Together Queensland, Industrial Union of Employees v Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency

[2014] FWC 3952

[2014] FWC 3952

The attached document replaces the document previously issued with the above code on 30 July 2014.

All references to “APHRA” should be “AHPRA”.

Laura Clark

Relief Associate to Commissioner Simpson.

Dated 1 August 2014.

[2014] FWC 3952

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.229 - Application for a bargaining order

Together Queensland, Industrial Union of Employees
v
Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency and anor
(B2014/727)

COMMISSIONER SIMPSON BRISBANE, 30 JULY 2014

Application under s.229 for Bargaining Order - Together Queensland eligibility rules considered - AHPRA not a Crown corporation - Application dismissed

[1] On 28 April 2014, Together Queensland, Industrial Union of Employees (“TQ”) a Transitionally Recognised Association applied under s.229 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act)for a bargaining order under s.230 of the Act concerning a proposed enterprise agreement.

[2] The current agreement applying to employees of Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency (“AHPRA”) is the Queensland Public Health Sector Certified Agreement (No.8) 2011 which expires 31 August 2014.

[3] The matter was listed for conference 6 May 2014 where directions were set out for the matter to be heard 20 June 2014. The hearing of 20 June was vacated at the direction of the Fair Work Commission. (“FWC”) The hearing was rescheduled by agreement for 22 July 2014.

[4] The applicant was represented by Mr Merrill of counsel instructed directly by the applicant, the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency (“AHPRA”) was represented by Mr O’Grady of counsel instructed by Clayton Utz and the Community and Public Sector Union (“CPSU”) were represented by Ms Hartigan of counsel instructed by Maurice Blackburn.

[5] At the commencement of the hearing on 22 July the applicant sought an adjournment which was opposed by AHPRA and the CPSU. The application for a bargaining order was brought and pressed on the basis of eligibility of TQ to represent employees of AHPRA under its rules 6(a) and (6(b). Eligibility was not pressed under its rule 6(c) for reasons it appears in connection with a demarcation agreement between the applicant’s federal body the Australian Services Union (“ASU”) and the CPSU. 1 The applicant requested the adjournment on the basis of allowing time to progress discussions between the Australian Services Union (“ASU”) and the CPSU that may resolve the dispute. For reasons given in transcript (which included the impact on bargaining caused by the application) the adjournment was not granted. 2

[6] Witness statements were provided in the applicant’s case by Mr Alex Scott, Secretary of Together Queensland, and Mr Brian Larter an employee of AHPRA. Witness statements were provided in AHPRA’s case by Mr Chris Robertson, Director National Board Services and Mr John Ilott, Director Finance & Corporate Operations. No witnesses were required for cross examination and the hearing proceeded by way of submissions only.

APPLICANTS SUBMISSIONS

[7] The applicant referred to the decision of Watson VP in Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency v Civil Service Association of Western Australia Incorporated  3 that addressed the statutory basis for the creation of AHPRA as follows:

[17] In my view this analysis is correct. AHPRA was established initially in Queensland. It was given extended powers by the enactment of legislation by each State and Territory. That legislation was intended to create a single national entity with powers in each State and Territory conferred by legislation in each jurisdiction. The single national entity is a body incorporated in each State and Territory.

[8] The applicant’s submission included reference to a letter of 9 April 2014 from Mr Ilott to Mr Scott which I don’t intend to reproduce here, but I agree succinctly sets out the history of the dispute concerning TQ’s entitlement to be a bargaining representative within the meaning of s.176 of the Act. It is clear from the tone of the correspondence while AHPRA formally advised TQ it did not recognise TQ as a bargaining representative it wished to be cooperative in dealing with any application TQ may bring to the FWC to determine the dispute in order to bring the matter to finality.

[9] I accept the applicants submission that the only real issue in respect to the application is whether the Applicant is lawfully entitled to be a bargaining representative, and as a corollary of that, whether AHPRA and the CPSU are not meeting the good faith bargaining requirements in section 228(1)(e) of the Act by not recognising and bargaining with TQ as a bargaining representative.

[10] Pursuant to section 4(1) of the Queensland National Law Act, the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law Act (“the National Law”) applies as a law of the State of Queensland. The National Law includes the following:

23. National Agency

(1) The Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency is established.

