SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
S APCR 2016 0006
| OLIVER TODD (A PSEUDONYM)[1] | Applicant |
| v | |
| THE QUEEN | Respondent |
| UPPER MURRAY CENTRE AGAINST SEXUAL ASSAULT | Intervening |
[1]To ensure that there is no possibility of identification, this judgment has been anonymised by the adoption of a pseudonym in place of the name of the Applicant.
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| JUDGES: | WEINBERG, WHELAN and PRIEST JJA | |
| WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE | |
| DATE OF HEARING: | 3 March 2016 | |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 3 March 2016 | |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2016] VSCA 29 | 1ST Revision: 24 March 2016: Correction of para nos [39] ff |
| RULING APPEALED FROM: | DPP v [Todd] (Unreported, County Court of Victoria, Judge Sexton, 17 December 2015) | |
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CRIMINAL LAW — Interlocutory appeal — Pending trial for sexual offences — Judge’s refusal to grant leave to compel production of confidential communication pursuant to s 32C of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 — Judge’s refusal to certify under s 295(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 — No error in judge’s refusal to certify.
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| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Applicant | Mr S Gillespie-Jones and Ms E McKinnon | Dawes & Vary Riordan Pty Ltd |
| For the Crown | Dr N Rogers SC and Mr B Sonnet | Mr J Cain, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions |
| For the Intervenor | Mr O P Holdenson QC and Ms M C Fox | Health Legal Pty Ltd |
WEINBERG JA:
I invite Priest JA to deliver the first judgment.
PRIEST JA:
Introduction
In circumstances where a trial for sexual offences is pending in the County Court, the applicant sought leave under s 32C of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 (‘the Act’) to issue subpoenas directed to a number of organisations or individuals. Each application was refused, and the judge later refused to certify pursuant to s 295(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (‘the CPA’).
The applicant now seeks to challenge the judge’s refusal to certify, and seeks leave to appeal the ruling[2] so far as it applies to two organisations and one individual.
[2]The ruling constitutes an ‘interlocutory decision’ within the meaning of s 3 of the CPA.
In my opinion, any proposed application for leave to appeal is without substance. For the reasons that follow, it must be refused. That conclusion, of course, seals the fate of the application to review the judge’s refusal to certify.
Background
By way of background, an indictment has been filed in the County Court charging the applicant with rape[3] (two charges – charges 1 and 4), indecent assault[4] (two charges – charges 2 and 3) and possessing a drug of dependence[5] (one charge – charge 5).
[3]Crimes Act 1958, s 38(1).
[4]Crimes Act 1958, s 39(1).
[5]Drugs Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981, s 73.
The applicant, who at relevant times was aged 42 years, ran a photography business from his home part-time. ‘TA’, the complainant, was aged 18 years, and was interested in pursuing casual photographic modelling. Essentially, the prosecution case is that, on 26 December 2013, TA went…
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- AGLC
- Todd (a Pseudonym) v The Queen [2016] VSCA 29
- Case
- [2016] VSCA 29
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the judge erred in refusing to grant leave to appeal the refusal to compel production and whether the judge erred in refusing to certify the decision to refuse to compel production. The court examined the relevant statutory provisions and the criteria for granting leave to appeal and certification. The court also considered the nature of the communication and the interests of justice in compelling its production.
The court found no error in the judge's decision. The court held that the judge correctly exercised his discretion in refusing to grant leave to appeal the refusal to compel production. The court found that the communication was not relevant to the issues in the trial and that compelling its production would not assist in achieving a just outcome. The court also held that the judge correctly exercised his discretion in refusing to certify the decision to refuse to compel production. The court found that the decision did not involve a substantial question of law of general public importance and that the interests of justice did not require certification.
No orders were made as the appeal was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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