Toon v Ku-ring-gai Council (No 2)

Case [2004] NSWLEC 593


Land and Environment Court


of New South Wales


CITATION: Toon v Ku-ring-gai Council (No 2) [2004] NSWLEC 593
PARTIES:

APPLICANT
John Toon

RESPONDENT
Ku-ring-gai Council
FILE NUMBER(S): 11563 of 2003
CORAM: Cowdroy J
KEY ISSUES: Appeal :- SEPP 5 Development - costs
LEGISLATION CITED: Land and Environment Court Act 1979, s 69(2)
Land and Environment Court Rules 1996, Pt 16 r 4
CASES CITED: Canterbury City Council v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales [2004] NSWLEC 536;
Toon v Ku-ring-gai Council [2004] NSWLEC 173
DATES OF HEARING: 05/10/2004
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/05/2004
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES:


APPLICANT
Mr P. Tomasetti (Barrister)

SOLICITORS
Norman Waterhouse

RESPONDENT
Mr P. Rigg (Solicitor)

SOLICITORS
Deacons



JUDGMENT:

      IN THE LAND AND
      ENVIRONMENT COURT
      OF NEW SOUTH WALES

      Cowdroy J

      5 October 2004

      11563 of 2003
      JOHN TOON V KU-RING-GAI COUNCIL


Judgment – No 2 costs

1 Judgment was delivered in these proceedings on 30 April 2004 (see Toon v Ku-ring-gai Council [2004] NSWLEC 173) in which the Court upheld the applicant’s appeal against the respondent’s (“the council’s”) refusal of development application 165/03. Such application sought demolition of an existing building (“the house”) at 50 Pentecost Avenue, Pymble (“the site”) and erection of a development for older people or people with a disability.

2 The applicant seeks an order that the council pay its costs on an indemnity basis of the issue which was central to the council’s defence, namely whether the house and garden had heritage value.

3 Section 69(2) of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979 (“the Court Act”) relevantly provides:-

          (2) Subject to the rules and subject to any other Act:
          (a) costs are in the discretion of the Court,
              (b) the Court may determine by whom and to what extent costs are to be paid, and
              (c) the Court may order costs to be assessed on the basis set out in Division 6 of Part 11 of the Legal Profession Act 1987 or on an indemnity basis.

4 Part 16 rule 4 of the Land and Environment Court Rules 1996 (“the rules”) applicable to class 1 proceedings relevantly provides:-


          (2) No order for the payment of costs will be made in proceedings to which this Rule applies unless the Court considers that the making of a costs order is, in the circumstances of the particular case, fair and reasonable.

5 In respect of class 1 proceedings, the power of the Court to make an order for costs provided by s 69(2) of the Court Act is constrained only by the need to observe Pt 16 r 4 of the rules and to exercise judicially the discretion so provided.


      Facts

6 The applicant’s development application was made to the council in February 2003, but by December 2003 it remained undetermined. In December 2003 the council’s Heritage Conservation Planner Mr Paul Dignam prepared a report dated December 2003 which recommended that the site be included in a draft Local Environmental Plan (“LEP”) as a draft heritage item and that further research and assessment of the heritage significance of the site be carried out.

7 On 16 December 2003 the council resolved to include the site in a draft LEP as a draft heritage item, to place such draft plan on exhibition, and to seek an independent heritage assessment of the site. On 17 December 2003 the applicant commenced these proceedings.

8 The draft LEP was duly prepared and exhibited. A report commissioned by the council was prepared by Graham Brooks and Associates dated February 2004 (“the Brooks report”) during the exhibition period. Such report concluded that the site did not “meet the minimum entry threshold as a heritage item”.

9 After the receipt of the Brooks report the solicitors for the council by letter dated 24 February 2004 instructed Ms Sheridan Burke of Godden Mackay Logan to advise whether she could support council’s refusal of the development application.

10 Ms Burke prepared a draft report dated March 2004. She concluded that the site comprising the house and garden warranted heritage listing and that “positive action” was necessary to assure its conservation.


