JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: TOPSEAL CONCRETE SERVICES PTY LTD -v- SIKA AUSTRALIA PTY LTD [2008] WASC 57
CORAM: BEECH J
HEARD: 10 APRIL 2008
DELIVERED : 10 APRIL 2008
PUBLISHED : 21 APRIL 2008
FILE NO/S: CIV 1325 of 2008
BETWEEN: TOPSEAL CONCRETE SERVICES PTY LTD (ACN 081 000 777)
Plaintiff
AND
SIKA AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 001 342 329)
Defendant
Catchwords:
Equity - Injunctions - Interlocutory injunctions - Strength of applicant's case - Turns on own facts
Contracts - Construction and interpretation - Implied terms - Implied obligation of good faith in performance of contract - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Nil
Result:
Application dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Plaintiff: Mr K E Yin
Defendant: Mr S M Davies
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: Murcia Pestell Hillard
Defendant: Deacons
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella (1998) 44 NSWLR 349
American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill [2006] HCA 46; (2006) 227 CLR 57
Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618
Burger King Corporation v Hungry Jack's Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 187
Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v The State of South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148
Central Exchange Ltd v Anaconda Ltd [2002] WASCA 94; (2002) 26 WAR 33
Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 55; (2004) 218 CLR 471
Garry Rogers Motors (Aust) Pty Ltd v Subaru (Aust) Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 903
Maggbury Pty Ltd v Hafaele Australia Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 70
Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for Public Works (1992) 26 NSWLR 234
Secured Income Real Estate (Australia) Ltd v St Martins Investments Pty Ltd (1979) 144 CLR 596
BEECH J:
Introduction
The plaintiff has brought an urgent application for interlocutory injunctions. At the commencement of the hearing, counsel for the plaintiff stated that the plaintiff sought the injunctions for a duration of one week only. The reasons for that need not now be canvassed.
For the reasons which follow I decline to grant the interlocutory injunctions sought. In summary, I so decide taking into account: my assessment of the strength of the case on the material now before the court; the extent to which it appears that damages would or would not be an adequate remedy; the balance of convenience; and some issues respecting the form and language of orders 2(a) - (c) of the orders sought.
Principles
I begin by outlining the principles relevant to the grant or refusal of an interlocutory injunction.
In Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v The State of South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148, 153, Mason ACJ summarised the principles governing the grant or refusal of an interlocutory injunction as follows:
In order to secure such an injunction the plaintiff must show (1) that there is a serious question to be tried or that the plaintiff has made out…
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- Case
- [2008] WASC 57
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court's reasoning was based on the principles set out in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill, where the relevant inquiries were whether the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case and whether the balance of convenience favoured the grant of the injunction. The court emphasised that the requisite strength of the probability of ultimate success depended upon the nature of the rights asserted and the practical consequences likely to flow from the interlocutory orders sought. The court found that the evidence presented by Topseal did not establish a sufficient likelihood of success to justify the preservation of the status quo pending the trial. The court also considered the implications of the evidence presented and concluded that the balance of convenience did not favour the grant of the injunction. The court dismissed the application.
Orders
Orders of the court
Application dismissed
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
These organising principles were further explained by Gummow and Hayne JJ in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill [2006] HCA 46; (2006) 227 CLR 57, [65] ‑ [71] (Gleeson CJ and Crennan J agreeing). Their Honours stated that the relevant principles are those explained in Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618, where the two main inquiries were said to be whether the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case and whether the balance of convenience favours the grant of the injunction. The phrase 'prima facie case' does not mean that the plaintiff must show that it is more probable than not that at trial the plaintiff will succeed. It is sufficient that the plaintiff show a sufficient likelihood of success to justify, in the circumstances, the preservation of the status quo pending the trial. How strong the probability needs to be depends upon the nature of the rights the plaintiff asserts and the practical consequences likely to flow from the orders the plaintiff seeks: [65], [71]. The apparent statement by Lord Diplock in American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396, 407 that, provided the court is satisfied that the plaintiff's claim is not frivolous or vexatious, then there will be a serious question to be tried, is not to be followed. The governing consideration is that the requisite strength of the probability of ultimate success depends upon the nature of the rights asserted and the practical consequences likely to flow from the interlocutory orders sought. These principles make it clear that the various considerations identified by Mason ACJ in Castlemaine Tooheys are to be considered together. I turn to the evidence relied upon by the plaintiff in support of its application for interlocutory injunctions. I give some attention to the detail of that evidence because, for reasons I will explain, in my opinion the evidence of the plaintiff does not establish a case of sufficient strength to call for the injunctive relief now sought by the plaintiff. The following summary is taken primarily from the affidavit of Mr Peter Davis sworn 2 April 2008. The plaintiff (Topseal) operates various businesses which include acting as a selling agent for the defendant (Sika). In about August 2000 Topseal commenced distributing Sika concrete and mortar admixture products. In about August 2004 Mr Davis had a conversation with Mr Hugh McCook on behalf of Sika, in the course of which various statements were said to have been made by Mr McCook to Mr Davis (as set out in par 9 of the affidavit). Subsequent to August 2004, Topseal sought customers in the Western Australian mining industry to whom it could distribute Sika products. In February 2007 further discussions took place between Mr Davis and Mr McCook, leading to a written agreement between them. In the course of those discussions, Mr Davis' evidence (par 13) is that Mr McCook said words to the effect that: (a) Sika wished for Topseal to continue to promote Sika's products as much as possible; and (b) Sika wanted Topseal to continue to seek as many new customers as possible, and to promote and distribute Sika products to those customers.