Transport Workers' Union of Australia v Ventia Australia Pty Ltd

[2021] FWC 5012

[2021] FWC 5012

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.437 - Application for a protected action ballot order

Transport Workers' Union of Australia
v
Ventia Australia Pty Ltd
(B2021/639)

DEPUTY PRESIDENT BEAUMONT PERTH, 17 AUGUST 2021

Proposed protected action ballot of employees of Ventia Australia Pty Ltd.

[1] On 6 August 2021, the Transport Workers’ Union of Australia (TWU) filed an application for a protected action ballot order (order) pursuant to s 437 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (Act). The application concerned a proposed ballot of certain employees of Ventia Australia Pty Ltd (Ventia). The employees in question are members of the TWU who are based in Western Australia and provide services in the court security and prisoner transport industry.

[2] The order sought related to bargaining between TWU and Ventia for a new enterprise agreement to replace the Broadspectrum WA CS&CS & TWU Enterprise Agreement (Agreement), 1 which has a nominal expiry date of 24 March 2021. The proposed order, as set out by the TWU in its application of 6 August 2021, contained the following questions:

In support of reaching an enterprise agreement with your employer, do you support the taking of protected industrial action against your employer which involve one or more of the following:

Question 1

An unlimited number of indefinite bans on working of overtime?

[ ] Yes

[ ] No

Question 2

An unlimited number of indefinite bans on the completion of paperwork except for paperwork that may have an effect on the health and safety of employees, prisoners, and the general public.?

Question 4

An unlimited number of indefinite bans on the performance of work in clothes to which badges,

stickers, or hats that are not part of the official uniform are not attached or worn?

[ ] Yes

[ ] No

Question 5

An unlimited number of bans on the performance of work for 2 hours?

[ ] Yes

[ ] No

Question 6

An unlimited number of bans on the performance of work for 4 hours?

[ ] Yes

[ ] No

Question 7

An unlimited number of bans on the performance of work for 8 hours?

[ ] Yes

[ ] No

[ ] Yes

[ ] No

Question 3

An unlimited number of indefinite bans on wearing of uniforms?

[ ] Yes

[ ] No

Question 4

An unlimited number of bans on the performance of higher duties?

[ ] Yes

[ ] No

Question 8

An unlimited number of bans on the performance of work for 24 hours?

[ ] Yes

[ ] No

Question 9

An unlimited number of indefinite bans on the use of electronic devices in the performance of work duties?

[ ] Yes

[ ] No

[3] Ventia objected to the proposed order of 6 August 2021, noting that question two and question nine in the proposed ballot application were vague and ambiguous in their terms such that they were not capable of precise meaning in circumstances where the TWU was required to provide such detail.

Question 2

An unlimited number of indefinite bans on the completion of paperwork except for paperwork that may have an effect on the health and safety of employees, prisoners, and the general public.?

Question 9

An unlimited number of indefinite bans on the use of electronic devices in the performance of work duties?

[ ] Yes

[ ] No

[4] On receipt of Ventia’s objections on 13 August 2021, the TWU submitted an amended application to the Commission. The amended application included revisions to questions two and nine of the proposed order, such that they read, respectively, as follows:

Question 2

An unlimited number of indefinite bans on the completion of paperwork, and instead, providing the relevant information to the supervisor, or other reporting officer in person or by telephone? (emphasis added).

[ ] Yes

[ ] No

Question 9

An unlimited number of indefinite bans on the use of electronic devices in particular, tablets and mobile telephones – in the performance of work duties?

[ ] Yes

[ ] No

[5] The amendments did not appease Ventia, and the matter proceeded to hearing. At the hearing, Ms Patricia Bushby, Care & Custody Officer Level 2 and a TWU Delegate, in addition to a Mr Jason Walters, TWU Industrial Officer, gave evidence on behalf of the TWU. Mr Jonathon Snow, Head of Operations for the Court Security and Custodial Contract (WA CS & CS Contract) held by Ventia, gave evidence on behalf of the respondent company.

Background

[6] The background to the matter is as follows.

