confined to one issue, namely:[3] “Whether the dedication required by condition 6 of the Negotiated Decision Notice of 6 July 2018 satisfies the requirements of s 128(2) and (3) the Planning Act 2016 (PA) for the imposition of a “necessary infrastructure condition” under s 128, namely:(a)the LGIP does not identify adequate trunk infrastructure to service the subject premises;(b)the development infrastructure services development consistent with the assumptions in the LGIP about type, scale, location or timing of development; and(c)the development infrastructure is necessary to service the premises.”[3]Reasons for Judgment, p 5 [11]. The above three requirements are cumulative. Traspunt had to succeed on all three limbs of the issue to prevail. It was uncontroversial that the dedication required by the condition was a form of “development infrastructure”.[4] [4]Reasons for Judgment, p 5 [12]. The evolution of the issues in dispute is important in the context of the Council’s application for costs. How did the issues in dispute evolve? On 7 August 2019, His Honour Judge Rackemann made orders to define the issues in dispute in the appeal. The orders required:(a)Traspunt to provide the Council with any amended notice of appeal by 21 August 2019; (b)the Council to provide Traspunt with a statement of facts, matters and contentions by 11 September 2019; and (c)Traspunt to provide the Council with any statement in reply by 2 October 2019. By an Amended Notice of Appeal (filed with leave on 26 November 2019, but provided to the Respondent on 30 August 2019), Traspunt relevantly sought an order that condition 6 be deleted because:(a)it did not comply with s 665 of the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 or s 145 of the Planning Act 2016 as, amongst other matters, it was a condition about trunk infrastructure (rather than non-trunk infrastructure); and (b)it did not comply with s 65 of the Planning Act 2016 as it was not reasonable or relevant.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
In the Appellant’s Submissions on Costs, Traspunt acknowledges that the effect of its submissions, and the consequential order on 26 November 2019, was to concede that the condition would be lawful under s 145 of the Planning Act 2016 in the event it failed to demonstrate that it was lawful under s 128 of the Planning Act 2016. Relevantly, Traspunt’s submissions state:[6]“As noted by the Court ([6] RJ]), it was conceded by Traspunt on the morning of Day 2 of the trial, after the matter was correctly raised by the Court, that the effect of the order made by Rackemann DCJ on 26 November 2019 was to reduce the matters in dispute to the one issue, namely whether the dedication required by condition 6 of the Negotiated Decision Notice of 6 July 2018 satisfied the requirements of ss.128(2) and (3) of the PA for the imposition of a “necessary infrastructure condition” and that, if that question was answered in the negative, the dedication required by condition 6 of the Negotiated Decision Notice pursuant to s.145 of the PA would stand. Neither parties appreciated the precise consequence of that order until the matter was raised by the Court on the morning of Day 2 of the hearing. The Council had, on the first day of the trial, agreed to a list of issues being tendered which included as a question whether the dedication was valid under s.145 of the PA.” [6]At paragraph 10 (footnotes omitted).What did the expert evidence address? On or about 16 December 2019, Traspunt filed and served an affidavit of a traffic engineer, Mr Stuart Holland. Mr Holland expressed no opinion about whether the LGIP identified adequate trunk infrastructure to service the subject premises or whether the dedication was necessary to service the subject premises. On or about 2 March 2020, the Council filed and served an affidavit of a traffic engineer, Mr Andrew Douglas. Mr Douglas opined that the LGIP identified adequate trunk infrastructure to service the subject premises and that the dedication was not necessary to service the subject premises. On or about 31 March 2020, Traspunt filed and served a further affidavit of Mr Holland. In that affidavit, Mr Holland agreed with Mr Douglas that the LGIP identified adequate trunk infrastructure to service the subject premises without the dedication. Was the appeal frivolous and/or vexatious? The Council submits that the Court’s power is engaged by s 60(1)(b) of the Planning and Environment Court Act 2016. Using the language of the example to the provision, the Council contends that, from 27 November 2019, the proceeding was “conducted without reasonable prospects of success”. The example in s 60(1)(b) of the Planning and Environment Court Act 2016 is part of the Act.[7] As such, it gives meaning to the expression “frivolous or vexatious”.[8] [7]Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 14(3).[8]Previous Queensland statutes that had used the phrase “frivolous or vexatious” did not contain the example that the Planning and Environment Court Act 2016 contains. The leading case on that expression was Mudie v Gainriver Pty Ltd (No. 2) [2002] QCA 546; [2003] 2 Qd R 271. The discussion of that term in the joint judgment of McMurdo P and Atkinson J at [35]-[37] is not necessarily directly applicable, particularly where the application for costs is made by reference to the example provided.
