Transerve Pte Ltd v Blue Ridge WA Pty Ltd (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Transerve Pte Ltd v Blue Ridge WA Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 1222

Citation: Transerve Pte Ltd v Blue Ridge WA Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 1222
Parties: TRANSERVE PTE LTD, PT MULYA SURYA and LEEMBRUGGEN BUTLER PTY LTD (ACN 153 055 513) v BLUE RIDGE WA PTY LTD (ACN 147 886 173) and ALAN NEIL MACKENZIE
File number: SAD 269 of 2012
Judge: MCKERRACHER J
Date of judgment: 12 November 2015
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – freezing orders – whether freezing orders ought to be made to restrain a respondent from disposing of assets pending an unsuccessful applicant’s substantive appeal – whether the applicant has a good arguable case on an accrued or prospective cause of action that is justiciable in this Court – whether there is a danger that a prospective judgment will be wholly or partly unsatisfied because the assets of the prospective judgment debtor may be removed from Australia or disposed of, dealt with or diminished in value – whether special circumstances exist – Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 7.32, 7.35

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether it is appropriate to rely upon documents in this proceeding which were obtained compulsorily from the second respondent in proceedings concerning the winding up of the first respondent – whether the use of such documents constitutes a breach of the implied undertaking that information will only be used for the purposes of the proceedings in which it is produced

Legislation: Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2, ss 21, 22
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 597(9)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 7.32, 7.35
Cases cited: Aspermont Ltd v Lechmere Financial Corporation [2002] WASCA 52
Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon [1990] Ch 48
Eastland Technology Australia Ltd v Whisson (2003) 28 WAR 308
Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Lovell (1998) 19 WAR 316
Hearne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125
Re Middle Harbour Investments Ltd (in liquidation) (unreported, New South Wales Court of Appeal, 15 December 1976)
Perdaman Chemicals and Fertilisers Pty Ltd v The Griffin Coal Mining Company Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 188
Tomasetti v Brailey [2012] NSWCA 6
Transerve Pte Ltd v Blue Ridge WA Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 953
Dates of hearing: 24 September 2015, 30 September 2015, 23 October 2015
Place: Perth
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 40
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr PJ Adams
Solicitor for the Applicants: DMAW Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: The First Respondent did not appear
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr AP Hershowitz
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Granich Partners

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

SAD 269 of 2012

BETWEEN:

TRANSERVE PTE LTD
First Applicant

PT MULYA SURYA
Second Applicant

LEEMBRUGGEN BUTLER PTY LTD (ACN 153 055 513)
Third Applicant

AND:

BLUE RIDGE WA PTY LTD (ACN 147 886 173)
First Respondent

ALAN NEIL MACKENZIE
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MCKERRACHER J

DATE OF ORDER:

12 NOVEMBER 2015

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1222
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Transerve Pte Ltd brought an application for freezing orders against Blue Ridge WA Pty Ltd and its director, Mr Mackenzie, to restrain them from disposing of assets pending Transerve's substantive appeal. The application arose out of a prior judgment in favour of Transerve against Blue Ridge WA for $2.4 million plus interest and costs. Mr Mackenzie opposed the application, arguing that there was no danger that assets would be removed or diminished in value and that special circumstances were not present. The court was required to decide whether Transerve had a good arguable case for freezing orders and whether there was a danger of unsatisfied judgment due to asset disposal or diminution in value. The court also considered whether it was appropriate to rely on documents obtained compulsorily in other proceedings.

The court found that Transerve had a reasonably good arguable case for freezing orders, subject to the facts falling the right way. However, the court was not satisfied that there was a danger of unsatisfied judgment due to asset disposal or diminution in value, as Mr Mackenzie had disclosed his assets and there was no evidence of absconding or asset hiding. The court also found that it was not appropriate to rely on documents obtained compulsorily in other proceedings, as they were subject to an implied undertaking that they would only be used for the purposes of those proceedings. The court noted that the implied undertaking was a substantive legal obligation and binding upon anyone aware of its existence.

The court dismissed Transerve's application for freezing orders and ordered Transerve to file and serve a minute of orders reflecting the reasons for judgment within 7 days.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant file and serve a minute of orders reflecting the reasons for judgment published today within 7 days.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Transerve Pte Ltd sought freezing orders to restrain Blue Ridge WA Pty Ltd and Mr Mackenzie from disposing of assets during the pendency of Transerve's substantive appeal against a previous decision of the Federal Court. The appeal concerned a claim by Transerve against Blue Ridge WA and Mr Mackenzie for damages and other relief. The application for freezing orders was made under the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) to prevent the satisfaction of a prospective judgment being frustrated or inhibited. The application hinged on whether Transerve had a good arguable case on an accrued or prospective cause of action that was justiciable in the Court, and whether there was a danger that a prospective judgment would be wholly or partly unsatisfied due to the removal or disposal of assets by the respondents. The affidavit material revealed that Mr Mackenzie had disclosed limited assets, including a 50% interest in a property valued at around $290,000 and $40,000 in respect of another property interest. However, Transerve argued that Mr Mackenzie had not fully disclosed all his assets, and that there was a risk of assets being moved or diminished in value.

