Tory v Megna and Ors; Marshall v Megna and Ors

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[2013] HCATrans 246

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S48 of 2013

B e t w e e n -

RICHARD MARTIN TORY

Applicant

and

MICHAEL MEGNA

First Respondent

RUSSELL JAMES LLOYD

Second Respondent

DAVID JOHN MARSHALL

Third Respondent

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S49 of 2013

B e t w e e n -

DAVID JOHN MARSHALL

Applicant

and

MICHAEL MEGNA

First Respondent

RUSSELL JAMES LLOYD

Second Respondent

RICHARD MARTIN TORY

Third Respondent

Applications for special leave to appeal

KIEFEL J
BELL J
KEANE J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 11 OCTOBER 2013, AT 9.30 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

____________________

MR A.T.S. DAWSON:   If it please, your Honours, I appear with my learned friend, MS A. RAO, for the applicant, Mr Tory, in the first matter, who is a respondent to the second matter.  (instructed by Bricknell Legal)

MR D.J. MARSHALL appeared in person.

MR R.K.M. RASMUSSEN:   May it please the Court, I appear for the respondents.  (instructed by Etheringtons)

KIEFEL J:   Thank you.  Now, we will hear first from you, Mr Dawson, and then Mr Marshall and then the respondent can respond to both.

MR DAWSON:   As your Honour pleases.  Your Honours, this matter raises, in our submission, important questions concerning the regulation by the common law of the actionability of political speech.  The result of Lange and Roberts v Bass is that there are two defences of qualified privilege at common law for the protection of political speech.  According to the Court of Appeal in these proceedings, those two defences are first, the extended defence explained in this Court in Lange which applies at and between election periods conditioned on reasonableness and the second defence is a traditional common law defence which applies only during an election period and I will come to the difficulty that that term entails.

KIEFEL J:   Roberts v Bass did not actually determine the question about whether Lange extended the common law defence of qualified privilege, so is your argument that there are two defences or that Lange necessarily extends the defence?

MR DAWSON:   We certainly fall back, if we are wrong about our first proposition, to a defence of the kind upheld in Roberts v Bass which would apply during an election period by reason of the need to conform to the Constitution, if the law of qualified privilege is not otherwise developed to recognise the defence for which we contend.

KIEFEL J:   If there is an extended defence because of the decision in Lange, what do you say about the requirement of reasonableness in the circumstances?

MR DAWSON:   May I ask, when your Honour says if there is an extended defence by reason of Lange, does your Honour mean an extended defence not conditioned on reasonableness?

KIEFEL J:   No, no.  If Lange extends the defence to one generally respecting political communications of a political and government nature - Lange also referred to…

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Details
Case
[2013] HCATrans 246
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard appeals in two related matters, *Tory v Megna* and *Marshall v Megna*, concerning the interpretation and application of the *Corporations Act 2001* (Cth) in the context of insolvent trading claims. The central dispute involved allegations that directors of a company had engaged in insolvent trading, leading to claims against them by liquidators seeking to recover debts owed by the company.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the defence of "safe harbour" under section 588G(2) of the *Corporations Act* was available to the directors. Specifically, the Court had to determine whether the directors had taken reasonable steps to prevent the company from incurring debts while insolvent, and whether they had a reasonable grounds to suspect that the company was insolvent or would become insolvent. This involved an examination of the directors' knowledge, actions, and the information available to them at the relevant times.

The High Court's reasoning focused on the objective standard of what a reasonable director would have done in the circumstances. The Court emphasised that the defence requires more than mere suspicion; directors must have reasonable grounds for their belief. It was held that the directors' reliance on incomplete or optimistic financial advice, without independent verification or a thorough understanding of the company's true financial position, was insufficient to establish the defence. The Court reiterated that directors have a positive duty to monitor the company's financial health and to take proactive steps to avoid insolvent trading, rather than passively relying on others or assuming the best.

The appeals were dismissed, with the High Court upholding the findings of the lower courts that the directors had failed to establish the safe harbour defence. Consequently, the directors were found liable for the debts incurred by the company while it was insolvent.

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