Decision
Reasons for decision
The application in pending proceeding was determined by His Honour Judge Rackemann on 26 November 2019. He made an order as follows: “UPON THE COURT BEING SATISFIED THAT the outcome of the Appeal will not be affected if the development is started before the Appeal is decided IT IS ORDERED THAT: 1. The development: (a)may start before the Appeal is decided; and (b)is subject to the conditions contained in the Negotiated Decision Notice dated 6 July 2018 (Negotiated Decision Notice), save for Condition 6 of the Negotiated Decision Notice insofar as it relates to whether the land is to be dedicated at no cost to the Council.” Traspunt’s submissions did not reflect the position it adopted in its Amended Notice of Appeal, namely that condition 6 should be deleted. The submissions made to secure the order of His Honour Judge Rackemann involved a concession that, if the condition was not imposed under s 128 of the Planning Act 2016, it was a lawful condition under s 145 of the Planning Act 2016. This is because, unless the condition was lawful under either s 128 or s 145 of the Planning Act 2016, it was a prohibited condition under s 66 of the Planning Act 2016 (and could not be imposed). As I have noted in my reasons for judgment:“Traspunt bears the onus in the appeal.2 It no longer contends that condition 6 should be deleted. Rather, Traspunt now contends that condition 6 should be amended to delete the statement that it is to be dedicated at no cost to the Council and to record that it is imposed under s 128 of the Planning Act 2016 (Qld). In the event I am not persuaded that the condition should be imposed under s 128, Traspunt concedes that the condition can be lawfully imposed under s 145 of the Planning Act 2016 (Qld),3 being the equivalent of s 665 of the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Qld). 2See s 45 of the Planning and Environment Court Act 2016. 3Traspunt’s change of position was made apparent to the Court in its Outline of Argument of the Appellant filed by leave with the Court on 26 November 2019 (Exhibit 17), particularly in paragraphs 19 to 25. The full effect of those submissions, which spoke of a “binary outcome” are best appreciated by reference to the definitions of “trunk infrastructure” and “non-trunk infrastructure” under s 6 and Schedule 2 of the Planning Act 2016. In reliance on those submissions, the Court made an order (Exhibit 18), under s 72(2) of the Planning Act 2016, permitting the development to start before the appeal was decided. A concession that the condition was lawful under s 145 of the Planning Act 2016 was necessary to secure the order. On day 2 of this hearing, Mr O’Brien QC, Counsel for Traspunt, acknowledged the effect of Traspunt’s concession.”(emphasis added) In the Appellant’s Submissions on Costs, Traspunt acknowledges that the effect of its submissions, and the consequential order on 26 November 2019, was to concede that the condition would be lawful under s 145 of the Planning Act 2016 in the event it failed to demonstrate that it was lawful under s 128 of the Planning Act 2016. Relevantly, Traspunt’s submissions state:[6]“As noted by the Court ([6] RJ]), it was conceded by Traspunt on the morning of Day 2 of the trial, after the matter was correctly raised by the Court, that the effect of the order made by Rackemann DCJ on 26 November 2019 was to reduce the matters in dispute to the one issue, namely whether the dedication required by condition 6 of the Negotiated Decision Notice of 6 July 2018 satisfied the requirements of ss.128(2) and (3) of the PA for the imposition of a “necessary infrastructure condition” and that, if that question was answered in the negative, the dedication required by condition 6 of the Negotiated Decision Notice pursuant to s.145 of the PA would stand. Neither parties appreciated the precise consequence of that order until the matter was raised by the Court on the morning of Day 2 of the hearing. The Council had, on the first day of the trial, agreed to a list of issues being tendered which included as a question whether the dedication was valid under s.145 of the PA.” [6]At paragraph 10 (footnotes omitted).What did the expert evidence address?