(2) The National Agency -

(a) is a body corporate with perpetual succession; and

(b) has a common seal; and

(c) may sue and be sued in its corporate name.

(3) The National Agency represents the State.

(4) Schedule 3 sets out provisions relating to the National Agency.

[11] TQ said that in Queensland, prior to the formation of AHPRA there were three bodies that performed the role now performed by AHPRA, namely the Queensland Medical Board, the Queensland Nursing Council and the Office of Health Practitioner Registration Board. TQ said the QPSU (which amalgamated with another state registered union in 2011 to form TQ) had a long history of representing employees of these three bodies. TQ said it continues to have members who are employed in the Queensland office of AHPRA.

[12] TQ referred to the following excerpt from its rules;

“6 ELIGIBILITY FOR MEMBERSHIP

A. Without in any way limiting by sub-rule B and sub-rule C, the following persons are eligible for membership of the Union:-

Existing Eligibility for Q.S.S.U.

- employees of the Queensland Government or (in relation to the Crown in right of the State) of any Crown Corporation, Crown Instrumentality, or Minister representing the Crown other than those employed in -

(a) The Police Force.

(b) The Queensland Railways.

(c) The Teaching Service other than teachers employed in Technical Colleges.

(d) Any such other employees or groups of employees as the Council of Union may from time to time determine.

and Nurses employed in Regional Health Authorities, formerly employed in the Public Service, and who were members of the Union as at 1st July, 1991.

- officers and employees of the Electoral and Administrative Review Commission and the Parliamentary Service Commission.

PROVIDED THAT all probationers during their period of probation shall be deemed to be officers or employees as the case may be for the purpose of this section.

B. Without in any way limiting or being limited by sub-rule A and sub-rule C, membership of the Union shall consist of:

Existing Eligibility for Q.P.O.A.

(a) Ordinary members, Persons permanently or temporarily engaged in either a full-time or part-time capacity by the State Government or (in relation to the Crown in right of the State) any Crown Corporation, Crown Instrumentality or Minister representing the Crown or by any Statutory Corporation of which fifty per cent or more of the members are appointed by the Governor-in-Council or employed in an educational institution designed as a University or a College of Advanced Education in the State of Queensland or employed in the Mater Misericordiae Hospitals, or The Australian Red Cross Society, Queensland Division, Blood Transfusion Service in professional or technical activities all of whom have been duly admitted by the Executive as herein provided.”

[13] TQ’s contention is that AHPRA meets the description of a crown corporation because of section 23(3) of the National law that is the schedule to the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law Act 2009. TQ referred to a decision in ex parte Workers’ Compensation Board of Queensland where GN Williams J of the Supreme Court of Queensland stated:

“When considering each of the bodies in question it is important to note the precise words of statutes conferring corporate status. In each instance the body is first constituted as a body corporate capable in law of suing and being sued. Then it is stated that it shall “represent the Crown”. That phrase is used in a number of statutes creating a statutory corporation; it is somewhat vague and its meaning has been the subject of judicial consideration. The most recent is that of Gibbs C.J. in Townsville Hospitals Board v Council of the City of Townsville (1982) 56 A.L.J.R. 789 at p.791:

“The alternative submission made on behalf of the Board was that the Board represented the Crown for the purpose of the erection of the buildings. Although the word ‘represent’ is not infrequently used in this context, it would be more precise to say that the question is whether the Board, in erecting the building, enjoys the privileges and immunities of the Crown.”

The expression was also considered by the High Court in Wynyard Investments Pty. Ltd. V. The Commissioner for Railways (N.S.W.) (1955) 93 C.L.R. 376, the judgement of Williams, Webb and Taylor JJ. at p.382 strongly suggests that the phrase when used in a statute has the effect of making the corporation an “agent or servant of the Crown” having the benefit of the prerogatives, privileges and immunities of the Crown; but being a separate juristic person. In the same judgement (p. 387) the proposition is advanced that the words place the statutory corporation in the same position as the Crown for particular purposes. Similar views are to be found expressed in the judgement of Gibbs A.C.J. in Bradken Consolidated Limited v. The Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited (1979) 145 C.L.R. 107 at pp. 114-5. (cf also Samuel Allen and Sons Limited v. Mayfield Homes Pty. Ltd. [1979] Qd.R 68).

