| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMERCIAL AND EQUITY DIVISION
No. 6852 of 2007
IN THE MATTER of Part IV of the Administration and Probate Act 1958
and
IN THE MATTER of the will and estate of LYLA MARGARET SHALDERS deceased
| JENNIFER MARGARET TORNEY, SALLY KATHRYN HICKS and CLARE DENISE SHALDERS | Plaintiffs |
| v | |
| DAVID LESLIE SHALDERS and BEVERLEY ANN CAMPIGLI (who are sued as the executors of the Will of Lyla Margaret Shalders deceased) | Defendants |
---
JUDGE: | Mandie J | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 12 -13, 16-17 March 2009 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 3 July 2009 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Torney v Shalders | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2009] VSC 268 | |
---
ADMINISTRATION AND PROBATE – Family Provision – application for further provision by three daughters of deceased – residuary estate including farm properties left to son of deceased.
---
APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiffs | Mr P Riordan SC with Ms G Grigoriou | Nevett Ford |
| For the Defendants | Mr A Rodbard-Bean | Wisewoulds |
HIS HONOUR:
The plaintiffs, who are three of the five daughters of Lyla Margaret Shalders deceased (“the testatrix”), claim further provision from her estate pursuant to Part IV of the Administration and Probate Act 1958 (“the Act”). The first defendant (“David”) is the only son of the testatrix and is the residuary beneficiary under her will. He is also co-executor of the will and trustee of the estate with the second defendant (a sister of the testatrix).
The testatrix died on 2 June 2006, aged 75, leaving a will dated 4 November 1999. Probate was granted to the defendants on 28 March 2007.
The plaintiffs, together with their other two sisters who do not make any claim, received benefits under the will valued at date of death in total at about $540,000 (i.e. about $108,000 each). The plaintiffs contend that the testatrix, in all the circumstances, failed to make adequate provision for their proper maintenance and support. The residuary estate primarily comprises real estate used by the testatrix and David for farming operations conducted by them in partnership, together with the share of the testatrix in the partnership business. The total value of the residuary estate left to David under the will was, at the date of death, about $2.1M.
The provisions of the will and the assets in the estate
By cl.4 of the will, the testatrix gave such of her daughters Anne Maree Ryan, Jennifer Margaret Torney (the first plaintiff – “Jennifer”), Sally Kathryn[1] Hicks (the second plaintiff – “Sally”), Helen Jane Butt and Clare Denise Shalders (the third plaintiff – “Clare”) as survived her, in equal shares, the following:
[1]In the will spelled “Katherine”.
(a)the house and land known as 11 Springs Road, Brown Hill (a residential property in Ballarat);
(b) all moneys payable under life assurance policies;
(c) any moneys in any bank account in her sole name;
(d) any AMP shares owned by her.
In addition, the testatrix gave to each of her daughters a legacy in the sum…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Torney & Ors v Shalders & Anor and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2009] VSC 268
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the daughters had made out a case for further provision from the estate, considering the provisions of the Family Provision Act and the discretion of the court. The court had to assess whether the daughters had been adequately provided for by their father, given his substantial estate, which included valuable farm properties left to their brother. The court also had to consider the statutory criteria and the discretion afforded by s 46 of the Act.
The court found that the daughters had not demonstrated that they were not properly provided for by the estate, despite their assertions regarding the value of the farm properties. The daughters' primary contention was based on the value of the farm properties left to their brother, but the court emphasised the need to consider the overall estate and the discretionary nature of the Family Provision Act. The daughters' claims did not meet the statutory criteria, and the court's discretion was not exercised in their favour. The application was dismissed.
The Supreme Court of Queensland dismissed the application for further provision by the daughters, holding that they had not been left unprovided for within the meaning of the Family Provision Act.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.