[7] Ventia and its employees are currently in negotiations for an enterprise agreement to replace the current Agreement. The employees covered by the Agreement are employed on the WA CS&CS Contract. The work the employees perform includes working in courts, custody areas, court security and also in the transport and the security of persons in custody. The work is performed in the Perth metropolitan area and several regional locations in Western Australia.

[8] Mr Snow gave evidence that in a five day period Ventia typically organised approximately 850 movements of persons in custody across the State of Western Australia. These movements were typically for critical issues which often occurred at short notice such as:

a) medical appointments;

b) hospital admissions;

c) attending direct family member funerals or visitation to dying relatives;

d) court appearances and trials;

e) inter prison transfers to assist in prison management and wellbeing; and

f) court clearances and police lock up clearances of remanded persons. 2

[9] Mr Snow expressed that in terms of the categories of movement identified above, a three day period for notification of industrial action would have significant impacts on persons in custody and other participants outside of those in the current industrial context of enterprise bargaining. 3 Mr Snow referred to a couple of examples where the impact would be felt, noting that where a relative of a person in custody dies, there were real prospects that industrial action taken on three working days’ notice would mean a person would be denied the opportunity to attend a funeral of a relative. This was because most funeral arrangements were obviously organised to occur as soon as practicable after a death.4

[10] At hearing Mr Snow clarified that the longest period Ventia would receive by way of notification was three days, and that was for medical appointments. For court appearances, notification was provided at 1900hrs the day before the appearance.

[11] Mr Snow explained that an important consideration was that the movements of persons in custody were not within the operational control of Ventia and were subject to the internal controls and procedures of other participants in the criminal justice system. 5

[12] Mr Snow noted that as court hearing dates were scheduled according to court calendars, industrial action may mean that hearing dates were vacated (despite having been set months in advance in many cases) and re-listed according to the next available date in a court’s calendar. 6 Additionally, legal fees and expenses incurred by persons in custody may also be charged to persons in custody, who are often of limited financial means.7

[13] Mr Snow noted that it was not possible to ‘telephone’ in such procedures as contemplated by question 2 of the proposed order. 8

[14] Ms Bushby said that she was aware that the Department of Justice gave Ventia 72 hours’ notice of a requirement to move persons in custody to courts, medical and other appointments. Movements that were required with less than 72 hours’ notice were referred to as ‘ad hoc movements’. Ms Bushby said that if Ventia is unable to carry out an ad-hoc movement, for example, a medical appointment, a funeral, or a visit to a terminally ill relative, due to staff shortages and the like, then the Department makes its own arrangements for those movements. 9

[15] Insofar as court hearing dates were concerned, Ms Bushby noted that those dates were set well in advance. In her view, Ventia would, therefore, receive at least 72 hours’ notice of a movement of a person to a court hearing, which gave Ventia an adequate amount of time to make arrangements for the person in custody to be transported to the relevant court for a hearing.

[16] When it was proposed to Mr Snow that the Department of Justice could step in to undertake movements of persons in custody if Care & Custody Officers were not available, Mr Snow expressed the view that the State did not have the resources sufficient to facilitate the transfers and it would place a huge strain on the prison system. Submissions were made that the Department of Justice had not undertaken the contracted work for some ten or more years. Ms Bushby disagreed with Mr Snow’s evidence asserting that on a regular basis Ventia was unable to provide ad hoc movement services and the Department of Justice would make arrangements.

[17] Mr Snow explained that the movements of persons in custody are highly controlled and regulated. He stated that almost every aspect of Ventia’s work is regulated with a procedure which could be termed paperwork. 10

[18] The different types of paperwork were explained by Mr Snow. Mr Snow detailed dealing with bail and surety paperwork for persons who are held in remand, and a health and safety checklist for persons in custody. He said that in respect of the checklist, a failure to complete a health and safety checklist could mean that a person taking responsibility for a person in custody is unaware of any dangers or threats posed by the person in custody. 11

[19] By way of example, Mr Snow explained that a staff member who refused to sign paperwork acknowledging receipt of a person in custody would have consequences in terms of legal authority to detain the person in custody and also possible legal consequences for the staff member. 12

[20] Ms Bushby agreed that movements of persons in custody are highly controlled and regulated; that there are court procedures around court custody, and the delivery, and monitoring of legal processes around bail, surety, reappearance and release to freedom. Further, Ms Bushy explained that there were procedures which correctional centres require to be followed around movements of person in custody. 13

[21] Ms Busby elaborated that movements of persons in custody are controlled through an OMI (Offender Movement Information) form, which is the authority for Care and Custody Officers to take control of and move persons in custody from the prison. 14 The OMI form is completed by an employee of the prison and it is given to the Care and Custody Officers who will be transporting the person(s) in custody.

