Transport Accident Commission v Lees

Case [2002] VSC 397


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

COMMON LAW DIVISION

No. 8918 of 2001

TRANSPORT ACCIDENT COMMISSION Plaintiff
v
JASON LEES Defendant

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JUDGE:

Bongiorno J.

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF HEARING:

5 March 2002

DATE OF JUDGMENT:

13 September 2002

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

TAC v Lees

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2002] VSC 397

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Appeal on questions of law – Statutory interpretation – Whether application of statute necessarily involves questions of law – Statute using ordinary words in common use – s. 3(1) Transport Accident Act 1986; s. 3(1) Road Safety Act 1986; s. 148 Victorian Civil & Administrative Tribunal Act 1998.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the Plaintiff Mr C. Maxwell, Q.C. with
Mr G. Lewis
TAC Law Pty Ltd
For the Defendant Mr G. Nash, Q.C. with
Mr D. Pulling
Slater and Gordon

HIS HONOUR:

  1. On 4 June 2000, Jason Peter Lees, then aged twenty-three, sustained serious spinal injuries resulting in incomplete paraplegia when he fell off an unregistered motorcycle he was riding on an area of land known as the Werribee Motocross[1] Track, Laverton.  Consequent upon his injuries, on 28 August 2000 Lees made a claim for compensation on the Transport Accident Commission ("the Commission") pursuant to the Transport Accident Act 1986. The Commission rejected that claim on the basis that the injuries suffered by Lees were not sustained as a result of a transport accident as defined by s 3 of the Act in that the incident in which they were sustained was not caused by the driving of a motor car or motor vehicle within the meaning of the Road Safety Act 1986 as applied to the Transport Accident Act. 

    [1]The term “motocross”  (sometimes spelt “motorcross”) is defined by the Macquarie Dictionary (3rd Ed.) as being: “a short distance motorcycle race of at least two laps on a circuit presenting a variety of surfaces and terrain.”

  1. On 26 November 2001 the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal ("the Tribunal"), in the exercise of its statutory jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commission, reversed the Commission's decision and found that as Lees was, in fact, injured as a result of a transport accident he was entitled to compensation under the Act.

  1. Pursuant to s 148 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 the Commission sought leave of a Master of this Court to appeal the determination of the Tribunal. Section 148 confers a right of appeal, by leave, on a question of law upon a party to a decision of the Tribunal. On 18 February 2002 Master Wheeler refused the Commission leave to appeal, holding that the questions raised by its application for leave to appeal were not questions of law but rather questions of fact.

  1. The Commission now appeals to this Court against the decision of the Master pursuant to Rule 77.05 of the Rules of the Supreme Court.  Accordingly, although the Court is presently technically concerned with an appeal from a Master refusing…

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Transport Accident Commission v Lees [2002] VSC 397
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[2002] VSC 397
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Transport Accident Commission versus Lees, the issue revolved around the interpretation of certain sections of the Transport Accident Act 1986 and the Road Safety Act 1986. The dispute came before the Court of Appeal, where the appellant, the Transport Accident Commission, sought to appeal against a decision made by the first respondent, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal. The central question before the court was whether the application of these statutory provisions necessarily involved questions of law, as contended by the appellant.

The court was required to determine whether the ordinary words used in these statutes could be interpreted as involving questions of law. Specifically, the court had to consider the meaning and scope of sections 3(1) of both the Transport Accident Act and the Road Safety Act, and whether these sections fell within the definition of questions of law as outlined in section 148 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998. The court's task was to examine the language of the statutes and any relevant legislative history to ascertain the legislative intent.

The court held that the interpretation of the statutory provisions did not necessarily involve questions of law, as the language used was ordinary and commonly understood. The court found that the statutes in question were not ambiguous and that their meaning could be determined without resorting to complex legal principles. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal, holding that the application of these statutory provisions did not involve questions of law as defined in section 148 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998. The decision of the tribunal was upheld.

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