Tobin and Tobin as trustees for the Tobin Superannuation Fund v Gray

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Tobin & Tobin as trustees for the Tobin Superannuation Fund v Gray & Anor [2021] QSC 27

PARTIES:

GRAHAME MORRIS TOBIN AND JANICE MARY TOBIN AS TRUSTEES FOR THE TOBIN SUPERANNUATION FUND

(plaintiffs)

v
ANTHONY DAVID GRAY

(first defendant)

AND

PAULINE SHEILA JOHNS

(second defendant)

FILE NO/S:

BS 11643 of 2017

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application filed 9 November 2020

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

22 February 2021

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

12 November 2020

JUDGE:

Jackson J

ORDERS:

1.   The application is dismissed.

2.   The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the application.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY – DEFAULT JUDGMENT – SETTING ASIDE – GENERALLY – where the plaintiffs allege they came to know the second defendant as a solicitor on the Gold Coast – where the second defendant has never been a qualified solicitor but worked as an administrative staff member or practice manager employed by solicitors, including the first defendant – where the plaintiffs instructed the defendants to act in relation to 13 separate loans to be fully secured by first mortgage against real property – where the plaintiffs allege that either no first mortgage security was obtained or retained and the second defendant failed to inform them that it had not been obtained or retained – where the plaintiffs as applicants filed an originating application in the proceeding on 7 November 2017 – where the second defendant was personally served on 9 November 2017 with the originating application, inter alia - where judgment was obtained in default of appearance and defence on 24 January 2018 – where damages were assessed on 9 March 2018 - where the second defendant as applicant filed an application to set aside the default judgment on 9 November 2020 – where the second defendant was outside the jurisdiction prior to filing the application – whether the default judgment should be set aside

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 290

Cook v DA Manufacturing Co Pty Ltd & Anor [2004] QCA 52,  cited
Embrey v Smart [2014] QCA 75, cited
Rosing v Ben Shemesh [1960] VR 173, cited
Shigaeva v Schafer (1984) 5 NSWLR 502, cited
Xiao Hui Ying (aka Hui Ying Xiao) v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2012] VSCA 316, cited

COUNSEL:

N Shaw for the applicant/second defendant

L Bowden for the respondents/plaintiffs

SOLICITORS:

Tara Jain Solicitors for the applicant/second defendant

Provest Law for the respondents/plaintiffs

Jackson J:

  1. This is an application under r 290 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (“UCPR”) to set aside a judgment obtained in default of appearance and defence and after a hearing as to proof of the damages claimed.

    Chronology of the proceeding

  2. On 7 November 2017, the plaintiffs as applicants filed an originating application in the proceeding supported by two affidavits made by the female plaintiff in relation to the plaintiffs’ dealings with their former solicitor, the…

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Details
Case
[2021] QSC 27
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Tobin and Tobin as trustees for the Tobin Superannuation Fund v Gray concerns a dispute involving the plaintiffs, who are trustees of a superannuation fund, and the defendants, one of whom was alleged to have acted as a solicitor for the plaintiffs in relation to 13 separate loans. The plaintiffs sought to set aside a default judgment that had been obtained against the second defendant, who had never been a qualified solicitor but had worked in an administrative capacity for a law firm. The case was heard in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.

The central legal issue in this case was whether the default judgment should be set aside, particularly considering the second defendant's application filed almost three years after the judgment was entered. The court had to consider various factors, including the strength of the defendant's potential defence, the explanation for the defendant's failure to appear in court, and the delay in bringing the application to set aside the judgment. The plaintiffs, who are both elderly and in poor health, also presented a compelling case for the importance of maintaining the default judgment.

The court found that, while there are many factors that can inform the exercise of discretion to set aside a judgment, the weight given to each factor varies according to the circumstances of the case. In this instance, the court concluded that the second defendant had not demonstrated a sufficient basis for a prima facie ground of defence on the merits to warrant setting aside the judgment. The court also considered the significant prejudice that would be suffered by the plaintiffs if the judgment were set aside after such a long period of time. The application to set aside the default judgment was dismissed, and the second defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiffs' costs of the application.

In summary, the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissed the application to set aside the default judgment and ordered the second defendant to pay the plaintiffs' costs of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

Tobin and Tobin, as trustees for the Tobin Superannuation Fund, filed a lawsuit against Gray, alleging that Gray, who had represented himself as a solicitor on the Gold Coast, failed to properly secure 13 loans with first mortgages on real property as instructed. The plaintiffs further alleged that Gray had never been a qualified solicitor but worked as an administrative staff member or practice manager for other solicitors, including the first defendant. The plaintiffs filed an originating application in the court on 7 November 2017, and Gray was served with this application on 9 November 2017. The plaintiffs sought damages and obtained a default judgment against Gray on 24 January 2018 due to Gray's failure to appear and defend himself. Damages were assessed on 9 March 2018. Subsequently, Gray filed an application to set aside the default judgment on 9 November 2020, claiming he was outside the jurisdiction when served with the originating application.

The matter began when the plaintiffs, Tobin and Tobin as trustees for the Tobin Superannuation Fund, filed an originating application against Gray on 7 November 2017. Gray was served with this application on 9 November 2017. As Gray failed to appear or defend himself, judgment was entered by default on 24 January 2018. Damages were assessed on 9 March 2018. On 9 November 2020, Gray, as the applicant, filed an application to set aside the default judgment. This application is the subject of the current proceedings.

Decision

Reasons for decision

As well, the plaintiffs are aged and suffer ill health. They are both over 80 years of age. The female plaintiff had heart surgery in 2014 and emergency heart treatment in August 2020. The male plaintiff has a long history of heart issues and was diagnosed with bowel cancer in February 2015. On 17 March 2016, two hernias were surgically repaired. In March 2018, he was diagnosed with cancer on the ball of his left eye.Conclusion Many factors can inform the exercise of the unfettered discretion to set aside a regularly obtained judgment under r 290 of the UCPR. Although the relevant factors considered above may all arise in most cases, the weight to be given to them in an individual case will vary according to the circumstances. For example, a relatively weak defence may sustain an order to set aside a judgment where there is a relatively good explanation for why the party failed to appear when the case was heard and where there is no undue delay by the party bringing the application to set aside the judgment. But more may be required when the explanation for the failure to appear is inadequate and the delay in bringing the application is inordinate. That is the situation in this case. Taking all the relevant considerations into account, in my view, in the present case the second defendant has not shown a sufficient basis for a prima facie ground of defence on the merits to warrant an order that the judgment be set aside, particularly having regard to the relative prejudice that will be suffered by the plaintiffs if the judgment is set aside after such a long period of time. For those reasons, the application must be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court considered the exercise of the discretion to set aside a regularly obtained judgment under r 290 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (UCPR). It noted that various factors could inform this discretion, including the strength of the defence, the explanation for the failure to appear, and the delay in bringing the application. The court weighed these factors in the context of the case, particularly focusing on the significant delay in bringing the application and the relative prejudice that would be suffered by the plaintiffs if the judgment were set aside after such a long period of time. The court found that Gray had not shown a sufficient basis for a prima facie ground of defence on the merits to justify setting aside the judgment. The court also considered the age and ill health of the plaintiffs, which further supported the decision not to set aside the judgment. The binding legal principle established by this decision is that significant delay and relative prejudice to the plaintiffs are critical factors in determining whether to exercise the discretion to set aside a judgment under r 290 of the UCPR. The court did not depart from prior authority but reinforced the importance of these factors in similar future cases.