[22] Ms Bushby clarified that Care and Custody Officers do not complete the court paperwork regarding person being remanded in custody (the court does a remand warrant). 15 Further, the court staff were said to deal with the release of bail documentation, and also if a person is released to freedom.16 Justices of the Peace were said to sign the bail papers.17

[23] Ms Bushby stated that in her view a ban on ‘completion’ of paperwork clearly differentiates between paperwork that is usually completed by Care and Custody Officers (which will not be completed), and paperwork that is completed by others and is given to the Care and Custody Officer by those persons, such as prison staff and court staff. Ms Bushby said that one example was the OMI Form, which gives Care and Custody Officers the authority to have persons in custody under their control and to move them from one location to another, but which the Care and Custody Officers were not required to complete. 18 Ms Bushby expressed that Care and Custody Offices were required to sign property forms for persons in custody, and if a ban on paperwork was put in place then those forms would not be completed.

[24] Evidence was given at hearing that the Care and Custody Officers use an E Prisoner Event Management System (EPEMS), an electronic tablet, to undertake some of their duties. For example, when performing escort duties of persons in transit, the Care and Custody Officer is required to make 15 minutely observations into the EPEMS. That data is thereafter transmitted to the Control Room and enables an event to be acted upon.

[25] In her evidence, Ms Bushby noted that if there were a ban on the use of EPEMS and a ban on paperwork, there would be no other means of recording that medication had been given to the person(s) in custody.

Statutory framework

[26] Section 437 of the Act sets out the requirements for a valid application for a protected action ballot order. Subsection 437(3) prescribes requirements as to the content of an application as follows:

Matters to be specified in application

(3) The application must specify:

(a) the group or groups of employees who are to be balloted; and

(b) the question or questions to be put to the employees who are to be balloted, including the nature of the proposed industrial action.

[27] Section 443 contains requirements as to the power of the Commission to make a protected action ballot order once an application pursuant to s 437 has been made. Subsection 443(1) requires the Commission to make a protected action ballot order if an application has been made under s 437 and the Commission is satisfied that the applicant has been, and is, genuinely trying to reach an agreement with the employer of the employees who are to be balloted. Subsection 443(3) provides:

(3) [Content of protected action ballot order]

A protected action ballot order must specify the following:

(a) the name of each applicant for the order;

(b) the group or groups of employees who are to be balloted;

(c) the date by which voting in the protected action ballot closes;

(d) the question or questions to be put to the employees who are to be balloted, including the nature of the proposed industrial action.

[28] If the taking of protected industrial action is authorised by employees in a ballot conducted pursuant to an order made under s 443, s 414(1) requires that written notice of any industrial action to be engaged in by employees must be given by the relevant bargaining representative to the employer. The provision of notice in accordance with the requirements prescribed by s 414 is one of a number of conditions that must be satisfied in order for the action to be protected: s 413(4). Section 414(2) states that the period of notice must be a least three working days, or if the protected ballot order for the employee claim action specifies a longer period of notice for the purpose of this paragraph – that period of notice.

Threshold requirements

[29] For reasons that will become apparent, I am satisfied that the threshold requirements have been met. Pursuant to s 437(1), I have found that the TWU is a bargaining representative and is entitled to make the application being considered in this matter.

[30] Having considered the evidence and other material provided, I am further satisfied that the application has been properly made under s 437 and the application was not made earlier than 30 days before the nominal expiry date of a previous enterprise agreement.

[31] It was confirmed that Ventia was provided with a copy of the application within 24 hours of it being made as required by s 440.