The matter came before the court as an application for freezing orders, which were initially granted to permit a hearing on the substantive application. The court heard arguments from both parties on whether the freezing orders should be extended beyond the hearing. The application for freezing orders was also contested on the basis that it should be pursued as a separate application, given the different principles involved compared to the substantive appeal. The court considered the procedural implications of using documents obtained compulsorily from Mr Mackenzie in the winding up proceedings of Blue Ridge WA, examining whether their use constituted a breach of the implied undertaking that such information would only be used for the purposes of the proceedings in which it was produced.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Although there was consent to the extension, or more accurately the granting of the freezing orders to permit a hearing, further extension beyond the hearing was opposed. Mr Mackenzie also opposes the application for the freezing orders being pursued by way of an order for liberty to apply, making the point, correctly I think, that following judgment and pending determination by an appeal court, a separate application is required. Also, different principles come into play. THE EVIDENCE It is unnecessary to identify all of the extensive affidavit material relied upon by Transerve, save to observe that, for reasons discussed below, I disallowed reliance upon bank statements annexed as ‘KLD 6’ to the affidavit of Kylie Lauren Dunn dated 29 September 2015, which comprised 400 pages of bank statements which were procured compulsorily from the second respondent in proceedings concerning the winding up of Blue Ridge WA and then sought to be used in these proceedings. Mr Mackenzie also relied on affidavit material to point out, amongst other things, that there were few assets to freeze and the exercise was academic, such that any successful appeal would not be rendered nugatory. THE PRINCIPLES By r 7.32(1) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the Court has a general power to make freezing orders with or without notice to the respondent for the purpose of preventing a frustration or inhibition of the Court’s process by seeking to meet a danger that a judgment or prospective judgment of the Court will be wholly or partly unsatisfied. Rule 7.35 empowers the Court to make a freezing or an ancillary order against a judgment debtor or prospective judgment debtor where the applicant has a good arguable case on an accrued or prospective cause of action that is justiciable in this Court. There is no evidence in this case of anyone absconding or being likely to do so, but there is evidence that assets have been dealt with so as to diminish the value of any prospective judgment against Mr Mackenzie. There is also evidence of non-disclosure of assets. Transerve contends that not only is there power to make a freezing order to restrain a respondent from disposing of assets pending an unsuccessful applicant’s substantive appeal, but further, there is no reason in principle why the considerations applicable to the grant of a Mareva injunction should not be applied in favour of such an unsuccessful applicant providing there are good arguable appeal prospects: Tomasetti v Brailey [2012] NSWCA 6 per Campbell JA (at [13]) and Aspermont Ltd v Lechmere Financial Corporation [2002] WASCA 52 per Hasluck J (at [57]-[65]). It is important to recognise that an applicant seeking freezing orders pending an appeal in circumstances where it has failed in the proceedings is required to satisfy a higher test than an applicant pending trial: see Perdaman Chemicals and Fertilisers Pty Ltd v The Griffin Coal Mining Company Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 188 per Pullin JA (at [5]). In assessing the balance of convenience, weight must be given to a respondent’s success in the court below: Re Middle Harbour Investments Ltd (in liquidation) (unreported, New South Wales Court of Appeal, 15 December 1976) (at [2]) per Mahoney JA (Moffit P and Glass JA agreeing). In Perdaman, the Western Australian Supreme Court of Appeal noted that the criteria for the grant of an injunction pending an appeal are analogous to those relevant to the grant of a stay of judgment pending the hearing of an appeal: Eastland Technology Australia Ltd v Whisson (2003) 28 WAR 308. These include the fact that the respondent has the benefit of a judgment of the court below and is entitled to the benefit of that judgment. Therefore, special circumstances must be shown to exist. In particular, it will usually be necessary to show that the appeal will be rendered nugatory if the injunction is not granted: Perdaman per Pullin JA (at [5]).

