Toth v Campbelltown City Council
[2003] NSWLEC 167
•10/30/2002
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Reported Decision: (2003) 127 LGERA 1
Land and Environment Court
of New South Wales
CITATION: Toth v Campbelltown City Council [2003] NSWLEC 167 PARTIES: APPLICANT
RESPONDENT
Tim Toth
Campbelltown City CouncilFILE NUMBER(S): 10896 of 2001 CORAM: Pain J KEY ISSUES: Appeal :- s 56A appeal - whether Commissioner erred by failing to take into account submissions that the plan making process of DCP 122 were flawed and that DCP 122 should be given no weight - whether Commissioner erred by failing to determine all matters in controversy between the parties - whether Commissioner erred by failing to give reasons for all issues identified for determination LEGISLATION CITED: Campbelltown Development Control Plan No 122 cl 9, cl 12
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 s 79C
Land and Environment Court Act 1979 s 22, s 56ACASES CITED: Brimbella Pty Ltd v Mosman Municipal Council (1993) 79 LGERA 367;
Flevaris v Hurstville City Council (Lloyd J, NSWLEC, 7 August 1998, unreported);
Hoskins v Waverley Council [1999] NSWLEC 236;
Russo v Kogarah Council (1995) 86 LGERA 300;
Westport Marina Developments Pty Ltd v Concord Council (2000) 109 LGERA 451;
Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Darling Harbour Authority (1991) 24 NSWLR 156DATES OF HEARING: 29/10/2002 DATE OF JUDGMENT:
10/30/2002LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES: RESPONDENT
APPLICANT
Mr G Newport (barrister)
SOLICITORS
Lansley Lawyers
Mr AM Pickles (barrister)
SOLICITORS
Abbott Tout
JUDGMENT:
IN THE LAND AND
ENVIRONMENT COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
- 10896 of 2001
Pain J
30 October 2002
- Applicant
- Respondent
1. This is an appeal by the Applicant under s 56A of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979 (the Court Act) in relation to a decision of Commissioner Brown on 17 May 2002 refusing consent to DA E57/2001. I note there was an agreed statement of facts.
Applicant’s grounds
2. The Applicant alleges three grounds of error in the Commissioner’s decision:
(i) The Court erred in law in failing to take into account the submission that the statutory steps taken in the making of DCP 122 were flawed and that such plan should be given no weight at all.
(ii) Alternatively the Court erred in law in failing to determine all matters in controversy between the parties.
(iii) Alternatively the Court erred in law in failing to give reasons as to findings of fact or law on the relevant issues identified in (i) and (ii) above and raised for determination in the proceedings of whether a determination was made or not made and the reasons therefore.
Applicant's arguments
3. The Applicant’s main argument in ground (i) is that the Commissioner did not consider the submissions or did not appear to consider the submissions made by the Applicant regarding cl 9 and 12 of Development Control Plan No 122 (DCP 122), namely that because of flaws in the plan-making process the Court ought to give little or no weight to DCP 122. If the Commissioner did consider DCP 122, his decision is silent on his reasons on that material issue.
4. The Applicant relied on two decisions. One was before the Commissioner in the hearing, Hoskins v Waverley Council [1999] NSWLEC 236, and a further decision relied on by the Applicant in this appeal was Flevaris v Hurstville City Council (Lloyd J, NSWLEC, 7 August 1998, unreported). The Applicant argued the Commissioner’s failure to mention the Applicant’s submission was material as the Council relied on DCP 122. The Commissioner should have made a determination as to whether he thought the plan-making process was fundamentally flawed and therefore, whether he accepted the Applicant’s submission that little or no weight should be given to DCP 122.
5. The Applicant further argued on the basis of Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Darling Harbour Authority (1991) 24 NSWLR 156 at 186 and also Russo v Kogarah Council (1995) 86 LGERA 300 that the Commissioner erred and the matter should be remitted to the Commissioner, for redetermination. The Commissioner was under a duty to give reasons as to how he arrived at his decision.
6. The Applicant argues that this is not an argument relating to the invalidity of DCP 122 (invalidity of that plan was raised during the proceedings but was not pursued by the Applicant). The argument before the Commissioner was that the process of making DCP 122 was so fundamentally flawed that no weight should have been attributed to DCP 122 and the Applicant argues this latter argument was not properly determined by the Commissioner.
7. Hoskins was essentially a challenge to the attribution of weight given to a draft LEP and a DCP by a Commissioner of this Court. One of the grounds in the case alleged that the Commissioner had erred in failing to apply the DCP in that case (DCP 24). The Commissioner had stated that, “DCP 24 is so inconsistent with the LEP that I have given little weight to it” . Lloyd J held that the Commissioner had not erred in law stating that "[h]aving fully considered the effect of DCP 24, the Commissioner was fully entitled to give it little or no weight" .