Matters in dispute - consideration

Ambiguity ballot question

[32] Subsections 414(6) and 437(3) both require that the ‘nature’ of the action (being the proposed industrial action the subject of the protected action ballot) must be specified. The object of the relevant division as set out in s 436 is to ensure that those who are to be balloted are afforded a fair, simple and democratic process which leads to the view of employees who vote on the question being expressed in the ballot.

[33] The TWU submitted that there were two types of forms that the Care and Custody Officers deal with. There are those that are completed by others and the forms that the Care and Custody Officers complete. The TWU stated that both the employees who are to be balloted, and Ventia, understand from the question, that the proposed ban only applies to forms that the Care and Custody Officers are required to complete, and, that the ban will not affect forms generated by others.

[34] The TWU emphasised that ‘the question’, presumedly question two, made it clear that, the information that would have been included in the forms that the Care and Custody Officers would usually complete, will be provided to Ventia verbally by telephone.

[35] It is noted the Union’s application contemplates a ban on the use of telephones in question nine of the Application. Ventia expressed that when question nine was read in conjunction with question two, the proposed course of action in question two could not be implemented by the members of the TWU.

[36] Addressing Ventia’s concern about the operation of question two and question nine, the TWU pressed that if the Commission made the order sought, then the concern raised by Ventia regarding questions two and nine would only arise if the TWU notified Ventia that its members proposed to take industrial action in terms of those two questions at the same time. If that happened, said the TWU, Ventia could make an application to the Commission at that time.

[37] The construction of s 443(3)(d) is well settled. In John Holland Pty Ltd v AMWU (John Holland) 19 the Full Bench said in relation to s 437(3)(b):

[19] Moving now to the construction of s.437 itself, seen in its statutory context, all that the section requires is that the questions should describe the industrial action in such a way that employees are capable of responding to them. If the questions are ambiguous or lack clarity there may be consequences for the bargaining representative and the employees if reliance is placed on the result of the ballot in taking industrial action. If the question or questions give rise to ambiguity, the conclusion may be reached that the industrial action specified in a notice under s.414 was not authorised by the ballot and that the action is not protected for the purposes of s.409(2). It is true that ambiguity or lack of clarity in the description of the industrial action is undesirable, but these are matters more appropriate for consideration under other provisions. It follows that in most cases the drafting of the questions will be a matter for the applicant.

[38] In Transport Workers’ Union of Australia v Prosegur Australia Pty Limited (Prosegur), 20 which was referred to by both the parties, the Full Bench stated that the passage in John Holland was squarely applicable to s 443(3)(d), which is expressed in the same terms as s 437(3)(b).21 The Full Bench continued that as John Holland makes clear, it will not normally be the proper role of the Commission to interfere in the drafting of questions to appear in a protected action ballot order. If the questions describe the nature of proposed industrial action in a sufficiently clear way such that employees are capable of responding to them, then there is no basis for the Commission not to include them in a protected action ballot order that it is required to make under s 443(1).

[39] However, the Full Bench in Prosegur cautioned that John Holland made it equally clear, there may nonetheless be some cases in which the Commission will not be satisfied that the condition in s 443(3)(d) is met. In those cases where the employer seeks to be heard in relation to an application for a protected action ballot order, the employer may present evidence or other material which demonstrates that, because of the nature of the work that employees perform or some other relevant circumstance, a considered response might not be able to be given by employees to a particular question. 22

[40] In this case, the lack of clarity did not necessarily arise from the evidence, but from the very framing of questions posed.

[41] Ventia expressed that it was not clear whether ‘indefinitite bans on the completion of paperwork’ referred to the physical act of writing or completing paperwork or the handling, transferring or dealing with paperwork. For example, conveying a completed form from one location to another.

[42] I am of the view that the word ‘completion’ in this context clearly refers to the act of writing, drafting or otherwise ‘completing’ the paperwork. This might be way of the provision of a signature or the marking of a cross in a box. On any objective level the ban does not include within its scope precluding the transfer of paperwork from one location to another or passing that same paperwork from one person to another.

[43] It is said that s 437 itself, seen in its statutory context, requires that the questions should describe the industrial action in such a way that employees are capable of responding to them. 23 However, despite my observation above, in its current form (that is the amended version of question two), I am not satisfied that the employees are capable of responding to it.