[14] TQ argued that while the phrase used in the Acts relevant in the authorities referred to was “represent the crown” and not, “represent the state” as is the case in the National law, that merely reflects modern legislative drafting practice. TQ argued this authority supports the proposition that the phrase “represents the crown” is strongly suggestive that it has the effect of making the corporation an agent or servant of the crown.

[15] TQ submitted that AHPRA, insofar as it is created by Queensland law, represents the State of Queensland. In the absence of any provisions in the National Law to the contrary, this can only mean that it is an agent or servant of the State of Queensland having the benefit of the prerogatives, privileges and immunities of the State.

[16] It was put that the phrase “the crown” generally means the executive branch of government and includes the departments of government that are headed by a Minister or are controlled by a Minister or are expressly declared by a statute as an agent of the crown. In support of that proposition TQ referred to a decision of Robin J of the District Court of Queensland in Peter Lennox v The Board of Professional Engineers of Queensland  4 where the following extract from the textbook ‘Liability of the Crown’ by Hogg and Monahan was referenced in the decision:

“(b) Crown Agency

The Crown includes the departments of government that are headed by a Minister. It is the control of the Minister that provides the link to the Crown. Municipal bodies, school boards, universities, hospitals, regulatory agencies, administrative tribunals and public corporations, even if they are performing ‘governmental’ functions, are not agents of the Crown, unless they are controlled by a Minister or expressly declared by statute to be an agent of the Crown. A question often arises as to whether a public body is or is not an agent of the Crown. The answer will determine whether the public body can render the Crown liable in tort, or bind the Crown by contract, or take advantage of the various privilege and immunities of the Crown.”

[17] TQ summarised the ‘nub’ of AHPRA’s argument as being that AHPRA cannot be a crown corporation within the meaning of rule 6(a) or 6(b) of the TQ rules because it does not pass the ‘control test’ in that there is no direct control of AHPRA by a Minister of the Executive of the State of Queensland. TQ sought to distinguish the authorities referred to by AHPRA concerning the ‘control test’ on the basis that in each case there was no similar statutory provision to s.23(3) in this case. TQ argues that in the cases relied upon by AHPRA it was necessary to resort to the ‘control test’ because there was no express provision in the relevant statute.

AHPRA SUBMISSIONS

[18] AHPRA correctly identified that whether TQ is a bargaining representative is a threshold jurisdictional question. AHPRA contends it is not the “Crown in the right of the State” or a “Crown Corporation” as those terms are used in TQ’s rules. On that basis TQ is not entitled to enrol its employees, TQ is not eligible to be a bargaining representative and therefore the FWC does not have jurisdiction and the application must be dismissed.

[19] AHPRA said that TQ’s submissions do not engage with the fact that the employees of AHPRA are engaged by a single national entity. AHPRA said the issue turns largely on whether AHPRA is controlled by the State of Queensland which it is not. AHPRA refers to section 7 of the National Law that establishes “one single national entity”.

[20] AHPRA referred to a High Court decision in Sue v Hill  5where the terms “the Crown” and “the Crown in right of ...” were considered. It said in the context of TQ’s rules the “State” must necessarily refer to the State of Queensland.

[21] AHPRA referred to the judgement of Finkelstein J in NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power & Water Authority  6 at paragraph 124 in arguing the threshold question in determining whether AHPRA is the Crown in right of the State is whether AHPRA is “the alter ego (or, as some would say, ‘agent’ of ‘emanation’) of the Crown” in the right of Queensland.

[22] AHPRA also referred to Grain Elevators Board (Victoria) v President, Councillors and Rate-Payers of the Shire of Dunmunkle  7 where the High Court established the ‘control test’ to determine whether a body corporate constituted under legislation was entitled to a Crown exemption provided under an Act. AHPRA reproduced the following passage of that High Court decision:

“Where persons or an incorporated authority are subject to direct Ministerial control, so that they act under the direction of a Minister, such persons or authorities act on behalf of the Crown, and any provision, whether express or implied, for Crown exemption is applicable to them: Marks v Forests Commission, (4); Repatriation Commissioner v Kirkland (5).

