IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M144 of 2006
B e t w e e n -
LEMALUOFUIFATU ALIPAPA TOFILAU
Appellant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M145 of 2006
B e t w e e n -
MATTHEW JOSEPH MARKS
Appellant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M146 of 2006
B e t w e e n -
SHANE JOHN HILL
Appellant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M147 of 2006
B e t w e e n -
MALCOLM JOSEPH THOMAS CLARKE
Appellant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
GLEESON CJ
GUMMOW J
KIRBY J
HAYNE J
CALLINAN J
HEYDON J
CRENNAN J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON TUESDAY, 27 FEBRUARY 2007, AT 10.19 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
__________________
MR O.P. HOLDENSON, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR L.C. CARTER, on behalf of the appellants Tofilau and Hill. (instructed by Victoria Legal Aid)
MR P.F. TEHAN, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR C.B. BOYCE, on behalf of the appellant Clarke. (instructed by Ronald V. Tait)
MR G.J. LYON, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR M.J. CROUCHER, on behalf of the appellant Marks. (instructed by Victoria Legal Aid)
MR P.A. COGHLAN, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends, MR J.D. McARDLE, QC and MS S.B. McNICOL, on behalf of each of the respondents. (instructed by Solicitor for Public Prosecutions)
GLEESON CJ: Yes, Mr Holdenson.
MR HOLDENSON: These four appeals are concerned with the admissibility of what the Crown contended in all four trials to be confessional statements which had been made by each of the four appellants to police officers who were pretending to be criminals. More particularly, these appeals are concerned with the question of whether or not the respective trial judges were correct to determine that the so-called confessional statements were proven by the Crown to be voluntary.
At common law a number of propositions can be said to be well settled and indeed not the subject of dispute in this Court by the respondent. I make reference just quickly to the first proposition which might be said to be well settled, namely that if the Crown fails to prove on the balance of probabilities that a confessional statement is voluntary, then it is simply inadmissible. Secondly, without reciting them, the two limbs of the voluntariness rule which we have set out in each and all of the outlines of submissions.
In accordance with that which was indicated by the Court consequent upon the grants of special leave, we have divided up today the oral argument. I will deal with the first limb of the voluntariness rule, Mr Tehan will deal with the second limb of the voluntariness rule…
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- Case
- [2007] HCATrans 81
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the trial judge erred in admitting evidence obtained by police using listening devices and other covert surveillance methods. Further, the Court had to consider whether the jury directions on the law of joint criminal enterprise, particularly concerning the scope of liability for murder in circumstances where the participants may have had different intentions, were adequate and correct. The appellants also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support their convictions for murder.
The Court analysed the admissibility of the surveillance evidence in light of the relevant legislation and common law principles governing the use of such evidence, particularly concerning issues of relevance and prejudice. Regarding the joint criminal enterprise, the High Court affirmed the principles established in *$R$ v $Lowery$* and *$R$ v $$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $
Background
Background to the litigation
These appeals before the High Court of Australia stem from the convictions of the appellants, Lemaluofuifatu Alipapa Tofilau, Matthew Joseph Marks, Shane John Hill, and Malcolm Joseph Thomas Clarke, who were found guilty of various criminal charges following trials in the Supreme Court of Victoria. The primary issue in these appeals is the admissibility of confessional statements made by the appellants to undercover police officers who posed as members of a criminal gang. Specifically, the appellants argue that the trial judges erred in determining that their confessional statements were voluntary. The appeals were heard together due to their commonality in the facts and legal issues involved. Each appellant's case involved undercover police operations where officers posed as gang members and used deception to elicit confessions. The appellants assert that the trial judges misapplied the common law principles governing the admissibility of confessions, particularly in relation to the concept of "voluntariness". The appellants' counsel argued that the deception employed by the police, including the inducement of false hopes and promises, rendered their confessions involuntary. In response, the respondent argued that the confessions were voluntary as the appellants had not been threatened or coerced in a manner that overbore their will. The High Court, in considering these appeals, focused on whether the trial judges correctly identified the persons in authority who made the inducements and whether the confessions were truly voluntary. The court also examined the implications of the undercover operations on the voluntariness of the confessions, particularly in light of the appellants' belief that the individuals who made the inducements could influence the police investigation. The appellants' counsel contended that the deception used by the police crossed a line into involuntariness, while the respondent maintained that the trial judges properly assessed the voluntariness of the confessions and found them to be voluntary. The court deliberated on the principles underlying the admissibility of confessions and whether the deception used in these cases should lead to the exclusion of the confessions on the grounds of involuntariness. The matter was adjourned to allow further consideration and written submissions on the issue of whether the confessions were voluntary and admissible, as well as on the late application to amend the grounds of appeal to include a challenge to the exercise of judicial discretion.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the covert police officers, despite posing as criminals, should be considered as "persons in authority" for the purposes of the common law rule on voluntariness of confessions.
2. Whether the confessions made by the appellants were influenced by deception and manipulation to such an extent that they were not made voluntarily.
3. Whether the voluntariness rule should be interpreted to include a broad and wide meaning that encompasses any pressure, hope of advantage, benefit, force, or coercion, including deception, trickery, or manipulation.