[44] Sense must be able to be made of the question posed and in this case question two is devoid of the type of clarity required to engender an informed response where a proper assessment has taken place.

[45] Question two provides that ‘relevant information’ can be provided to the supervisor or reporting officer in person or by telephone. However, when one considers the action in question nine, which refers to the indefinite ban on the use of electronic devices including mobile telephones, a difficulty arises.

[46] Where the supervisor or reporting officer is unavailable in person and there is in place a ban on paperwork and a ban on electronic devices, it is unclear how the ‘relevant information’ is to be conveyed. Question two clearly contemplates that the provision of relevant information by telephone or in person, as the alternative to completing the paperwork. Question two does after all refer to ‘instead’. There is no apparent option for the ‘relevant information’ not to be conveyed. Therefore, the employee is left in the perplexing situation of not quite understanding what it is they are voting for.

[47] While the TWU pressed that two types of action may not be agreed upon together, this argument does not ‘cure’ the ambiguity that persists within question two when considered in light of question 9. Further, in all the circumstances, it is unclear from both text of the question itself and the evidence adduced by the TWU as to what constitutes ‘relevant information’. Is relevant information, for example, the confirmation that a Care and Custodial Officer has signed a form or is it the case that that ‘relevant information’ means something all together different.

[48] Counsel for the TWU cautioned that the role of the Commission does not extend to interfering in the drafting of questions to appear in a protected action ballot order. However, question two does not describe the nature of proposed industrial action in a sufficiently clear way such that employees are capable of responding to it. In this case I am satisfied that question two is absent the clarity required to engender an informed response where a proper assessment has taken place. The question will not be included in the Commission’s Order. With regards to the other questions asked, I do not consider that they suffer from the same difficulties and I consider that the employees are capable of responding to them in an informed manner.

[49] For the sake of fulsomeness, I simply note that there appeared to be some confusion on the TWU’s behalf as to whether safety critical paperwork would be completed notwithstanding the paperwork ban.

[50] Whilst Mr Walters stated that the safety carve out in the initial question 2 was removed with a view to limiting any potential ambiguity, Ms Bushby appeared somewhat surprised by the omission of the carve out in the revised question 2. From all accounts it appeared that Ms Bushby held the view that safety critical paperwork would be completed due to the Care and Custody Officers duty of care. The confusion of the witnesses perhaps illustrates further the problematic nature of the revised question 2.

Extension of the three day period

[51] Section 443(5) of the Act provides that the Commission can require a longer period of notice to be given where it is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances justifying this. The onus is on Ventia to provide evidence that would satisfy the Commission that there are exceptional circumstances in this instance.

[52] The approach to exceptional circumstances in this context was discussed by Vice President Lawler in CEPU v Australian Postal Corporation, 24 which concerned an equivalent provision of the Workplace Relations Act 1996:25

[10] In this passage his Honour was concerned with the ordinary meaning of the expression “exceptional circumstances” and the approach identified is, in my view, equally applicable to the use of that expression in s.465(3). In summary, the expression “exceptional circumstances” requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon but need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare. Circumstances will not be exceptional if they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered. Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. It is not correct to construe “exceptional circumstances” as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural “circumstances” as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of “exceptional circumstances” includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.

[11] However, it is important to note that when considering whether to make an order pursuant to s.463(5) the Commission is not simply concerned with determining whether there are exceptional circumstances. There must be exceptional circumstances “justifying” the specification of a longer notice period. The notion of justification is critical and calls for a consideration of the purpose of the notice required by s.441.

[53] The Vice President went on to state:

[21] Essentially, what is required in determining whether exceptional circumstances justify an extension of the required notices [sic] period is a weighing of the interests of the employer and third parties in the employer having a greater opportunity to take appropriate defensive action as against the diminution in the effectiveness of the employees’ bargaining power that results from such an extension. The fact that the legislature has seen fit to condition the ordering of an extension of the required notice period on the presence of exceptional circumstances justifying it, as distinct from merely conferring a simple discretion to extend the required notice period, indicates that ordinarily there should be no extension.