Decision

Reasons for decision

I cannot say that Transerve would necessarily succeed on the second contention, but I am satisfied that in the form ultimately identified by counsel, such a proposition would satisfy the test as there is a reasonably good arguable point. This is, of course, subject to the facts falling the right way. This may all fall away on the analysis of the detail, but for present purposes I consider that the first limb of the test is satisfied. A DANGER THAT JUDGMENT WILL BE UNSATISFIED The affidavit material, Mr Mackenzie says, establishes that all assets directly or indirectly under his control are known to Transerve and have been known for a very long time. The liquidators of Blue Ridge WA, whom counsel for Transerve also represents, have obtained all the financial statements of every entity associated with Mr Mackenzie and are aware of his assets. There is, therefore, he argues, no evidence of an ensuing danger of dealing with assets. In any event, Mr Mackenzie says that even if Transerve succeeded on appeal, he does not have assets which could satisfy a judgment debt in the sum claimed by Transerve or even a small portion of such damages. Mr Mackenzie argues that the only assets he has of any value is his 50% interest in a Hillary’s property, which is valued at about $290,000, and $40,000 in respect of interest in another property known as ‘Lot 625’. Part of those funds are required by him for payment of legal fees and living expenses. The only sum remaining in bank accounts associated with him is the sum of approximately $11,496. Mr Mackenzie makes the point (with which I am inclined to agree) that Transerve has gone to extraordinary lengths to try and demonstrate that there is evidence of a positive intention to frustrate a judgment and to put assets beyond reach of the applicants. He notes that Blue Ridge WA was put into voluntary liquidation as a consequence of cash flow issues following on from the failure by Roy Hill to pay contractual amounts due and owing to Blue Ridge WA. He says that the submission that Mr Mackenzie placed Blue Ridge WA into liquidation to avoid a judgment debt or to avoid the claim by the applicants has not been made out on the evidence. Mr Mackenzie also contends that the suggestion that the initial liquidator was somehow complicit in such an arrangement failed on the evidence at trial. There is no debate, however, even from Mr Mackenzie, that his disclosure when first ordered by the Court in respect of an application for freezing orders was deficient in various respects. Mr Mackenzie tends to gloss over this somewhat. But, in my view, the deficiency was substantial, being significant sums and was then further repeated in subsequent affidavits. His answer is that the applicants were entitled to take further steps to remedy that situation, such as pursuing him for contempt of court for alleged breaches or for failure to disclose, but did not do so. As explained to me by counsel for Transerve, the decision not to press on with a contempt application close to the commencement of the trial was based on an indication given by the primary judge that there may be difficulties in the timing and circumstances in his sitting on the actual trial if he were to hear and determine the contempt application. It was on that basis that the application was not pursued. This explanation was not challenged by counsel for Mr Mackenzie and, having regard to the timing of the contempt application, would appear to make sense.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I also note that the extraction of financial information from Mr Mackenzie has not been straightforward. The fact that all funds due to him were paid to his wife was disclosed by Mr Mackenzie in his examination before Deputy District Registrar Trott on 4 December 2014. Transerve’s lawyers sought and obtained orders pursuant to s 597(9) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) for the production by Mrs Mackenzie of all bank account statements for any bank accounts maintained by her during the period 15 December 2010 to 4 December 2014, and the production of further books and records by Mr Mackenzie and Mr Paul Mahar, Blue Ridge WA’s former accountant and Mr Mackenzie’s current accountant. Mr and Mrs Mackenzie sought review of those orders, and in particular challenged the scope of the orders. The result of the review was that minor amendments were made to the wording of the orders. On 7 August 2015, various books and records were produced to the Court by Mr Mackenzie’s solicitor on behalf of Mr and Mrs Mackenzie. As Mr Mackenzie was overseas, his oral examination was adjourned to 15 October 2015. Counsel for Transerve sought leave to rely upon the documents thus produced, notably, bank account statements and also sought leave to cross-examine Mr Mackenzie in relation to them. I disallowed reliance on the bank statements and indicated that I would not be favourably disposed to cross-examination in an application of this sort, which should not be reduced to a mini trial. Moreover, Mr Mackenzie faces cross-examination by the same counsel over the same matters in the liquidator’s examination. Again, I do not propose to deal with the reasonably extensive submissions exchanged on this topic, save to say that I accept Mr Mackenzie’s submission that it is not appropriate to rely upon the documents. I note that information produced as a result of invoking the compulsory processes of the Court is subject to an implied undertaking that the information will only be used for the purposes of the proceedings in which it is produced. The bank records at ‘KLD 6’ were obtained under compulsion by the production order in the examination proceedings, in which neither the applicants in this application or the appeal, nor Mr Mackenzie, were parties. This implied undertaking is a substantive legal obligation arising by operation of law: Hearne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125. It is clear that the implied undertaking is binding upon anyone into whose hands the relevant documents come, if that person is aware that they have been obtained by way of discovery: Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Lovell (1998) 19 WAR 316 per Anderson J (at 334-335). While the examination proceedings were not litigation in the party and party sense, nonetheless, the documents produced were by way of compulsion through court order and the protection afforded in respect of such processes would be very limited if it did not extend to examination proceedings pursuant to the Corporations Act. Of course, the position is different if approval for relief from the implied undertaking is obtained before use of such documents.