But if a board is a body independent of the Government, with discretionary powers of its own, so that it is not a mere agent of the Government, then such a body does not represent the Crown. This was the criterion which was applied in Fox v Government of Newfoundland (6) and by this Court in Repatriation Commission v Kirkland (5). See also Ex parte Graham : Re Forestry Commission (7). The question was put in the following form in Roper v Public Works Commissioners (8) - whether the persons in question were acting as servants of the Crown or merely as a statutory body invested with public rights, duties and liabilities like the trustees of a public dock or public park. Were they Government servants doing the work of the Government? In Metropolitan Meat Industry Board v Sheedy (9), their Lordships of the Privy Council described the Board there under consideration as “a body with discretionary powers on their own. Even if a Minister of the Crown has power to interfere with them, there is nothing in the statute which makes the acts of administration his as distinguished from theirs....”

[23] AHPRA went on to refer to other instances where Courts have applied the ‘control test’ in Grain Elevators including in NT Power Generation mentioned earlier. I will not repeat all the authorities relied upon by AHPRA here.

[24] AHPRA referred to earlier decisions of this Commission including a decision of Senior Deputy President Kaufman in AHPRA [2012] FWA 8776, a Full Bench decision in CPSU; CSA v AHPRA [2013] FWCFB 661, and a decision of Vice President Watson in AHPRA v CSA [2013] FWC 3256 which dealt with variously the background, purpose and functions of AHPRA including that it is a constitutional corporation and a national system employer, and specifically in Vice President Watson’s decision finding that;

“...AHPRA was established initially in Queensland. It was given extended powers by the enactment of legislation in each State and Territory. That legislation was intended to create a single national entity with powers in each State and Territory conferred by legislation in each jurisdiction. The single national entity is a body corporate in each State and Territory...”

[25] AHPRA submitted that the FWC has already decided AHPRA is a single national employer established in Queensland, with a public purpose that extends beyond Queensland. AHPRA relied on the statements of Mr Ilott and Mr Robertson which include that;

● the AHPRA Agency Management Committee is AHPRA’s governing body and it oversees the affairs of AHPRA, decided policy and ensures it functions properly, effectively and efficiently working with National Boards;

● the Australian Health Workforce Ministerial Council which comprises Health Ministers from each State and Territory has capacity to give direction to AHPRA and the National Boards about the policy;

● the Australian Heath Workforce Advisory Council provides independent advice and has no direct relationship with AHPRA;

● the National Boards are responsible for certain registration and investigation functions;

● AHPRA works with accreditation authorities in respect of accreditation assessment; and

● AHPRA which is established under s.23 of the National Law Act is responsible for administering the national scheme.

[26] AHPRA also submitted it had a Chief Executive Officer who has functions conferred by written instrument of the Agency Management Committee. Further AHPRA’s ongoing funding does not derive from Government but rather is sourced from membership fees set by the National Boards and paid by health practitioners, and income on AHPRA’s investments.

[27] AHPRA concluded by stating it does not satisfy the ‘control test’, and is therefore not an agency in right of the Crown or an agent or emanation of the Crown because;

(a) it was the clear intention of the various States and Territories, and for the Commonwealth Governments to “alienate” functions previously performed by their Governments to address inherent inefficiencies and inconsistencies flowing from regulation by various state based boards;

(b) in the alternative, to the extent that the functions are “governmental in character” they bear the characteristics of numerous governments and not just the Queensland Government, and there is nothing to suggest COAG intended to confer the responsibility for Governmental functions of other jurisdictions on Queensland;

(c) AHPRA is not under the financial control of any Government;

(d) AHPRA is predominantly not subject to direct Ministerial control. Rather it is predominantly subject to control by the Agency Management Committee; and has discretionary powers of its own;

(e) to the extent that there is any limited Ministerial control over AHPRA via the Australian Health Workforce Ministerial Council, the State of Queensland is not the sole repository of these powers and it has no power to individually direct AHPRA;

(f) AHPRA’s CEO is appointed by the Agency Management Committee and it, and not Executive Government has the power to terminate the CEO’s appointment.

[28] Mr O’Grady made an important point that earlier cases dealing with the term “represents the crown” did not concern a ‘beast’ of the complicated nature of AHPRA. 8

[29] He also, in reference to the TQ rules said that references to the ‘crown in the right of the State’, must be to an entity which is entirely an emanation of the State of Queensland, not an entity that is partly an emanation of the crown in the right of Queensland.

[30] Importantly Mr O’Grady drew attention to the two separate pieces of legislation passed in Queensland. Mr O’Grady contrasted section 18 of the first of those Acts, the Health Practitioner Regulation and Administrative Arrangements National Law Act 2008, that lay the basis for AHPRA to be created with s.23 of the subsequent National Law. Section 18(3) was as follows;

“(3) The National Agency has the status, privileges and immunities of the State.”