[22] The first example provided in Davids Distribution provides an illustration of where exceptional circumstances may justify an extension of the required notice period. A sophisticated piece of plant, such as a smelter, may take many days to shut down without damage. The employer is exposed to wholly disproportionate damage if it is prevented by too limited a notice period from undertaking an orderly shutdown of the plant. A further example may be afforded by a strike by teachers where the school needs to be able to notify parents of the strike so as to give them an opportunity to make alternative arrangements for the care of their children on the days of the strike. Typically, three working days will be insufficient for this purpose.

[54] In order to warrant an extended period of notice, the Commission must be satisfied both as to the existence of exceptional circumstances and the fact that these justify the granting of the extended notice. This requires a weighing up of the opportunity for Ventia to take appropriate defensive action against the diminution of the effectiveness of the TWU members’ bargaining power that is contemplated by the scheme of the Act 26. In that light, it would not be a relevant exercise of discretion to grant additional notice simply to allow the employer to neutralise the impact of the industrial action.27

[55] Where the interests beyond that of the immediate parties may be significantly impacted by the taking of industrial action, the tendency is for an extension of the notice period to be provided. 28

[56] Briefly stated, Ventia has not met the onus of satisfying the Commission that there are in this instance exceptional circumstances justifying the period of notice of protected industrial action being longer than three working days as is prescribed in the Act.

[57] No direct evidence was led as to what options Ventia has or does not have, to take steps to ameliorate the impact of protected industrial action, and no evidence was led as to why in particular three working days’ notice of any protected industrial action is insufficient in the circumstances.

[58] It would appear that most of the movement services provided by Ventia under the WA CS&CS Contract to the State, are subject to the State providing a maximum of 72 hours’ notice for the required services. For the transfer of persons in custody to court facilities that notice is provided the evening before. Therefore, it is unclear why, in circumstances where Ventia usually operates with limited notice periods, it requires longer than three working days. As to the impact upon a third party, namely the State or the Department of Justice, the evidence provided was simply assertion.

[59] I decline to specify a longer period than the three working days referred to s 414(2)(a) of the Act.

Conclusion

[60] For the above reasons, I have found that the TWU has met the statutory requirements of the Act.

[61] An order 29 based on the draft order provided by the TWU is issued in conjunction with this decision albeit question two is omitted and typographical matters have been addressed.

DEPUTY PRESIDENT

Appearances:

Mr. Adam Dziecol, for the Applicant;
Mr. Jason Walters, for the Applicant;
Mr. Danny Klepac, for the Respondent;
Ms. Natasha Kearley, for the Respondent.

Hearing details:

Perth (video);
August 16;
2021.

Final written submissions:

14 August 2021.

Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer

<PR732819>

 1   [2019] FWCA 3988; PR709165.

 2   Witness Statement of Jonathon Snow (Snow Statement) [5].

 3 Snow Statement [7].

 4 Snow Statement [9].

 5 Snow Statement [12].

 6 Snow Statement [14].

 7   Ibid.

 8 Snow Statement [24].

 9   Witness Statement of Patricia Bushby (Bushby Statement) [5].

 10 Snow Statement [18].

 11 Snow Statement [23].

 12   Ibid.

 13 Bushby Statement [7].

 14 Bushby Statement [8].

 15 Bushby Statement [9].

 16   Ibid.

 17   Ibid.

 18 Bushby Statement [10].

 19   [2010] FWAFB 526 (‘John Holland’).

 20   [2021] FWCFB 1562.

 21   Transport Workers’ Union of Australia v Prosegur Australia Pty Limited[2021] FWCFB 1562 [32].

 22 Ibid [33].

 23   John Holland.

 24   Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v Australian Postal Corporation[2007] AIRC 848.

 25   Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 463(5).

 26   Australian Federation of Air Pilots v Alliance Airlines Pty Ltd T/A Alliance Airlines[2017] FWC 6748 [12].

 27   Ibid.

 28   Transport Workers’ Union of Australia[2012] FWA 133; Transport Workers’ Union of Australia v the Chief Executive of the ACT Internal Omnibus Network (ACTION) on behalf of the Australian Capital Territory; Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union known as the Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union (AMWU) v the Chief Executive of the ACT Internal Omnibus Network (ACION) on behalf of the Australian Capital Territory[2010] FWA 3355.

 29   PR732874.