Trans Atlantic Freight Services Pty Ltd v Olympic Airways SA

Case [1991] FCA 294


44 , 41
JUDGMENT NO. 2. ... ........
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA 1 NG318 of 1987
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY )
GENERAL DIVISION )
BETWEEN:  TRANS ATLANTIC FREIGHT SERVICES PTY LTD

Applicant

AND: OLYMPIC AIRWAYS SA

Respondent

MINUTES OF ORDER

JUDGE MAKING ORDER:  PINCUS J.
DATE OF ORDER:  12 FEBRUARY 1991
WHERE MADE:  SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 

1.   leave to file, out of time, the notice of motion received in the Registry on 3 December 1990, be granted;

2.    the notice of motion, for which leave to file has been granted above, be dismissed;

3.    the applicant company pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the notice of motion, to be taxed.

NOTE:  Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in
Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA 1 NG318 of 1987
NEW SOUTH WmES DISTRICT REGISTRY 1
GENERAL DIVISION 1

BETWEEN: TRANS ATLANTIC FREIGHT SERVICES PTY LTD

Applicant

AND: OLYMPIC AIRWAYS SA

Respondent

CORAM: PINCUS J.

PLACE: SYDNEY

W: 12 FEBRUARY 1991

EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

The matter before the Court is as I understand it an

application for leave to file a notice of motion out of time.

Mr Debuse, who appears for the respondent, intimated that he

doesn't object to leave being given and the substance of the matter dealt with. There will therefore be leave to file out of time the notice of motion which was apparently received in the registry on 3 December 1990.

The notice of motion asks for three orders:

1.    that orders made on 5 October 1989 by Sheppard J. be set aside;

2.    that orders made on 11 February 1988 by Gummow J. be set aside; and

  1. that matter number G318 of 1987 be restored and a hearing date fixed.

It appears that the applicant wishes to pursue proceedings relating to events which occurred some time in 1984 and subsequently. The applicant has been represented today by Mr Adamopoulos who has explained to me his earnest desire to pursue the matter and I accept for the purpose of these proceedings that that desire exists and that the case is in that sense bona fide. It has, however, some history which should be briefly mentioned.

The application was filed in 1987 and it was accompanied by a statement of claim which was, as Mr Debuse mentioned, struck out. A further statement of claim was filed in September 1987 and about the same time, or perhaps a little before, Burchett J. had before him an application for interlocutory relief which was refused. In refusing the application for interlocutory relief, his Honour held in effect that he did not regard the case as one of any strength.

Subsequently, on 11 February 1988 in proceedings, the transcript of which Mr Adamopoulos has shown me, the

application was struck out by Gummow J. Then on 5 October

1989, Sheppard J. dealt with a notice of motion by which the applicant sought to set aside the order of Gummow J. of 11 February 1988. I have read the reasons of Sheppard J. dealing with that matter.

Mr Adamopoulos says, in effect, that the order of

Sheppard J. was incorrect and that I should disagree with it.

He points to certain events which have occurred since that order was made; for example, to what he claims to be ill- intentioned actions on the part of the respondent against him relating to bankruptcy proceedings and criminal proceedings. However, it seems clear that the matters to which Mr Adamopoulos refers, which occurred, so he says, since the order of Sheppard J., cannot affect the correctness of that order.

The Court has, of course, no jurisdiction to set aside Sheppard J. 'S order simply because it is disagreed in. Having read the reasons of Sheppard J., I must respectfully say that if I had such jurisdiction I would not exercise it, because the conclusion at which his Honour arrived seems to me correct.

Apart from that, the passage of time has to be kept
in mind. Gummow J.'s order was made some three years ago.

Sheppard J.'s order, which is also attacked, was made in

extraordinary circumstances that after such a lapse of time an October 1989. We are here early in 1991. It would only be in
order of the Court would be set aside.

The circumstances which have confronted Mr Adamopoulos include some illness of which I've taken note, and he has, it seems to me, a genuine sense of grievance. Neither of these, however, can possibly justify granting the orders

which he seeks, and the notice of motion, Leave to file which
I have granted, will be dismissed.

The order will be made that the applicant company pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the notice of motion to be taxed.

I certify that this and the

three preceding pages are a true copy of the reasons for judgment herein of ~r Justice Pincus.

G---CL.wc-

Associate

Details
AGLC
Trans Atlantic Freight Services Pty Ltd v Olympic Airways SA [1991] FCA 294
Case
[1991] FCA 294
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Trans Atlantic Freight Services Pty Ltd brought an application to the Federal Court of Australia against Olympic Airways SA. The applicant sought leave to file a notice of motion out of time, which aimed to set aside previous orders made by Sheppard J. on 5 October 1989 and Gummow J. on 11 February 1988, and to restore the matter for further proceedings. The case originated from an application filed in 1987, which was accompanied by a statement of claim that was struck out. A further statement of claim was filed in September 1987, and an application for interlocutory relief was refused by Burchett J. Subsequently, the application was struck out by Gummow J. on 11 February 1988, and an attempt to set aside that order by Sheppard J. on 5 October 1989 was also unsuccessful.

The central legal issues were whether the Court had jurisdiction to set aside the orders made by Sheppard J. and Gummow J., and if the passage of time and the applicant's circumstances could justify such an action. The applicant argued that recent events, including alleged ill-intentioned actions by the respondent, warranted reconsideration of the previous orders. The Court considered the applicant's arguments but ultimately concluded that the previous orders were correctly made, and the lapse of time and the applicant's grievances did not justify setting them aside.

The Court granted leave to file the notice of motion out of time but dismissed the notice itself. The Court held that it had no jurisdiction to set aside the previous orders simply because they were disagreed with, and it would not exercise such jurisdiction even if it existed. The passage of time and the applicant's circumstances did not provide a basis for altering the previous orders. Consequently, the Court ordered the applicant to pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the notice of motion, to be taxed.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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