4. Whether the confessions should have been excluded based on the discretionary principle of fairness or public policy, even if they were found to be voluntary under the common law rule.
5. Whether the confessions should have been excluded on the basis that the police engaged in improper conduct that violated the appellants' right to silence.
6. How to reconcile the common law principles relating to voluntariness of confessions with the provisions of the Uniform Evidence Acts.
Held
1. Whether the covert police officers, despite posing as criminals, should be considered as "persons in authority" for the purposes of the common law rule on voluntariness of confessions.
The court held that the covert police officers should be considered as "persons in authority" because the appellants reasonably believed that they had the capacity to influence the course of the police investigations.
2. Whether the confessions made by the appellants were influenced by deception and manipulation to such an extent that they were not made voluntarily.
The court concluded that the confessions were not made voluntarily due to the manipulative deception and promises by the covert police officers.
3. Whether the voluntariness rule should be interpreted to include a broad and wide meaning that encompasses any pressure, hope of advantage, benefit, force, or coercion, including deception, trickery, or manipulation.
The court held that the voluntariness rule should be interpreted to encompass any pressure, hope of advantage, benefit, force, or coercion, including deception, trickery, or manipulation, when it leads to the overborne will of the confessionalist.
4. Whether the confessions should have been excluded based on the discretionary principle of fairness or public policy, even if they were found to be voluntary under the common law rule.
The court did not make a definitive conclusion on this issue, but it indicated that the matter of the discretionary principle of fairness or public policy would not be considered as it was not raised by the appellants.
5. Whether the confessions should have been excluded on the basis that the police engaged in improper conduct that violated the appellants' right to silence.
The court did not reach a conclusion on this issue, but it acknowledged that the appellants' right to silence could be relevant in the context of the discretionary principle of fairness or public policy.
6. How to reconcile the common law principles relating to voluntariness of confessions with the provisions of the Uniform Evidence Acts.
The court did not provide a clear answer to this issue, but it noted that the Uniform Evidence Acts have a different approach to the "person in authority" test and that the application of the common law principles might be limited in some circumstances.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The High Court in Tofilau, Marks, Hill and Clarke v The Queen considered several issues relating to the voluntariness of confessions made to undercover police officers posing as criminals. The central issue was whether the confessions were influenced by deception and manipulation to such an extent that they were not made voluntarily. The court examined the legal principles and authorities surrounding the common law rule on voluntariness, focusing on whether the covert police officers should be considered "persons in authority" for the purposes of the rule.
The appellants argued that the covert police officers, despite posing as criminals, should be considered "persons in authority" because the appellants reasonably believed that these officers could influence the police investigations into the crimes. The court discussed the traditional understanding of "persons in authority" and whether it should be limited to those who are cloaked with legitimate authority. The court referenced cases such as Hurst, Bosman, and Grandinetti to illustrate that the common law has not confined the inducement rule to lawful promises made by individuals in official positions. The court concluded that the covert police officers could be seen as persons in authority because the appellants reasonably believed they could influence the course of the investigation through corrupt police contacts.
The appellants also argued that the confessions were not made voluntarily due to the extensive deception and manipulation by the undercover officers. They contended that the voluntariness rule should be interpreted to include a broad and wide meaning that encompasses any pressure, hope of advantage, benefit, force, or coercion, including deception, trickery, or manipulation. The court acknowledged that the confessions were made under significant psychological pressure and that the appellants had no real choice but to confess. However, the court had to determine whether the level of pressure and manipulation was sufficient to overbear the will of the appellants, rendering the confessions involuntary.
The court further considered whether the confessions should have been excluded based on the discretionary principle of fairness or public policy, even if they were found to be voluntary under the common law rule. The appellants did not rely on this argument, focusing instead solely on the voluntariness issue. Nevertheless, the court noted that while the confessions might have been truthful, the manner in which they were obtained raised concerns about the propriety of the police conduct.
Another issue was whether the confessions should have been excluded on the basis that the police engaged in improper conduct that violated the appellants' right to silence. The court recognised that the police tactics involved significant deception and manipulation but concluded that the confessions were not excluded on the basis of improper conduct, as the focus was on the voluntariness of the confessions.
Finally, the court had to reconcile the common law principles relating to the voluntariness of confessions with the provisions of the Uniform Evidence Acts. The court observed that the Uniform Evidence Acts have modified the common law test, focusing on inducements made by individuals capable of influencing a decision rather than those in a position of legitimate authority. The court noted the difficulty in applying these provisions to specific cases but concluded that the trial judges had correctly applied the common law principles in finding that the confessions were voluntary.
In summary, the ratio decidendi of the decision is that while the undercover police officers' tactics involved significant deception and manipulation, the confessions were found to be voluntary under the common law rule. The court did not find it necessary to broaden the definition of "persons in authority" or to exclude the confessions based on discretionary principles or the improper conduct of the police. The court upheld the trial judges' findings that the confessions were voluntary and did not overbear the will of the appellants. The court also highlighted the importance of distinguishing between the common law rule on voluntariness and the discretionary principles that may apply in other contexts.