[31] Mr O’Grady drew attention through the statements of Mr Robinson and Mr Ilott to the evidence that a number of persons working with the entity at that time were public servants, and submitted that it was intended at that time that the entity be an emanation of the State. However it was said that once the work was done and the national scheme was in operation Parliament abandoned that language and replaced it the language in section 23(3) of the National Law;

“(3) The National Agency represents the State.”

[32] Mr O’Grady submitted that what should be drawn from that change in language is an acknowledgement from the Queensland Parliament that in the case of a national entity operating through mirror legislation across Australia, it was not appropriate to invest AHPRA with all of the privileges, immunities and status of the Crown but to acknowledge in some respects AHPRA would represent Queensland.

[33] Finally AHPRA drew attention to a different extract from the textbook ‘Liability of the Crown’ by Hogg and Monahan to that referred to above. It reads as follows:

“If (as is common) a statute expressly provides that a public corporation is to be “an agent of the Crown”, then the corporation will be an agent of the Crown. A Parliament of Legislature, acting within its competence, is free to confer on a public corporation any privileges or immunities that it chooses. If it chooses to confer on the corporation the privileges and immunities of the Crown, that is a matter of legislative policy that is unreviewable by the Courts. The express stipulation that a public corporation is to be an agent of the Crown is accordingly conclusive, even if the public corporation is not subject to the control of the Minister of the Crown, and would for that reason not be treated as an agent of the Crown at common law.

A statutory designation as a Crown agent may not necessarily be treated as conclusive if the designation is interpreted as being for limited or specific purposes only...” (my emphasis) For example, in British Columbia Power Corporation Limited v Attorney General (1962), a provincial statute declared that the British Columbia Electric Company Ltd was “an agent of Her Majesty the Queen in right of the Province”. Another company commenced an action against the Electric Company, and it claimed that it was immune from discovery on grounds that it was an agent of the Crown. The British Columbia Court of Appeal held that, despite the statutory designation, the Electric Company was not a Crown agent except when it “performs a duty or carries out a direction, or acts for or on behalf of Her Majesty, or deals with or otherwise acts in respect of or holds public funds or property of Her Majesty”. It was also pointed out by one member of the Court that the statutory designation did not include language designating the Electric Company as a Crown agent “for all purposes”. In this case, since the Electric Company was not acting pursuant to instructions of the government, it was held that it was not entitled to the status of a Crown agent and, accordingly, was not immune from discovery. Thus, where a statute designates an entity as an agent of the Crown for certain limited purposes rather than “for all purposes”, the Court may wish to ensure that the agent is acting within the scope of its designation before concluding that it is entitled to claim the status of Crown agent.

[34] AHPRA said that if it were the case that the entity was solely a Queensland entity, and if parliament adopted the same language in s.18 of the Administrative Arrangements Act at s.23 of the National Law, then even if the Crown did not have control that would be the end of the matter. However it was submitted it is necessary to have regard to what the words in s.23(3) mean when one has regard to the nature of AHPRA, and that it could not be said that Parliament intended to confer the status of Crown corporation on AHPRA through the language of section 23(3).

[35] In the alternative AHPRA argued the words in 6(a) and 6(b) of the TQ rules are not intended to provide coverage for an entity that is anything other than solely a Queensland Crown corporation.

CPSU SUBMISSIONS

[36] The CPSU submitted the use of the expression “Crown” in TQ’s rules is prefaced as being in right of the State, being the State of Queensland. The CPSU said AHPRA is not a Queensland crown corporation. The CPSU said that given the corporate structure and character of AHPRA it cannot be. The CPSU said that whether AHPRA is a crown corporation depends on the nature and degree of control which is exercised by the State of Queensland over AHPRA.

[37] The CPSU said that it is clear from the terms of the National law as supported by affidavit material filed on behalf of AHPRA that the State of Queensland in its own right does not exercise overriding control over AHPRA. The CPSU submission outlined the corporate character of AHPRA from paragraphs 12 to 19 of its written submission. The CPSU referred to the role and functions of the Ministerial Council in sections 11 to 17 of the National Law. It said section 5 of the National Law defines the Ministerial Council as the Australian Workforce Ministerial Council comprising Ministers of Government of the participating jurisdictions and the Commonwealth with portfolio responsibility for health.

