| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
PRACTICE COURT
S CI 2010 1155
| MILAN TOMASEVIC | Plaintiff/Appellant |
| and | |
| STATE OF VICTORIA | Defendant |
| and | |
| MELBOURNE INJURY LAWYERS | Respondent |
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JUDGE: | HARGRAVE J |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 8 September 2014 |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 9 September 2014 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Tomasevic v Melbourne Injury Lawyers |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2014] VSC 434 |
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PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – Appeal from Associate Justice granting plaintiff’s solicitors leave to file and serve a notice that the solicitors have ceased to act for the plaintiff – No error shown – Appeal dismissed – Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 r 20.03; Plenty v Gladwin (1986) 60 ALJR 665, 666.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff | Appeared in person | |
| For the Defendant | No appearance | |
| For the Respondent | Mr D O’Brien | Melbourne Injury Lawyers |
HIS HONOUR:
The plaintiff, Milan Tomasevic, alleges in this proceeding that he sustained psychiatric injury arising from the defendant’s negligence as his employer.
Mr Tomasevic has been represented by three firms of solicitors. The third firm of solicitors, Melbourne Injury Lawyers (‘the firm’), is the respondent to the present appeal. The appeal arises in the following circumstances.
Melbourne Injury Lawyers commenced acting for Mr Tomasevic on a no win — no fee basis in October 2013. The agreement between the firm and Mr Tomasevic included a condition that Mr Tomasevic must co-operate with the firm and accept reasonable advice. If he did not do so, the firm reserved the right to terminate its agreement to act on his behalf.
As a result of a number of matters, the firm now contends that the relationship between it and Mr Tomasevic ‘has irretrievably broken down’. In these circumstances, the firm sought leave under r 20.03 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 to file a notice that it has ceased to act for Mr Tomasevic. It was necessary for an application for leave to be made, because the proceeding had been fixed for trial on 17 November 2014.
The firm relied upon the affidavit sworn by the solicitor with the conduct of Mr Tomasevic’s matter, Katherine Wilson. Ms Wilson’s affidavit was sworn 12 June 2014. In her affidavit, Ms Wilson deposed:
(1) In paragraph 8, that she met with the plaintiff to discuss his behaviour and interaction with the firm’s staff and the fact that ‘he did not seem to be developing any level of trust in respect of the abilities of [the] firm to conduct his litigation’. Ms Wilson deposed that she advised Mr Tomasevic that, in the event that he did not follow reasonable advice, it was possible that the firm would cease to act for him. In an affidavit which Mr Tomasevic was given leave to file on appeal, he deposed that he ‘strongly’ disagreed with this paragraph of Ms Wilson’s affidavit.
(2) In paragraph 9, Ms Wilson deposed to an email sent to Mr Tomasevic in which she confirmed his…
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- Case
- [2014] VSC 434
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue was whether the Associate Justice's decision to grant the plaintiff's solicitors leave to file and serve the notice of cessation complied with the requirements of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005. Specifically, the court examined if the decision was consistent with the principles articulated in Plenty v Gladwin, which outlined the conditions under which such leave could be granted. The court also considered whether the Associate Justice had considered all relevant factors and whether the decision was within the proper exercise of judicial discretion.
In addressing these issues, the court found that the Associate Justice had correctly applied the relevant legal principles and had not erred in granting the leave. The reasoning was grounded in the fact that the Associate Justice had appropriately considered the circumstances of the case, including the timing of the request and the potential prejudice to the opposing party. The court held that the decision was in accordance with the precedent set by Plenty v Gladwin and that the principles of procedural fairness had been upheld. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as no error was identified in the Associate Justice's decision.
No further orders were made beyond the dismissal of the appeal, affirming the Associate Justice's decision as correct and final in this instance.
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