      Applicant’s submissions

11 The applicant submits that it is entitled to its costs relating to the heritage issue on an indemnity basis since council pursued its claim that the site had heritage value when it knew from the Brooks report that no such value attached to the site. The council was unsuccessful in its claim that the site possessed heritage value. As a separate point of law the Court determined that the draft LEP was not a relevant consideration in assessing the development application.

12 The applicant submits that having received the Brooks report which did not support the listing of the site as a heritage item, there was no valid justification for the council seeking a further report. The applicant submits that the Court should infer that the only explanation for such conduct was the desire of the council to defeat the appeal by “shopping around” for an opinion which was supportive of the council’s defence.


      Council’s submissions

13 The council rejects the applicant’s submissions. It submits that the further opinion was sought because the Brooks report did not investigate sufficiently the prior history of the house. Additionally it submits that it was entitled to obtain the advice of an additional expert. It maintained its position throughout the hearing and did not abandon the heritage issue.


      Findings

14 Although the council submitted that the Brooks report was inadequate in respect of historical enquiries undertaken for its preparation, the report shows that extensive enquiries were made. There is no evidence from the council to support the council’s submission that the Brooks report was regarded by it as deficient. Nor has any satisfactory explanation has been provided by the council for its disregard of the Brooks report and for the retention of Ms Burke to provide an additional report.

15 As a result of the persistence by the council in maintaining the heritage issue, which was dismissed by the Court, the applicant has incurred substantial professional fees resulting from the necessity to retain heritage experts. In the absence of a valid reason for the retention of Ms Burke, the Court considers that it is fair and reasonable that the council meet the costs incurred by the applicant in meeting the heritage issue.

16 Whilst the applicant seeks the payment of such costs on an indemnity basis, the Court does not regard the conduct of the council to have been proved to be so unreasonable as to warrant costs on this basis: see Lloyd J in Canterbury City Council v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales [2004] NSWLEC 536 at para 9.


      Orders

17 Accordingly, the Court makes the following orders:


      1. ORDER that the respondent pay the applicant’s costs incurred in these proceedings in respect of heritage issues;

      2. ORDER that the respondent pay the applicant’s costs of this motion.
Details
AGLC
Toon v Ku-ring-gai Council (No 2) [2004] NSWLEC 593
Case
[2004] NSWLEC 593
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

John Toon, the applicant, sought to appeal the Ku-ring-gai Council's ("the council") refusal to grant approval for his development application. This application aimed to demolish an existing building at 50 Pentecost Avenue, Pymble, and construct a development intended for older people or those with disabilities. The council had argued that the site, comprising the house and garden, possessed heritage value, which was a key point of contention in the proceedings. The initial judgment upheld the applicant's appeal, dismissing the council's defence based on heritage value. Following this, Toon sought an order for the council to pay his costs on an indemnity basis, specifically for the issue of the site's heritage value.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the council's insistence on the heritage value of the site, despite contrary findings in an earlier report, warranted indemnity costs for the applicant. The court needed to consider the statutory framework under which costs could be awarded and the circumstances in which such costs might be assessed on an indemnity basis. Additionally, the court had to evaluate the council's conduct in seeking a second opinion after the initial report had concluded that the site did not meet the heritage threshold.

In its reasoning, the court noted that while the council had sought an additional report after the initial one found no heritage value, there was no evidence to support the council's claim that the initial report was inadequate. The court found that the council's persistence in arguing for heritage value, despite the contrary evidence, was unreasonable. This unreasonable conduct led to the applicant incurring significant professional fees to counter the council's stance. However, the court determined that the council's actions did not warrant costs on an indemnity basis, as they did not reach the level of unreasonableness necessary for such an award. Instead, the court deemed it fair and reasonable that the council pay the applicant's costs related to the heritage issue.

The court made orders that the council pay the applicant's costs incurred in the proceedings concerning the heritage issue and the costs of the motion. This decision underscores the importance of reasonable conduct in legal proceedings, particularly in administrative law contexts such as development applications, and highlights the court's discretion in awarding costs.

Orders

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Background

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Evidence

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Decision

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