8. In Flevaris Lloyd J again had to consider, amongst other things, whether there had been an error of law in relation to misattribution of weight given to a DCP. Once again, in that case the provisions in the LEP and DCP were held by the Commissioner to be fundamentally inconsistent such that the provisions of the LEP prevailed. Lloyd J held that such a finding was open and there was no error of law disclosed.
9. The Applicant relied on these two cases to argue that there was an appropriate basis for the Applicant’s submissions to the Commissioner that little or no weight should be attributed to DCP 122 because of the flaws in the process of making DCP 122 and he had a legal duty to consider those submissions. The steps in the process of making DCP 122 were flawed and so inconsistent that the same principles as applied in Hoskins and Flevaris also applied in this case.
10. Grounds (ii) and (iii) essentially flow from ground (i). In relation to ground (ii) the Applicant argued that having considered DCP 122 the Commissioner also had a duty to consider the Applicant’s submissions regarding the fundamental flaws in the plan-making process as was required by s 22 of the Court Act. The Commissioner clearly failed to do so in his decision.
11. In relation to ground (iii) the Applicant argues that the Commissioner failed to give any reasons for matters raised for determination, namely the matters raised in grounds (i) and (ii). The Applicant argued the failure to give reasons constituted an error of law and relied on Westport Marina Developments Pty Ltd v Concord Council (2000) 109 LGERA 451 at [28], amongst other cases. The Applicant submitted this was a matter central to the Commissioner’s decision and reasons should have been given. The Applicant argued this was not a case of taking a fine tooth comb approach as warned against in Brimbella Pty Ltd v Mosman Municipal Council (1993) 79 LGERA 367 , there simply had been no words used, no reasons given at all in his decision.
12. I intend to largely adopt the submissions of the Council made at the hearing in dismissing this appeal. The issue of the imperfections in the making of DCP 122 raised before the Commissioner are clearly matters going to the validity of that DCP. This ground was expressly abandoned by the Applicant at the hearing. The alleged flaws in the process of making DCP 122 are not of the same character as the differences between the LEP and the DCP which Commissioners of this Court have had to consider in Hoskins and Flevaris . Clearly in those cases the two documents in question could not stand together, essentially the issue was of a different legal nature.
13. I do not therefore consider there is any validity in the Applicant’s submissions in relation to ground (i). The Applicant must also fail in its arguments in relation to ground (ii), that the Commissioner had a statutory duty to determine all matters in controversy between the parties. Given my finding on ground (i) there was clearly no obligation on the Commissioner to do so. In the absence of a duty to determine a question of law the Commissioner has no duty to give reasons in relation to that question so the Applicant also fails on ground (iii).
14. It seems to me that it is important to view the Commissioner’s decision as a whole as, even if I am wrong in my finding that the Applicant fails on its grounds of review, unless that error has materially effected the decision it would not, in any event, vitiate the Commissioner’s decision. I was referred to a case by the Council’s counsel which I will rely on, Guideline Drafting and Design v Marrickville Municipal Council (1988) 64 LGRA 275, on this point .
15. I note that in par 42 of the Commissioner's judgment the matters in DCP 122, in particular cl 9 and 12, were considered to be part of the range of considerations under s 79C of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 and on that basis the Commissioner stated that they be given some weight. In par 66 of his decision the Commissioner sets out those matters on which he relied in his decision including factors under s 79C and no mention is made in that paragraph of DCP 122. It is clear that the primary basis on which Commissioner Brown made his decision were matters other than DCP 122.
16. Further, I also note that the Commissioner specifically referred in his decision to the submission put by the Applicant that the DCP should be given little weight because it had been made after the DA was made, this is at paras 41 and 42 of his decision. While this is another ground for argument raised by the Applicant and is different to that alleged in the grounds of review before me today it is relevant in the context of reading the overall judgment of the Commissioner in relation to how he considered DCP 122.
18. Orders17. In all these circumstances I do not consider that the errors alleged by the Applicant in grounds (i) and (ii) would have materially affected the Commissioner’s decision, assuming that I had found that he had made such an error. I think the statements of Kirby J in Brimbella to the effect that a fine tooth comb approach to appeals of this nature is not appropriate, are particularly apt in this case. A Commissioner in a merit appeal is not expected to refer to every issue where that issue is not central to the matters in issue, as this issue is not. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed.
- The Court orders:
2. The Applicant is to pay the Respondent's costs.
3. Order 2 is stayed for seven (7) days and the parties are granted leave to approach the Court within that seven (7) days if they wish to apply to vary Order 2.
4. The exhibits may be returned.
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