[38] The CPSU said the control of AHPRA is quite clearly not vested in a Queensland Minister and that this was consistent with its single national entity status. The CPSU referred to section 7 of the National Law which provides:

7 Single national entity

(1) It is the intention of the Parliament of this jurisdiction that this Law as applied by an Act of this jurisdiction, together with this Law as applied by the Acts of the other participating jurisdictions, has the effect that an entity established by this Law is one single national entity, with functions conferred by this Law as so applied.

(2) An entity established by this Law has power to do acts in or in relation to this jurisdiction in the exercise of a function expressed to be conferred on it by this Law as applied by Acts of each participating jurisdiction.

(3) An entity established by this Law may exercise its functions in relation to -

(a) One participating jurisdiction; or

(b) 2 or more or all participating jurisdictions collectively.

(4) In this section, a reference to this Law as applied by an Act of a jurisdiction includes a reference to a law that substantially corresponds to this law enacted in a jurisdiction.”

[39] The CPSU said that consistent with the provisions of s.7 of the National Law, AHPRA has an office in every capital city in Australia and it engages employees as one entity. AHPRA has one ABN, one CEO and a head office in Melbourne.

[40] The CPSU submitted that TQ provided no evidence in support of its argument that the words “Crown” and “State” have the same meaning, and the CPSU said it does not accept the two terms have the same generic meaning.

[41] The CPSU in submissions identified a range of points on which it is unified and united with AHPRA concerning matters going to the ‘control test’ that establish AHPRA is not within the control of the State of Queensland or one of its Ministers. This primarily went to the nature and degree of control exercised by the ministerial council being quite limited, however even if it were sufficient to satisfy the ‘control test’ the next question is who exercises control over the Ministerial Council, and the CPSU submitted that cannot be the Queensland Minister given that Minister is only one member of a council of representatives from all jurisdictions.

CONCLUSION

[42] The TQ argument rests on the language found in section 23(3) of the National Law and the proposition that there is no need to have regard to the control test given the terms of s.23(3). The submissions of AHPRA and the CPSU set out above as to why that proposition is incorrect are compelling and I agree with them.

[43] I agree with the position as put for AHPRA that the change in language from s.18 in the Administrative Arrangements Act to the language in s.23 of the National Law was instructive of what the Queensland Government intended and that it did not intend for the words; “(3) The National Agency represents the State” to confer the status of Crown corporation on AHPRA. It would appear the words at s.23(3) more reflect, as Mr O’Grady put it, a ‘beast’ of the complicated nature of AHPRA.

[44] Having made the finding above and turning to the submissions concerning the ‘control test’ it is clear that AHPRA does not meet the test as set out in Grain Elevators and other authorities referred to. I do not intend to repeat much of what has already been summarised above except to say that the evidence that AHPRA is one national entity with limited Governmental oversight, and to the extent such oversight operates it does so through the Australian Health Workforce Ministerial Council where the Commonwealth and all States and Territories are represented, and oversight does not rest solely with the Queensland Executive Government or one its Ministers, then that is sufficient to settle the question.

[45] For these reasons TQ is not entitled to be a bargaining representative for employees of AHPRA on reliance of either rule 6(a) or (6)(b) and accordingly is not able to bring an application under s.229 of the FW Act on reliance of those rules and therefore this application is dismissed. So there is can be no confusion, an entitlement for TQ to be a bargaining representative on reliance of rule 6(c) was not pressed by TQ in this matter or considered in reaching this decision.

COMMISSIONER

Appearances:

Mr J Merrill of counsel appeared for Together Queensland,

Mr C O’Grady of counsel instructed by Clayton Utz appeared for The Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency

Ms C Hartigan of counsel instructed by Maurice Blackburn appeared for The Community and Public Sector Union

Hearing details:

2014

Brisbane

22 July

 1   Transcript dated 22 July 2014 PN 16 - 18

 2   Transcript dated 22 July 2014 PN 56 - 58

 3   [2013] FWC 3256

 4 [2009] QDC 282

 5 [1999] HCA 30

 6 [2002] FCAFC 302

 7   H.C of A 9 (No 4270)

 8   Transcript dated 22 July 2014 PN 139

Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer

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