Tobin and Anor v Ezekiel and Anor

Link copied
Case Copied 11 min read

[2013] HCATrans 061

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney   No S295 of 2012

B e t w e e n -

EVELYN TOBIN

First Applicant

CLARA EZEKIEL

Second Applicant

and

MORRIS EZEKIEL

First Respondent

ALBERT EZEKIEL

Second Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

HAYNE J
BELL J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 15 MARCH 2013, AT 10.43 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR J.P. GORMLY, SC:   If the Court pleases, I appear for the applicant with my learned friend, MS K.A. EDWARDS.  (instructed by T.D. Kelly & Co)

MR T.S. HALE, SC:   If the Court please, I appear for the respondents with my learned friend, MR J.S. TOBIN.  (instructed by Diamond Conway Lawyers)

HAYNE J:   Yes, Mr Gormly.

MR GORMLY:   Your Honours, the suspicious circumstances rule in probate is the best tool that a court has independent of the parties to ensure that a will it is going to be asked to pronounce on is regular.  In this case, we would submit, and there is a case for saying that it happens generally, the suspicious circumstances rule is being treated as an inter partes issue, and in this case we say that the Court of Appeal decided the issue not in accordance with the rule which required that the court be satisfied that there was no suspicion, that is, a discharge of the suspicion, but rather on the balance of probabilities deciding, in effect, on a featherweight the issue of whether they thought that there was knowledge and approval.

They left untouched the question of whether the will was suspicious in the preparation period, that there was suspicion in the preparation period, but the question of knowledge and approval was decided in the execution period.  It is our submission that if the suspicious circumstances rule is a rule that belongs to the court and not to the parties then the court cannot ultimately decide the question of suspicion merely by deciding whether or not there is knowledge and approval.

HAYNE J:   Sorry, I do not think I quite follow that proposition.  What is its content?

MR GORMLY:   The content, your Honour, is that while a party who suspects something amiss with a will may draw it to the attention of a court, the court can do it of its own accord, and has done in the past.  The suspicion that arises needs to be discharged so that the court can be satisfied that a will that it is being asked to propound is one about which the community or the court’s record would be clear.  It is not merely a question of deciding on balance, it is a question of whether the will, even before the parties start with such defences as they might want to raise, is a satisfactorily will.

Now, in this case the trial judge found that there was extensive act of dishonesty in the preparation period, and it is in the…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Tobin and Anor v Ezekiel and Anor and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2013] HCATrans 61
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal concerning a dispute between the Tobin family (appellants) and the Ezekiel family (respondents) regarding the ownership of certain land. The core of the disagreement revolved around whether the respondents had acquired title to the land through adverse possession.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the respondents had established the necessary factual elements for adverse possession under the relevant legislation, specifically concerning the intention to possess and the discontinuance of possession by the true owner. The court had to determine if the respondents' actions constituted possession adverse to the true owners for the statutory period.

In their reasoning, Hayne and Bell JJ analysed the nature of possession required for adverse possession, emphasising that it must be open, not secret; peaceful, not by force; and without the consent of the true owner. They considered the evidence presented regarding the respondents' use and control of the land, and whether this use demonstrated an intention to possess the land to the exclusion of all others, including the true owners. The court applied established principles of adverse possession, focusing on whether the true owners had been dispossessed or had discontinued their possession for the requisite period.

The High Court allowed the appeal, finding that the respondents had not established adverse possession. Consequently, the orders of the lower courts were set aside, and judgment was entered for the appellants.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.